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Para Juan Fernando –  
 
‘He got up outta there, ran for hundreds of miles 
He made it to the ocean, had a smoke in a tree 
The wind rose up, set him down on his knee 
 
A wave came crashing like a fist to the jaw 
Delivered him wings, "Hey, look at me now" 




High.. wide,  
he’s flying’ 
 
Mike McCready and Eddie Vedder 
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Abstract 
There is more to democratic transitions than elections and markets. This thesis is a comparative 
study between the internationalisation processes in Spain and Mexico and the interaction 
between these and the respective transitions to democracy in both countries. 
 
The stark contrast between the institutional, political and sociocultural provisions in NAFTA 
and the EU – as well as the distinctly different considerations that shaped the strategies of 
international actors towards Spain and Mexico during their transitions to democracy – interacted 
in very distinctive ways with the processes of democratisation of Mexico and Spain 
respectively. Whilst an implicit democratic conditionality for membership into the European 
Community proved an incentive to Spain to democratise, NAFTA’s lack of any political 
conditions proved an incentive for the Mexican regime to hold back on democracy. What is 
more, the social, economic and political consequences of internationalising through EEC 
membership had a positive democratic effect in Spain. The lack of any such provision in 
NAFTA represented a missed opportunity to support Mexico’s democratic consolidation. 
 
By using the examples of the EU (or EEC) and NAFTA, and the particular case studies of Spain 
and Mexico, I will contribute towards the field of democratisation theory by putting forward the 
idea that the way in which a country in transition to democracy internationalises can be an 
important factor in the success with which a country achieves the consolidation of democracy. 
 
 




The theoretical, practical and even ethical analysis of democracy and democratisation has 
arguably been one of the most researched topics in comparative politics in the last 70 years, and 
almost certainly in the last quarter-century (Boix and Stokes, 2007: 9). With the end of World 
War II democracy went from being one of many forms of political organisation to being widely 
recognised as the preferred form of government for liberal-capitalist industrialised societies. 
Immediately after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the subsequent democratisation of 
Central Europe, which was meant to signal, as famously hailed by Francis Fukuyama (1992), 
the end of the historical development of political systems, it seemed as if democracy was on 
track to becoming the only form of political organisation. The rapid increase in the number of 
countries that began a progression towards democracy since 1989 (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 
176), which gave an unprecedented impetus to the ‘third wave of democratisation’ seemed to 
confirm the notion that the democratisation of the globe was only a matter of time. Regardless 
of how controversial this assumptions may now seem, the fact is that a succession of events 
around the globe between the mid 1970s and the late 1990s spurred an even greater interest in 
democratisation as an academic field. Important studies on democratisation, both theoretical and 
empirical, (Almond and Verba, 1963 and 1980; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995; Huntington, 
1991; Inglehart, 1997 and 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Linz and Stepan, 1978, 1996; 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986a, 1986b and 1986c) added to the already well-
established literature on the theory and practice of democracy and political systems (Dahl, 1971; 
Lipset, 1960 [1981]; Sartori, 1973; Schumpeter, 1942 [2011]). 
 
However, despite the vast academic literature on the subject, we are not yet able to fully 
understand – let alone predict – how, why or when democracy will prevail; in fact, political 
science is far from even finding a consensus on what democracy is and what it is not. Even as 
theories of democracy become increasingly complex and the methodology increasingly 
accurate, the academic community is still far from reaching a consensus on any of the causes of 
democracy (Geddes, 2007: 317-319). The third wave of democratisation has only accentuated 
the difficulties political scientists face when explaining, predicting and defining democracy. 
Hence, democratisation studies remain at the fore of comparative politics. Recent events in the 
Arab world, the real threat of democratic regressions in Latin America and Africa, the sudden 
calls for ‘Real Democracy’1 in some quarters of developed societies, the increasingly salient 
role international organisations have in the democratic politics of sovereign states, as well as 
questions over the possible emergence of a new non-democratic hegemon in the world stage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Occupy movement in the United States and Europe, and the 15-M movement in Spain are two good 
examples of such developments.  
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(i.e. China) and its prospects for democratisation, are all issues that remind us of the continuous 
relevance of democracy and democratisation studies. 
 
As the study of democratisation enjoys some sort of a revival, this thesis embarks on a 
comparative analysis of two important cases of the ‘third wave’: Spain and Mexico. Although 
they are both important in their own right – Spain was one of the first democracies to be 
‘consolidated’2 in this third wave and it is also considered by some as a catalyst for the 
democratic trend in Latin America, which, not at all unrelated, culminates with the transition to 
democracy in Mexico – I find the similarities in the circumstances surrounding their transitions 
as striking as their respective outcomes. Although I will be elucidating further on my reasons 
for comparing these two cases later on, I should accentuate at this point that more than a 
comparison between two cases of transition to democracy, this is a comparison of two projects 
of redefinition of a political system. These redefinitions are nowhere more evident than in the 
respective projects of internationalisation Spain and Mexico embarked on; and it is with the 
particularities of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in mind that I find the comparison between these two cases not only worthy of 
making for its strictly academic value but also for its potential to shed a light on the role 
internationalisation projects can play in transitions to democracy elsewhere. This research does 
not pretend to be an exhaustive comparison between every aspect of what are two very complex 
processes of democratisation – there is simply not enough time to do so – nor will I claim to 
develop new theories in the field of democratisation based on these two cases. I do intend, 
however, to develop a detailed comparison of the relationship between very unique cases of 
internationalisation and some very specific changes in the political, social, institutional and 
economic structures of both countries, which, as I will evidence, had an influence on the 
respective processes of democratisation. In so doing, I will develop a hypothesis about the 
interactions between internationalisation and democratisation that can hopefully help explain 
other cases. As said before, I am aware that a new theory of democratisation cannot be 
developed from the analysis of two case studies, but I do not see a reason why two specific 
cases cannot be used to develop a hypothesis on the workings of a very specific particular 
correlation. The goal of this thesis is not to explain every detail of democratisation or develop a 
new theory of democratisation. My goal is far more realistic; to explain how the transitions to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is worth mentioning here that, as will be discussed in further detail in this thesis, there is a growing 
concerns regarding the use of a dichotomy between transition and consolidation due to the emergence of 
new regimes – particularly in Latin America and Asia – that, despite having begun a process of 
democratisation, seem to be stuck somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism. This new 
development has transformed the notion that transitions to democracy are processes that either end on 
consolidation or authoritarian regression; the concept of ‘consolidated’ transition no longer does, in my 
opinion, represent the reality of democratisation processes (Bejarano, 2011:6). I will, nevertheless, use the 
adjective ‘consolidated’ throughout this thesis in an attempt to simply portray to the reader that the 
Spanish transitions has been, in most accounts, far more successful than the Mexican transition. 
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democracy in Spain and Mexico were, to an extent, shaped by their respective 
internationalisation projects.  
 
This thesis is mainly divided in two parts. In the first part I will address issues that are related to 
the theory of democracy and the different approaches to democratisation; as such, I will analyse 
and criticise the current literature on democratic studies and the methodology of comparative 
politics. As it is my aim to contribute towards the field of democratisation studies, I feel it is 
only appropriate for me to identify and discuss the main models offered in contemporary 
political science in order to place my research in this academic spectrum. The second part of the 
thesis will deal with the case studies. In an attempt to familiarise the reader with the two cases, I 
will briefly examine the key differences and similarities between the two projects of 
internationalisation, and then I will analyse how the particularities of NAFTA and the European 
Economic Community (EEC)/EU, help us understand the changes, or in some case lack of 
change, in some specific areas of the political systems of Spain and Mexico. 
 




We have all had hundreds of goals, ideas and plans. Yet not all of them come to fruition. My 
original plan (age 11) to score the winning goal of the Champions League final playing for The 
Arsenal was, unfortunately, frustrated by my complete lack of anything resembling a footballing 
talent. My backup plan (age 13) of becoming an international rock superstar was similarly 
frustrated by my distinct inability to keep a tune. Yet, had I had the same help and support when 
pursuing those ‘goals’ as I have had during my PhD studies, there is no doubt I would have 
been considerably closer to becoming a rock and roll superstar or an Arsenal legend.  
 
First of all, I have to thank my supervisory team for their incredible support. My main 
supervisor Nagore Calvo not only patiently guided me through this process, but also was very 
supportive at a personal level. Nagore always made me feel comfortable with my research and 
in my own ability, which made this process incredibly enjoyable and rewarding. What is more, 
Nagore’s guidance was not only fundamental when developing the analysis of the case studies, 
but her expertise in other areas of political science helped me broaden my research. I always felt 
this was a real team effort and for that I am extremely grateful. As my secondary supervisor, 
Adrian Pearce was also incredibly generous with his time, his support and his very timely 
corrections; I am particularly grateful for his help correcting many of my very own 
‘Hispanisms’. He also deserves special credit for his help with the historical component of this 
thesis and overall, had it not been for him, this thesis would have lacked much focus, depth and 
breadth. Both Nagore and Adrian did a lot more than merely providing academic guidance and 
advice. Their help in my (more or less constant) efforts to secure funding, participate in research 
activities, publish my findings and early professional development was of paramount 
importance. Probably just as important, however, was their support at a personal level; 
particularly when difficult personal circumstances threatened the progression of my work. I 
cannot thank them enough for their support.  
 
At institutional level I have to thank everyone at the Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American 
Studies Department, as well as the School of Art’s and Humanities. The multidisciplinary 
nature of the SPLAS Department was what initially attracted me to King’s College London and, 
I must admit, the experience of completing a PhD in Social Sciences in what is mainly a 
Humanities Department, although not without its challenges, has been exceptionally rewarding. 
The whole Department thrives in multidisciplinary and I feel grateful to the whole Department, 
and to Catherine Boyle in particular, for giving me the opportunity and support to fully take part 
in this amalgam of disciplines, research projects and interests. What is more, the School of Arts 
and Humanities provided me with a number of generous grants to complete fieldwork and 
participate in international conferences. In the same vein, I would also like to thank Santander 
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Bank for its generous financial support to take part in the International Political Science 
Association Summer School at the University of Sao Paolo, as well as to the Society of Latin 
American Studies for their funding of two research trips. I am particularly grateful to Carmen 
Aristegui, Luis de la Calle Pardo and Ambassador Eduardo Medina-Mora for taking the time to 
discuss my research, and for giving their invaluable insight and advice. I am also grateful to 
Ramon Pacheco Pardo for giving me my first opportunity to teach at the Department and for all 
his support in my professional development. I also have to thank Scott James for his continuing 
support in this regard; he has given me a number of opportunities to engage in a broad array of 
activities at the Department of Political Economy and for this I am extremely grateful. Finally, I 
would like to thank the research staff at the Centre for the Advanced Studies in the Social 
Sciences at the Fundación Juan March for their support whilst conducting fieldwork in Spain, as 
well as to everyone at the Department of International Relations (and in particular to Antonio 
López Mijares) for their support and their generous help during my research stay at ITESO 
University in Mexico. 
 
At a personal level I have to thank my wonderful fiancé (hopefully wife by the time this goes to 
print) Rachel Thomas for all her incredible support. As my partner, Rachel was probably the 
one person that suffered the most but enjoyed the least during this process. While I experienced 
the highs and lows in equal measure, Rachel, I am sorry to say, probably experienced more of 
the lows than the highs. However, although writing a PhD is undoubtedly a very personal 
process in which the failures can only be, at the end of the day, attributed to the author, I must 
admit that whatever success I may achieve can be attributed primarily to Rachel; she has been 
my greatest supporter in this project from the very beginning. I am also very grateful to 
Rachel’s family, particularly her parents Sir Eric and Lady Thomas, for accepting me as a 
member of their family and, just as importantly, for every once in a while taking us out for 
dinner to places most PhD student would never be able to afford (i.e. one with table service)!  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family. To my friends in Madrid Carlos 
Pitillas and Erick Palomares, ¡Muchas Gracias! Thank you for lending me your sofas and spare 
rooms during my many research trips to Madrid; and thank you, above all, for your willingness 
to show me that there is more to life (at least in Madrid) than work on a PhD. I also have to 
thank my many friends in London, Mexico and elsewhere for never asking how the PhD was 
going! More often than not I would have taken a solid couple of hours answering the question, 
after which I probably would not have felt any better and you probably would not have been 
any wiser. But you were always there to cheer me up, support me when I needed support and 
take me out for a beer when I needed a beer… there is nothing else one could ask from a friend.  
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There is nothing I can say here that could even come close to portraying how lucky I feel to 
have a family that has always supported me. Although it was sometimes hard to explain to them 
why a thirty year old had to spend most of his time in a library, they remained supportive 
nonetheless. My siblings René and Amine have both showed me by example how success has 
different faces; but that, in any case, it takes effort, commitment and bravery to achieve it. My 
parents have both been an inspiration at a personal and professional level, and, besides the 
obvious, I could not have achieved anything without them. Thank you for always believing in 
me. 
 
Despite the many people that have made this possible, this PhD is dedicated, however, to two 
people. First of all, I dedicate this thesis to my father. He has been my supporter, benefactor and 
motivator for most of my life. Secondly, this thesis is dedicated to my father’s brother. In 
academia we aspire to shape the world by developing ideas that can, hopefully, make it a better 
place. There are those, however, that are willing to pay the ultimate price in an attempt to make 
the world – and in particular my country – a fairer, safer and more just place. Juan Fernando 
Calderón de la Barca was one of these brave few; he was also my uncle, my friend and my 
family. Above all, however, the example he set in his short life will always be my greatest 
motivation.  
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CHAPTER I. Introduction: Methodology and the Case Studies 
 
Prior to dealing with the particular issues that concern this research project, I believe it is 
necessary to present a fairly detailed structural overview of the thesis. Since this is a 
comparative study that aims at formulating working hypotheses, as well as analysing the already 
very complex processes of internationalisation and democratisation, the structure of the project 
is of paramount importance. Hence, I will use this introductory chapter to describe the main 
elements of the research and present the overall structure of this thesis. As I agree with the view 
that ‘for the scientific study of politics to progress then research needs to be related to theory’ 
(Peters, 2008: 45), I will attempt to offer a clear explanation of the relationship between the 
theory and reality of my case studies throughout the whole thesis; but it is in this opening 
chapter that the reader will get a detailed account of how this will be done. 
 
In this first chapter I will address some of the essential issues that, I believe, every comparative 
study should cover in its earlier stages. In the very first instance I will develop a theoretical 
framework on comparative politics that will, hopefully, explain why this study is, above all, 
worthy of being made; I will then present some arguments to back my selection of case studies 
as well as ‘introducing’ both cases to the reader; I will present my main hypothesis; I will 
discuss the scope of my research; and finally I will offer a general description of the chapters of 
the thesis. 
 
1.1 On the methodology 
Before embarking on the specific questions my thesis will be tackling, I think it is important to 
answer two apparently straightforward questions: why compare? And, for that matter, why 
compare ‘only’ two cases?  
 
1.1.1 Why compare? And Why ‘only’ two cases? 
The role of comparison in political science is closely linked with the idea of inference in social 
science. As one of the major social sciences, political science faces the same main 
methodological limitation as economics or sociology, i.e. the impossibility of recreating social 
phenomena in a controlled environment. Therefore the role of inference is vital if political 
science is to be considered, indeed, a science. It has been pointed out that the essential objective 
of the study of politics has to be ‘the creation of knowledge, defined as inferences or 
generalisations about politics drawn from evidence’ (Almond, 1996: 52); in political science, 
the only evidence we have are the observable events that have already taken place. Obviously, 
in an ideal world the experimental method would be used when trying to develop any sort of 
scientific explanations, however, there are many obvious practical and even ethical impediments 
that make the use of the experimental method in political science uncommon (Lijphart, 1971: 
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683-684). The only way then that we can advance inferences and generalisations from observed 
events without being able to replicate them is by comparing political systems – be it different 
countries at a particular time, different countries at different times or a particular country at 
different times – in order to advance hypotheses on specific outcomes. In this sense, 
comparative politics becomes the only way for political science to develop theories that come 
close to explaining political phenomena. Unlike political philosophy, for instance, comparative 
politics has to embark on the task of separating between the ideals and the realities. In simpler 
words, comparison is ‘a basic methodological concept, not merely a convenient term vaguely 
symbolizing the focus of one’s research interests’ (Kalleberg, 1966; 72); obviously then, in 
political science, a study is comparative not because of its area of interest (i.e. different political 
systems) but because of the methodology that is used to develop hypotheses. 
 
In the particular case of democratisation studies, the comparative method is the only realistic 
way in which political scientists can establish, if not causal relationships, at least some basic 
dynamics that are at the core of democratic developments. However, we must be aware that the 
comparative method is not the only method of comparative politics but only one of the methods 
in political science – the others being the statistical, experimental and the single case study 
method (Lijphart, 1971: 682); but although the statistical method has been widely used in 
comparative politics in the last 40 years, the comparative method is still what distinguishes 
comparative politics from other areas of political science.  
 
If comparison is the main methodological tool of comparative politics, then why not compare as 
many political systems as possible to explain democratisation? One could certainly make the 
argument that the theory has to follow the history; ‘theories ought to be inferred from facts and 
not the other way around’ (Fukuyama, 2011: 24). At the same time, although ‘the comparative 
method is not the equivalent of the experimental method but only a very imperfect substitute’ 
(Lijphart, 1971: 685), it is nonetheless clear that the statistical method is better suited for the 
analysis of correlations as it allows for the control of specific variables. If the key 
distinguishable element of comparative politics vis a vis other disciplines in political science is 
its ability to control, then ‘its generalisations have to be checked against “all cases”’ (Sartori, 
1970: 1035). However, it is clear to me that democratisation theory finds itself at a theoretical 
and methodological crossroad. The appearance of comprehensive survey studies in a large 
number of countries transformed the way comparative politics and democratisation theories 
were being generated and tested1. Since technological advances in communication facilitated 
the collecting, accessing and analysing of increasingly large data sets, large-n studies have come 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Probably the best-known examples of these types of large-n studies are the works by Arend Lijphart on 
democratic institutions (1984 and 1999), and Ronald Inglehart’s work (1988, 1990 and 1997) on value 
changes and modernisation.  
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to dominate comparative research. Nonetheless, despite the clear benefits of having multiple 
resources available to carry out large-n cross-national studies, we are probably not any closer 
today than we were twenty years ago of predicting democracy with certainty (Geddes, 2007: 
318-319). Undoubtedly, the theories explaining democratisation have become increasingly 
complex as larger datasets from a larger number of countries have allowed political scientists to 
test, to almost absolute certainty, many of the hypotheses presented in the post-war era. This 
availability of resources, however, has led to a decline in hypothesis generating through case or 
small-n studies – in the same way for example that Almond and Verba (1963 [1989]) developed 
their ground breaking hypothesis of democratisation almost half a century ago – in favour of 
hypothesis testing. One could be forgiven for agreeing with the notion that in contemporary 
comparative politics ‘the conjectural element of social science is usually dismissed as a matter 
of guesswork, inspiration or luck – a leap of faith, and hence a poor subject for methodological 
reflection’; but, as John Gerring points out (2007: 98), ‘there are two moments of empirical 
research, a light bulb moment and sceptical moment’. Without getting carried away, and 
understanding the obvious limitations of a comparison between two cases, this thesis will 
attempt to be more of a ‘light bulb moment’ rather than a ‘sceptical moment’.  
 
It was Seymour Martin Lipset who, in an attempt to criticise the state of affairs of comparative 
politics more than 50 years ago, first warned about the perils of focusing exclusively on 
discrediting theories (1959: 70). He explained how the existence of some deviant cases in 
democratisation theory is not enough to discredit a whole hypothesis; hence the exercise of 
putting together high quality research with the sole objective of discrediting a rival hypothesis 
can be rendered as rather pointless. He claimed that just as ‘the existence of some wealthy 
socialists or poor conservatives’ does not demonstrate (or, at least, did not in 1959) that 
economic factors play no part in determining political preference, the existence of some deviant 
cases in democratisation theory should not be used as irrefutable evidence that a given 
hypothesis is false (ibid). On the other hand, one has to admit that democracy is probably the 
most intricate way of organising what is already a very complex invention, i.e. the modern state; 
as such, disregarding deviant cases as mere ‘exceptions to the rule’2 in an attempt to confirm 
one’s hypothesis can be counterproductive. The principles of multicausality and endogeneity 
provide political scientists with the methodological tools to avoid the conundrum between 
compulsive rejection of hypothesis and continuous disregard of deviant cases as mere flukes.  
 
In this sense, if we had to draw a single lesson from the last decades of increasingly large and 
complex cross-national studies, it would have to be that context matters. Regardless of how far 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) for example, explain the lack of democratic institutions in some oil-rich 
countries in the Middle East by separating between different kinds of socioeconomic development; they 
also explain the lack of secular values in the United States – a supposedly necessary variable for 
democratic mass values – as a mere historical irregularity. 
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the methodology of comparative politics – or indeed political science in general – advances we 
should not realistically expect to generate and prove hypotheses of causality in a single sweep. 
Perhaps a theory cannot be developed from a single case study but a working hypothesis can 
emerge from comparing a small number of cases3. The inclination towards large-n studies is not 
necessarily related to specific methodological advantages, as much as it is to certain 
technological advances in methodology (e.g. gathering, accessing and analysing data) and to 
changes in the discipline of comparative politics as such. Since the transformation in the 
political landscape following the Second World War, the object of study of political science as a 
whole has become broader. This is down not only to the fact that the world became increasingly 
politicised – i.e. the realm of what is political grew together with the expansion of the welfare 
state – but it is also related to the continuous increase in the number of units of analysis in the 
discipline (Sartori, 1970: 1034). The expansion of the object of study meant political science 
became increasingly prominent, whilst the increase in the number of units of analysis (states) 
provided a wider array of cases to be compared. If you couple this general development in 
political science with the facilities offered by new technologies, it is not hard to understand why 
a clear predilection for causality and large-n studies was developed. All of a sudden, political 
scientists in the field of comparative politics had the resources to draw standards of methods 
and theory from the physical, ‘paradigmatic’ sciences (ibid: 1033). The possibility to develop 
‘generalisations and laws of the “if… then” type’ (ibid: 1035) took over the realm of 
comparative politics. In this brave new world of “if… then” theories, large-n studies have 
almost become the norm; ‘the more case studies one has, the less intensely each one is studied 
and the more confident one is in the representativeness (of some broader population), the more 
likely one is to describe them as a sample rather than a series of case studies’ (Gerring, 2007: 
96). In this general trend in comparative politics towards causality, the term ‘sample’ is always 
more appealing that the term ‘case study’.  
 
Despite its many benefits, large-n studies are still not a perfect substitute for the experimental 
method. Admittedly, the ability to control variables (although this term is used rather lightly in 
some cases) and to establish some levels of causality does give large-n studies the edge when 
theorising generalisations. It is also true that – no matter how rigorous the methodology of a 
focused comparison (i.e. two or three case studies) is – the problem of ‘too many variables and 
too few countries cannot be sidestepped’ (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 92). In fact, ‘if at all 
possible one should generally use the statistical (or perhaps even the experimental) method 
instead of the weaker comparative method’ (Lijphart, 1971: 685). However, the fact that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although not very common in contemporary comparative politics, single case study analyses are not 
unheard of. Robert Putnam (1993), for instance, convincingly presented his theory of a causal link 
between social capital and democracy by analysing only the case of modern Italy. His is a comparative 
study because it takes Northern and Southern Italy as different units of study, but that still leaves us with 
a comparative study in democratisation theory with ‘only’ two case studies. 
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‘value of a focused comparison lies in the journey rather than the destination’ (Hague and 
Harrop, 2007: 92) should not put the researcher off from embarking on what can be ‘one of the 
more theory-driven forms of comparative analysis’ (Peters, 1998: 62). The benefit of statistical 
work is that, as a wider sample is analysed, there can be a higher level of certainty on specific 
correlations. Therefore, if we want to determine specific causal agents of democracy, a 
statistical approach that looks at the correlation between x and y in a vast number of countries 
would be ideal. Thus such approach has been very popular in the study of democratisation and 
democracies in general since the behavioural revolution of the 1950s  (Almond and Verba, 
1963; Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1988 and 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Lijphart, 1999; 
Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Similarly to what happened after the Second 
World War with comparative politics in general, the development of new technologies and the 
advent of statistical analysis, coupled with the dramatic increase in the number of democratic 
systems, has lead to an increase in the prominence of democratisation studies and a switch to 
statistical methodology within the field. However, in strictly methodological terms, the 
‘comparative method resembles the statistical method in all respects but one. The crucial 
difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit systematic controls by 
means of partial correlations’ (Lijphart, 1971: 684). Hence, although the comparative method – 
understood by Lijphart as basically small-n comparisons – is clearly less apt than the statistical 
method – understood as large-n studies – at establishing causal correlations, small-n studies 
should not be overlooked. There are times, for example, when the limited availability of cases 
makes the use of large-n studies redundant. What would have been the point, for instance, of 
applying the statistical method to analyse the emergence of the first democracies during the 
earlier stages of industrialisation? Surely a less intense statistical analysis of the few 
democracies that existed in 1850 would be far less enlightening than an intensive analysis of the 
few cases available.  
 
My proposed research is an ideal example of when a focused (or small-n) comparison is better 
suited than a large-n study. Since there are only a very few examples of institutionalised 
internationalisation processes, and even fewer that have coincided with the development of 
democratic institutions at domestic level, we have a rather limited pool of case studies. If on top 
of this we consider that there have arguably only been two attempts of regional integration 
between highly developed, consolidated democracies with less developed, democratising 
countries – the European and North American regionalisation projects – our options become 
even more limited. Then, if we are to develop the idea that specific projects of 
internationalisation matter in the process of democratisation, and in particular when these work 
as an incentive for democratisation, we should compare the two cases of regional integration 
that attempted integration of consolidated democracies with democratising countries. Despite an 
apparent downturn in regional integration, we could argue that as internationalisation processes 
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become more complex and institutionalised, for instance, they offer opportunities to be analysed 
empirically as mechanisms of causality; thus political theory could avoid becoming a repetitive 
exercise of hypothesis rejecting and fall into the trap Lipset warned us of over 50 years ago. 
 
As said before, small-n studies have some clear advantages but also some obvious limitations. It 
is clear that more correlations between variables can be better observed from using large-n 
statistical studies, albeit it remains contested how effective these types of studies can be in 
establishing both causality and the mechanisms of causality – i.e. not only that x causes y but 
how it is that x causes y. In a mechanism or process-based approach to democratisation, 
‘democratisation is not a product but a special condition of public politics’ (Tilly, 2001: 33). In 
other words, democracy is not the result of linear causal flows but is rather the result of a 
specific correlation between citizens (subjects) and governments. As such, this correlation can 
be changed by a number of factors and processes, which constitute specific mechanisms that 
alter the way citizens and governments relate to each other. A change that leads towards a 
protected consultation of the citizens (subjects) is what is understood as democratisation (ibid: 
31-32). Furthermore, these changes can be caused by a number of exogenous processes that 
include relational (e.g. brokerage), environmental (e.g. resource depletion or, in the case of this 
thesis, changes in the access to international resources and opportunities) and cognitive (actor 
choices) mechanisms/processes (ibid: 25-34). Mechanism-based explanations of 
democratisation are therefore shy from being analyses of case-specific macro-social political 
transformations (following the ‘classical tradition’ of Barrington Moore (1966 [1993]) or Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967)), but are certainly far more wide-ranging than agency or modernisation 
based theories of democratisation. As such, at least a basic account of how some of the most 
common factors that can influence democratisation (institutional development, power 
distribution, interaction between main social groups, etc.) should be analysed. Since this is a 
thesis focused on casual mechanisms rather than causal correlations (or inferences) or 
propensities, a small-n research design makes even more sense. 
 
This is not to say, of course, that large-n statistical comparisons are less suitable than small-n 
comparisons when trying to explain political phenomena; my defence of case study and small-n 
analyses relates to what I perceive to be an over-reliance on statistical research. There is no 
reason not to take full advantage of technological and theoretical advances to develop new 
theories. I argue that both types of studies are just as important for the advancement of quasi-
scientific knowledge in political science, and so I believe it would be better to avoid defining 
ourselves and our research based solely on the methodological approach utilised to reach 
testable theories. In fact, we should bear in mind that whilst case studies ‘allow scholars to 
explore causal mechanisms […] large-n comparisons allow them to identify causal effects’ 
(Boix and Stokes, 2007: 4). It is hard enough for researchers to avoid the risk of letting the use 
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of a particular theory to become a set of blinders that leads the outcome of the research; to allow 
methodological approaches (research design in particular) to become yet another set of blinders 
would be a devastating problem for any research project (Peters, 2008: 47). As far as possible, 
students of comparative politics should try to engage with multiple theories and multiple 
methodological approaches; if one lets the theory dictate the methodology it will, in all 
likelihood, dictate the result of the research as well. As Guy Peters points out, once we ‘choose 
our theoretical approach and develop a methodological design based on that theoretical choice, 
most people find it all too easy to find support for that approach’ (ibid). This simple and 
elementary statement – in fact Guy Peters warns about these perils in a fairly introductory 
volume to comparative politics – is not always easy to follow. With this in mind, I will strive to 
utilise a number of theoretical approaches.  
 
It is not enough, however, to be aware of the many hazards inherent in choosing a methodology 
and a theoretical approach; one has to actually avoid them. One such peril is the, perhaps 
natural, tendency to put forward speculative generalisations. As said before, it is hard enough to 
avoid the temptation, when dealing with large-n studies, of either ignoring or giving too much 
importance to deviant cases. In a similar vein, one has to be careful not to exaggerate the 
validity of a working hypothesis that has been generated from analysing a small number of case 
studies and try to make it a general rule. This can be an issue simply because it is often ‘easier 
to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a small number of 
cases) than for a larger set of cases’ (Gerring, 2007: 98). In the context of this thesis, it would be 
a gross exaggeration to claim that – based on two cases – processes of internationalisation 
always (or even generally) dictate the outcome of democratisation processes. Nevertheless, ‘x-
y’ relationships in comparative political science are a ‘reduction from the complexities of the 
real world’ (Keman, 2008: 66), and it is somehow obvious that these complexities are easier to 
‘control’ the fewer cases one is analysing. Comparative politics should no longer be only about 
comparing evidence in order to tell if a relationship exists and, if it does, if it is a causal 
relationship (ibid). We need to bare in mind that  
 
‘It is now well established that causal arguments depend not only on measuring causal effects, but 
also on the identification of causal mechanisms. X must be connected to Y in a plausible fashion; 
otherwise it is unclear whether a pattern of covariation is truly causal in nature, or what the causal 
interaction might be’ (Gerring, 2007: 102).  
 
Mechanisms of causality can be best analysed in small-n studies such as this one. Hence, the 
objective of this thesis is not to prove that internationalisation projects dictate democratisation 
processes, or vice versa, but rather this thesis analyses how specific internationalisation projects 
can shape – rather than make or cause – democratisation processes. 
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There are also other challenges faced by any comparative study regardless of the number of 
cases, variables or causal correlations analysed. First of all, one should always aim at 
developing ‘a middle-range theory’; that is a theory that ‘avoids the pitfalls both of excessive 
abstraction (the vice of economists) and excessive particularism (the problem of many 
historians and anthropologists)’ (Fukuyama, 2011: 24). This is a particularly hard trap to avoid 
when dealing with correlations (be them directly causal or not); on the one hand there is the risk 
of, as I have said before, putting forward shaky generalisations in an overzealous attempt to 
establish causality. Whilst on the other hand there is the very real risk of analysing everything 
but explaining nothing. This work will attempt, by looking at a number of variables (processes 
of decentralisation, influences on elite behaviour and calculations, socioeconomic development, 
attitudinal/societal changes, and other institutional changes), to analyse the cases of Spain and 
Mexico with enough thoroughness to be able to establish clear correlations without going as far 
as claiming outright causality.  
 
Another difficulty common to all comparative studies is the ‘how far back’ problem. This 
problem is obviously related to the issue of finding a ‘middle-range theory’ but has to be dealt 
with on its own. Even if a study focuses on a handful of variables and/or causal relationships 
(e.g. socioeconomic development causes democratisation) there is still the risk of going too far 
back or not going far back enough. There is certainly a need to study the ‘causes of effects as 
well as effects of causes’ (Przeworski, 2007: 148) but – unless one has almost limitless 
resources, time and energy – there has to be a limit.  It is sensible to acknowledge that ‘any 
causal factors one adduces for a given development are themselves caused by prior conditions 
that extend backward in time in endless regression’ (Fukuyama 2011: 23); but only if one has in 
mind rewriting the Bible (as Francis Fukuyama seems to attempt in over a thousand pages 
spread in two different volumes) would it be possible to indulge in such analyses. Thus, this 
thesis has to have a clear temporal limitation (which I discuss further on) as well as a 
methodological. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that political development does not take place in 
a historical vacuum or in conveniently organised time-periods, reference to events outside these 
chronological limits is unavoidable. This thesis will not pretend to be an exhaustive analysis of 
an ‘endless backward progression’ but rather, recognising that all causes are effects themselves, 
it will strive to offer a broad explanation of the structural limitations that shaped these two 
transitions to democracy4.  
 
A final methodological consideration to be kept in mind when developing any sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Without following the strict path-dependency approach inherent in historical institutionalism, the idea is 
to borrow some of its principles. Ana María Bejarano’s approach to ‘structured contingency’ fits well 
with my own approach that ‘the pre-existing structures and institutions do not predetermine results, but 
they do indeed condition them’ (2011: 13).    
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comparative study is that of confusing the method with the object. If, then, this is to be avoided, 
attention has to be paid not to confuse, as I have said before, a ‘basic methodological concept’ 
with a ‘convenient term vaguely symbolising the focus of one’s research’ (Kalleberg, 1966:2). 
The tendency to do so can lead to an overreliance on defining concepts rather than developing 
theories; this is not necessarily a problem if you are writing a methodological note, but if the 
aim of the research is to develop theories then ‘too much emphasis on definitions only leads to 
sterile verbalism, to the development of “conceptual frameworks” as opposed to theories’ (ibid: 
72). Having said this, the definition of key concepts and the development of a conceptual 
framework are necessary steps towards developing a theory; just as political institutions do not 
develop in a vacuum, theories that explain them cannot emerge in a theoretical void. The second 
chapter of this thesis will therefore pay its due attention to the defining of key concepts 
(internationalisation, democracy, democratisation, political culture, amongst others), as well as 
examining the main theories that explain democracy in general, and a comprehensive overview 
of the literature that deals with the case studies from a variety of perspectives. This thesis will 
not, however, shy away from developing working hypotheses based on these concepts and 
theories, thus avoiding the above mentioned ‘sterile verbalism’.  
 
1.1.2 The object of comparison 
 
As just discussed, comparing in political science is, for the most part, the method by which we 
are able to develop hypotheses through inference and generalisation, and small-n studies are not 
only a valid tool of comparison but also unavoidable in certain cases where the sample pool is 
limited – such as when comparing institutionalised projects of internationalisation or regional 
integration – then the exercise of case study selection becomes increasingly important. This is 
simply because we are not aiming at putting together a ‘sample’ that will prove a specific causal 
relationship – if that were the case the way forward would be to include as many cases as 
methodologically possible. This thesis is a defined study that will analyse correlations between 
two wider processes. This type of study, therefore, implies a typical small-n research design of 
few cases many variables. Albeit the use of strict dichotomies in research methodology is no 
longer that common, a thesis of these characteristics would tend to gravitate towards a most 
similar system design; however, there is more to it than this narrow description. Moving on 
from the methodological debate though, one has to keep in mind that, as mentioned before, in 
political science theories should, as far as possible, be inferred from facts and not the other way 
around (Fukuyama, 2011: 24). The exercise of case selection should adhere, at least to some 
extent, to this simple premise; developing a hypothesis should follow the thorough analysis of 
the case studies. This does not mean, however, that one has to select random cases and hope for 
the best; there has to be a process of inference that precedes the case selection. The analysis of 
the selected case studies has to follow the ‘light bulb moment’ – or the genesis of a probable 
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hypothesis – if one is to avoid the risk of using the case studies as the only focus of the research 
rather than as a methodological tool that will help us develop a working hypothesis. Certainly in 
a small-n comparative study, the thorough analysis of the case studies is of paramount 
importance but this should not lead the study away from its main goal: the further development 
of political theory; the main goal should always be in sight. With this in mind, the case selection 
has to follow the selection of a basic number of parameters (which will then become variables) 
that are being analysed. 
 
In the case of this thesis, the very fundamental objective of the analysis is to explore if and how 
specific internationalisation projects interact with parallel processes of democratisation. With 
this basic idea in mind, I will analyse the specific ways in which internationalisation (for now 
understood as very specific forms of regional integration but it is a concept that will be 
discussed in depth further on) interacted with specific institutional, social and political elements 
of the process of democratisation. These are, in essence, the very basic parameters that will 
inform the process of case selection. With the now widely accepted premise in mind that 
‘context matters’, I will analyse the way in which internationalisation interacted with 
democratic developments at three basic levels: the supposed correlation between socioeconomic 
development and democracy, the linkage-leverage dichotomy and the national elites, and the 
domestic political structures and societal values. More than a random approach, these three 
basic levels correlate with – as will be analysed in the second chapter – the three basic 
theoretical approaches to democratisation: modernisation theory, elite theory/institutionalism 
and the political culture school. 
 
1.2 The case studies 
 
Comparative studies of democratic transitions are not uncommon. However, the case of the 
Spanish transition is arguably the single most studied case of the third wave and, despite some 
recent worrying developments, the Spanish transition is still broadly regarded as something of a 
‘paradigmatic case’ (Waisman, 2005: 1). Not so long ago academics and commentators alike 
were unequivocal when hailing the Spanish transition’s success; to say that virtually no one 
doubted the ‘sustainability of Spanish democracy’ (Hopkin, 2005: 6) is no exaggeration. Recent 
events, however, suggest that this ‘sustainability’– as with other democracies in Western Europe 
– is no longer completely beyond doubt5. Regardless, Spain’s transition to democracy has been 
compared to the transitions in Portugal and Greece, ex-communist Central and Eastern 
European countries, and the Latin American transitions in the last quarter of the twentieth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The latest Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit places Spain just one spot above the 
‘flawed democracies’ category and suggests a clear decline in the ‘quality’ of Spanish democracy. Spain, 
however, is not the only country in Western Europe presenting this negative trend; France, Portugal, Italy 
and Greece all fall below the line that divides ‘full democracies’ with the rest of the regimes.  
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century (Colomer, 1991; Holman, 1995; McDonough et al, 1998b; Montero, 2001a and 2001b; 
Ortega Ortiz, 2001 and 2008; Wiarda, 1989 and 1996). Even if not all of these comparisons 
have been grounded on straightforward similarities such as geographical proximity, institutional 
similarities or a historical connection, it seems that the southern European transitions (and the 
Spanish in particular) have set the bar against which all third wave democracies have to 
measure. This is mainly due to the chronology of the third wave – which started in Southern 
Europe and then moved to Latin America, Africa and finally post-communist Europe – but also 
to the relative success of the Spanish transition. Without resting importance to the equally 
significant transitions in Portugal and Greece, it is clear to me that the transition to democracy 
of a middle-size country with a lack of a significant democratic tradition as was Spain, gave a 
greater impetus to the democratic trend worldwide. Although not without its problems, the 
Spanish transition succeeded in developing a strong market economy within the framework of 
integration into Europe, raising the level of welfare indicators to Western European levels, 
establishing a robust democracy (despite being marred by ETA terrorism, the 1981 coup attempt 
and some economic crises) (Waisman, 2005: 1-3), internationalising its bourgeoisie and 
transforming the identity of Spanish society6.  
 
On the other hand, Mexico’s transition is, at best, yet to be completed. Denise Dresser (2005) 
explains that Mexico’s initial transition to an electoral democracy was a long process 
accomplished through many electoral reforms taking no less than 30 years. In this sense, 
Mexico’s transition fits the bill of what is commonly known as a ‘protracted transition’, i.e. a 
process that resembles ‘a war of attrition’ between the regime and the opposition parties over 
the ‘microinstitutional foundations of the transition’ (Eisendstadt, 2000: 4). This type of 
transition is rather different from the model of elite-driven transition developed by Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986a) – and, as we will see in the next chapter, supported 
by many others – and thus presents different challenges. This ‘voted transition’, as described by 
Mauricio Merino (2003), achieved a rather limited success. Hence, although from 1997 onwards 
elections in Mexico are free, fair and overseen by a truly independent arbiter – the Federal 
Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral - IFE) – the institutions established by the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) were never really transformed. The fifth chapter of 
this thesis will analyse how the limited influence of the United States in Mexico’s 
democratisation supported the protracted nature of the transition and, as such, did not help 
correct many of the issues inherent in this type of democratisation. In a nutshell though, we 
could say that Mexico now has a democratically elected president at the top of a diluted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A quick glance at the Eruobarometers and World Values Surveys from the last years shows that the 
views and attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, interpersonal trust, etc. of the majority of Spanish 
society has changed drastically since the end of the dictatorship. 
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presidential system that was not designed to be a liberal democracy7; democratic governance in 
Mexico is ‘limited by a weakened executive, a divided Congress, a party system made-up by 
political parties in disarray and a decentralised political geography in which the PRI still has a 
big influence’8 (Dresser, 2005: 355). Besides these institutional shortcomings, there are also 
those who take things further and speak of a failed transition based on growing levels of 
corruption, impunity, a collapsed judicial system, cacicazgos and the return of the PRI’s old-
guard to the presidency (Aristegui, 2009: 9). Finally, as will be discussed in the sixth chapter, 
there are also clear concerns that in Mexico there is a strong correlation – and one that is not all 
that easy to explain – between its authoritarian past and its democratic prospects (Middlebrook, 
2004: 28). Be it because of a lack of a comprehensive state reform, the re-emergence of the PRI, 
an incredibly faulty judicial system or the legacies of authoritarian rule, it is hard to disagree 
with the notion that Mexico’s transition has not been as successful as the Spanish one (this 
notion will be discussed in detail in the next chapter).  
 
The clear differences in the outcome of the transitions, along with the fact that the Spanish 
transition has become something of a transition ‘model’, are two good enough reasons to 
broadly justify a comparison. However, there are more significant motives to justify the 
selection of Spain and Mexico as case studies. Although throughout the thesis there will be 
detailed justifications of specific comparisons, for now it is important to set some general 
common characteristics that facilitate a comparison between the transitions to democracy in the 
two countries. Firstly, it is hard to disagree with the assumption that both countries share some 
significant cultural traits (religion, language, cultural habits and some common history) and that 
at some point they arguably shared a pre-democratic culture that was ‘hampered not only by the 
pre-authoritarian regimes but also by cultural traditions that exalted monism, uncritical 
acquiescence of religious and political dogmas and intolerance’ (Waisman, 2005: viii). This 
cultural legacy will be analysed in further detail in the sixth chapter. Secondly, it is also evident 
that Spain and Mexico had very limited experience with democracy before their respective 
transitions at the end of last century. The Spanish Second Republic was a turbulent and short-
lived experience with democracy, which failed to create any sort of long-standing democratic 
institutions. Conversely, despite claims that the PRI regime had some periods of near-
democratic functioning9 during the 1930s and 1940s when it was able to accommodate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I will provide a wider definition of democracy in the second chapter but for now, by liberal democracy I 
simply mean the system of majority rule limited by minority rights (Sartori, 1995), in which certain 
institutional checks and balances limit the executive. 
8 ‘El futuro de la gobernabilidad democrática estará limitado y constituido por un ejecutivo restringido, un 
Congreso dividido, un sistema partidista edificado sobre partidos en desorden y una geografía política 
descetralizada en la cual el PRI todavía ejerce una gran influencia’. 
9 In fact, the PRI’s ‘official’ version of Mexico’s history, as Lorenzo Meyer boldly stated during the 
heyday of the regime, promoted the notion that ‘the Porfiriato […] was only an unfortunate parenthesis in 
the democratic progress of the country’ (1977: 3). The reality though is that neither the revolutionary 
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accept contestation (even in the electoral arena), and achieved high degrees of civil participation 
(Davies and Brachet-Marquez, 1997: 86-119), it is now clear that the PRI regime never 
achieved the ‘consolidation’ of democratic norms.  
 
Although it is open to debate if the Second Republic had any impact in Spain’s democratic 
culture or if the PRI regime was ever anything else than the ‘perfect dictatorship’ – as famously 
described by Mario Vargas Llosa (EL Pais, 1/9/1990) – what is clear is that neither Spain or 
Mexico had any significant experience with democracy, or the socio-historical characteristics 
usually linked with democratic societies. Finally, at least for some time, the authoritarian 
regimes in Spain and Mexico drew sufficient legitimacy to survive from their record in 
achieving political stability and sustained economic growth. Although this is a characteristic 
commonly found in authoritarian regimes elsewhere, the success of authoritarianism in Spain 
and Mexico in establishing order and stability was particularly impressive because of events 
that preceded the regimes. The Franco regime, on the one hand, followed the bloody schism of 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and survived the desperate situation of ostracism after 
World War II. The PRI regime, on the other hand, followed the traumatic affair that was the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), the near annihilation of the country’s economic output and a 
period that was characterised by Mexico’s volatile relationship with the United States. Under 
these circumstances, the success of both regimes in stabilising Spain and Mexico was a huge 
source of legitimacy. What is more, although these were not the only authoritarian regimes 
claiming to be different from everything else, their relative success did allow both regimes to 
ascertain a sense of being unique. 
 
Despite these similarities, there are also many significant differences between the two cases. 
Leaving aside the actual outcome of the transition, the most striking difference has to be the 
very composition of the undemocratic regimes that preceded democracy; whilst Spain was 
under an authoritarian fascistic military dictatorship, Mexico was under the hegemonic grip of a 
self-proclaimed ‘revolutionary’, nationalist and self-serving political machine dominated by 
civilian leadership. Admittedly, though, these definitions are not as clear cut as they seem: the 
Franco regime was not as fascist as seen by many from the outside – Franco himself promoted 
the argument that whatever support he gave Hitler was forced out of him by Nazi Germany 
(Liedtke, 1999: 231) – and the PRI regime was not as revolutionary as it claimed to be. 
Nevertheless, the ideological and organisational differences between the two regimes were so 
significant that the Mexican PRI government never recognised the Franco regime. At the same 
time, the PRI regime was a civilian organisation which managed to (rather successfully) limit 
the interference of the military with government affairs, was bound by an unbreakable no re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regime that followed nor the decades of political turmoil that preceded it can be described as anything 
resembling a representative democracy.	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election rule, managed to incorporate the interests of the vast majority of the population without 
having to directly antagonise with any specific group or interest10, and which prided itself from 
a leftist secular tradition that emerged directly from a revolutionary movement11 . As a 
postrevolutionary type of authoritarianism, the PRI regime shared many of the characteristics 
found in similar regimes elsewhere but not necessarily in Franco’s. The PRI, unlike the Franco 
regime, was characterised by the prominence of mass actors in government (labour and the 
peasantry in the Mexican case), reliance by the elites on the ideology of the revolution to gain 
legitimacy, and – most important of all – the existence of a hegemonic single party that 
institutionalised mass mobilisation rather than stop it all together (Middlebrook, 1995: 6-8).  
 
On the other hand, Franco’s regime found its legitimacy in a civil war which by definition put it 
in direct antagonism with a large sector of the citizenry, it was clearly a conservative regime 
(both looking inwards and outwards), it was a military and militaristic regime, and it resorted to 
violence, intimidation and repression far more often than the Mexican regime ever did. Besides 
the ideological (if they ever had an ideology) and structural differences, however, the most 
relevant difference for the purpose of this thesis is that the PRI regime in Mexico may have 
been far more institutionalised than the Franco regime ever was. In truth, this does help explain 
why the Spanish transition to democracy was achieved quicker than the Mexican (Ortega Ortiz, 
2001 and 2008). Yet, the nature of the preceding regime is not enough to predict the outcome of 
a country’s transition to democracy; while there seems to be a certain correlation between 
institutional evolutions and democracy (Payne, 1993; Thelen, 1999), it stops short of being a 
proved causal relationship (Geddes, 2007: 317). Therefore, the foundations for the comparison 
for this thesis are not found neither in the shared culture (whether this is real or imagined), the 
similarities of the preceding undemocratic regimes or, for obvious reason, geographical 
proximity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It has been argued (Levy and Bruhn, 2006; Davies and Brachet-Marquez, 1996) that the very strength 
of the regime was its ability to accommodate citizens’ demands via incentives rather than repression. The 
regime successfully included and looked after the interests (or gave the impression of doing so) of trade 
unions, peasant groups, industrialists, elites, the middle class, the military and even the church. 
‘For several decades both the party and Mexico’s citizenry seemed relatively 
content with party institutions and practices that were constantly revamped to 
accommodate the latest demands. By implementing these changes Mexico’s PRI 
could therefore claim legitimacy as we as some approximation of democracy.’ 
(Davies and Brachet-Marquez, 1996: 109) 
 
11 As Levy and Bruhn (2006: 188-192) point out, this ideological tradition was most commonly invoked 
in foreign policy issues at the expense of directly antagonising with the wishes of the United States. This 
was an exercise in defiance which helped the government look more leftist for the leftists at home and 
which reasserted the regime’s ‘independent’ credentials. Although the regime was everything but 
revolutionary at home, ‘to dismiss the notion of genuine conviction is to indulge in a hypercynicism 
which is both unfair and inaccurate’ (188) when analysing the regime’s dealing of the Cuban revolution, 
the Chilean coup of 1973 or even the recognition of the Spanish Republican government in exile.  
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Notwithstanding the very clear differences in the regimes that preceded democracy and the 
concerns about their explanatory value for democratisation, comparisons between the Mexican 
– or countless others in Latin America – and the Spanish transition12 have been carried out 
consistently both in academic and non-academic circles. This obviously has much to do with the 
evident sociocultural similarities between the Latin American region and Spain, as well as with 
the reputation of the Spanish transition as a great success worthy of being imitated elsewhere. 
The current comparison however, although clearly facilitated by these conjectural similarities, is 
based on a very specific feature shared by both transitions: the internationalisation of some 
domestic politics and the importance both countries gave to international considerations whilst 
embarking on democratic changes. The fact that both countries regarded accession into a larger 
association of states as a key element in their transition processes is, without a doubt, a very 
distinctive characteristic of both Spanish and Mexican transitions.   
 
I should at this point make it clear that I am aware that the European project of 1986 was by no 
means the same as NAFTA; it is clear that Spain joined a group of states which had a much 
more ambitious plan of integration than the United States, Canada and Mexico ever did. The 
differences and similarities in their evolutions and characteristics will be analysed in greater 
detail in the third chapter, as I will present a more comprehensive framework for the 
comparison. For now it is important to acknowledge, however, that the way in which 
internationalisation shaped the structural contingencies within which Spain and Mexico 
transited to democracy followed a similar dynamic. As I will discuss in chapters three, five and 
six both countries regarded accession into a larger ‘union’ of states as a way to strengthen 
certain institutions or attitudes that were key for their development. The Spanish elites and 
electorate were aware that accession into Europe would very much ensure the survival of 
democracy as well as strengthen their economic position; ‘to the Iberians “Europe” implie[d] 
cultural, political and psychological interconnections as well as economic ones’ (Wiarda, 1989: 
175). Although there is little evidence to suggest that the Mexican government of Carlos Salinas 
had a similarly democratic agenda, the proposal of NAFTA was a clear move to engage in a 
completely new model of development, in which a democratic government seemed, with the 
benefit of hindsight, an almost inevitable side effect. This is not to say that, as has been 
suggested before, NAFTA is directly or solely responsible for ‘unleashing forces’ that 
‘democratised Mexico’ (Pastor, 2011: xv). Yet, whether it was actively looking for it or as a by-
product of a different process, both countries took a path towards democratisation within the 
context of internationalisation. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 As Waisman points out ‘contemporary Latin American press is full of invidious references to Spain’s 
accession to the club of rich nations and to traits of the Spanish political transition, such as the role of 
King Juan Carlos or the Moncloa Pact’ (2005: 1).  
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Otto Holman explains that Europe was such a key element in the transitions of Spain, Portugal 
and Greece that any comparison between them ‘would have to take the “European aspirations” 
of these countries as a primary… point of departure’ (Holman 1995: 4). The same can be said 
about Mexico in relation with NAFTA; any comparison between Spain and Mexico has to take 
their individual international aspirations as a point of departure. The ‘internationalisation of 
domestic politics’ in Spain has been widely discussed (see Farrell, 2005; Holman, 1995; Story, 
1995: 29-30) and it is generally accepted that Spanish accession into Europe was regarded as the 
main objective of Spanish foreign policy in the years following transition. Although accession 
into the European Community (and other Western alliances) was not a new aspiration of the 
democratic regime, only after Franco’s death was it possible to predict the end of international 
ostracism. The transition government in Spain and the first socialist government of Felipe 
González were willing and able to do what Franco’s regime had not: subordinate internal 
policies to international objectives. Although Mexico’s pursue of a free trade agreement with 
the United States and Canada was not intended as a tool for democratisation, the reality is that 
within the context of NAFTA the whole structure of the Mexican political system was 
transformed. In my view, the Mexican integration into the international system can hardly be 
overestimated; in Mexico ‘national development is defined as integration into the world, 
specifically and spectacularly including unprecedented integration with the United States’ (Levy 
and Bruhn, 2006:194). NAFTA was the pinnacle of a set of economic and political reforms that 
interacted with the democratisation process in Mexico. It is within this context of 
democratisation and regional integration that this comparison is carried out.  
 
The main reason, therefore, to use Spain and Mexico as case studies is that they both embarked 
on processes that led to democratisation within a context of internationalisation. They also did 
so by joining completely different projects. A comparison between Spain and other nations that 
also joined the European project whilst democratising (such as Greece, Portugal, Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, and the rest of post-communist Europe) would certainly be of less 
use if we were trying to analyse the correlation between internationalisation projects and 
democratisation. Even though a strict causal correlation is not trying to be established, there is a 
need to consider democratisation as a dependent variable and internationalisation as an 
independent variable. With this in mind, one must look at cases in which different 
internationalisation projects produced different democratic outcomes. In other words, what 
would be the point of comparing two cases with similar outcomes in the dependent variable 
(democracy) and a similar independent variable (integration with Europe)? 
 
In simple statistical terms, then, our independent variable (internationalisation) partially 
explains the differences in the outcomes of the democratic transition of both countries. In other 
words, despite their many similarities at the moment of commencing their transition to 
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democracy in culture, historical experience, level of socioeconomic development, geographical 
proximity to more developed and more democratic nations, and many other indicators that 
suggest social similarities, the difference in the outcomes of their democratic transition can be 
explained, to an extent, by the differences in their projects of internationalisation. As I have said 
before though, this thesis does not pretend to put forward a simple monocausal model for 
democratisation; rather, what I strive to demonstrate is that contrasting levels of success in the 
democratic transitions of Spain and Mexico can be explained, to an extent – along with the 
differences in the preceding regimes – by the differences in the variable to be analysed. It is not 
the same to be in ‘the good neighbourhood’ (Waisman, 2005: 9) participating in the European 
integration project, than to be neighbouring the world’s largest super-power who has no need, 
desire or will to pledge to any sort of social or political organisation that could be perceived – 
no matter how desperately false this perception may be (Pastor, 2011: 12) – as a challenge to its 
sovereignty.  
 
As said before, I completely understand that,  
 
‘whilst the EU is a political and economic union in which the principles of solidarity and social 
cohesion are present in their treaties; NAFTA, on the contrary, is a free trade agreement that 
lacks any explicit political or social objectives and any social cohesion instruments at 
institutional level similar to those the EU has.’13 (Royo, 2004: 530). 
 
Yet, as I have briefly mentioned and as it will be explained throughout this thesis, the 
integration processes in Spain and Mexico were key parts of the social and institutional 
transitions to democracy; it was internationalisation that forced both countries to embark on a 
process of political and social self-examination and self-rediscovery and deal with issues such 
as nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, social policies, political parties and many others (ibid: 
538). What is more, there are other interesting similarities and points of convergence (which 
will be discussed in detail in the third chapter) that can help us justify a comparison between 
NAFTA and the EU. This is especially true if we recognise that the EEC that Spain applied to 
join in June 1977 was a very different organisation to today’s enlarged and troubled EU. In any 
case, if we understand that Spain joining the EEC and Mexico joining NAFTA were key factors 
in their attempts to democratise, then we can assume that analysing these processes will help us 
understand the differences in outcomes in both cases. The fact that both countries embarked on 
internationalisation processes aimed at ending years of autarchy and ostracism, and which ended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘La UE y el TLCAN tienen objetivos muy diferentes […] Por ejemplo, la UE es una unión política y 
económica en la cual los principios de solidaridad y cohesión social estan presentes en los tratados. El 
TLCAN, por el contrario, es un acuerdo de libre comercio que carece de objetivos politicos o sociales 
explícitos y de capacidad e instrumentos de cohesion social a nivel institucional como los de la UE’ 
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up being central to their democratisation attempts, makes them ideal case studies for my 
research.  
 
1.2.1 Scope and reach of the project 
 
Some chronological boundaries are essential in any comparative study. However, neither 
transitions to democracy nor regional integration processes are spontaneous events that can be 
easily placed within strict temporal structures. Whatever our view of democracy may be, few 
would argue that democratisation is anything else than a process. This process may be led by 
mere pragmatic calculations from the elites, it may be caused and shaped by socio-economic 
development, or it may be spurred by historical and cultural traits specific to a society, but it is 
almost universally accepted that democratisation is a process. The evolutionary nature of 
democracy, as that of any other political process, means that to study democracy one must study 
a temporal progression; political cultures (and mass values in general), institutional changes, 
changes in elite behaviour and socioeconomic development can only be appreciated by 
analysing data from different periods. This is not to say, however, that democratisation is a 
strictly linear process, but rather that we need to analyse a clear chronological progression if we 
are to explain it. At the same time, internationalisation is also a process, albeit one which is 
easier to place in a specific timeframe. The main reason to set clear chronological limits, 
though, is the need to avoid the danger of this study degenerating into the ‘endless chorological 
regression’ discussed earlier. Since this study deals, to some extent, with issues relating to 
causal relationships, it is of paramount importance to set up limits to the study of causes as 
effects, or risk taking back the scope of the research all the way back to the beginning of time. 
Although not entirely arbitrary, the ‘cut-off’ point has to be, to an extent, a decision of the 
researcher based on methodological, theoretical and practical considerations. 
 
Taking all of the above under consideration and bearing in mind that both countries embarked 
on their respective attempts to democratise at different times, I have set two different and 
comprehensive timeframes.  In the case of Spain I will focus my research on the period from the 
beginning of the liberalisation reforms carried by the Franco regime in 1959 (marked by the 
regime’s Stabilisation Plan) and the first term under the Partido Popular (PP) between 1996 and 
2000 – which coincided with Spain’s second Presidency of the Council of the EU in 1995. 
Although we could argue that the comprehensive political transformation of the Spanish state 
that led to the institutional dismantling of the regime did not truly begin until Franco’s death 
allowed certain reformists to take decisive action to change the regime, there is little doubt that 
the conditions that made political evolution possible started to develop in the 1960s. The 1959 
Stabilisation Plan paved the way not only for democratisation to take place, but also for the 
eventual integration into Europe by introducing much needed economic reforms. The second 
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Presidency of Spain in 1995 and José María Aznar’s first term in power may not seem as such 
relevant events – as far as Spain’s history of democratisation goes of course – as the 1978 
Constitutional Referendum, the failure of the attempted coup in 1981 or even Spain’s accession 
into the EEC in 1986. However, although the new democratic regime seemed to be safely in 
place and delivering on many of its promises by this time, Spain’s 1995 presidency cemented 
Spain’s place in Europe; it was the Spanish government who was setting the pace for the EU’s 
external relations, it took a leading role in the widening and deepening of the Union, and was 
comfortable enough to challenge the old European powers in Europe (Torreblanca, 2001). 
Spain’s comfortable position in Europe was, in more ways than one, the end of Spain’s process 
of ‘catching up’ with integration and the end of its internationalisation. In a similar vein, 
following Adam’s Przeworski’s well-known description of democracy as a ‘system in which 
parties lose elections’ and in which ‘there are periodic winners and losers’ (1991: 10), we 
should place the end of the democratisation process in Spain on the eventual electoral defeat of 
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and a peaceful transfer of power to a centre-right 
party.  
 
Mexico’s transition to democracy is considerably harder to place chronologically. In the case of 
Mexico it is not only hard to say where the process ends (there is no clear consensus as whether 
it has ended, when it will end or, indeed, if it will ever be completed) but also where it 
beginnings. For some there was no real transition to democracy but only an improvement of a 
somehow dysfunctional democracy (Davies and Brachet-Marquez, 1997), but besides these 
isolated views there seems to be a consensus that Mexico began a process of transition to 
democracy but has failed to secure its success. The many challenges facing Mexico’s 
democracy will be analysed in detail throughout this thesis, but for now let us just say that the 
main problem when trying to encapsulate Mexico’s transition into a specific timeframe is that 
the electoral arena has been the ground where most battles have been fought (Eisenstadt, 2001; 
Merino, 2003). Since the student movement of 1968, almost every other election was followed 
by some electoral concession made by the regime in an effort to accommodate political rivals 
and improve its democratic credentials. These successive reforms, however, although important, 
never really threatened the rule of the PRI that had most of the state’s resources and an 
enormous corporatist network at its disposal. It was not until 1988 that there was an actual 
electoral challenge to the dominant party by a leftist movement headed by the former PRI 
reformer (and son of former Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas) Cuahtémoc Cárdenas and 
which, it is widely believed, was only survived thanks to a mixture of fraud and intimidation. 
The 1988 presidential race and controversial win of Carlos Salinas (a staunch neoliberal 
educated in the US) did, however, represent a clear change in economic policy and marks the 
beginning of the long process leading to the signing of NAFTA. Although the 1988 election in 
itself was a step back rather than forward, it did give the opportunity for the conservative 
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Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) to participate in the electoral reforms, become a participative 
opposition, ‘negotiate’ recognition to opposition governments in some states and strengthen its 
position as the main alternative to the PRI. For these reasons I would argue that 1988 marks the 
beginning of the double process of democratisation and internationalisation. 
 
Where the processes of democratisation and internationalisation in Mexico end (if they have 
been completed) is a question with no straightforward answer. The ratification of NAFTA in the 
US Congress in November 1993 by a margin of 34 votes marked, according to one of Mexico’s 
chief negotiators of the Treaty, the end of Mexico’s ‘exceptionalism’ (as described by Luis de la 
Calle Pardo, 2010) but only the beginning of its process of internationalisation. There have 
certainly been many controversies surrounding NAFTA and its implementation, which will be 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis. However, it suffices to say here that NAFTA clearly falls 
short as a benchmark for integration; in many respects social, economic, cultural and even 
political integration between Mexico and the United States has already surpassed NAFTA’s 
original provisions. Despite its shortcomings, however, the full implementation of NAFTA 
exemplifies Mexico’s clear commitment to internationalisation as an economic and political 
strategy. On the democratisation front there is no easy way to describe where Mexico is in this 
process. The 1994 and 1996 reforms of the IFE, which has been hailed by many international 
observers as an exemplary electoral institution (the IFE, for example, offered support, training 
and supervision to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq to organise the elections of an 
Assembly in that country (Nexos 1/8/2004)), clearly represent a milestone in the electoral 
democratisation of the country. The same can be said of the first PAN presidential victory in 
2000, when power finally escaped the grip of the PRI in what are widely regarded as free and 
fair elections. However, Vicente Fox and his PAN government failed to push through 
convincing reforms that would widen and strengthen the democratic order (especially on issues 
regarding the tax system, the political restructuring of the state, a convincing reform in energy 
policy, media regulation, the judicial system and security). Regardless of the contentious nature 
of the 2006 presidential elections, which did damage the reputation of the IFE and the Electoral 
Tribunal (Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación - TEPJF) within a 
considerable sector of the electorate (primarily amongst the supporters of the defeated candidate 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador), I agree with the notion that the 2006 presidential elections, and 
the role the electoral institutions played in resolving the controversies surrounding it, 
represented the final maturing of Mexican electoral democracy (Domínguez et al,, 2009). Yet, 
as will be discussed later, there is more to democracy than elections. Therefore, since the 
democratisation process has clearly not been completed, and since there is little evidence to 
suggest that Mexico is nearing a democratic ‘consolidation’, this thesis will engage with recent 
developments in Mexico as part of its continuous struggle towards democracy.  
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There are two final observations that I consider necessary to include in this section. First of all, 
although these broad chronological limits have the objective of helping us define the 
phenomena under analysis, these are by no means strict or immovable boundaries. The third 
chapter, for instance, will briefly cover a wider period in an attempt not only to familiarise the 
reader with the historical evolution of both internationalisation projects, but also with the 
objective of painting a general picture of the terrain to be explored in detail. Similarly, 
particularly with the Spanish case, reference to events that fall outside these strict chronological 
barriers will be made. The objective of establishing a chronological structure for this analysis is 
not to raise barriers but rather to help clarify the phenomena under analysis.  
 
Secondly, it may come as a surprise to the reader to realise that despite the fact that the Mexican 
transition has been a protracted process that is being built by long and intricate negotiations 
between political forces, within the electoral and institutional arenas, and which has been going 
on for more than 45 years, the period under analysis in this thesis is generally more reduced 
than that under study in the Spanish case. I am well aware that there have been eight more 
Constitutional reforms to Mexico’s electoral system since the first electoral reform of 1946 and 
the latest in 2007. Until 1977, however, all the reforms carried out (1946, 1951 and 1973) were 
aimed at strengthening the authoritarian nature of the regime – the 1946 reform, for example, 
aimed at subordinating the electoral authorities to the executive branch – rather than weakening 
it (Valdés Zurita, 2013: 147). Even if, admittedly, the 1977 and 1987 reforms did represent 
steps in the direction of furthering representation, these reforms had the goal of ensuring the 
participation of a loyal opposition and were not intended to represent a serious challenge to the 
PRI’s hegemony. It was not until the 1990 reform established a more or less independent 
electoral organisation (the IFE) that democratic reforms were actually starting to take place, and 
it is not until the 1996 reforms that we can actually speak of the beginning of a period of 
institutional transition (in mere electoral terms) towards democracy (ibid: 148). This is why, 
although not ignoring the important developments that take place during the 1960s (such as the 
1968 student movement) and the 1970s, I focus my research on the last 20 to 25 years.  
 
What is more, although Spain’s democratisation was achieved in ‘record time’ (Encarnación, 
2001:61) – in itself a factor that explains its greater success compared to Mexico’s transition – 
there is little doubt that Spain’s struggle to join the process of European integration – which 
defines its internationalisation strategy – has clearly been a long and arduous process. Although 
the Spanish transition was achieved relatively quickly, its internationalisation strategy – a key 
element of this research – has been a process delayed by many circumstances. As will be 
discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters, the path of Spanish integration with Europe began 
much before it applied for membership in 1977. Mexico’s internationalisation strategy, on the 
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other hand, is relatively recent (mid 1980s) and has developed at a blistering pace. This explains 
why this thesis may, in some instances, focus on a broader temporal space in the Spanish case. 
 
1.3 Description of the thesis’ structure 
 
This first introductory chapter has presented a basic justification of this thesis; it has engaged 
with the methodological debate and put forward clear arguments that support the use of small-n 
projects as a valid – albeit sometimes neglected – tool that aids comparative politics in the 
development of theories. Here I have also presented some of the basic reasons that justify the 
selection of Spain and Mexico as case studies, and how this comparison will be constructed; this 
chapter has presented some of the main research questions and the basic hypothesis – i.e. that 
internationalisation projects (the way a country relates and interacts with other countries 
bilaterally and/or as part of the international arena) can act as ‘mechanisms of causality’ of 
parallel processes of democratisation. At the very basic level, this chapter has been both an 
explanation of this project as well as a justification of the project – this justification has been 
developed from both practical and theoretical perspectives; I have described here why this 
comparison is relevant and also why a ‘hypothesis-generating’ study (Lijphart, 1971) can be 
developed from comparing ‘only’ two case studies.  
 
The second chapter of the thesis will present a breakdown of the main theoretical aspects. After 
all, the main objective of this project is to contribute towards the broad discussion on 
democratisation theory. In order to achieve this goal, this thesis has to be placed within the 
existing literature. The second chapter, thus, presents a comprehensive summary of the main 
literature and theories pertaining to the different aspects of this thesis, as well as identifying the 
appropriate definitions for the main concepts to be analysed. As I have stated before, the precise 
definition of concepts and framing of the theory is of particular importance for any hypothesis-
generating research in political science; it is important to avoid the risk, by focusing exclusively 
on the particularities of the case studies, of ending up with a research that says a lot but explains 
too little. In order to contribute towards the theory, it has to be clear what that theory is. At the 
same time, a thorough analysis of the existing theories and sources is of particular importance 
for this project because of the contrasting amounts of literature available for the different 
aspects that make up this thesis. On the one hand there is a broad amount of literature available 
on democratisation theory and, specially, on the Spanish transition to democracy. Similarly, 
there are a number of recent studies that focus on the international dimension of 
democratisation, and even some that deal with the role the international context played in the 
transition to democracy in Spain (Alvárez de Miranda, 2003; Pridham, 1991; Story, 1995; Story 
and Pollack, 1991; Whitehead, 1996). On the other hand, there has been – bar a few notable 
exceptions (including Jacqueline Mazza’s work (2001), and some sections of Aguayo Quezada 
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(2010a) and Domínguez and Fernández de Castro (2009)) – a lot less written on this subject 
regarding the Mexican case. The very welcomed surge in the works dealing with democracy 
promotion and the role external factors play in democratisation (Barany and Moser, 2009; 
Levitsky and Way, 2010; Lindberg 2009; Youngs, 2010) needs to complemented, in my view, 
with focused comparisons that explained how these two dimensions interact. At the same time, 
it would be impossible for me to cover the entire range of sources available on democratisation 
studies, democracy promotion, methodology, internationalisation, the transition to democracy in 
Spain and the transition to democracy in Mexico; hence, the second chapter will function as a 
‘filter’ for the literature to be used and justify why this thesis focuses on specific sources.  
 
The second chapter will also present and explain the main theories to be utilised as analytical 
tools. This chapter engages fully with the debate surrounding democratisation theory, and the 
main question of causality; the analysis of the different approaches to democratisation to be 
presented will make use of my own classification of the different approaches based precisely on 
the issue of causality. The detailed analysis and broad categorisation of the different schools of 
democratisation theory serves a very specific purpose. Throughout this thesis, I will explain 
how internationalisation has interacted with the key variables that are emphasised (as agents of 
regime change) by the different theories of democratisation. Hence, before presenting an 
analysis of how the projects of internationalisation influenced the elites, the institutions, the 
socioeconomic development and the political cultures in Spain and Mexico, it is necessary to 
understand why all of the above are relevant in the study of democratisation. Here I will also 
further develop my assessment of the new approaches to hypothesis generation in democratic 
theory and present an analysis of some of the monocausal explanations of democratisation that 
have come to dominate, to a great extent, the debate on the matter. In this chapter I will also 
explain the apparently straightforward premise that, albeit not without its problems, Spain’s 
transition to democracy has simply been more successful than Mexico’s  
 
The third chapter marks the beginning of the analysis of the case studies. First of all, the chapter 
opens with a brief comparison of the processes of regional integration in Europe and North 
America. This initial comparison is of the utmost importance since it will present a broad 
justification for the comparison, as well as identifying some of the key differences and 
similarities between both projects. This section will deal with the key differences, for the 
purpose of this thesis, between Europe’s multilateral approach to regional integration vis a vis 
NAFTA’s weak ‘dual-bilateralism’. The wider and deeper process of European integration, this 
chapter will argue, opened more opportunities to pro-democracy forces in Spain than the narrow 
and weakly institutionalised process of regional cooperation in North America offered to 
Mexico. The second part of the chapter builds on this idea of weak vs. strong institutionalisation 
to tackle two of the institutional transformations that were, to an extent, shaped by the 
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internationalisation projects of both cases. I argue that these transformations played an indirect 
part in shaping the democratic outcomes in both countries. Arend’s Lijphart’s celebrated work 
on democratic regimes (1999) has already analysed how the federalist/unitary dimension and 
the variations of political party systems (the ‘executive-parties dimension’) are characteristics 
that shape different democracies (majoritarian and consensus democracies) but that are by no 
means ‘necessary’ for democracy. These two dimensions may have an impact on the quality of 
democracy and/or shape of the regime (i.e. ‘more or less’ democratic) but not necessarily on the 
classification of the regime as democratic or non-democratic (i.e. ‘either/or’). With this in mind, 
this thesis begins the analysis of the case studies by moving from the general to the particular. 
This is predominantly so for the Spanish case; there is already a vast amount of literature that 
deals with the process of Europeanisation – both in its ‘maximalist’ (understood as a structural 
change that takes a state to exhibit ‘similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely 
identified with, Europe) and minimalist (understood as a ‘response to the policies of the EU’) 
senses (Featherstone, 2003: 3) – and how this has shaped Spain’s democratic regime (Börzel, 
2000 and 2002; Closa, 2001; Fishman, 2003; Guillén and Álvarez, 2004; Morata, 2007). Hence, 
this third chapter will analyse only two particular instances when internationalisation partially 
led to specific institutional adaptations in Spain (decentralisation and the political party system) 
and contrast these with the far more diffuse Mexican experience.  
 
The fourth chapter basically ‘defends’ the thesis hypothesis from the perspective of 
modernisation theory. The chapter opens with a broad analysis of the modernisation approach to 
democratisation and the role socioeconomic features play in determining the structural 
contingencies that shape transitions to democracy. Hence, before moving into the analysis of the 
dynamic between internationalisation, socioeconomic development and democratisation in our 
two case studies, the first part of the chapter will briefly analyse other cases (mainly other Latin 
American countries) that elucidate better how this relationship works. The chapter will 
immediately move towards the analysis, from the perspective of a broader version of 
modernisation theory, of the role both processes of internationalisation played in the 
socioeconomic development of both countries, and thus in their respective processes of 
democratisation. A big part of this analysis obviously has to do with socioeconomic 
development in itself (after all the main premise of modernisation theory is that socioeconomic 
development makes democratisation an increasingly likely outcome), but it will also deal with 
the transformation of the economic model in both countries and how this may have affected its 
respective processes of democratisation.   
 
The fifth chapter deals with one of the most significantly marked differences (for the purpose of 
this research project) between NAFTA and the EU as projects of internationalisation. This 
chapter deals with a level of the analysis that is explicitly related to democratic development: 
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the influence of NAFTA and the EU in the reconfiguration of the elites and the very important 
question of democratic conditionality. Matters of democratic conditionality are, in some ways, 
easier to identify since these are often included in official documents, accession treaties or 
declarations from officials. The broader role of internationalisation projects play in the 
reorganisation of elites may be, however, harder to identify. Yet it is still possible to do so. 
Following Steven Levitsy and Lucan Way’s theory (2005 and 2010) on the impact of linkage 
and leverage on elite behaviour, this chapter will argue that as linkage between Europe and 
Spain, and the United States (and Canada to a lesser extent) and Mexico increased as a by 
product of a marked effort to change the ways both countries related to the international, 
important changes at elite level took place. Whether it was that a new elite (a more ‘European’ 
elite in the case of Spain or the ‘educated-in-the-US technocrats’ in Mexico) replaced the old 
authoritarian elite – as put forward by Holman (1995) – or it was the same elites simply 
becoming more sensitive to international pressure, the fact is that transformations at elite level 
played an important part in both transitions from authoritarianism. However, this chapter argues 
that the reluctance of the United States to attach any sort of democratic conditionality to 
NAFTA meant a missed opportunity by the Unites States to exert some leverage on the 
Mexican regime to democratise. This is obviously a marked contrast with the Spanish 
experience where it was understood – by both new and old elites – that full democratisation was 
a sin qua non for integration with Western Europe. I will therefore describe and analyse how 
Mexico’s signing of NAFTA far from being hailed as a democratic triumph actually allowed for 
the (at least partial) strengthening of the regime.  
 
The sixth chapter will, in a way, analyse the ‘other side of the coin’. Whilst the fifth chapter 
analyses the effects of internationalisation on democratisation from ‘above’, the sixth chapter 
will analyse what effect, if any, the processes of internationalisation had on the creation of a 
broad social consensus in favour of democracy. In other words, this chapter asks if Spain 
joining the project of European integration or if Mexico’s increasing linkage to North America 
influenced in any way their processes of democratisation from ‘below’. Certainly it is difficult 
enough to analyse social and cultural changes by themselves, as well as any correlation between 
these and the process of democratisation. Adding an international dimension to this analysis 
complicates things even further. However, this chapter will focus on a number of very specific 
transformations at social level (e.g. the creation of a common ‘identity’ in the European case, 
the part international considerations can play in securing pro-democracy consensus at social 
level, as well as the role international actors may play in the creation of social capital) that were 
at least partly influenced by the increasing salience of the international context, and which 
clearly played a part in the democratisation of both countries. 
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The final chapter will, first and foremost, look to reinforce my main hypothesis by presenting a 
condensed summary of the main arguments. The idea is not to simply present a general 
recapitulation of the main points discussed, but to actually present my main conclusions in way 
that further emphasises how the specificities of NAFTA and the process of European integration 
were important elements that can help us explain the outcomes of the transitions to democracy 
in Spain and Mexico. Finally, the epilogue of this will present some reflections based on the 
idea that when transitions to democracy overlap with projects of internationalisation, the 
international context matters even more, and briefly discussed how this idea fits within the 
context of current developments; can the Spanish and Mexican examples help us explain the 
international dimension of democratisation elsewhere? 
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CHAPTER II. Framing the Debate: Because Theory Matters 
 
Is democracy truly the preferred form of government for most people around the world? Francis 
Fukuyama – although no stranger to controversy – is not afraid to support this notion outright 
and claim that ‘most people around the world would strongly prefer to live in a society in which 
their government was accountable and effective’ (2011:11). Undoubtedly there are many 
problems with this generalisation and there are probably better ways to make this point1. 
Although true that the last two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the 
twenty-first spelled an unprecedented increase in the number of democratic regimes, less than 
half the world’s population lives under some form of democratic rule and only 11 per cent 
reside in full democracies; as recently as 2011, ‘some 2.6 billion people, more than one-third of 
the world’s population, still lived under authoritarian rule (with a large share being, of course, in 
China)’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011: 2-3). What is more, even the unpredicted 
‘Arab Spring’ cannot make up for the clear ‘stagnation’ in democratic advancements. Evidence 
suggests that the quality of democracy has been dropping in Western Europe and Latin 
America: 
 
In recent years, the post-1970s wave of democratisation has slowed or been reversed. In some 
respects the trend was made worse by the post-2008 economic crisis. There has been a decline in 
some aspects of governance, political participation and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration 
in attitudes associated with, or that are conducive to, democracy in many countries. Many 
governments have felt increasingly vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying 
their efforts to control the media and impede free expression (ibid: 17). 
 
If, then, as Fukuyama suggests and logic would probably dictate, most people would prefer to 
live under an ‘accountable and effective’ government (i.e. a democratic one, since only 
democratic governments are accountable through the ballots and are, by definition, far more 
susceptible to citizens’ demands than any authoritarian regime ever could), why is it that 
democracy is still far from being the only form of government around the world? The answer to 
this question has been troubling political scientists for the last fifty years and, in fact, it has 
probably been the discipline’s most researched question for the last quarter of a century (Boix 
and Stokes, 2007: 9). At the same time, there are many levels to this question and there are no 
easy answers. Before even dealing with the issue of causality there is the question of defining 
democracy. Trying to explain why and how a particular process takes place becomes an even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nancy Bermeo (2009: 245-249) develops a far more comprehensive argument regarding the ‘triumph’ 
of democracy. Bermeo draws on a number of cross-regional surveys to prove the point that democracy 
has more cross-regional appeal than any other form of government; she furthers reaffirms her argument 
by claiming that almost all regional integration projects or International Organisations have some sort of 
democratic clause, and that even non-democratic elites feel compelled to ‘pay lip service to democracy’s 
merits’ (248).  
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harder proposition if there is no clear consensus regarding what the end product (i.e. 
democracy) of that process should be. In reality, there are probably as many definitions of 
democracy as scholars willing to write about it. In a similar vein, political science – in particular 
comparative politics – has tried to analyse the process of democratisation from a variety of 
perspectives; any number of variables ranging from institutional arrangements to 
cultural/religious traits have been proposed as the underlying causes of the failure of some 
countries to establish democracy. This chapter, though, initially deals with the apparently 
simple question: what is democracy?  
 
This chapter will deal with the essential task of defining key concepts, in particular the concept 
of democracy and, by inference, that of democratisation. Here I will develop a concept of 
democracy that will help with the construction of my hypothesis on democratisation. In a 
similar vein, I will develop a definition of internationalisation based on the narrower literature – 
if compared with the amount available on democratisation – dealing with this issue. In order to 
develop satisfactory definitions of these key concepts, however, a thorough review of the 
literature will be presented, which will also help place this thesis within a theoretical 
framework. This chapter will also describe how, with some exceptions, transitions to democracy 
are often analysed under specific theoretical constraints. As I have said before, studies of the 
Spanish transition to democracy, for instance, have, more often than not, presented theories of a 
‘top-down’ nature and/or focused on ‘elites’ as the main unit of analysis (Balfour and Quiroga, 
2007: 19; Colomer, 1991 and 1995; Field and Hamann, 2008; Gunther, 1992; Holman, 1995; 
Hopkin, 2005; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Poulantzas, 1976); interpretations of the Mexican 
democratisation process, on the other hand, have not been as ‘narrow’ as the literature on the 
Spanish case but there is still a certain tendency to interpret Mexico’s transition as a process 
carried out at an institutional level (mainly political partiers) and one that was started from 
‘within’ the institutional arrangements of authoritarianism (Acosta, 2010; Aguayo Quezada, 
2010a: 25; Crespo, 2007; Dresser, 2005: 363; Durand Ponte, 2004; Magaloni, 2005; Merino, 
2003; Ortega Ortiz, 2001 and 2008; Prud’Homme, 1994). With this in mind, this chapter will 
present a comprehensive literature review and develop the theoretical framework that will be 
used during the comparison of the case studies. 
 
2.1 Defining democracy 
 
The emergence of centralised modern nation-states with clear geographic boundaries created the 
possibility of international relations and comparative politics as independent disciplines. 
Similarly, and much more relevant to this thesis, with the appearance of a new state-apparatus 
capable of monopolising the use of force and establishing a rationalised-legal administration, 
came a need to find new ways to legitimise these governments (this a basic Weberian definition 
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of the state). In essence, the modern state ‘transformed personalistic rule and ad hoc justification 
of authority to depersonalised, public governance based on the rule of law’ (Spruyt, 2007: 212). 
The change in the justification of authority basically implied a change in the way the use of 
power by the state was being rationalised. In a nutshell, once divine right stopped being a viable 
way to legitimise the monopolisation of power, several new ways to do so arose. It was then 
that democratic rule emerged as one of those new ways of gaining legitimacy.  
 
The common conception that democracy was born in Athens, although true to some extent, can 
be misleading. Fifth-century Athens’ form of democracy was at the very best an ‘amateur’ 
version of modern democracy (Hague and Harrop, 2007: 45) – it was in essence a form of direct 
democracy that was already hard enough to implement as the small city-states began to grow 
and thus would be almost impossible to conceive in any modern state (Fukuyama, 2011:20). 
Other descriptions, however, that get closer to explaining the key difference between Athenian 
republicanism (i.e. democracy) vis a vis modern democracy would probably be those of ‘tribal 
democracy’ (Tocqueville, 1835 [2006]) or ‘classical republicanism’ (Fukuyama, 2011: 20). The 
key element that differentiates the Athenian republicanism from the new republican theory – 
ushered by the founding of the United States – which explains the progression from tribal (or 
amateur) to modern conceptualisations of democracy, is the understanding of the citizenry’s 
liberty. In classical republicanism the citizens (as limited as the citizenry was) were free because 
they pursued direct participation in politics, whilst in the theory of ‘new republicanism’ liberty 
means the freedom to accumulate private property without inference (Pangle, 2009: 21-22). In 
any case, it would be easy to think that, since democracy has, one way or another, been a 
constant feature of political development since before the emergence of the modern state a 
consensus would have already been reached on its basic characteristics. Yet, agreeing on the 
characteristics that constitute a modern democratic regime (i.e. one that fits the notion of the 
modern nation-state) has been an issue troubling political scientists for as long as politics has 
strived to be a science. It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that, with the rise to prominence of 
social scientists such as Robert Dahl, Seymour M. Lipset and Joseph M. Schumpeter, serious 
attention was paid to the theoretical implications of democracy. Regardless of the theory that 
dominated academic circles at a specific period, the study of democracy has very much been at 
the fore of political science ever since.  
 
As one of the earlier modern theorists of democracy, Schumpeter proposed ‘another type of 
democracy’ that was a response to what he perceived as the eighteenth-century ‘classical 
doctrine of democracy’. He famously defined this ‘new’ democratic method as ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter, 1942 
[2011]: 269). In his definition, Schumpeter decides to leave aside conflicting concepts such as 
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‘the Common Good’ and the coterminous ‘Common Will’, in favour of a definition that favours 
electoral competition for different groups with different interests, and that acknowledges the 
role of leadership instead of attributing to the electorate an ‘altogether degree of initiative which 
practically amount[s] to ignoring leadership’ (ibid: 270). This notion of democracy is 
commonly referred to as minimalist or Schumpeterian. 
 
There are, of course, other characteristics that democracies should share and I shall deal with 
this question soon. For now though, it has to be kept in mind that despite a natural tendency to 
abandon dichotomies, there is still a basic need for typologies in political science. In fact, the 
process of classification should be completed before comparison can even take place; whilst 
classification is a matter of ‘either/or’, comparison is a matter of ‘more or less’ within the 
typologies already established (Kalleberg, 1966: 81). For democratic studies there has to be a 
clear ‘either/or’ dichotomy between democratic and non-democratic before we can attach 
qualifiers and talk about ‘more or less’ democratic (i.e. the quality of democracy). In order to 
achieve this basic distinction, Norberto Bobbio puts forward the argument that the only way one 
can distinguish democracy from any other form of autocratic government is by analysing the 
rules that establish who is authorised to take collective decisions and under which procedures 
these decisions are taken (1984 [2001]: 24). This minimalist approach to the distinction of 
democracy vis-a-vis everything else – most likely influenced by Schumpeter’s work – is then 
complemented by Bobbio’s three basic conditions governments must comply with in order to be 
considered democratic. The first condition is that decisions taken by some members of the 
group have to be accepted as collective decisions – the only way for this to be possible is if 
there are clear rules that establish who are the individuals responsible for taking the decisions 
and how they reach these decisions; the second condition is that those called to participate in the 
collective decision making process – this includes the actual decision making or the selection 
process of the individuals in charge of making the decisions – represent a ‘very high number’ of 
the members of the group; and his third condition is that those who make decisions and those 
who are called to select those who take decisions, must have real alternatives and must be able 
to choose between one or the other (ibid: 24-26). This notion of democracy is very close to 
Schumpeter’s with the significant distinction that Bobbio refers to a legal framework that 
legitimises the selection of leaders and the decision making process. Bobbio goes beyond the 
mere ‘struggle for the people’s vote’ by adding a basic legal dimension. 
 
The final pieces of the puzzle are found in Giovani Sartori’s four basic elements he claims a 
regime should adhere to in order to be considered a liberal democracy. These elements are not 
merely a complement to the minimalist definitions offered by Schumpeter and Bobbio but 
rather encapsulate what they propose whilst adding the ‘liberal’ aspect to democracy. It is this 
liberal aspect (i.e. the legal safeguarding of minorities) that makes modern democracies unique. 
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This ‘liberal dimension’ to democracy does not necessarily refer to the incorporation of 
minorities (or the ‘maximisation of the size of the majorities’) into the decision-making process 
as the consensual model of democracy would suggest (Lijphart, 1999: 2), but rather to the 
safeguarding of their rights even when they are not part of government. In any case, these four 
elements are: 1) The freeing of people (the liberal element), 2) the empowering of people (the 
democratic element), 3) what he refers to as ‘demo-protection’ or the protection of people from 
tyranny, and 4) ‘demo-power’ or the implementation of popular rule (Sartori, 1995). I believe 
these basic four conditions combined with a minimalist definition of democracy should give us 
enough elements to understand what institutional democracy is, as well as the very basic tasks it 
should accomplish (i.e. freeing people, empowering people and defending them from tyranny).  
 
Although I believe that the conditions mentioned above are enough to distinguish democracies 
from non-democracies, there are those who disagree. The minimalist/Schumpeterian notion of 
democracy – which has influenced the views on democracy of a whole generation of scholars 
that include Bobbio, Dahl, Di Palma, Elster and Linz – has been heavily criticised. Wolfgang 
Merkel, for example, refers to it as an ‘abstract system of rules’ (1998: 33-34) that is 
unrepresentative of the complexities of democracy. Although this is a valid concern, it is my 
view that, for purely methodological reasons, such definitions still provide a good framework 
for the study of democratisation. Certainly Merkel’s concerns with a ‘watered-down’ 
interpretation of democracy are justified and, in fact, echoed by other transition scholars. 
Guillermo O’Donnell, for instance, is not only concerned with the wisdom of providing a 
somewhat simplistic definition of democracy but he is also concerned with the resulting 
difficulties of providing an appropriate theoretical framework that can accurately help us 
explain the paradoxical situation of new post-authoritarian democracies. In his view, ‘the joyful 
celebration of the advent of democracy’ that followed the sudden collapse of the USSR and 
marked ‘the end of history’ should have been ‘complemented with the sober recognition of the 
immense (and, indeed, historically unusual) difficulties’ of institutionalising and consolidating 
democracy at a societal level (O’Donnell, 1993: 1367). The ensuing logical step of ‘attaching 
qualifiers to democracy’ to define the emerging post-authoritarian regimes was, in O’Donnell’s 
view (2001: 2), simply inaccurate as it implies that the term democracy ‘is taken to have a clear 
and consistent meaning, which then is partially modified by the qualifiers, something that is not 
the case’. Despite all these valid anxieties surrounding the use of a procedural definition of 
democracy – and regardless if it is complemented by the qualifiers O’Donnell condemns – it is 
clear to me that following a minimalist approach helps transitoligical researchers develop 
hypotheses of democratisation without getting entangled with the almost impossible task of 
defining democracy. Dahl’s criteria for a democratic process, for example, allows us to qualify 
regimes on a democratic scale by looking at five simple indicators: effective participation, 
voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of adults (Dahl, 
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1998: 37-38). Such straightforward conceptualisations may not be enough to describe the many 
intricacies of democracy but they do provide a valid framework to rely on when developing 
democratisation hypotheses.  
 
In fact, it has been argued that contemporary applications of Schumpeterian democracy ‘heavily 
overlap with Dahl’s polyarchy by also implying the civil and political freedoms necessary for 
political debate and electoral campaigning’ (Diamond, 2002: 21-22); this means that even 
minimalist definitions of democracy (such as Schumpeter’s) encompass more than the simple 
exercise of placing responsibility for the decision making – thus avoiding the fallacy of 
‘electoralism’ as warned by Schmitter and Karl (1991: 78). Without ignoring the concerns of 
Merkel and O’Donnell, one could, in a narrow sense then, single out the basic institutional 
arrangements necessary for a democratic regime to thrive and which, even if contested, are 
accepted by most. Although regimes with democratic institutional characteristics that are not 
completely democratic can and have existed (single-party or dominant-party regimes in Mexico 
or Poland in the 1970s and 1980s for example), an example of a democratic regime without 
democratic institutions (i.e. an electoral organisation, an independent judiciary, a competitive 
and fair party system, etc.) is, for obvious reasons, impossible to find. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this thesis the procedural definition of democracy will be understood as a system of 
government that allows for competition of votes where true choice and freedom to choose 
exists, where a high number of the citizens are able to participate, where there are rules that 
dictate how decisions are taken (and who takes them) and where legal frameworks guarantee the 
safeguard of individual and minorities’ liberties. This definition involves a more detailed 
explanation of what democracy, at a very basic level, and what it us supposed to achieve 
without necessarily falling into oversimplifications of the concept (such as ‘democracy is a 
system in which parties lose elections’ (Przeworski, 1991: 10)).  
 
There is, of course, an argument to be made against the use of an ‘empirical’ understanding of 
democracy. After all, democracy is not only a procedural arrangement (as aptly explained by 
Schumpeter and Dahl) but can also be understood as an ideology or a theory (Grugel, 2002: 12). 
In fact, before the behavioural revolution of the 1950s, democracy was probably better 
understood as a ‘normative’ term, which was explained as an ideology by political philosophy 
(ibid: 12-18). It was this understanding of democracy as an ideology that motivated Schumpeter 
to distinguish between the ‘classical conception of democracy’ from his ‘new democracy’, and 
Dahl’s distinction between democracy and polyarchy. As mentioned before, this new 
empirical/procedural definition of democracy focuses on explaining the process or method by 
which leaders are selected and how decisions are taken. However, this straightforward 
explanation of democracy as an empirical construct has come under fierce criticism. First of all, 
authors such as Bob Jessop, Charles Lindblom and Steven Lukes have vehemently criticised the 
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idea that democracy can be simply reduced to an institutionalised competition for ‘the people’s 
vote’. Despite some differences in how they perceive power, they all seem to agree that 
pluralism in its classical sense (i.e. competition amongst different factions that have access to 
the same resources) is unrepresentative of capitalist societies (ibid: 20-21). As such, defining 
democracy as merely the institutions that regulate competition is ignoring the structural, cultural 
and normative dimensions of democracy.  
 
At the same time, the idea of democracy as a ‘universal value’ – as famously described by 
Amartya Sen (1999) – has considerably strengthen in the last three decades. In essence, the end 
of the Cold War can be interpreted as the success of democracy as an idea rather than juts a 
procedure (Bermeo, 2009: 243-245). By the early 2000s, for instance, most developmental aid 
organisations in the world had already embraced the promotion of ‘democratic governance’ as 
one of their key goals (Carothers and Gramont, 2013: 90-91). This adoption of specific political 
goals (i.e. the promotion of democracy/democratic governance) is due to instrumental reasons 
(as the consequences of democracy literature would suggest (Carbone, 2009), democracy 
supposedly helps solve problems such as inequality, slow economic growth, human capital and 
lack of socioeconomic development in general), but it is also because of intrinsic reasons  
(Carothers and Gramont, 2013: 10); there seems to be a belief that the values of democracy are 
‘goods in their own right and should be promoted as separate objectives or as part of a unified 
political-economic conception of development’ (ibid). This recent development is evidence that 
a procedural understanding of democracy may no longer be the same as an ‘empirical’ 
understanding of democracy. For all intents and purposes then, democracy – in the ‘real world’ 
– exists as more than a mere ‘institutional arrangement’. It could be said that the 
conceptualisation of democracy has come full circle since Schumpeter ‘striped’ democracy of 
its normative elements in order to develop a more empirical definition. Today, it could be 
argued that the ideological dimension of democracy is as relevant to its empirical understanding 
as is its description of institutional arrangements.  
 
With this in mind, it becomes increasingly important to analyse the ‘cultural’ dimension to 
democracy. Despite the fact that ‘with the exception of Hobbes, the relationship between civic 
culture and political regime has been one of the central perceptions of all modern political 
theorists’ (Boix and Stokes, 2007: 10), the proposition that there are certain values and attitudes 
that fit democratic regimes is sternly contested. In Democracy in America, Alexis de 
Tocqueville refers to a certain virtue in societies that successfully establish democratic regimes,  
 
‘Although a democratic government is founded upon a very simple and natural principle, it 
always presupposes the existence of a high degree of culture and enlightenment. At the first 
glance it may be imagined to belong to the earliest stages of the world, but a maturer observation 
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will convince us that it could only come last in the succession of human history’ (Tocqueville, 
1835 [2006]).  
 
Tocqueville is referring to democracy as a form of government (or a regime) and not as the 
‘tribal’ form of organisation described before when referring to ancient Greece. A century and a 
half later Huntington picked up where Tocqueville left off and explored the idea that democratic 
leaders cannot ‘through will and skill create democracy where pre-conditions are absent’ 
(Huntington, 1991:108). He goes on to explain that the Third Wave of democratisation was only 
possible because several factors made it a possibility in much of the developing world. This 
included socioeconomic development and responsible elites, of course, but also cultural (mainly 
religious) and international changes. In his view ‘a strong correlation exists between Western 
Christianity and democracy’; his controversial claim that it seemed ‘plausible to hypothesise 
that the expansion of Christianity encourages democratic development’ (ibid: 72), gained him as 
many critics as supporters2. Religious beliefs as such are not part of the orientations that define 
political culture3, but they do have a major impact on the way people in a given society interact 
with authority figures and amongst themselves. Therefore, we can expect that a change in 
religious attitudes could have a major effect on the orientations that do define political culture. 
  
Influenced by Talcott Parsons’ work (1951[1991]) in the field of sociology, scholars such as 
Seymour Martin Lipset, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba proposed a culturalist response to 
the procedural conceptualisations of democracy and developed qualifying scales for 
democracies based on more that institutional qualifiers. It has been, however, Ronald Inglehart 
(although himself a modernisation theorist) who has been at the forefront of the more recent 
culturalist attempts to  ‘measure’ democracy. By assigning quantitative values to societal 
attitudes and beliefs, Inglehart has attempted to construct a clear distinction between formal and 
genuine democracies. Inglehart and Welzel, for instance, define democracy as a result of deep-
rooted orientations that motivate the members of a society ‘to demand freedom and responsive 
government – and to act to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them’ (2005: 
2). From this perspective democracy is a phenomenon that depends on individual values that are 
then projected towards the political system. Their distinction between formal (when the 
institutions and the mass values are not congruent) and genuine democracy (when institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The successful democratisation of Southern Europe, Latin America and Poland put an end to the idea 
that democracy was an inherently protestant phenomenon. However, the view that religious 
characteristics can shape elements of democratic regimes is still defended in some quarters; Lipset and 
Lenz have argued that, to some degree of statistical certainty, Protestantism has, for instance, a negative 
correlation with levels of corruption (Lipset and Lenz, 2000: 20-22). 
3 As defined by Almond and Verba, the political culture of a nation is the ‘particular distribution of 
patterns of orientation toward political objects’ (1989: 13); since religion is not inherently part of the 
political spectrum – regardless of how secular or religious a state may be – it cannot be an element of 
political culture as such. Regardless, there is no doubt that religious beliefs can play a big part in how an 
individual regards its political system (both cognitively and affectively) and him/herself in that system. 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  48	  
and mass values are in alignment), which is key to understanding the importance mass values 
and social attitudes have in democratisation processes (sixth chapter), rests on the claim that 
‘formal democracy can be imposed on almost any society, but whether it provides genuine 
autonomous choice to its citizens largely depends on mass values’ (ibid: 149).  
 
The view that many of the problems of democracy or government in general are a result of a 
difference between societal and institutional evolutions is by no means new though. As early as 
1968 Samuel Huntington put forward his theory that the distinction in the type of government is 
not as relevant as the distinction in the degree of government. Although he acknowledged that, 
in general terms, authoritarianism does not mean a lower degree of government, he explains that 
political instability in the developing world (which at the time the book was written included 
most of Latin America, Africa and Asia) is precisely a consequence of political institutions not 
evolving quickly enough to fit with the many societal changes usually related with 
modernisation; 
 
‘Social and economic change – urbanisation, increases in literacy and education, 
industrialisation, mass media expansion – extend political consciousness, multiply political 
demands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine traditional political 
institutions; they enormously complicate the problem of creating new bases of political 
association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of 
social mobilisation and expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political 
organisation and institutionalisation are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The 
primary problem of politics is the lag in development of political institutions behind social end 
economic change’ (Huntington, 1968 [2006]: 5).  
 
This basic idea of a mismatch between institutions and societal ‘values’ has remained at the 
forefront of the debate on democratisation. Diamond observed, at the beginning of last decade, 
that although more and more regimes may be adopting the ‘form’ of an electoral democracy, the 
vast majority of them would fail to pass the ‘substantive test’ (Diamond, 2002: 22). It goes 
without saying that ‘formal democracies’ will always tend to be unstable unless they find 
another way of legitimising power other than the popular vote (e.g. economic performance, 
ideology, law and order). In any case, it would be safe to assume that there are not many formal 
democracies that would pass this ‘substantive test’ or many genuine democracies that only 
adopt a ‘form’ of electoral democracy. At a first glance it would appear that Inglehart and 
Welzel – and Diamond to a lesser extent – fall into the contradictions Schumpeter warns us of, 
i.e. attributing to the electorate an ‘altogether degree of initiative which practically amount[s] to 
ignoring leadership’. The reliance on the individual in Inglehart and Welzel’s definition does 
not, however, exclude the importance of institutional arrangements that Schumpeter 
emphasises, it simply introduces a cultural variable to the equation. In my view, both theories 
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refer to different aspects of the same process, or two sides of the same coin (the institutional and 
the mass values variables). Hence, throughout this thesis whenever there is a reference to 
democracy I will be referring to the procedural arrangement I described earlier (its institutional 
arrangements) complemented, particularity with the sixth chapter in mind, by the mass values 
variable as identified in Inglehart and Welzel’s genuine democracy concept. 
 
Finally, one last consideration that needs to be acknowledge when defining democracy is the 
increasing tendency to separate democracy – defined as a set of institutions that determine who 
governs, or the input dimension – and good governance – understood as the ‘the exercise of 
political and administrative authority at all levels to manage a country’s affairs’ (UNDP, 2012: 
3), or the output. In essence, a growing academic literature distinguishes the process of 
establishing democratic institutions (democratisation) from the process of developing ‘good 
governance’ or ‘quality of government’. In this new vision, democracy in the form of ‘political 
equality on the input side must be complemented with impartiality on the output side of the 
political system, that is, in the exercise of public authority’ (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008: 170). 
This new tendency, spearheaded by international aid organisation like the World Bank and the 
UNDP, emphasises the promotion of ‘desirable features’ such as ‘participation, accountability, 
inclusion and transparency’ in the formation of ‘democratic governance’ (Carothers and de 
Gramont, 2013: 90-91). The main argument of the proponents of the good governance literature 
is that ‘well-functioning democracies tend to embody the core desirable governance 
characteristics’, or in other words, ‘democracies that do not exhibit good governance […] are 
not doing well as democracies’ (ibid: 91). It could be argued, therefore, that the differences 
between our two case studies, for instance, may be down to their quality of government (i.e. 
democratic governance) rather than to the levels of success of their respective transitions to 
democracy. It is not that Spain is more ‘democratic’ but simply that it has a better quality of 
government.  
 
Although I do not entirely disagree with this general assessment, the distinction between good 
governance and democracy, for the purpose of this thesis is not entirely relevant. Definitions of 
good governance tend to be rather broad and fail to distinguish, for example, whether the 
quality of government is better or worse due to issues with the content of policies (i.e. bad 
policies) or the procedures (the implementation of policies) (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008: 168). 
In any case, the distinction between democracy as the input, and good governance as the output 
is what is more relevant for this thesis. The idea that what defines a democracy is the equality in 
the access to power, and than the impartiality in the execution/application of policies is what 
defines good governance (ibid: 170) is certainly relevant. However, for the purpose of clarity 
and simplicity, when referring to democracy in this thesis I will be referring to both issues of 
input and output. After all – as the literature in political culture, institutionalism (see next 
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chapter) and the policy process (Lindblom, 1959) argues – the input and the output dimensions 
of the political system are not independent from each other; there is a clear reinforcing element. 
Even a quick glance at the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators shows a clear 
correlation between good/high governance and democracy. What is more, even if Spain seems 
to be one of those ‘full democracies’ (as defined by Polity IV) or ‘Free countries’ (as defined by 
Freedom House) that exhibit quite poor governance levels in some of the indicators analysed by 
the World Bank (Carothers and Gramont, 2013: 91) – particularly the ‘Political Stability and 
Absence of Terrorism’ indicator – the fact remains that Spain’s record is still considerably 
better than Mexico’s (see table 2.1). For these reasons, then, when referring to democracy in this 
thesis I will be referring to both the input and the output without necessarily making a 
distinction between the two.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.1. Worldwide Governance Indicators 2012, The World Bank Group. Percentile relative to 
worldwide countries in the six ‘governance indicators’ measured by The World Bank.  
 
It probably goes without saying that when referring to democratisation or transition to 
democracy during this thesis, I will be referring to the process by which a specific political 
system becomes more akin to the definition of democracy presented above. Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s (1986: 7) definition of democratisation, which is based on 
the concept of citizenship (i.e. the ‘right to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with 
respect to the making of collective choices and the obligation of those implementing those 
choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity’), accurately 
describes the transformations that are inherent in this process of democratisation. For them 
democratisation  
 
‘refers to the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to 
political institutions previously governed by other principles […], or expanded to include 
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persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations […], or extended to cover issues and 
institutions nor previously subject to citizen participation’ (ibid: 8).  
 
Unlike their definition, my description of democracy is not explicitly linked to the concept of 
the citizen, yet their description of the process does elucidate the areas that democratisation 
should transform. In other words, democracy not only advances by democratising institutions 
but also by expanding the number of people involved in its exercise, and by transforming rules 
and procedures. Since democracy here is understood both as an institutional arrangement and as 
the social construct that supports this arrangement, democratisation occurs not only when 
institutions are transformed but also when individuals change their views and attitudes. Whether 
mass values and attitudes are projected towards the political system – as claimed by Inglehart 
and Welzel – or if these are consequences of an institutional arrangement is, for now, irrelevant. 
What is important to note at this point is that successful democratisation entails a redefinition of 
institutions as well as the emergence of certain attitudinal changes that support it.  
 
2.2 Defining internationalisation in relation to democratisation 
 
There is no doubt that, although not as problematic as defining democracy, developing an 
accurate definition of internationalisation also poses some difficulties. First of all, it is important 
to make the distinction between globalisation and internationalisation. Although, especially in 
mere economic terms, globalisation and internationalisation are often used as interchangeable 
terms (e.g. Sweet, 1999: 4), for the purpose of this thesis it is necessary to delineate some key 
differences. Whilst the term ‘globalisation’ – which I use here with due caution – has usually 
been used to describe the process of increasing integration of the globe4, internationalisation as 
a concept, albeit closely related to globalisation, refers to the increasing relevance of the 
international in domestic processes. In many ways, we could say that the increasing 
internationalisation of domestic politics is a result of globalisation rather than a synonym. This 
is a particularly acute symptom of globalisation in what can be considered the less powerful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Although a detailed discussion on the validity of the concept and the intricacies of the phenomenon is 
outside the scope of this thesis, it must be noted that there are different views on what globalisation is and 
what it entails. On the one hand, for example, Thomas Friedman’s well-known work ‘The World is Flat’ 
(2005) argues that we are now entering an era of ‘Globalisation 3.0’ in which personal computers and the 
Internet make the exchange of information free and simple. His basic argument is that national borders 
and other barriers to international trade, offshoring and generally doing business globally are disappearing 
under the weight of globalisation. An alternative view, however, sees economic integration not as a single 
process of globalisation in which the world as whole is becoming ‘flat’, but rather as a process with 
‘mountains and deep valleys – restrictions and impediments – that impede globalisation and encourage 
investments in near regions’ (Pastor, 2011: 98); in other words ‘globalisation as popularly understood 
does not exist’ since multinational corporations in the United States, Europe and Asia tend to ‘both 
produce and sell on a home region bases’ (Rugman and Oh, 2008: 13). This view of globalisation, i.e. as 
a combination of regionalisations (Pastor, 2001: 19-39 and 2004) rather than a single process of global 
integration, relates better to this thesis understanding of internationalisation. This is because 
internationalisation – much like regionalisation but not necessarily globalisation – implies a conscious 
effort by national governments in order to be successful. 
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‘semi-peripheral’ (or middle-income) countries. As globalisation advances, we see a transfer of 
control ‘over the movements of people capital and information’ away from many semi-
peripheral countries’ domestic governments, and into the hands of international organisations, 
regional and political economic blocs, transnational companies and world-wide communication 
and entertainment networks (Yilmaz, 2002: 82). Concurrently to this process, we can observe an 
increasing tendency from internationally based actors to become ‘a part of the domestic system’ 
and, thus, become regulated by the ‘institutional relationships which are built around them’ 
(Chalmers, 1993). Therefore, international actors based in a third country can gain relevance as 
they become incorporated, as full actors, into the domestic system. For example, if we were to 
consider the consolidation of democracy in Latin America we would have to pay attention not 
only to whether or not ‘the US government’s policy has been to promote democracy, and if it 
has the will and resources to carry out the policy, but also whether the way in which [the US] 
behaves and is linked with other actors is democratic, and encourages democratic behaviour’ 
(ibid). We could thus argue that the combination of these two processes, the loss of control by 
domestic governments and the increasing integration of international actors into domestic 
systems, has led to an ‘internationalisation of domestic politics’ in some countries (Yilmaz, 
2002: 83). This thesis understands projects of internationalisation as the attempts by national 
governments to deal with this phenomenon and/or their attempt to gain an advantage from this 
phenomenon; they do this by institutionalising this process through membership into 
International Organisations (IOs), regional blocs or supranational organisations. 
 
A slightly different way of looking at internationalisation would be to look at its economic and 
political dimensions as parallel yet different processes. In economic terms, internationalisation 
is generally understood as the ‘successful constitution of transnational markets’ facilitated by a 
wide range of ‘economic and technological interdependencies’ (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 41-
42), or simply put it is the ‘integration into the international economy’ (Garrett and Lang, 1995: 
627). Since this thesis is not dealing with the specificities of economic integration but rather 
with the political repercussions of specific projects of internationalisation, there is no need to go 
into further detail to define economic internationalisation. What is important to understand, 
though, is that the ‘integration into the international economy’ will have an impact ‘on the 
preferences and coalitional behaviour of domestic actors’ and institutions (ibid: 628). At the 
same time, more often than not this ‘successful constitution of transnational markets coincides 
with the inability of governments to address social and political problems that are emerging 
from economic integration, both at the national and the international level’ (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002: 42). In other words, there is a clear discrepancy between the advancement of 
economic and political internationalisation.  
 
We can see this discrepancy in specific examples. For instance, globalisation explains, to an 
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extent, the increasing flow of people, goods and capital between the Mexican/American borders. 
This phenomenon, though, creates certain ‘problems’ that need solving. One of them is the issue 
of trade (i.e. the efficiency, safety and speed with which products move between borders), 
which was partly solved by NAFTA. But other problems, such as drug trafficking and 
undocumented migration, remain unsolved. An international or transnational agreement, treaty 
or organisation that would seek to solve these issues would be an example of political 
internationalisation, or a political reaction to economic internationalisation; it would be a 
conscious attempt to solve a political problem via transnational solutions. This would entail a 
recognition that these problems ‘do not comfortably fit into the compartments of “domestic” or 
“foreign” policy. They share both components’ (Pastor, 2011: 15). When governments accept 
that many of the problems affecting their countries cannot be solved domestically, since there 
are transnational dimensions to the supply and demand chain, political internationalisation may 
occur. Obviously this political internationalisation rarely evolves at the same pace of economic 
internationalisation. This is obviously down to the fact that designing, agreeing on and 
implementing political structures (or even coordinated policies) at a speed that can keep up with 
the dynamics of economic integration is almost impossible to achieve (as the recent crisis in the 
EU can probably attest); this does not mean, though, that governments are not trying. Either as a 
response to increasing economic internationalisation or as conscious attempt to solve other 
political issues5, political internationalisation has been advancing at a steady pace for the last six 
decades. For the purposes of this thesis, then, a definition of internationalisation has to originate 
from an understanding of the process as the political attempts to ‘catch up’ with economic 
internationalisation. This is not to say that economic developments in the area are to be ignored 
but this is primarily a thesis dealing with political transformations. 
 
Having established that internationalisation will be understood mainly as a political 
development, there is a need to briefly explore the relationship between this process and that of 
democratisation. In essence, it could be said that there are two broad ways this analysis can be 
done. If one is to understand internationalisation (both political and economic) as a process that 
threatens the legitimacy of liberal democracies by subtracting effective power from traditional 
political institutions (i.e. citizens’ votes no longer confer effective power to national 
governments), then one is left with a problem of ‘global democracy’ (Held, 1995 and 1997; 
Saward, 2008). But if one is to analyse internationalisation as a process affecting democracy as 
a national/institutional arrangement (i.e. taking the state as the unit of analysis despite its 
transformation spawned from internationalisation processes) (Görg and Hirsch, 1998: 587-599) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The EU is the clearest – and probably only – example of economic internationalisation being used as a 
tool for political integration. The argument being that political integration was the only way Europe could 
resolve the great problem of the post World War II era: how to reconcile the idea of a strong German 
economy, needed for the prosperity of the wider western European economy, with the rearmament of the 
country. The solution, reluctantly accepted by France at first, was to secure the integration of Germany 
into a supranational structure (Stirk, 1996: 119).   
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instead of as the principle by which individuals confer legitimacy to a specific government, then 
one is left with a problem of interaction between the domestic and the international. In other 
words, we can see globalisation and internationalisation as a challenge to the concept of 
democracy or to its execution.  
 
A procedural approach to internationalisation would see this process as a challenge to 
democracy’s execution rather than its conceptualisation and it would have to be, by force of 
logical inference, a state-centred approach. Such a definition of internationalisation fits the 
objective of this thesis better than a definition that leads us to discuss issues of ‘global 
democracy’. What is more, a minimalist definition that sees internationalisation as a process 
whereby the political regime simply becomes a more international object (Goldmann, 2001: 8) 
is a better fit – particularly in its procedural sense – for a state-centred definition of democracy 
(such as the one I discussed before). Hence, when talking about internationalisation I am 
referring to a state-centred process (e.g. the internationalisation of the economy, media, society, 
higher education and decision making of a country). As such, the internationalisation of the 
political (as has been said, democracy remains a political phenomenon) combines three 
dynamics: the internationalisation of problems on political agendas (e.g. climate change, 
terrorism and drug trade), the internationalisation of societies for which politics are made 
(migration, cultural homogenisation and media) and the internationalisation of the making of 
political decisions (e.g. International Organisations and International Summits) (ibid: 9).  
Therefore, when referring to internationalisation I am obviously referring to the impact of two 
organisation/institutions (EEC/EU and NAFTA) on democratic transitions, but also about the 
wider initiatives by European actors (be it European institutions or individual member states) 
and the United States. After all, domestic structures in Spain and Mexico were influenced 
directly by the ‘institutional’ pressures inherent in adaptation to membership into a new regional 
organisation, as well as by the policies, strategies and initiatives implemented by different 
international actors.  
 
In short then, as discussed in the first chapter, Spain and Mexico (and NAFTA and European 
integration) were chosen mainly because when trying to compare the effects of 
internationalisation projects on democratisation processes we have very limited options. Not 
every country that democratises and embraces liberal economic reform is necessarily embarking 
on a specific process of internationalisation. This is because globalisation is not necessarily a 
uniform process leading to a ‘flat world’ (Friedman, 2005) but rather a process that, by 
increasing the vulnerability of individual countries ‘to the performance of the world economy’ 
(Kim and Shin, 2002: 450), leads to increasing regional integrations. The redefinition of 
domestic policies that certain forms of regionalisation entails is, thus, what is understood here as 
internationalisation. 
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2.3. Democratisation theories 
 
The scholarly study of democratisation is characterised by countless approaches, explanatory 
theories, typologies and categorisations. In general terms however, a distinction can be made 
between the major theories depending on whether they try to explain how democracy happens 
or why it happens. Theories that explain how democracy happens tend to focus on ‘proximate 
causes rather than long-term causes. In a strict sense, this situation-oriented approach does not 
explain democratisation. It describes it, even if the description is highly formalised’ (Haerpfer et 
al., 2009: 4). Theories that explain why democracy happens often focus on ‘conditions that 
predate democratisation processes. The aim is to identify the factors that make it likely for 
democratisation to start and to succeed, rather than on focusing on what takes place during the 
process of democratisation itself’ (ibid). The distinction between these two approaches though 
is not always clear. Even theories that supposedly focus on approximate causes, like elite theory 
for example, do try to establish causal correlations that explain democratisation (e.g. the more 
unified elites are, the likelier democratisation is to succeed). In any case, newer theories of 
democratisation do not focus exclusively on one or the other; no longer is it enough to say why 
democracy happens without explaining how it happens. ‘Insights from both approaches must be 
integrated to attain a full understanding of democratisation processes’ (ibid).  
 
2.3.1 Classic approaches to democratisation 
 
This holistic approach to democratisation has not always been a priority for democratisation 
scholars. We could say that, very broadly speaking, the key question of causality has dominated 
the study of democratisation. Based on this principle, it can be said that there are three main 
approaches to democratisation: 1) functionalist/political culture approach (Almond and Verba 
1963 [1989], 1980 and 1989; Huntington 1991) 2) modernisation theory (Boix and Stokes, 
2003; Lipset, 1994; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and 3) pact 
school/institutionalism (Przeworski, 1986; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Colomer, 1995; 
Higley and Burton, 1989; Lijphart, 1980; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). These are obviously 
very general classifications and the reader should keep in mind that, much like any other social 
science, the categorisation of theories in different schools is a subjective process open to the 
author’s interpretation. Therefore, different authors may develop different categorisations based 
on different considerations6. This classification however, is based primarily on the relationships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For an example of categorisations not necessarily based on causality refer to Desfor Edles (1995) or 
Robert J Franzese (2007). Christian Welzel puts forward a broad distinction of types of democratisation 
based solely on whether or not democratisation is responsive; the main point of contention here is 
causality but he only makes a distinction between those democratisation processes that take place as a 
response to mass pressures and those that respond to other types of elites calculations (2009: 87). 
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of causality proposed by different approaches: functionalists/political culture proponents find a 
direct causal flow from mass values moving towards the political regime; modernisation 
theorists place the causal origin on socioeconomic development; pact school/elitist and 
institutionalism scholars claim that the origins of democratisation processes are found on elite 
arrangements and the institutional constructs that emerge, to varying degrees, from these pacts. I 
will now explore each approach individually. 
 
1) Political culture school. The Political culture school, as put by David Laitin, had its ‘hour 
upon the stage’ in the 1960s (Laitin and Wildavsky, 1988: 549). Although since the late 1980s 
culturalists views have enjoyed a ‘renaissance’ (Inglehart, 1988) of sorts – this ‘reinassance’ 
itself has also been challenged (Jackman and Miller, 1996) – the bulk of its foundational work 
was indeed developed in the 1960s. In their ground-breaking work on the political orientation of 
culture, for instance, Almond and Verba (1963 [1989]) looked at five ‘democracies’ (they 
controversially considered Mexico to be a democracy) to provide a solid theoretical framework 
for the study and analysis of political cultures. Political culture is, according to them, the group 
of ‘specifically political orientations-attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, 
and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system’, hence, the ‘political culture of a nation 
is the particular distribution of patterns of orientations towards political objects among the 
members of the nation’ (ibid: 12-13). Based on Parsons’ work (1951), they propose three levels 
of orientations applied to four different political objects. The three orientations are: 1) The 
cognitive orientation, defined as the knowledge and belief the members of the nation have about 
their political objects; 2) The affective orientation, understood to be the feelings about the 
political objects, its roles, its personnel and its performance; and 3) the evaluational orientation, 
which is the judgements and opinions about the political objects that typically involve the 
combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings. The political objects 
they refer to are: 1) The system in general; this refers to the feelings, knowledge and 
judgements of how the nation looks at itself, whether it is ‘big’ or ‘small’, democratic, 
constitutional, socialist, ‘strong’, ‘weak’, etcetera; 2) the input objects refer to the process by 
which the citizens influence the government, or ‘the flow of demands from the society into the 
polity and the conversion of these demands into authoritative policies’ (ibid: 14); 3) the output 
objects refer to how the demands of society are applied (i.e. policies, bureaucracies, courts, the 
use and monopoly of force, etc.); and 4) the self as the object, or the content and quality of 
norms of personal political obligation, and the content and quality of the sense of personal 
competence vis-à-vis the political system (how effective can a citizen be at influencing the 
system).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Geoffrey Pridham (1991: 5-6) also bases his categorisation on causal factors but considers there are only 
two main schools – functionalist and genetic – that can group all the different approaches. 
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In fewer words, the political culture is the outcome of ‘the frequency of different kinds of 
cognitive, affective and evaluational orientations towards the political system in general, its 
input and output aspects, and the self as political actor’ (ibid: 16). Most culturalist scholars still 
adhere to this general idea of political culture or some slight variation of it. The rapid increase 
in the number of cross-National surveys that seek to qualify attitudes towards democracy 
around the globe (World Values Survey (WVS), Eurobarometers, European Values Studies, 
Freedom in the World Rating, etc.) could be seen as evidence of the enduring relevance of 
culturalist interpretations of democracy. 
  
According to Robert Franzese (2007: 27-29), The Civic Culture represented not only a new way 
of thinking in terms of ‘Western’ democratic development, but it also transformed comparative 
politics; it was the early political culture scholars who gave democratisation studies a ‘positive 
question’. Mainstream pre-war comparative political theory and thought had been more 
interested in describing (i.e. what, where and when) than explaining and predicting (i.e. ‘what 
fosters stable, well-functioning democracy?’). Although the political culture school primarily 
considers sociocultural factors as the foundations for democratic consolidation, early 
proponents of the political culture theory stop short of establishing a straightforward causal 
correlation between mass values and democracy. This does not mean though that early political 
culture interpretations of democratisation were not highly deterministic; classical approaches to 
democracy went too far in placing an altogether exaggerated level of importance on pre-existing 
cultural conditions7. Newer versions of modernisation theory have tried to correct this problem 
but have failed in moving away from deterministic monocausal explanations (Boix and Stokes, 
2003: 518-519; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959: 75-85 and 1994: 2-3; 
Moore, 1966 [1993])  
 
2) Modernisation theory. According to Karl Marx’s conclusions, relationships emerging from 
the means of production are the ultimate factor that determines the development of productive 
forces and the cultural superstructures (überbaus) that support these forces; the Marxist view is 
that ‘in order to enforce their interests, and to make them look more ethically grounded and 
acceptable to the (dominated) population at large, the dominant classes elaborate ideologies 
which legitimise their actions’ (Heller, 2002: 140). Marxist explanations tend to see the cultural 
structure as little more than a tool of the capitalist elites, which is set from the top and is 
dominated by economic factors. This early tenet of modernisation theory has barely changed; 
modernisation theories tend to understand social and political changes as consequences of 
economic relations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 John Quincy Adams, for example, famously commented that schemes to establish democracy in South 
America appeared to him ‘as absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies among the birds, 
beasts, and fishes’ (1815, in a letter to James Lloyd).	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Although early versions of modernisation theory did not necessarily answer the positive 
question (i.e. how democracy comes to be consolidated), proponents of this approach – 
following the Weberian tradition of capitalist development (1905 [2003]) – unequivocally 
supported the view that democracy was a by-product of capitalism (Durkheim, 1933 [1997]; 
Lerner, 1958; Schumpeter, 1942 [2011]: 296-297). Despite there being differences between 
classic modernisation theorists they all agreed, to some extent, that modernisation was a single 
process transforming economic, social and political institutions (Fukuyama, 2011: 458-459). 
Although not without its challenges8, modernisation theory, and the view of democracy as part 
of a wider process (be it capitalism, industrialisation, development or modernity), has, one way 
or another, dominated the study of democratisation since the post-war era. As explained before, 
culturalist interpretations of democratisation did pose a challenge to modernisation theory’s 
classic approach to democracy (i.e. that it is simply a stage of capitalist development). New 
modernisation theorists such as Ronald Inglehart (supported by the likes of Carles Boix and 
Susan Stokes) responded to this challenge by developing ‘mixed’ approaches to democratisation 
theory that include premises from the modernisation and political culture schools. However, the 
premice that ‘economic development both causes democracy and sustains it’ (Boix and Stokes, 
2003: 545) has remained basically unchanged, and it probably still is the main point of criticism 
of modernisation theory.  
 
Lipset’s 1959 work on the social requisites of democracy is widely considered as the precursor 
of a new modernisation approach that explains development and democracy as a linear process. 
It was not until the late 1980s, and thanks mainly to the availability of new research techniques 
that made the acquirement and use of large data sets simpler and cheaper, that the theories 
proposed by the political culture and modernisation schools could be put to the test. Since then, 
new supporters of modernisation theory have put forward the theory that political cultures do 
not depend on the political structure, but rather that ‘democratic institutions seem to depend on 
enduring cultural traits such as life satisfaction and interpersonal trust’ (Inglehart, 1988: 1209)9. 
Despite the apparent prominence of mass values in this interpretation, Inglehart’s theory 
remains firmly rooted in a modernisation paradigm. Although Inglehart seems to agree with the 
general notion that cultures are ‘constantly evolving and endlessly porous’ (Pagden, 2002: 22), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Diamond (1992: 473) explains how one of the earliest and most successful challenges to modernisation 
theory came from the dependency school of the 1960s and 1970s. He explains how, according to 
dependency scholars, socioeconomic development can lead to furthering authoritarian dictatorships as the 
elites in the peripheral countries choose to ally themselves with dominant countries and corporations 
abroad; these exclusionary alliances usually require ‘political repression of popular mobilization to 
maintain low wage levels and high profit levels.’ 
9 Alongside Ronald Inglehart, Robert D. Putnam (1993 and 1995) has been one of the strongest 
proponents of the notion that social capital, understood as a combination of cultural traits including 
interpersonal trust and functional social networks, is necessary a prerequisite for democracy. However, 
Putnam is less concerned with the relationship between socioeconomic development and the prevalence 
of social capital or with causality (i.e. why democracy happens) as a whole.    
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he argues that the values and orientations that define political culture change solely as a result of 
socioeconomic development. He thus places a direct causal flow from socioeconomic 
development to political culture and then to political institutions. Despite his best efforts to 
avoid following the footsteps of early modernisation scholars and being labelled as an economic 
determinist, there is no doubt that his theory admits the existence of only one agent of change: 
socioeconomic development. This view completely clashes with sociological explanations of 
political culture. For political culture scholars, the political culture is always a part of a wider 
general culture; and cultures, by definition, have a tendency to reinvent themselves as processes 
of individual internalisation change (Pateman, 1971). In this interpretation, cultures are certainly 
‘constantly evolving and endlessly porous’, but they are transformed by external factors (e.g. 
socioeconomic development or institutional changes) just as much as they are transforming 
themselves. An interpretation that sees socioeconomic development as the only reason for 
cultural change is a radical break from the political culture school. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Inglehart and Welzel’s model (2005) 
 
3) Pact school/elitists and institutionalism. Critics of the modernisation and political culture 
schools emerge mainly from theorists of an institutionalist or elitist disposition such as Giovani 
Sartori, Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Arend Lijphart. While elite driven (or 
pact school) and institutionalist interpretations of democracy are not entirely the same, the 
history of transitions to democracy tells us that institutional changes are almost invariably the 
outcome of elite bargaining and elite pacts. Although historical institutionalism will be analysed 
in further detail in the fourth chapter, it is important to mention now that the path-dependence 
approach to political and/or social evolution (Pierson, 2000) suggests that institutional ‘inertia’ 
tends to limit the options available to key actors. This dynamic only changes at ‘critical 
junctures’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 110) when elites have the possibility to change path 
if the right incentives exist. In this view, institutional development and elite behaviour are 
reinforcing processes that lead to democratisation. The Spanish transition to democracy is a 
commonly used example of how specific agreements by elites on different sides of the political 
spectrum (continuistas, reformistas and rupturistas) led to bargaining, negotiation and eventual 
formal pacts (The Moncloa pacts of 1977 for example). Institutionalism claims that once 
democratic institutions have somehow been established (almost unavoidably through elite 
pacts), these then create the social capital and democratic cultures necessary for democratic 
consolidation. An argument often made by institutionalism is that there is a ‘considerable 
reluctance on the part of civil society advocates to grant political institutions any role in 
producing the very same pro-democratic values and orientations believed to aid a flourishing 
civil society consolidating democracy’ (Encarnación, 2001: 77).  
Socioeconomic 
Development  
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   DEMOCRACY 
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In his analysis of the Spanish case, José María Magone (1996: xxii), for instance, suggests that 
although a ‘democratic institutional setting has to be followed by a sustaining culture’, this 
‘political systemic culture’ is shaped, nourished and conditioned by political institutions. In his 
view, the political culture of a nation is consciously transformed by the political system through 
a planned selection of ‘political experiences, institutions and beliefs’ that help produce a 
‘congruent culture with the demands and dynamic of the political system’ (ibid: 62). In this 
sense, political elites often shape the structures of the political system but are, at the same time, 
a product of those very same institutions. Therefore, as the political systemic culture is 
‘imposed by symbolic power through participation and socialisation structures’ (ibid: 175) the 
elites who impose this structures help shape the political culture. However, how it is that 
political democratic institutions emerge is a different concern; what is important to understand 
here is, that for Magone, the system creates the culture and not the other way around. Following 
a similar trail of thought, Arend Lijphart (1980: 48) explains that institutions dictate the changes 
in political culture; the cognitive aspect of political cultures relates directly to the performance 
of the political institutions, therefore the way these behave will have a direct influence on the 
way they are perceived. What is more, the cognitive orientations are based on knowledge about 
the political system and, obviously, knowledge cannot be absent of the objective realities 
presented by this system.  
  
Institutionalism and elite-driven approaches to democratisation also question the validity of 
modernisation theory. The exogenous approach to democratisation, for example, suggests that 
democracies ‘may be established independently of economic development but may be more 
likely to survive in developed countries’ (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 156-157), which is 
not the same as saying that socioeconomic development is the cause for democracy. The 
common story presented by modernisation theorists (i.e. that as authoritarian regimes achieve 
economic growth their societies become too complex and too technological to be controlled) is, 
in the opinion of Adam Prezeworski and Fernando Limongi, without factual backing. Max 
Heller also believes that Inglehart’s model does not consider the reverse effect of culture 
(values) on economic development (the Protestant theory) – or in comparative politics terms, 
Inglehart ignores the influence of endogeneity (Heller, 2002: 143). More radical elitist 
approaches argue that ‘democratic transitions and breakdowns can best be understood by 
studying basic continuities and changes in the internal relations of national elites’ (Higley and 
Burton, 1989: 17). This view explains that institutions (democratic or otherwise) that do not 
emerge from pacts by consensually unified elites do not have a long life expectancy. Therefore, 
‘unless regime changes are preceded by elite transformations – from disunity to consensual 
unity, in cases of democratic transition […] – they should be regarded as strictly temporary’ 
(ibid: 18).  
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Although elitists may recognise that other factors (such as socioeconomic development and 
mass values) may affect elite relationships in a country, they tend to ‘deny that such forces lead 
inexorably to democratic transitions or breakdowns’ (ibid: 29) and reaffirm a belief that 
transitions are down primarily to the way elites filter these forces. A clear problem with this 
view is that – as will be discussed in the fifth chapter – in most transitions to democracy, elites 
are not clearly separated between authoritarian hard-liners, moderate authoritarians, reformists 
and revolutionary opposition (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 65). What is more, although identifying 
elites in authoritarian regimes may be – to an extent – a relatively straightforward exercise, this 
dynamic is transformed during the period of ‘uncertainty’ that characterises transitions to 
democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 4). If it is hard enough to identify the elites, it is 
‘almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will 
take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative’ (ibid). This makes the idea of a 
pact-led transition hard to defend except in cases where there is a more or less clear distinction 
between different elite groups and their preferences. In Spain, for instance, the task of 
identifying Francoist hard-liners from reformers was considerably easier than in other countries. 
The emergence of ‘proto-parties’ and opposition groups such as the ‘Tácito’ group – formed by 
young and more or less anonymous politicians within the regime but who were already looking 
ahead to gaining a strong position in a future democratic regime – made the task of identifying 
the reformist faction of the regime’s elite relatively simple (Powell, 1990: 249); the ‘Tácitos’ 
had a clear profile (born shortly after the Civil War, university graduates, from Madrid or living 
in the capital, and most of whom ‘were in the service of the Francoist state’), met regularly in 
Madrid and used their links to the Catholic press to push for subtle reform (ibid: 250-252). In 
the case of Poland, on the other hand, the fear of the Stalinist hard-liners (the beton) slowed 
down the process of democratisation, only to be later exposed as nothing short of a fable 
conjured by the communist elites in an attempt to intimidate the opposition (Gentleman and 
Zubek, 1992: 65).  
 
2.3.2 Multicausality in democracy 
  
The classic models of democratisation explained until now have many points of contention and 
a countless number of critics. However, the unwillingness to accept alternative causal 
correlations is what ties them together. This is, however, not surprising; since econometric 
models and statistical analyses started to be applied to increasingly larger and more complex 
datasets, political scientists have developed a near obsession with causality. As David Landes 
points out (2000; 3), ‘economic analysis cherishes the illusion that one good reason should be 
enough, but the determinants of complex processes are invariably plural and interrelated’. 
Hence, a recent turn within comparative politics theory has led political scientists and 
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sociologists to believe in the ‘identification of a specific mechanism – a causal pathway – as 
integral to causal analysis whether the model in question is formal or informal or whether the 
evidence is qualitative or quantitative’ (Gerring, 2007: 92). Thus, without undermining the 
crucial contributions to democratisation theory from scholars such as Inglehart, Lijphart, 
Przeworski or Sartori, models such as those put forward by Linz and Stepan (1996: 1-80), 
Wolfgang Merkel (1998) or Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) provide, in my view, more 
complete explanatory frameworks. These models take into account that ‘factors driving the 
development of any given political institution are multiple, complex, and often dependent on 
accidental or contingent events’ (Fukuyama, 2011: 23). They also allow for the possibility to 
consider (with the probable exception of Merkel’s model) the influence of endogeneity. For 
example, if we take Inglehart’s hypothesis that culture (values and attitudes) causes democracy, 
we would have to consider the plausibility of the hypothesis that democracy causes democratic 
cultures; ‘if so, causal models of the relationship between civic culture attitudes and democracy 
should be formulated to take into account the possibility of reciprocal causation between these 
variables’ (Muller and Seligson, 1994: 635). I believe multicausal models can account for 
reciprocal causation far better than monocausal explanations.  
 
Linz and Stepan’s model, for instance, refers to five overlapping ‘arenas’ in which democratic 
change is necessary in order to be consolidated. These arenas are: a lively civil society, a 
relatively autonomous political society, rule of law, a usable state and an economic society 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996: xiv). We could say that, of the five arenas two fit into institutional 
considerations (rule of law and a usable state), two can be explained as culturalist variables 
(civil society and an independent political society), and one derives mainly from socioeconomic 
reasoning (economic society). Contrary to what institutionalism/pact school or modernisation 
theories propose ‘democratic consolidation requires much more than elections and markets’ 
(ibid: 6-7). Certainly elections are a sine qua non for any democratic regime whilst a free 
market economy can weaken authoritarian regimes, but clearly there is much more to 
democracy than that. The fact that the five ‘arenas’ interact and reinforce each other means that 
there are institutional, culturalist and socioeconomic factors constantly evolving during 
transitions to democracy.  
  
In a similar vein, Diamond et al. (figure 2.2) agree with the notion that as socioeconomic 
growth takes place democracy becomes an ever-likelier outcome (therefore it is hard to find 
functional democracies in underdeveloped countries or undemocratic regimes in developed 
nations), however, they do not see economic growth as the only reason for democracy or for a 
transformation in political culture In fact, they suggest that ‘economic development is not a 
prerequisite for democracy’ (Diamond et al. 1995: 24). They do admit that socioeconomic 
development can be a motor behind democratisation but they also place a great deal of 
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importance on other historical (previous experiences with democracy), external (openness of the 
economy, influence from abroad, pressure from abroad) and domestic (elite and institutional 
efficiency and legitimacy, urbanism, education) factors. This model also disagrees with the 
notion that a favourable political culture is a prerequisite for democratisation since ‘cultural 
patterns and beliefs do change in response to new institutional incentives, socioeconomic 
development and historical experience’ (ibid: 21). This model considers more than the 
relationship between socioeconomic growth and political culture; it considers the role the elites 
play (in promoting development and in shaping political culture), the effectiveness of new 
democratic institutions (which influences and is influenced by political culture) and the inability 
of undemocratic regimes to deal with a more urban and educated society through better means 
of communication.  
 





                                                           
 




As well as the two models described before, Wolfgang Merkel proposes a ‘multi-level’ 
approach to explain democratic consolidation; in his view democratisation is a sequential 
process that goes from institutional consolidation to the democratisation of parties and electoral 
groups to the development of a political culture. In this process, however, the behavioural 
consolidation of potential veto actors (i.e. elite democratisation) can happen at any time during 
this process (1998: 40). Merkel’s model, along with those proposed by Linz and Stepan and 
Diamond et al., bring into the fore more than institutional arrangements, pacts, elite behaviour, 
socioeconomic development and cultural determinisms. By introducing variables such as 
historical experience, institutional efficiency and external influence they allow for more factors 
to interact as causal elements in democratic transitions. This helps explain why democracy is so 
hard to predict; history has proven that socioeconomic development is not enough to predict 
democratisation (Portugal embarked on its transition to democracy in 1975 with a GDP per 
capita of $2,097 whilst Saudi Arabia remains firmly authoritarian with a GDP per capita 
exceeding $15,000), and history has also shown us that clever institutional arrangements and 
elite pacts can crumble under the pressure of internal and external factors (The Weimar 
Socioeconomic Development   
                   + 
Historical Experience  










urbanism and  
better 
communications 
	   	   	   DEMOCRACY 
	  	  
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  64	  
Republic is a good example). The one thing that is clear from the emergence of multicausal 
models is that democracy is not that easy to achieve and there is no unique formula to achieve 
it, rather, a combination of factors have to act together by influencing different spheres of social 
and political life for democracy to become, as famously put by Linz and Stepan, ‘the only game 
in town’ (1996: 5).  
 
2.4. The international dimension of democratisation 
 
It is probably safe to say that the days when international considerations were ignored are now 
behind us. There certainly is an increasing amount of literature on the international dimension 
of democratisation and on democracy promotion strategies that recognises the new 
opportunities that the change in the international environment of the 1990s has opened 
(Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 91). Yet, not so long ago there was a distinct lack of attention 
being paid to the international context during transitions to democracy (Pridham, 1991: 1); 
indeed there was a time when the international context in democratic theory was relegated to a 
footnote. This had much to do with the prominence of the nation-state as the unit of analysis in 
classical comparative politics. But it was also an indication of how democratisation theories 
have tended to focus almost exclusively on the question of causality. It has been argued that 
unless democracy is directly imposed as a regime (e.g. Post-war Japan), there is no point in 
considering the international in what is an inherently domestic process. At the same time, 
international influence is harder to quantify than economic development, institutional efficiency 
or even cultural/mass value changes. This undoubtedly has played a role in the omission of 
international considerations from democratisation theories. Although cases such as Southern 
and post-communist Europe, and even Mexico, clearly validate the notion that international 
factors impact on transitions to democracy in significant ways, early democratisation theorists, 
bar a few notable exceptions (Garrett and Lang, 1995; Pridham, 1991 and 1995; Whitehead, 
1986 and 1996), tended to either ignore (Ingehart; Inglehart and Welzel; Sidney and Verba; 
Przeworski and Limongi) or underestimate them (Boix and Stokes; Fukuyama; Higley and 
Burton; Huntington; Linz and Stepan). Again this is hardly surprising since democracy is by 
definition an inward-looking arrangement of political and social institutions, and as such, 
domestic factors will always play a more prominent role in democratisation. Most democratic 
transitions since the end of World War II have been processes dominated by domestic 
considerations, in which international factors have only been ‘conducive’ to change 
(Huntington, 1991: 58-108). Between 1945 and 2003 there are very few examples of 
authoritarian regimes being removed by force and replaced by democratic regimes; predictably, 
international causality has been rarely considered. The few who, particularly during the 1970s 
and 1980s, ventured into the unknown and tentatively explored the relationship between 
international considerations and regime transition, already called for an ‘“unscrambling” of the 
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international dimension, for vague references to the “international climate” as broadly positive 
or negative do little to facilitate the analysis’ (Pridham, 1991: 9). 
  
As a new era of democratisation studies dawns on us, however, it is becoming widely accepted 
that context matters. Multicausality and endogenoity are now accepted as reasonable 
explanations of why democracy is so hard to predict. ‘The conviction that many possible causal 
factors potentially operate in any given context’ (Franzese, 2007: 36) is in itself enough to 
challenge any theory that sees democratisation as a monocausal event. As said before, different 
approaches to democratisation that embrace this new principle have emerged in the last two 
decades (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996), and thus the attention put to 
the international dimension of democratisation has increased considerably. What is more, the 
academic interest in the international dimensions of democratisation has increased greatly due 
to the recent emphasis on policies of democracy promotion adopted by the United States, the 
EU and other democratic regimes (Brown and Kaufman, 2011:241). This in turn has led to a 
reformulation of democratisation theory in which the external dimensions of transitions to 
democracy are being seriously considered. Most of this recent work, though, focuses on 
democracy promotion instead of concerted projects of internationalisation. The apparently 
natural tendency that democracy has to ‘export itself’ has led, allegedly, to efforts to assist 
emerging democracies around the world. It is debatable whether or not democracies have to 
engage in direct activities that seek to export democracy or if democracies should settle with 
setting a good example. What is clear, though, is that policies of democracy promotion, 
assistance or diffusion are now being considered as elements in democratisation processes.  
 
Despite these developments, however, there is still a need to explore how specific projects of 
internationalisation interact with democratisation processes. The fact is that democracy 
promotion activities are not the same as, or indeed may not even look to increase, 
internationalisation. At the same time, it is also true that the so-called third wave 
democratisations are taking place in an increasingly interlinked world. In spite of how easily the 
concept is thrown around, there is a need to account for the fact that as ‘globalisation’ advances, 
the salience of international actors in domestic politics increases – and as countries become 
more intertwined the significance of the dynamics of internationalisation in the processes of 
democratisation have to be reconsidered. Starting from a definition of the political system as a 
‘patterned interaction of roles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical 
compulsion’ (Almond, 1956: 395) – in which roles are the groups (armies, bureaucracies, 
political parties, social groups, international context, etc.) conforming the system and the 
patterns are the orientations defining these interactions – one would be correct in assuming that 
changes in either the roles or the patterns (orientations) would translate into the transformation 
of the system. For example, ‘when the role of political communication is transformed by 
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technology this transforms the electoral process, political parties, etc.’ (ibid: 396-397). In a 
similar vein, the increase in the salience (a patterned interaction) of the international context (a 
role of the political system) must be transforming the system.  
 
With this in mind, there is evidence that suggests that international factors play an increasingly 
important role in democratisation processes, especially as socioeconomic development usually 
involves reforms that bring to the fore new cleavages sensitive to new international influences. 
If increased wealth, as argued by Lipset (1959: 83), ‘affects the political role of the middle class 
through changing the stratification structure’, we must ask why it is that an emerging middle 
class is likely to support democracy. As more internationalised elites sensitive to global 
developments emerge, so the explication goes, the old regimes find themselves unable to 
accommodate growing demands for access to international markets that are usually reserved for 
democratic countries (Holman, 1995: 35-39). As growth forces authoritarian regimes to 
internationalise their economies further they become more sensitive to ‘stronger pressures from 
Western industrialised democracies – and from their own elites trained in Western (especially 
US) Universities’ (Diamond et al., 1995: 22). Once authoritarian regimes can no longer provide 
the conditions for continuing development, they loose support from the elites and population 
alike, and a process of political reform is then set in motion. At this point, both old and new 
elites will try to gain support and legitimacy; the old elites will desperately try to prove their 
reformists credentials to show they are willing to secure democracy whilst the new elites will 
try to prove they are capable of delivering democratic reforms. Non-political elites (the business 
class, civil society leaders, NGOs, union leaders and the likes) will also be expecting a clear 
compromise with reform; the recognition of the democratising efforts in one country by other 
democratic nations has a big impact on the legitimacy that the new democratic regime will have. 
If a new democratic regime, for example, joins an IO that holds a democratic clause (regardless 
of the willingness of the IO to enforce such clause), it will go a long way to prove the 
democratic credentials of the new regime (Pevehouse, 2002). Once a country is accepted into 
the democratic international community, getting expelled from it again can have serious 
political costs.  
 
Regardless of how we choose to call this phenomenon, the fact is that as states become more 
interdependent, global events have a greater effect on national structures than ever before. The 
international debt crisis of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, were 
global events that had tremendous repercussions in domestic democratisations (Anderson, 1999: 
6). If transitions to democracy were exclusively domestic processes we could not speak of 
‘waves of democratisation’ since this term already implies that democratisations happen 
simultaneously in different countries. As international linkages grow so does the influence of 
international events. Following Linz and Stepan, we could refer to three different ways in which 
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internationalisation processes interact with transitions to democracy. First we should consider 
the direct impact foreign policies of regional hegemons have on their areas of influence; as 
mentioned earlier, the EEC’s collective pro-democratic policies in Southern Europe helped their 
democratic consolidations, whilst the USSR’s foreign policies effectively stopped transitions in 
Central Europe, and the United States’ foreign policy of containment allowed some 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America to remain in power for longer than they had to. The 
second aspect to consider is the international zeitgeist effect; when democracy is the dominant 
ideology in a given geographical region, democracy is more likely to spread to the non-
democratic countries in the region. The final factor is the diffusion effect, which refers to the 
principle that ‘the more tightly a group of countries are, the more a successful transition in any 
country in the group will tend to transform the range of perceived political alternatives for the 
rest of the group’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 73-76).  
  
The effects above mentioned clearly do not affect every country in the same way, if that were 
the case, democratic waves would be far wider and deeper. To better understand how the effects 
of external factors influence individual transitions we have to identify the varying levels of 
linkage to and the potential for leverage of other democracies in each case (Levitsky and Way, 
2005 and 2010). Leverage refers primarily to the ‘power’ a given democracy (or group of 
democracies) has over an authoritarian regime or the amount of pressure it is willing and able to 
put onto that regime to democratise. For example, if a regime is dependent on specific economic 
ties with, or direct aid flowing from a given democracy, that democracy can choose to exert or 
not exert substantial leverage in a push to democratise that country. Whilst leverage (i.e. the use 
of ‘power’ or the threat to use it) can increase the cost of repression, electoral fraud or other 
government abuses, thus playing a role in ending full-on authoritarian regimes, it is rarely 
sufficient to persuade regimes to fully democratise (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 22). When 
leverage is combined with international linkage to Western democracies it becomes a truly 
effective democratising factor. Unlike leverage, linkage works at economic, geopolitical, social, 
communications and civil society levels thus penetrating several areas of the state. Linkage not 
only raises the costs of undemocratic behaviour for the governing elites but also for everybody 
else. Businesses not only benefit financially from linkage but they also learn to play by 
democratic rules; civil society groups not only benefit from the support of organisations with 
similar aims in other countries but they also learn how to organise themselves better to defend 
democracy; a better educated mass of technocrats benefit from being part of a wide network of 
countries where they can perform their trade, expand their businesses or attend universities; 
wide sectors of society benefit from access to a wide range of information sources, 
entertainment, travel and technology. In short, ‘when linkage is extensive, international 
influences may be decisive, contributing to democratisation with highly unfavourable domestic 
conditions’ (ibid: 33). This is a key point to be developed later in the thesis since, by all means, 
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it seems clear that Mexico’s transition took place in a context of extremely high linkage but 
very low leverage (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 153-155), whilst Spain’s transition took place in a 
rather different context of high linkage and high leverage.  
 
2.5. Breaking the mould: from transition to consolidation, hybrid regimes and competitive 
authoritarianism  
 
It is essential for the objective of this thesis to analyse the different levels of success transitions 
to democracy can achieve; after all, the main premise of this thesis is that, despite the many 
current problems with the Spanish political and economic models, the Spanish transition has 
been, simply put, more successful than the Mexican. Undoubtedly, many of the recent pan-
European challenges have led to a diminished quality of the Spanish (and indeed other EU 
countries’) democracy. According to a recent report, ‘the erosion of sovereignty and democratic 
accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2011: 2) is to blame for this regression. Indeed, some critics of the European 
neoliberal model have gone as far as to propose the ‘Latinoamericanisation’ of Europe’s 
political system (El Pais 21/10/2012). Such a suggestion would have been unthinkable 25 years 
ago when political scientists could confidently – and with good reasons – claim that the 
Southern European experience with democratisation had been ‘a remarkable success, 
contrasting sharply with the record in Latin America’ (Whitehead, 1986: 38). Either way, if one 
looks at any of the many rankings that seek to qualify democracy, one would find that Spanish 
democracy is still faring a lot better than Mexico’s. Evidence put forward from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (table 2.1.) already suggests that Spanish ‘quality of 
government’ is higher than Mexico’s. Even more so, according to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index (table 2.2), Spain has been a ‘full democracy’ from their first report 
(2007) until their last (2011), albeit Spain has dropped a few places in the last year (from 17th in 
2010 to 25th in 2011) and is just holding on to its ‘full democracy status’. Mexico on the other 
hand has been consistently categorised as a ‘flawed democracy’ and has been unable to break 
into the top 50. Even more impressively, according to the Polity IV project Spain has 
maintained its status as a ‘full democracy’ since it reached it in 1977 whilst Mexico, having 
reached ‘democratic’ status in 1997, is yet to reach the ‘full democracy status’ (Polity IV, 
2011). At the same time, this data (as can be seen in table 2.3) shows the contrasting natures of 
both transitions; the Spanish signalling a clear break with autocracy whilst Mexico’s has been a 
protracted process. Just as indicative is the Freedom in the World index, which shows Spain as a 
freer country than Mexico since its transition to democracy in 1977 up until 2010 (table 2.4). 
This simple categorisation, however, cannot paint a complete picture and should not be 
considered as an ultimate guideline. One must not forget that this, just like any other typology, 
represents the arbitrary criteria of its methodology. Nevertheless, these indicators suggest that 
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the Spanish transition to democracy has been, in plain words, more successful. 
 
The end of the Cold War brought such an unprecedented increase in the standing, desirability 
and prestige of democracy that it almost became the uncontested regime of choice. The general 
view was that ‘under pressure from the forces of scientific and technical progress and market 
production, liberal democracy had triumphed, this time on global scale. Something like the “end 
of history” was unfolding before the eyes of the world’ (Keane, 2009: 699). This, at the very 
least symbolic, triumph was short lived; it soon became evident that many of the regimes that 
appeared so eager to embrace a democratic system were either not prepared or not willing to do 
so. This state of perennial democratisation – of which Mexico was something of a pioneer 
(Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 24) – led to a wide amount of literature that dealt with this 
phenomenon. It soon became evident that rather than dealing with regimes ‘moving’ towards 
democratic consolidation or towards democratic regression, these were a new type of ‘hybrid 
regimes’. Any number of adjectives describing these ‘hybrid regimes’ emerged in quick 
succession, including ‘electoralist’, ‘populist’, ‘delegative’ and ‘illiberal’. Of these sub-types of 
‘diminished forms of democracy’ it is probably the latter two that are best known. ‘O’Donnell’s 
notion of “delegative democracy” denotes a political system in which institutional checks and 
balances are weak or insufficient, allowing the executive to centralise power’ (Bernhagen, 2009: 
36); whilst Zakaira’s concept of ‘illiberal democracy’ refers to a similar notion but instead of 
placing the democratic weakness on the balances to the executive he places it on the rule of law 
and the protection of civil liberties (ibid). Although not without value, these interpretations still 
fail to define these new regimes in their own terms and are still being understood as somehow 
democratic, e.g. almost democratic but there is no accurate balancing of power, or almost 
democratic but the rule of law is not entirely upheld. I believe the use of adjectives to qualify 
democracy could imply that these regimes are striving to be democratic when this may not 
necessarily be the case. 
 
What is more, the use of adjectives to qualify democracy provides the non-democratic forces 
within these regimes a certain degree of legitimacy. Aguayo Quezada (2010a: 24), for example, 
argues that in the case of Mexico the reluctance shown by the academic community (he is very 
critical of Linz, Schmitter and O’Donnell) to label the PRI regime as outright authoritarian, 
unlike Franco’s Spain, gave the regime a certain amount of leeway with the international 
community. Although, he goes on to imply that there was some sort of hidden agenda behind 
the inability of the academic community to categorise the PRI regime, which seems rather 
unjustified, Aguayo Quezada does have a point. This explains in part why new typologies such 
as ‘competitive authoritarianism’ attempted to explain the functioning of hybrid political 
regimes where ‘elections were meaningful enough that they reflected much of the electorate’s 
preference even if they were still plagued by problems of fraud and manipulation’ (Brownlee, 
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2009: 130). Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010: 4), two of the earlier proponents of this new 
typology along with Larry Diamond (2002), have confidently declared that the ‘assumption that 
all hybrid regimes are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical 
foundation’, therefore concepts that reflect this reality ought to be developed. A clear advantage 
of using this intermediate categorisation is that it offers a theoretical framework that allows us 
to explain democratic evolutions. In this sense, although there will be some allusions in this 
thesis to democratic consolidation (during the sixth chapter in particular), this refers more to a 
mere chronological division (the stage that follows the alternation in power) than to an 
expectation of irreversibility. After all, recent evidence seems to back the argument that ‘even 
democracy in “developed societies” is neither unavoidable or irreversible’ (Merkel, 1998: 42). 
 
FIGURE 2.4. Democracy Index 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011. Measure five criteria (electoral processes, 
functioning of government, political participation, and civil liberties) on a scale from 0 to 10. The 
averages of these measurements are taken to get a final score; from 8-10 ‘full democracies’, 6 to 7.9 
‘flawed democracies’, 4 to 5.9 ‘hybrid regimes’, and 0 to 4 ‘authoritarian regimes’. 
 
However, it must be kept in mind that although competitive authoritarian regimes may be 
institutionally closer to democratic regimes it does not mean that there are any guarantees that 
they will ever become democratic. The main difference between democracy and competitive 
authoritarianism often relates to, although not always, the fairness of the election – in particular 
the need to have a level playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 7). This may seem to be less of 
an obstacle than, say, the whole reformulation of the state (à la post-Communist Europe) but 
that is not always the case. According to Steven Levitsky and Lican Way, Mexico went from 
being an ‘electoral authoritarian regime between the 1920s and mid-1980s’ to becoming a 
textbook example of competitive authoritarianism following the 1985 legislative race and 
finally culminating in a democracy in 1997 (ibid: 153) (this is, of course, highly debatable); all 
these political transitions took place in the electoral arena and through electoral reforms in what 
has been referred to as Mexico’s ‘voted transition’ (Merino, 2003). On the other hand, Spain’s 
transition took the country from authoritarianism to a strong market economy within the 
framework of integration into Europe, similar level of welfare indicators to Western European 




EIU Democracy Index: 2007-2011 
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levels, a robust democracy (Waisman, 2005: 1-3), an internationalised new bourgeoisie 
(Poulantzas, 1976) and a psychological transformation of Spanish society (Wiarda, 1989: 4)… 
and all without ever being anything like a competitive authoritarian regime (figure 2.2 clearly 
shows how Spain went from ‘autocracy’ to ‘full democracy’ between 1975 and 1980). Other 
examples can be found in the Middle East; the Iranian regime has been, for a number of years, 
seriously challenged in the electoral arena by a democratic opposition, whilst Mubarak’s Egypt 
did not face such challenges (Brownlee, 2009:131). Regardless, it is Mubarak who was 
forcefully ousted from the top of the Egyptian regime whilst Iran’s Islamist government seems 
to be gaining stability. This goes to show that competitive authoritarian regimes are not a 
‘halfway house’ where countries patiently work on their full ‘recovery’. Whether Mexico in 
particular has transited from authoritarianism to democracy via competitive authoritarianism, as 
claimed by Levitsky and Way, will be discussed in detail throughout the next chapters.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.5. Polity IV Project: Political Regimes Transitions and Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2010. A scale from -10 to 10 is applied; 10 ‘being full democracy’, 6 to 9 being ‘democracy’, 1 to 5 
‘open autocracy’, -5 to 0 ‘closed anocracy’, and -10 to -6 ‘autocracy’.  
 
FIGURE 2.6. Freedom in the World, Freedom House. The values are the average score between the two 
criteria measured by freedom House (Political Rights and Civil Liberties); 1 represents the most free and 
7 the least free.  
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CHAPTER III: Contrasting Internationalisations: ‘Critical junctures’ and Institutional 
Transformations 
 
This chapter marks the beginning of the analysis of the case studies. Whilst the previous two 
chapters have set the tone for the comparison and only touched on the case studies 
intermittently, this chapter will engage fully with the comparison of the processes of 
democratisation and internationalisation in Spain and Mexico. Having said this though, it has to 
be pointed out that this comparison will go from the general to the particular. With this in mind, 
this chapter will, first and foremost, present an overall comparison between the European and 
North American projects of regionalisation. The reasons for starting with this overall 
comparison are that, in the first instance, it will allow the readers to familiarise themselves with 
the context of the case studies, and it will also present a wider explanation of why a comparison 
between Mexico and Spain is justified. Although I do not disagree with the notion that the 
process of European integration – and its inherent process of Europeanisation – is unique in the 
way it formalises links of interdependence (Closa, 2001: 16-17), I do not agree with the idea 
that the process of European integration is so different to the North American process of 
regionalisation to render a comparison futile. In fact, the second part of this chapter analyses 
two institutional transformations (decentralisation and political parties) that were not exempt 
from being influenced by the two processes of internationalisation despite the clear differences 
between the two – particularly in their respective levels of institutionalisation. As the second 
part of this chapter will show, the fact that NAFTA was a weakly institutionalised project (in 
the sense that almost no institutions emerged from the agreement, nor were any transformations 
of the pre-existing institutions explicitly required) did not mean that joining NAFTA did not 
have some indirect repercussions on Mexico’s institutional arrangement. The analysis of the 
decentralisation processes in Mexico will evidence how its internationalisation project played 
some part (albeit rather limited) in this process. The main idea is that NAFTA, despite attempts 
to limit its repercussions at institutional level, had an impact (or at least increased the likelihood 
of international actors having an impact) in Mexico’s institutional evolution. What is important 
to note here is not if Mexico’s internationalisation had less of an impact at an institutional level 
(we can assume it did), but rather that the EEC’s stronger institutional framework helped shape 
these transformations in a more democratic way, whilst NAFTA’s weak institutionalisation and 
the United State’s (and Canada’s) lack of engagement failed to offer similar encouragement.  
 
3.1. Contrasting projects of regional integration 
 
Although it has been tried before (Gienaris, 1998; Pastor, 2001; Rosenberg, 1992; Sweet, 1999; 
Vega-Cánovas, 1999), more or less straightforward comparisons between North American 
regionalisation and the EU tend to either ignore or exaggerate historical and structural 
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differences between the regions, or tend to see the EU as a strict model of integration that is 
impossible to replicate, or simply have rather unclear methodologies (it is, for example, not 
clear what they are comparing or why (e.g. Sweet, 1999)). The two regions under analysis here 
are indeed very different in the arrangements, their goals and their capabilities. From its 
conception NAFTA was designed with the objective of developing a free trade block rather 
than, strictly speaking, a project of regional integration; something closer to the alternative 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that Britain launched in 1960 ‘in reaction to the 
establishment of the EEC’ (Pinder, 2001: 125) than to an EU type of organisation (Chanona, 
2003: 79). In any case, despite the many clear difficulties involved in a straightforward 
comparison between the EU and NAFTA, I find it necessary to open this analysis with a broad 
description of the similarities and differences between the two projects.  
 
First and foremost, however, it must be remembered that, despite the sheer size of the EU today, 
the process of European integration had a rather modest beginning and took decades to gather 
momentum. It is true that the process of European integration quickly unfolded after World War 
II but this was by no means the first attempt at constructing a federal Europe. Several attempts 
at reaching some degree of integration in the region were carried out long before the war. It 
would be fair to say that by the time a concrete institutional evolution towards integration was 
set in motion by the Treaty of Rome of 1951, a European ‘federalist movement’ had been 
‘building steam for decades, [or] even centuries’ (Dinan, 2006: 301). The Briand Plan of 1929, 
which aimed to bring about the ‘final liquidation of War’ (Stirk, 1996: 34) in Europe, is 
probably the most significant of these attempts. Aristide Briand, who served as France’s 
Foreign Minister between 1925 and 1932, already envisaged then a ‘moral union of Europe’ 
that would subordinate the economic problems to the political ones (Davies, 1996: 951). 
Briand’s plan did not have many immediate consequences as the Wall Street Crash and the first 
electoral success of the Nazis in Germany, which quickly followed the official launch of the 
plan in 1929, destroyed any hopes of it being taken seriously (ibid). What is more, even after the 
Second World War European integration did not enjoy anything resembling universal support. 
Some European federalists, and after 1947 a growing number of key American policy-makers, 
saw integration as ‘the only way to put an end to the continent’s recurring civil wars’ (Stirk, 
1996: 53). Yet at a grassroots level the idea was far from popular. During the war the Third 
Reich presented itself as ‘a guardian of European independence against American imperialism 
and Russian Bolshevism’ (ibid: 65) and appropriated the slogan of European integration. 
Somehow unsurprisingly then, the idea of integration remained tainted after the war (ibid: 51). 
Although popular support was eventually gathered, the initiation of the process of European 
integration was far from straightforward and has to be understood as an elite-driven process. 
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Once we consider the troublesome beginnings of the EU, drawing parallels between European 
integration and NAFTA may begin to make more sense. This is particularly the case if we 
consider that, as Robert Pastor (2004: 36-38) points out, both projects were originated by fear. 
The key difference is that Europe managed to move on from ‘negative integration’1 simply 
because the fear that motivated this process was greater than the one motivating integration in 
North America. In Europe integration was about survival (Pastor, 2004: 36; 2001: 8), whilst in 
North America it was about Mexico and Canada securing access to the United States market 
amid fears American protectionism was to re-emerge (ibid: 38). Although this may be one of 
the key differences between the two projects, there are, of course, other dissimilarities that have 
to be considered in the parameters that limit and shape integration in both regions (table 4.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Key differences in parameters of integration between  
NAFTA and EU. Based on Pastor, 2004: 37. Modified by the author. 
 
Despite these clear differences in the origins and objectives of both projects, we can find certain 
similarities in their respective (particularly early) evolutions. It is more or less accepted that the 
very first direct precedent of what is now the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), intended to achieve political objectives (i.e. avoiding war between France and 
Germany) through economic means. Within the framework of what was the very ambitious 
Schuman Plan of 1950, the ECSC was part of a ‘far reaching package of economic military and 
political institutions’ that would ‘form the foundation for a United States of Europe’ (Davies, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Pinder argued that although ‘negative and positive integration together compromise economic 
integration, whose end is economic union’ (1968: 90), the latter cannot take place without first going 
through the three stages of negative integration – a free trade area, a customs area and a common market 
(Vega-Cánovas, 1999:228). In other words, negative integration entails ‘the removal of discrimination’, 
whilst positive integrations refers to the ‘formation and application of coordinated and common policies 
in order to fulfil economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination’ (Pinder, 1968: 
90), i.e. an economic union in the first instance and total economic integration after that (Vega-Cánovas, 
1999:228). 
PARAMETER EU NAFTA 
1. Origin Trauma following the War and fear of 
continuing ‘civil wars’. 
Fear of losing access to the American 
market. 
2. Objectives Unity, solidarity and a common market Competitive markets and low tariffs. 
3. Policy towards 
regional 
imbalances 
Reduce and/or eliminate imbalances. No policy. 
4. Composition Equality amongst members; one 
member one vote 
Disparity.  
5. Security basis String structure through NATO and the 
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy/High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. 
Merida Initiative.  
6. Institutions and 
Sovereignty 
EU Parliament, Commission and 
European Council. Shared Sovereignty. 
Sovereignty resides with national 
governments; minimal institutions 
(Secretariat, ad hoc dispute 
settlement mechanisms and NADB). 
7. Ideology Coordinated market economy; welfare 
state. 
Free market and resolution of 
disputes/controversies within the 
parties. 
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1996: 1084). Although the military and political institutions failed to take off (NATO already 
provided a strong military framework and the Council of Europe had just started as a ‘weak’ 
form of political cooperation in Europe), the ECSC, which was by all accounts a success, still 
had clear political goals. The Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, spelled out what 
would be the overriding political objective of European integration. Its preamble clearly 
articulates that the ultimate goal was ‘to create, by establishing an economic community, the 
basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts’ and 
to ‘lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward 
shared’ (Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951). These few lines 
clearly stipulate that economic objectives were to be subordinated to what is, ultimately, a 
political goal. Yet, the treaty in itself is an economic arrangement limited to the production of 
Coal and Steel. Undoubtedly these were the two most important industries in 1951 and, 
arguably, a seemingly unresolvable source of conflict that stemmed from France and Germany’s 
natural tendency to seek control over the large iron ore reserves in Alsace and Loraine. But be 
that as it may, the Treaty of Paris was still primarily an economic agreement. 
 
At the same time, free trade and a customs union were not introduced until the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957, and the common market was not truly consolidated until the Single European Act 
(SEA) came into effect in July 1987. Indeed, before the SEA came into effect the European 
Community the Treaty of Rome founded was ‘still little more than a customs union, 
supplemented by an expensive and wasteful agricultural policy’ (Stirk, 1996: 208), and terms 
like ‘Eurosclerosis and ‘Europessimism’ were common terms used to describe the ‘dismal state 
that Europe was in’ during the 1970s (Griffiths, 2006: 187). On the political front the 
Community seemed unable to ‘develop a defence profile, or even to consolidate a common 
foreign policy’ (Stirk, 1996: 208). The Council of Europe, which was established as a parallel 
political process to that started by the Treaty of Rome, had no supranational power (Messenger, 
2006: 40) and had the ‘minimalist mandate’, mainly due to British reservations (ibid; Dinan, 
2006: 300-301), to ‘promote European unity by debate, publicity and research’ (Davies, 1996: 
1083). The pessimism was such that The Economist even decided to close its Brussels office in 
1982 and the cover of its now infamous 20th March issue of the same year mischievously 
announced the death of the EEC (Ludlow, 2006: 222). Greater political integration was not 
properly achieved until the late 1980s and early 1990s when, under the leadership of Jacques 
Delors, the Maastricht Treaty and the process of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were 
set in motion. It was this Europe, the Europe of ‘eurosclerosis’ and ‘Europessimism’ that Spain 
applied to join in July 1977. Considering all of the above, a comparison between the 
international dimension of the Spanish transition (undoubtedly dominated by the parallel 
process of integration with the EEC), and the international dimension of the Mexican transition 
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(similarly shaped by the country’s desire to integrate with North America) starts to make much 
more sense.  
 
Having said this though, the similarities between the process Spain embarked on when 
integrating with Europe and the process Mexico started when proposing North American 
integration, should not distract us from the equally significant differences. After all, the focus of 
this thesis is on the differences of the internationalisation projects rather than the similarities. A 
quick comparison between the carefully worded text of NAFTA, and the ambitious and 
exuberant text that delineated the grand vision for Europe in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome 
– which established the European Economic Community in 1957 – is all the evidence we need 
to convince us of the different context in which both projects set out. NAFTA’s preamble is, 
understandably, characterised by a sober tone that avoids any hint of it being, in any way, 
anything else than an agreement to ‘strengthen the special bonds of friendship and cooperation 
amongst the nations’ by creating an ‘expanded and secure market for the goods and services 
produced in their territories’ (North American Free Trade Agreement, 1992: preamble). The 
leaders of the three countries, in what has been described as a ‘potent symbol’, even signed the 
treaty (all five volumes!) individually in their respective capitals. All this helped reinforce the 
main sentiment behind NAFTA: Canada, the United States and Mexico ‘were together but also 
separate’ (Pastor, 2011: 54).  
 
In stark contrast, the Treaty of Rome, which followed the comparably grandiose style of its 
predecessor Treaty of Paris, looked to ‘strengthen the unity’ of the economies of the signing 
members ‘to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions’ (Treaty of Rome, 1957: 
preamble). In essence both treaties established a similar broad objective, i.e. to strengthen the 
unity, or at least the ‘bonds of friendship’, between the signatories by economic means. Yet, 
whilst the NAFTA text only goes as far as setting the objective of creating a ‘secure market’, 
the Treaty of Rome already establishes a desire to correct economic imbalances within Europe. 
What is more, whilst the NAFTA text does mention the rather ambiguous goal of creating ‘new 
employment opportunities’ and improving ‘working conditions and living standards’, it makes it 
clear that this goal will be the responsibility of each individual country ‘in their respective 
territories’. In other words, cooperation in these areas is off the table. On the other hand, The 
Treaty of Rome established the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which were created (the ESF in particular) ‘in order 
to improve employment opportunities for workers in the common market and to contribute 
thereby to raising the standard of living’. (Treaty of Rome, 1957: Art. 123). The social element 
embedded in the process of European integration will be analysed in detail in the sixth chapter, 
but for now it is important to point out that whilst NAFTA saw development as a problem of the 
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individual nations, the EU, from its very origins, considered development, employment, 
correcting imbalances and the raising standard of living as a common challenge.  
 
3.1.1 European multilateralism vs. ad hoc economic cooperation and ‘dual bilateralism’ 
 
Another significant difference that has to be acknowledged – and one that had some bearing on 
the transitions to democracy in both countries – is the multilateral nature of European 
integration vis a vis the distinctly ‘dual-bilateral’ nature of NAFTA. NAFTA is formally a 
trilateral agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada, yet nothing about the 
agreement seems to be trilateral in the conventional sense. In reality, the lack of any multilateral 
institutions in NAFTA, which is characterised (especially in comparison to the EU) by the 
asymmetry between the three countries (Pastor, 2011: 18), has led to the treaty functioning 
basically as two bilateral treaties: one between the United States and Canada, and another 
between the United States and Mexico. Mexico’s relationship with Canada before NAFTA was 
basically non-existent (diplomatic relations between the two governments were only established 
in 1944, whilst full diplomatic relations with the US were established in 1927 – even Argentina 
established diplomatic relations with Canada four years before Mexico did) and, although trade 
has increased since then, ‘the Mexican-Canadian leg of the triangle remains weak and 
overshadowed by the other two legs’ (ibid: 149). Similarly, according to a Special Task Force 
set up by the Council on Foreign Relations, by 2005 over 80 per cent of Mexican and Canadian 
trade was with the NAFTA partners, yet American trade with its North American partners 
represented less that one third of its total (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005: 1); this is a clear 
indication of just how much more important the United States is to Mexico and Canada, than 
Mexico and Canada are for the United States. 
 
What is more, the Special Task Force report fails to convey the bilateral nature of trade. In 2005 
Mexico’s exports to Canada (as table 4.2 shows) represented a mere 1.98 per cent of its total 
exports, compared with the staggering 85.68 per cent – over $214 billion – that exports to the 
United States represented. Even exports to the EU (4.27 per cent) represented a higher 
percentage of the country’s total exports, and exports to Germany alone were not far from those 
to Canada. Imports from North America to Mexico in 2005 were similarly dominated by the 
United States (representing over 95 per cent), whilst Canada’s share of the total imports was 
less than 3 per cent – behind Japan, China, Germany and South Korea. In real terms the EU was 
Mexico’s second biggest trading partner in 2005. Even if we were to consider the year 2000 
rather than 2005, when North America apparently reached its highest level of integration, we 
find that the dynamic in the ‘trilateral’ relationship was very much the same (table 4.2). The 
destination of over 88 per cent of Mexican exports was the United States compared to 2.15 per 
cent that were directed to Canada. Again even in 2000 – the very first year after the Mexico-EU 
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‘Global Agreement’ came into effect – total Mexican exports to the EU were higher than the 
exports to Canada.   
 
Figure 3.2.. Share of total Mexican exports and imports in 2000 and 2005. With data from the Secretaría 
de Economía/Subsecretaría de Comercio Exterior. 
 
Certainly there is much more to international relations and internationalisation than trade, and 
thus the data presented above only looks at part of the picture. It is also true that the sheer size 
of the American economy explains why the United States has been and will be, at least for the 
foreseeable future, the biggest trading partner for both Canada and Mexico. Having said this 
though, the dual bilateral nature of trade in North America does indicate there is a worrying 
disparity. After all, the American economy and market are certainly larger than Canada’s, but 
neither the United States economy nor its market size (population) is 40 times the size of 
Canada’s. Factors such as geography and a distinct lack of infrastructure help explain these 
uninspiring figures. Yet this cannot be the sole reason. Indeed, political leaders in both countries 
have preferred to focus on a bilateral agenda with the United States rather than focusing on a 
trilateral approach. Although some timid attempts were made during the early stages of NAFTA 
to develop a stronger relationship between the two nations, both Canadians and Mexicans, 
weary of hurting the sensibilities of the colossus, quickly returned to the bilateral nature of the 
relationship (Pastor, 2001: 13). Leaders in both countries were unwilling to serve the others’ 
purposes or, indeed, neither government was willing to raise American suspicions that their 
collaboration was intended to undermine the position of the United States in the region (ibid).  
 
The diplomatic links between Mexico and Canada compared to those with the United States 
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other. Today Mexico has only five consular offices in Canada (Calgary, Leamington, Montreal, 
Toronto and Vancouver) compared to the almost fifty consular representations it has in the 
United States – including representations in Anchorage, Alaska (with a population of less than 
300,000) and Little Rock, Arkansas (with a population of less than 200,000) – plus the newly 
established ‘mobile consulates’ that serve smaller communities around the United States’ 
territory. Again, the sheer number of Mexicans residing in the United States explains this 
enhanced presence but there is no doubt where the priority for Mexico lies. Similarly, Canada 
has only two Consular offices in Mexico (not including the consular section of the embassy) 
compared to the fourteen in the United States (again ignoring the consular section of the 
embassy). Although the main function of the Consular offices is to provide assistance to their 
respective nationals and undertake other administrative procedures, they also serve as points of 
contact for businesses and individuals.  
 
Further evidence of the clear priority Canada and Mexico give to their bilateral relation with the 
United States over the relation with each other can be seen in their Ambassadorial 
appointments. Compared to the sequence of Mexican Ambassadors to the United States since 
the late 1980s, which includes two former Finance Secretaries (Gustavo Petrocioli Iturbide and 
Jesús Silva-Herzog Flores), a former Energy Secretary and then Director General of Pemex 
(Jesús Reyes-Heroles González-Garza), and currently the former director of the Mexican 
intelligence services (CISEN), former Attorney General and Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom (Eduardo Medina Mora), the list of Mexican Ambassadors to Canada in the same 
period is, shall we say, far less impressive. It includes a former governor of Chiapas (Jorge de la 
Vega Domínguez), a couple of career diplomats (Alfredo Phillip Olmedo and Sandra Fuentes-
Beraine), and, probably most telling of all, a certain Ezequiel Padilla Couttelonc, who served as 
ambassador to Canada between 1998 and 2001. The appointment of such a low-key figure at a 
time when NAFTA was in its heyday is rather telling. Padilla Couttelonc was neither a career 
diplomat nor a particularly high-ranking politician. Before taking the role as Ambassador to 
Canada, he was a Tourism Undersecretary, an Ambassador to the Netherlands and then to 
Switzerland, and he ended his diplomatic career as a General Consul in Dallas, Texas. Indeed, 
according to the Mexican publication Proceso (3/4/1993 and 19/4/1986), his career probably 
benefited greatly from his family ties to the PRI (he is the son of the former Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs under President Manuel Ávila Camacho). In short, the appointment of such a 
figure to the Embassy in the United States would be unthinkable, and thus helps us understand 
the value the Mexican government puts on its relationship with Canada. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum we have the process of European integration, which has been, 
from its outset, a clearly multilateral process. Certainly the immediate objective of the process 
of European integration that was set in motion in the 1950s was to deal with the geopolitical 
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propensity France and Germany had to go to war. As such, the initial steps towards integration 
had France and Germany at the very core. The Schuman declaration of 1950, for example, 
which launched the plan of the same name, explicitly referred to this immediate objective. After 
recognising that ‘Europe will not be made all at once’, the declaration proposed that ‘the 
coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of 
France and Germany’, and that any action taken in the direction of integration ‘must in the first 
place concern these two countries’. This in itself does not seem to be a call for multilateralism 
but rather a call to create a bilateral agreement. However, the Schuman Declaration also 
proposed the creation of a High Authority to regulate the production of coal and steel, and 
extended the call to join this institution to ‘the other countries of Europe’ as a ‘first step in the 
federation of Europe’. This High Authority would be managed by a number of ‘independent 
persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation’, and by a chairman who 
would be chosen ‘by common agreement between the governments’. It finally envisaged that 
the decisions of the High Authority would ‘be enforceable in France, Germany and other 
member countries’. By committing to respect a common High Authority formed by nine 
individuals from the signing countries, which did not impose any sort of quotas based on size of 
the country or production of Coal and Steel (the only limitation was that the High Authority 
could not include ‘more than two members having the nationality of the same state’ (Treaty of 
Paris, Article 9)), signified a clear commitment to multilateralism by the ‘bigger’ states. 
 
Although in recent times some commentators have claimed – and with good reason – that 
Germany has come to ‘dominate’ the EU, which has in turn led to a ‘cultural dominance’ of the 
Eurosceptic discourse in the rest of Europe (Beck, 2013), it would be hard to accept that the 
multilateral nature of the process of European integration has been replaced by an asymmetric 
relationship dominated by Germany (or any other state). Even after the Single European Act 
(SEA) began the process of replacing unanimity voting by a qualified majority voting system in 
the Council of the UE, the system remains clearly multilateral. The rules and distribution of the 
votes established in the Treaty of Nice (2001) – although to be changed by the Treaty of Lisbon 
from 2014 – may have ended unanimity voting for good but the system remains multilateral; 
‘with a qualified majority of over 70 per cent of the 237 votes, any three of the largest four 
[Germany, France, UK and Italy] could still block a decision’ (Pinder, 2001: 38). Even two of 
the big four backed by one middle-sized country (Spain or Poland) and one of the smaller 
nations (Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia or Lithuania) could still block some decisions.  
 
What is more, at the time Spain was seeking accession there was not a single country that, as 
arguably happens today, dominated the EEC politically or economically. Similarly, no single 
nation in Europe dominated Spanish trade in a similar way the United States dominated 
Mexican imports, exports and FDI during its transition to democracy. Although trade with the 
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EEC and then EU grew considerably, trade with Europe as a whole did not dominate Spanish 
trade in a similar way (figure 4.2). By 1985, the year before Spain’s accession, the EEC of 12 
was already Spain’s biggest commercial partner, yet, according to Eurostat data, it only 
represented 52 per cent of total exports and 36.6 per cent of imports. These percentages grew in 
the next decade to 68.9 per cent exports (or ‘dispatches’ to be more accurate) and 63 per cent 
imports (‘arrivals’) in 1996. By 2005 these figures grew even more to 72.4 per cent and 64.2 per 
cent respectively, but this had probably more to do with the EU enlarging than with any 
significant change in trading patterns. At the same time, Spain has established fairly even 
trading relations with the major countries in Europe. The gap in the trade between Spain and its 
two biggest European partners (France and Germany) has never been significant (figure 4.2). 
Equally telling is the fact that the United States has also remained a major trading partner for 
Spain since the 1950s. Again, I understand that there is more to international relations than trade 
but, if we take these figures as an indicator, together with the institutional structure of the EU, it 
is clear to see that the process of European integration Spain embarked on was – and still is – a 
distinctly multilateral process.  
 
It is clear, then, that the whilst the process of European integration has been dominated by 
multilateral strategies and dynamics, North American integration has been a ‘dual bilateral’ 
process which is politically and economically dominated by the United States. This is, to an 
extent, to be expected given the asymmetry between the three countries; but it was not 
unavoidable. What is more, this almost paranoid bilateralism has hindered the opportunities of 
democratic forces in Mexico to gain international support. As we will discuss in the next 
chapters (particularly the fifth and sixth), once it became clear the usual agents of democracy 
promotion in the United States (USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and 
the main political parties) were not going to get involved with the democratisation of the 
country, Mexico’s opposition parties and other democratic forces were left to their own devices. 
Although economic aid has always had something of a bad reputation in the United States 
(Miller and Stefanova, 2004: 513), this is hardly the case in Canada. Despite being one of the 
biggest contributors of international aid in the world, Canada has showed little interest in aiding 
Mexico’s development. According to OECD figures, during the first years after NAFTA came 
into effect (1994-2000) Canada was one of the highest providers of aid in the world, providing 
more development aid (as percentage of GDP) during these years than the United States, France 
or the Netherlands, whilst only the UK, Spain, Japan and Germany outspent them (OECD Stats, 
2013a). Yet Mexico received little help. This is hard to explain especially if we consider that 
even other Latin American countries with similar levels of development have actually received 
more aid than Mexico – last year (2012), for example, the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) spent twice as much in aid programs in Brazil ($3.66 million) and Colombia 
($3.27 million) as it did in Mexico ($1.44 million) (CIDA, 2011-2012). In short, Canada has 
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shown little interest in getting involved in Mexico’s social, economic or political development, 
which left the United States as the sole actor able to implement any leverage or provide any 
support.  
 
Figure 3.3. Share of total Spanish exports and imports in 1985, 1996 and 2005. With data from Eurostat 
(2011), and Buisán and Gordo (Banco de España) (1997). 
 
In stark contrast, Spanish opposition forces, again as we will see in the fifth chapter, had a wide 
array of options and possibilities, and successfully managed to build support networks all over 
Europe. This meant that even at times when one or some of the member states cooled down 
their support for Spanish democracy or accession into Europe, there was always somewhere to 
turn to. When François Miterrand unilaterally stopped negotiations over concerns with the CAP 
and access to fishing waters (Michalski, 2006: 284), for instance, Spain could still count with 
the enthusiastic support of West Germany – despite it being clear at that time that it would be 
the Germans who would have carry a large share of the financial burden of Spain’s accession. A 
key German political objective had long been to strengthen the southern flank of NATO, whilst 
German businessmen were just as eager to gain unrestricted access to an increasingly 
competitive Spanish market (Tsoukalis, 1978: 441). What is more, whilst the PSOE, for 
example, benefited from links to other socialist parties in Germany and Sweden, the Spanish 
right under the banner of the newly reformed Partido Popular (PP) benefited from cooperation 
with other centre-right parties around Europe. The multilateral nature of the EU allowed many 
member states to get involved in supporting the emerging Spanish democracy. The ‘dual 
bilateral’ structure of NAFTA meant that once the United States decided not to get involved, 
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the increasing integration with two major democratic centres, were left with fewer resources 
from international democracy promotion actors than their Spanish counterparts. 
 
In fewer words, then, NAFTA and the wider process of integration in Europe are very different, 
yet not so different that a comparison between the two becomes useless. Despite movements in 
Asia towards greater integration on trade issues, for example, the EU and NAFTA remain the 
only two trade regimes that ‘represent coherent and formidable entities’ (Pastor, 2011: 16). 
Although I would not go so far as agreeing with the notion that by 2001 North American 
integration had almost reached ‘the levels of integration that Europe achieved after five 
decades’ (ibid: 9), one cannot deny that between NAFTA’s implementation in 1994 and the 
EU’s enlargement of 2004, North America was the largest trade regime in territorial size, gross 
production and per capita GDP (ibid: 16). As we have seen though, this in itself does not mean 
that NAFTA and the EU share any organisational or institutional characteristics. In fact, as 
Robert Pastor rightly points out (2001: 9), any comparison between NAFTA and the EU should 
not originate from the assumption that Europe developed the ideal model for regional 
integration, but one should instead consider if ‘there are elements of its experience that NAFTA 
could learn from, adapt and adopt’. In any case, the objective of this and the next chapters is not 
to develop a straightforward comparison between NAFTA and the EU but rather to assess how 
the differences between these two projects influenced the democratic transitions in Spain and 
Mexico. Having already analysed one of those key differences, i.e. the multilateral nature of the 
EEC and the ‘dual bilateral’ nature of NAFTA, it is time to turn our attention, first of all, to 
other key differences in the way the EEC/EU and NAFTA helped shape, rather than make, the 
Mexican and Spanish democracies.  
 
3.2. A Note on institutional inertia and macrosocial change. 
 
‘Change is seen as the consequence (whether intended or unintended) of strategic action 
(whether intuitive or instrumental), filtered through perceptions (however informed or 
misinformed) of an institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors and perspective 
over others. Actors then appropriate a structured institutional context which favours certain 
strategies over others and they do so by way of strategies they formulate or intuitively adopt. 
Such strategies are, in turn, selected on the basis of an always partial knowledge of the structures 
(the institutional context) within which the actors find themselves and they anticipate the 
behaviour of others’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955-956). 
 
Before moving on to the analysis of the more direct impact the North American and the 
European contexts may have had in Mexico and Spain’s respective democracies, this thesis will 
develop a brief comparison between some institutional transformations. The reason is simple; as 
we have seen in the previous section, despite some similarities between NAFTA and the EU, 
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the differences are still considerable. Probably the biggest difference between the two projects is 
their respective level of institutionalisation; whilst the European project is characterised by a 
strong institutional framework that requires perspective members to embark in a wide-ranging 
process of institutional adaptation (Europeanisation), NAFTA is characterised by an extremely 
weak (not to say non-existent) institutional structure that, more often than not, makes 
cooperation and coordination between the three countries harder to achieve. Yet, despite this 
strong difference, as the rest of this chapter will show, NAFTA played some part in opening 
opportunities for institutional transformation, which is, as will be argued, no small feat. 
 
First of all, we should bear in mind that institutional arrangements are by definition reluctant to 
change. This makes the analysis of the influence internationalisation projects may have in 
changing institutional arrangements even more important. With the probable exception of 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s model, all of the theories of democratisation analysed in the second 
chapter attribute history a secondary role; modernisation, culturalist and even multicausal 
explanations of democracy tend to view history as a secondary factor that merely limits or 
influences political outcomes. However, following the influential work in economic institutions 
from Douglas North and other path-dependence scholars, a new type of historical 
institutionalism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. In general terms, historical institutionalism 
shares many of the characteristics of path-dependence understood in its narrower sense, which, 
according to Paul Pierson, is very different from its broader understanding. In a broad sense 
path dependence is synonymous with the phrase ‘history matters’; the process by which 
‘previous events in a sequence influence outcomes and trajectories but not necessarily by 
inducing further movement in the same direction’ (2000: 252). Modernisation and culturalist 
explanations of democracy adhere to such a broad conception; history influences outcomes but 
in more or less unpredictable ways.  
 
The narrower understanding of path-dependence though is what probably shapes historical 
institutionalism – which is according to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, one of the ‘three new 
institutionalisms’ in political science (1996). This theory of political evolution is influenced by 
the idea of increasing returns. The process of increasing returns basically proposes that ‘the 
probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path’. This 
is simply because the further you go one path the cost of ‘exit – of switching to some previously 
plausible alternative’ (Pierson 2000: 252) increases exponentially2.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In statistical terms ‘increasing returns’ is explained by Polya’s urn model; imagine an urn with an x 
number of white balls and a y number of black balls, then pick out one of those balls, observe what colour 
it is and put it back in the urn. From that information we could make certain assumptions of what will 
happen next time we repeat the dynamic. If we were to repeat this ten times we would get a certain 
distribution of black to white balls. If we repeat it another ten times we would probably get a different 
distribution, and then another ten times a different distribution, etcetera. In Polya’s model however, every 
time a ball of a particular colour is drawn, that ball is put back in the urn along with another ball of the 
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Political institutions reinforce certain patterns of behaviour and dictate political outcomes. 
Mancur Olson’s famous logic of collective action (1965) has already explained that overcoming 
the ‘free rider’ problem for new organisations can be extremely difficult if all the members are 
not receiving direct benefits (e.g. public interest groups). Hence, the cost of setting up new 
institutions or organisations – particularly those that look to influence the distribution of public 
goods (such as political parties or new levels of government) – tends to be very high. So, it 
could be inferred that ‘whether you put energy into developing a new party, or join a potential 
coalition, or provide resources to an interest group may depend to a considerable degree on your 
confidence that a large number of other people will do the same’ (Pierson, 2000: 258). 
Conversely, your expectation of other people ‘doing the same’ will in great measure depend on 
what you can predict others will do. These predictions, according to historical institutionalist 
advocates, are fundamentally based on the institutions that already exist. Whether one 
understands institutions as mere ‘formal arrangements’ or as broader ‘culturalist’ constructs is 
irrelevant to this basic dynamic. If institutions are understood from their strictly formal 
approach, they still allow individuals (as strategic maximisers) to predict to some degree of 
certainty ‘the present and future behaviour of other actors’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 940). This 
allows individuals to make decisions by reaching some sort of ‘Nash equilibrium’. If one 
understands institutions as more than formal rules – i.e. considering the role of informal 
institutions in constraining behaviour ‘by norms passed across generations through early 
socialisation’ (Jackman and Miller, 1996: 635) – and sees individuals as more than strategic 
maximisers, then institutions provide a lesser degree of certainty when it comes down to 
predicting the behaviour of other actors. But one can still get ‘strategically useful information’ 
of how actors will behave based on the influence institutions have on their ‘very identities, self-
images and preferences’ (ibid: 939). Thus, no matter how we define institutions, what is true is 
that they will have an impact on how individuals will behave when it comes down to creating 
new institutions or changing existing ones. This is, in essence, why widespread institutional 
change is very hard to achieve. Having said this though, historical institutionalists tend to reject 
the idea of rational actors being guided in their decision-making by mere maximising rationales 
(Hay and Wincott, 1998: 954). Either way, it is institutions that shape strategic actions from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
same colour. We could then make different assumptions for the next time we draw a ball. In this model 
the contents of the urn are changing and there is a clear reinforcing dynamic. Probably the most common 
example of this dynamic at work comes from the QWERTY keyboard experience. This keyboard was 
initially designed, or so the folktale goes, to actually slow down typing since the very first typing 
machines were prone to jamming if many keys were hit in quick succession. To avoid this problem, an 
awkward key arrangement was developed. Once producers and consumers alike accepted this peculiar 
arrangement of keys, and even when modern computers that could process unimaginable amounts of data 
were being developed, the cost of changing to a more efficient keyboard would have been enormous. The 
way the QWERTY keyboard has survived is not that dissimilar to how many institutions have proved 
resilient to change. 
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certain actors, and it is this fact that confirms the reinforcing nature of historical 
institutionalism. 
 
Obviously this vision of political development has many points of contention. Probably the 
most obvious one must be the limited importance it places on agency. Colin Hay and Daniel 
Wincott (1998) explain how, despite claiming to be somehow different from path-dependence 
theories, historical institutionalism still remains a structuralist theory that all but ignores the role 
of free agency. An extreme view of institutionalism does not allow for any deviance from the 
selected path. If, for some reason, actors behave in a way that seems contrary to what formal 
institutions would dictate, then it must be down to the cultural institutions that shape 
individuals’ perceptions ‘of what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable’ (ibid: 957). 
Historical institutionalism seems to take Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy to 
such an extreme that it ends up doing exactly what Schumpeter warned us against, i.e. ‘ignoring 
the role of leadership’. After all, if the elites’ actions can be predicted based on institutional 
(structural) incentives then there is no real leadership involved in that process. As we will see in 
the fifth chapter, however, actions taken by the key actors during the Mexican and Spanish 
transitions were of paramount importance and, what is more, actors in Spain and Mexico 
reacted differently to institutional contingencies.  
 
On the other hand though, institutionalists from all dispositions tend to pay even less attention 
to the role society in general may play in political change. According to historical 
institutionalism, institutions not only dictate behaviour but also distribute economic and 
political power. Institutions allow and limit ‘access to strategic resources, and indeed to 
knowledge of the institutional environment’, which invariably leads to an uneven distribution of 
both resources and knowledge (Hay and Wincott, 1988: 955-956). Once this uneven 
redistribution is institutionalised it follows the same reinforcing dynamic as other institutions; 
the elites that enjoy access to resources and knowledge are the only ones who have a realistic 
opportunity to change the institutional arrangements that would distribute resources better. 
Obviously though, they lack the incentive to do so (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 83-87). 
This helps explain why consolidating democracy can be such a daunting project. As we will see 
in the cases of Spain and Mexico, arriving at a stage when non-democratic elites were willing to 
accept change was not easy. What is more, this is a very short window of opportunity that can 
close very quickly, and, as the increasing return principle explains, real democratic change 
relies heavily on the initial strategic decisions that are taken. A factor that needs to be 
considered in this very delicate balance of strategic calculations that explains why some actors 
reacted in a specific way (be it in favour or against democracy), is the international context. In 
other words, the influence of the international context on the elites’ actions can be referred to as 
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what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call ‘small differences’, whilst transitions to democracy 
are what they would consider ‘critical junctures’. 
 
With this reinforcing dynamic in mind, let us briefly analyse two specific ways in which the 
international context played a part in transforming (or at least shaping) institutions in Spain and 
Mexico. Bearing in mind that the interaction between elites calculations and internationalisation 
during the transitions to democracy in Spain and Mexico will be analysed in detail in the fifth 
chapter, the cases to be analysed in this chapter (decentralisation and the political party system) 
will paint a more general picture of how the two projects of internationalisation influenced 
institutional changes. As just described, institutional change is not easy to achieve and the 
consequences of internationalisation can often be significant when the possible outcome is far 
from straightforward. 
 
3.3 Shaping not making democracy: internationalisation and institutional change. 
 
A main premise of this thesis is that much as Europe has historically been considered (as 
famously put by José Ortega y Gasset) the answer to the problem of Spain, Mexico’s 
development since independence has been moulded by the clashing forces towards economic 
integration with the northern hegemon and the need to develop a nationalism of its own 
(Castañeda, 1988: 14).  
 
This section, then, focuses on certain institutional transformations that, albeit not directly 
related to the process of democratisation itself, were, in varying degrees, transformed by Spain 
and Mexico’s attempts to redefine their international roles. The fact that we are referring here to 
‘indirect influences’ does not mean that these institutional transformations were less receptive to 
international pressures, or indeed any less important. In fact, we could say that the influence of 
internationalisation on specific institutional designs is, certainly in the case of Europe, the most 
obvious one. Although I will touch on other institutional transformations inherent in the process 
of internationalisation, I will begin my analysis with the decentralisation processes and the 
transformations in the political party systems in Spain and Mexico simply because most of these 
have been researched extensively elsewhere – the literature dealing with Europeanisation is 
particularly broad – and also because these only played an ‘indirect’ role in shaping (rather than 
making) the democracies of our case studies. Again, what I mean here by ‘indirect’ is not a 
synonym for ‘accidental’; the dynamics to be analysed may be indirectly related to the transition 
process itself but, as I have said before, these can make some real differences in the quality of 
the resulting democracy.  In any case, briefly analysing these variables will help us set the tone 
for the rest of the thesis, help illustrate the point made before about how the international 
context can influence the delicately poised conditions that usually accompany institutional 
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change, as well as further reinforce the main point of this thesis – that in cases like Mexico and 
Spain, where projects of regional integration have overlapped with democratisation processes, 
we have to consider the role internationalisation played in shaping the outcome of the transition. 
 
3.3.1 Decentralising power 
 
As I said before, Europeanisation could be understood as the process of institutional adaptation 
(or convergence) inherent in European membership. Europeanisation, it is fair to say, is 
different from any other internationalisation project or indeed relationship of interdependence, 
simply because it formalises these relationships in institutional arrangements (Closa, 2001: 6). 
In the case of Mexico, of course, we cannot speak of a similar process simply because NAFTA 
did not require the creation of any formal institutions or, indeed, the explicit transformation of 
the existing ones. This is not to say, however, that certain institutional and systemic 
transformations did not occur as an indirect consequence of internationalisation; it does mean, 
however, that a correlation is harder to establish. The next few pages will, then, briefly analyse 
how these institutional transformations were, in some cases subtler than in others, influenced by 
regional integration.  
 
A good place to start is a brief analysis of how the new Spanish regional arrangement – 
following democratisation – has had an impact on the ‘reformulation’ of the Spanish state, as 
well as the way policies and institutions emanating from the EU have influenced this 
‘reformulation’ (Börzel, 2000 and 2002; Montero, 2001). These developments can be compared 
to the seemingly ‘chaotic’ process of decentralisation that took place in Mexico as the PRI 
regime continuously weakened (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 241-244; Guillén López, 2010; 
Peschard, 2010; Tuckman 2012: 52-83), and the part that the signing and implementation of 
NAFTA may have played in initialising this process. The main argument is that, considering the 
weak institutionalisation of the State of the Autonomies in Spain, the EU played an important 
role in stabilising or normalising the relationship between Madrid and the Autonomies (Börzel, 
2000 and 2002). On the other hand, the process of economic integration with North America 
contributed towards greater regional inequality within Mexico – the poorly developed road 
network in Mexico has hindered the chances of the southern states to seriously benefit from free 
trade with the United States – thus contributing towards the emergence of some caciquismos. 
More importantly though, whilst the EU has created an incentive for the Spanish Autonomies to 
cooperate with each other and with the central government, NAFTA contributed towards a 
shrinking of Mexico’s central state that although signified a loss of control over territory 
(alternation in power at state and municipal level intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s) 
did not necessarily contribute towards the democratisation of government at state and municipal 
levels, or towards improving the interaction between the different levels of government. In 
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essence, during the early stages of the transition, gubernatorial and municipal level 
appointments were used as tokens to negotiate political gains. The gubernatorial race for the 
government of Guanajuato in 1991, for instance, ended with an electoral victory for the PRI 
candidate – Ramón Aguirre Velázquez – but after a campaign of contestations and mobilisation 
orchestrated by the PAN’s defeated candidate – Vicente Fox – Guanajuato’s governorship 
eventually went to the PAN (although not to Fox). This was clearly the product of a backroom 
arrangement rather than an actual electoral process (Peschard, 2010: 71-72). Victories at state 
and municipal level also served as political capital during negotiations at the federal level, 
which was the real arena where the political forces battled for access to power. This led to a 
stronger institutional democracy at a federal level but a considerably weaker one at the local 
level.  
 
In authoritarian regimes power is, by definition, heavily centralised, which leads to local and 
regional governments becoming mere symbols of the regime without any actual power. As 
democratisation progresses, power becomes decentralised and returns to the local and regional 
levels. In the case of Mexico, municipal and state governments remained firmly under the 
control of the PRI’s strict vertical structure. Before the PAN’s electoral triumph in three 
municipal elections in Chihuahua (Ojinaga, Julimes and Belisario Domínguez) in 1974, there 
had been only two opposition governments at any level: the case of the Unión Civíca Leonesa 
(UCL) in Guanajuato 1945 and then the ‘Navista’ movement in San Luis Potosí 19593. What is 
more, in Mexico the centralisation of power was exacerbated by an exaggerated presidentialism 
that portrayed the head of state as an omnipotent yet accessible figure that was responsible for 
fixing even the smallest of problems. This carefully crafted idea of a sympathetic and powerful 
president, willing to fix even the smallest of problems, encouraged the average citizen to aim 
their petitions as high as possible, thus completely bypassing local governments and rendering 
them useless (Craig and Cornelius, 1980: 351-353). NAFTA played a somewhat indirect role in 
changing this dynamic. By allowing some localities to gain access to resources outside of the 
federal government’s control, and thus helping minimise the damage of having a non-PRI 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The case of the UCL is particularly interesting due to its incredible success. Although not without 
success of its own, Salvador Nava’s challenge of the PRI structures was more about a PRI member 
challenging the local cacique. Once Nava ‘broke the rules of the system’ and tried to challenge for the 
state government – buoyed by his success at the municipal level – his movement was swiftly repressed 
(Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 163). On the other hand, President Ávila Camacho accepted the victory of UCL’s 
candidate, Carlos Obregón, in the local elections of León Guanajuato after widespread repression – 27 
murders and more than 60 injured in the days following the fraudulent December 1945 elections (ibid: 
161) – and what effectively constituted a suspension of power at state level failed to demobilise civil 
unrest. What is more, the United States government reacted negatively to the developments in 
Guanajuato; the then United States ambassador to Mexico reported back to the State Department on the 
negative effects electoral fraud and subsequent repression could have as a destabilising influence in the 
still unconsolidated Mexican regime. Even the FBI launched its own investigation over the episode, 
concluding that the Mexican Army had acted to quash a post-electoral struggle (Loaeza, 2013). However, 
the UCL never managed to build on its victory and once Obregón’s term was over, the government 
disbanded the organisation and comfortably regained the municipal government (Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 
161). 
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government, NAFTA contributed towards the alternation in power at local level. From the mid 
1980s and the early 1990s, for instance, Mexico’s cities near the United States border started to 
take a more active role in the environmental issues affecting this region. Since NAFTA’s 
implementation there has been a surge of programmes managed by border localities thanks to 
North American Development Bank (NADB) and the Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission (BECC). The NADB and the BECC are the only development institutions 
emerging from NAFTA and their mission is to ‘address environmental issues on the US-Mexico 
border’ (NADB website); as such, they provide ‘financial assistance to public and private 
entities involved in developing environmental infrastructure projects in the border region’ 
(ibid). To date the NABD has provided over $1.22 billion in loans for projects in the border 
region and 95 of the 177 projects funded have been on the Mexican side of the border. This 
allowed border cities to access resources from the NADB and not depend entirely on the federal 
government to fund projects. However, the impact of NADB and BECC projects remains 
marginal and these are, for the most part, rather unknown organisations on both sides of the 
border.  
 
During the negotiation stages of NAFTA and the debate over its benefits in the United States, 
the Salinas administration and other business interests reportedly spent at least $30 million on 
what was described by the Center for Public Integrity (2006, 16) – an independent think tank – 
as the ‘largest foreign lobbying campaign in [United States] history’. The Mexican Diaspora 
was identified as a useful asset in the PRI’s PR campaign and the Home Town Associations 
(HTAs) were developed to try to get them involved (Ayón, 2010). The idea was to engage the 
Mexican community in the United States whilst keeping them away from criticising the regime. 
The best way to achieve this was by getting them involved in localised projects. The Salinas 
administration conjured the two-for-one plan in which the federal government matched 
donations from the Diaspora to their communities back in Mexico. This also allowed some 
municipal governments to access resources outside the federal patronage. As remittances from 
Mexican immigrants in the United States surpassed oil as the number one source of dollars in 
the country, it became clear that the effort to get the Diaspora involved in local affairs had 
worked. This helped raise the profile of some state and municipal governments, which have 
gone since the transition to democracy, ‘from a subordinate role to one of increasing political 
autonomy’ (Guillén López, 2010: 189). Nevertheless, although NAFTA gave the opportunity to 
some local governments to access resources outside the PRI’s patronage, these were 
concentrated in a handful of northern localities and in the states with a high number of 
emigrants (e.g. Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán and Hidalgo).  
 
Finally, although not a direct effect of NAFTA but certainly a consequence of Mexico’s 
increasing receptiveness to foreign trends, there is an argument to be made about the influence 
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the ideas of the New Public Management school had in Mexico’s process of decentralisation. 
As Mexico’s internationalisation project advanced and as the state kept getting smaller, the new 
Mexican policy-makers (as we will see in the fifth chapter, mostly educated in the United 
States) and technocrats joined the zeitgeist of the time. Almost overnight, governance and 
efficiency in policy implementation became relevant, whilst much of the focus was on 
decentralisation of power and policy innovation at local level. In 2001, the Ford Foundation – in 
cooperation with the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas – awarded five different 
municipalities in Mexico the Premio de Gobierno y Gestión Local worth $250,000 Mexican 
Pesos each (around $27,000 dollars at the time), in recognition of their contribution towards the 
institutionalisation of good governance at municipal level, as well as the promotion and 
development of better democratic practices (Premio Municipal website). The Ash Centre for 
Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University had, also funded by the Ford 
Foundation, established a very similar award in the United States – the Innovations in American 
Government Award – in the mid 1980s with the objective of incentivising the development of 
innovations at subnational level (although this changed in 1995) (Ash Center’s website). Similar 
awards and organisations – all closely linked to the principle of efficiency in policy making and 
implementation – also started to emerge in other Latin American countries around the same 
time (such as Peru’s ‘Participation and Local management Program’ and the ‘Public 
Management and Citizenship Program’ in Brazil). The emergence of such awards in Mexico 
evidences an involvement in the transnational trends of the time, but is also evidence of, at the 
very least, the increasing attention that was being paid to local governments in Mexico. 
 
Despite this focus and effort to promote decentralisation, it is no longer clear if the rise in power 
at state and local levels was actually a positive development for Mexico’s democracy. Sergio 
Aguayo Quezada (2010a: 191-197) argues that as Mexico’s governors now control so many 
resources outside the scope of federal control, they can be real players in the federal elections 
and, more often than not, they tend to abuse this power. The notion that the PRI losing control 
of increasing parts of the country could only be positive for democracy is no longer an 
undisputed fact. The uneven evolution of decentralisation in Mexico has on the one hand led to 
an increase in the relevance of the state governments by increasing the amount of resources they 
control, but on the other hand has not completely eliminated the clear dependence politicians 
have on the centre (be it the presidency or the central authority of the party) to advance their 
political careers (Montero, 2001b: 49-50). So whilst many political leaders now see 
governorships as an important step, the fact that there is a strict no re-election rule for these 
posts means that governors are still dependent on the presidency or the leadership of their 
parties (all three main parties remain heavily centralised) to advance their political careers. 
What all this means is that, similarly to Spain’s process of informal redesign of its State of the 
Autonomies, Mexico’s transformation to a real federalist state is a process ‘guided more by 
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informal negotiations among key actors than by any clear roadmap or desired outcome’ (Guillén 
López, 2010: 188). Unlike Spain, however, this chaotic process has contributed toward the 
survival of pockets of authoritarianism inside Mexico. 
 
This uneven decentralisation, was accelerated by the need to reduce the size of the central state 
if Mexico was to complete its economic internationalisation, has had negative repercussions for 
Mexico’s democracy. The fact is that whilst opposition forces were consumed by their priority 
of changing the electoral rules at national level, the electoral rules at state level have not moved 
at the same direction (Peschard, 2010: 68-69). Some states, particularly those which political 
parties felt were their ‘strongholds’ (such as the PAN in Jalisco or the Partido de la Revoulción 
Democrática (PRD) in Mexico City), introduced important electoral reforms as they sought to 
gain political legitimacy without risking losing the power which state governorships now gave 
them (ibid: 78). Yet many other states have not undergone widespread electoral reform. This 
duality in the democratic evolution has had serious consequences for Mexican democracy 
overall. In those states where democracy has not made the same inroads (such as Guerrero, 
Chiapas, Mexico State and Tamaulipas) (Índice de Desarrollo Democrático de México, 2012), 
citizens tend to have a more negative view of the whole system and are far more disengaged 
(Hiskey and Bowler, 2005). Since they do not interact with democratic institutions on a daily 
basis, the development of a democratic political culture in these states is unlikely. An 
authoritarian local environment potentially undermines ‘any impact positive national-level 
changes may have had on levels of system support in democracy’ (ibid: 58). In other words, as 
long as democracy does not advance from the national to the local, authoritarian experiences at 
local level will have an impact on democracy at the national level. 
 
Even more so than in Mexico, the transition to democracy in Spain had huge repercussions for 
the way the state was organised. A strong central and undividable Spanish state was one of the 
main tenets of Francoism. Once the regime was dismantled, there was a need to redesign the 
state in order to accommodate the many grievances of the regions, which was by no means a 
straightforward endeavour. Tanja Börzel (2002) describes how the Europeanisation of 
policymaking in Spain contributed to the strengthening of a dual federalist model over 
intergovernmental competition in the State of the Autonomies. Unlike most federal states (but 
similar to Mexico), the weakly institutionalised nature of Spain’s regionalisation (or ‘open-
endedness’) had encouraged competitive bargaining between the central government and the 
different Autonomous Communities, and among the Autonomous Communities themselves 
(Colomer, 1998: 40; Montero, 2001a:152-159). Unlike in Mexico – where contrary to most 
‘third wave’ democracies ‘subnational processes of political opening preceded the arrival of 
democracy at national level’ (Hiskey and Bowler, 2005: 58) – in Spain the devolution of power 
was effectively initiated only after the transition was achieved at national level; thus although 
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decentralisation and democratisation advanced at roughly the same time, the local/regional 
arena was not a ground where democratic improvements were being gained or lost 
(Encarnación, 2008: 102-103). In short, if judged exclusively ‘by the degree to which the state 
has been decentralised’, it would be ‘easy to declare that Spain’s autonomías system [has been] 
a success’ (ibid: 105).  
 
Yet there is a negative dimension to this process too. Whilst in Mexico decentralisation opened 
opportunities for non-democratic forces (caciquismos) to hold on to the power structures of the 
old regime, in Spain decentralisation opened similar opportunities for regionalist parties to 
further advance their projects of autonomy (ibid: 107). The few institutions that were supposed 
to promote cooperation or mediate between the regions that emerged during the transition, were 
not actually designed to function as a federal state; the arrangement in the 1978 Constitution is 
the result of a process of ‘rational choice’ within the ‘framework of consensus’ (Balfour and 
Quiroga, 2007: 48), which partly explains the weak institutionalisation of the State of the 
Autonomies. The Constitutional Court, for instance, can be an arbiter between the centre and the 
regions but only on issues limited to the actual legality of proceedings, whilst the Senate was 
not designed to be a chamber of territorial representation as such, but was rather conceived as an 
easy way to ‘give some Francoist politicians a chance to retain parliamentary seats’ (Colomer, 
1998: 49). Thus despite Spain technically not being a federal state, the amount spent by the 
central government as a percentage of GDP between 1995 and 2008 averaged only 18.74 per 
cent – only marginally higher than Germany’s 14.25 and the second lowest level in all of 
Europe (Eurostat, 2013). Despite regional and local governments clearly controlling a huge 
percentage of overall total spending, Spain does not have the sort of institutional arrangements 
that facilitate cooperation, negotiation and coordination. Just as happened in Mexico, 
decentralisation has been more about pacts and ad hoc negotiations than actual institutional 
evolutions. 
 
European membership, however, somehow contributed to improving the structures of 
cooperation between the different levels of government. As policy competencies are transferred 
to the EU, the distribution of resources between the Spanish central state and the regions is 
essentially transformed, ‘thereby increasing the mutual interdependence between the two levels 
of government’ (Börzel, 2002: 18). Although this may not seem to have had a direct effect on 
democratisation, the Europeanisation of policy implementation has helped the Spanish State of 
the Autonomies develop a more functional decentralised political system. Besides the obvious 
benefit of facilitating good governance – a particularly important factor if the sort of 
disenchantment with democracy that can threaten the regime is to be avoided – in Spain an 
effective distribution of power strengthened democracy not only by bringing local independent 
institutions closer to the citizenry, but also by facilitating the access to power to individuals and 
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political forces not linked to the regime or the traditional opposition (Powell, 2001: 240). What 
is more, by offering a new structure of political opportunities to the regions (i.e. access to 
resources bypassing the central state), the EU has helped correct an imbalance that existed in the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978. Decentralisation was considered a contentious issue during the 
Constitution’s negotiations as the Francoists regarded the integrity of the Spanish state as a sin 
qua non for participating in the transition; conversely the historical nationalities (primarily the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) had suffered the most under Franco’s repression and 
were eager to gain some sort of autonomy. Hence, decentralisation was only half-heartedly 
negotiated and resulted in a very loose institutional framework that rewarded competitive 
politics over cooperation (Field and Hamann, 2008: 16). Although initially membership with the 
Community opened ‘lobbying opportunities’ to the regional governments and provided a clear 
incentive for the regional governments to ‘expand their command over economic policy’ 
(Montero, 2001a: 150), cooperation amongst the regions and between the regions and the State 
soon increased as it became evident agreements had to be reached in order to access European 
funds and influence; thus cooperation over European issues has been far more common than 
over any other strictly domestic issue (Börzel, 2000). Unlike the Mexican case, then, the 
negative consequences of an uneven and almost impromptu process of decentralisation in Spain 
– although still far from perfect – were ameliorated by the necessity to cooperate at least on 
European issues.  
 
3.3.2 Political parties, party system and foreign policy  
 
There is also evidence that suggests Europe had a ‘normalising’ effect in the Spanish system of 
political parties as a whole, and on the Partido Popular in particular (Román Marugán, 2001). 
The transformation of the Spanish political party system is the perfect example of how the 
process of European political and social integration indirectly helped transform a part of the 
political system, specific institutions and the political culture of a country. It is clear that ‘since 
the democratisation of the Spanish system, the right has undergone a series of rapid ideological 
and organisational changes’ (Llamazares, 2005: 315), and evidence suggests that an important 
facilitator for these changes has been the process of European integration. The framework of 
institutional Europe was the perfect space for manifestations of the ideological and political 
redefinition of the Spanish right. One of the most striking effects of the Europeanisation of the 
PP was its embrace of neo-liberal economic models and the abandonment of ‘the ambiguous 
attitudes towards markets and capitalism that historically characterised Spanish conservatism’ 
(ibid: 322). While democratisation almost always leads to a centripetal tendency amongst 
political parties, in the case of the Spanish right, European politics became a core element in its 
ideological, organisational, and structural transformation. The success of the political right in 
moving towards the centre following Aznar’s centralisation of the old Alianza Popular (AP) 
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under the new PP structure in 1989 was extraordinary. The destitution of Manuel Fraga as 
leader of the party symbolised a ‘staged’ break with Francoism. In what is usually perceived as 
an electoral strategy to appeal to a larger portion of the population, the PP joined the European’s 
People Party (EPP) in 1989 and fully adopted the traditional centre-right, moderate view that 
characterises the European Christian Democratic parties. At the same time, the EPP’s self-
positioning as part of ‘the political family of the centre-right’ with roots that ‘run deep in the 
history and civilization of the European continent’ (EPP website), provided the PP with an 
opportunity to enter fully into the European debate whilst continuing its ideological path 
towards the centre. 
 
Up until that point, the Spanish right had been more focused on internal scuffles than on 
European integration. Although never openly against EU membership, the AP tended to have a 
very critical approach towards any UCD or PSOE policies regarding Europe. By changing its 
position on European integration and ending its European ostracism, the PP not only 
transformed itself ideologically but also presented a credible centre-right alternative to the 
Spanish electorate. The emergence of a credible opposition to the PSOE sparked political 
competition and a serious debate over European policy. What is more, Spaniards began to 
define themselves on more traditional left/right political orientations. According to data from 
the WVS, whilst in 1981 more than 30 per cent of the population could not place themselves 
anywhere in the political spectrum and only 17 per cent declared themselves to be centrists; by 
1990 almost 25 per cent of the population considered themselves to be centrists (raised to 28 per 
cent in 1995), and the respondents who placed themselves in the centre-right of the spectrum 
accounted for 22 per cent of the total (an increase of more than 3 per cent from 1981).  
 
The other parties, however, were by no means exempt from a moderating European influence. 
European integration was, as we will see in the next chapters, a common goal for virtually every 
political party. As the parties prepared for the first democratic elections in 1977, the debate was 
not whether Spain should join Europe, but rather which party offered the best strategy to 
achieve this. All the main parties (PSOE, Partido Comunista Español (PCE), AP and UCD) 
looked for foreign (mainly European but in the case of AP also from the United States) 
endorsements; the PSOE brought leaders from abroad, Carrillo made public appearances with 
other prominent Eurocommunist leaders such as the Italian Enrico Berlinguer and the leader of 
the French Communists Georges Marchais, whilst Federico Silva – one of the founding 
members of the AP – was sent to Munich by his party to meet the German Christian Democrat 
Franz Strauss (Edles, 1998: 57). This obsession with seeking approval from other European 
main parties helped to moderate the positions of the political parties themselves – no 
mainstream European party would have lent their support to radical or anti-democratic groups in 
Spain – but also contributed towards the eventual ‘approval’ of the European Parliament of the 
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Spanish process of democratisation, which was so important in legitimising the transition (ibid: 
58). 
 
The transformation of the PSOE into a party capable of governing also stands out (Ortega Ortiz, 
2008: 152-155). In order to understand how and why the PSOE had to change, we have to 
consider that the memory of the Civil War was a strong conditioning factor in the transition to 
democracy (Aguilar, 1997 and 2000: 303). There is a certain degree of consensus around the 
idea that the transition to democracy in Spain was a relatively peaceful process, because a 
sentiment of ‘never again’ prevailed amongst the population (Varela Ortega, 2000: 152-155). It 
was in this atmosphere of ‘conciliation over confrontation’ that the PSOE and the PCE had to 
enter the electoral arena. As we will see in the fifth chapter, even with different strategies, both 
the PSOE and the PCE had been the historical oppositions to the regime, and many of their 
members and activists had personally endured Franco’s repression. Trying to appeal to a 
majority of centrist voters without alienating their base was a balancing act for both parties. 
Whilst the Communist, under Santiago Carrillo tried to appeal to the general population by 
finally renouncing Leninism and joining the Eurocommunist movement, the PSOE, under the 
leadership of Felipe González, used its links with European social democratic parties 
(Germany’s SPD and Sweden’s Social Democrats) to boost their democratic credentials (Ortega 
Ortiz, 2008: 135). As we will see in detail in the fifth chapter, whilst the PSOE represented the 
external opposition, it was the PCE who took a ‘hands-on’ approach to opposing the regime. 
Although a laudable approach, this meant that, when the transition arrived, the PCE was still 
regarded by most Spaniards as an anti-systemic party that could destabilise the whole 
democratic process. Considering the events surrounding the 1981 attempted coup, one could 
argue that the Spanish electorate was not far off the mark; if the PCE had done better in the 
1979 election (the PCE got a mere 10 per cent of the vote), it is hard to predict how the armed 
forces would have reacted. Despite the PCE’s best efforts – unlike its Greek and Portuguese 
counterparts the PCE declared itself solidly pro-European (following economic, political and 
geopolitical considerations) since it was legalised in 1977 (Alvarez-Miranda Navarro, 1994: 
163) – they could not rely on the recognition in Europe that the PSOE had, which was so 
helpful in convincing the electorate they were prepared to govern. But we should still not 
underestimate the stabilising and depolarising effect EEC membership had on the PCE, and on 
the wider Spanish political party system; in Spain, unlike Greece and Portugal for instance, by 
the time of the first democratic elections on 1977 all three main parties could be considered to 
be pro-European and not one was anti-systemic (ibid: 166).  
 
In Mexico the reformulation of the political party system (and the parties themselves) is 
probably a more important feature than for Spanish democracy. After all, as is said repeatedly, 
the architecture of the Mexican transition has been designed by the struggles between political 
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parties in the arena of electoral institutions. A big part of the PRI’s success was owed to its 
ability to institutionalise a subsystem of political parties that took part in its non-competitive 
elections (Prud’homme, 1994: 31). Transforming this system was always going to be a priority. 
This explains why the IFE is such a respected institution (as said in the first chapter, the IFE 
advisors helped design the new electoral institutions in Iraq). Yet the IFE and the electoral 
tribunal still ‘rely on the good will of the parties themselves’ (Prud’homme, 2010: 53). Despite 
the efforts that have been made to de-politicise the electoral institutions, the political parties 
remain firmly in control; not only do they choose the rules of the game they are playing, but 
they also choose the rewards and the resources available. Unsurprisingly then, with the 
exception of the post-2006 electoral challenge, since 1996 political parties have shied away 
from pushing electoral reform; they all believe they can still benefit from the prevailing 
conditions, thus the status quo is maintained (ibid: 53). Although the 1996 electoral reform 
completely transformed the political landscape by radically increasing the capabilities of 
opposition parties, it did so by granting them huge access to public resources. The public money 
spent by political parties in 2000 (over 3.3 billion Mexican Pesos) was more than five times 
higher than in 1997 (639 million Pesos) (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 132) – and we are talking 
here only of official figures. In a country where corruption is rampant, the political parties are 
not keen on self-regulation and had become the ‘brat children’ of the transition; the reported 
spending of over 150 million Pesos of public money in the last ten years seems to fall short of 
the real amount (ibid: 235).  
 
Despite the obvious need to restructure the party system, there is no evidence that suggests the 
international context, and the United States in particular, supported in any way the opposition 
parties during the transition or, indeed, the redesign of the electoral laws after the transition. 
What is again striking about this lack of engagement, is that the United States (through USAID 
and the NED) has not shied away from supporting democratic opposition parties or financing 
institutional transformations elsewhere. Drawing on the precedent of the German political 
parties who, as just mentioned, have long provided aid to their counterparts in democratising 
countries (Pangle, 2009: 6), NED and USAID took an increasingly active role in supporting 
democracy through political assistance (ibid: 7) in democratising countries. According to one 
estimate (Finkel et al., 2008: 83), USAID invested over $50 million in ten years supporting 
Democracy and Governance4 in Mexico, which would, according to that same study, translate 
into an improvement of roughly 1.2 points in Freedom House’s general democracy index 
(Finkel et al. 2006: 83). Although these figures are significant, we should consider that 
Colombia received over US$100 million from the same organisation in roughly the same time 
(Finkel et al., 2008: 70), whilst Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, El Salvador and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I.e. supporting elections, civil society, independent media, the rule of law and more transparent and 
accountable governance (USAID – Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Office website). 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  98	  
Guatemala in the Western Hemisphere, and countries like South Africa, Indonesia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania in other regions all 
received more aid from USAID than Mexico did in roughly the same time period (ibid). What is 
more, the total amount invested by the United States in democracy promotion ‘remains a 
relatively small proportion of total U.S. development assistance, which in turn is a relatively 
small portion of its GNP when compared to almost all other advanced industrial democracies’ 
(Finkel et al., 2008: 83). In short, it would be fair to say, whatever aid Mexico received from the 
United States in this instance was far from overwhelming.  
 
Yet, probably more important than financial support, Mexican opposition parties did not enjoy 
the sort of backing from their counterparts in the United States as Spanish parties did from 
theirs in Europe. Although this is mere speculation, it would be fair to assume that a more 
proactive approach from, say, the Democratic Party may have helped the PRD consolidate its 
position as a ‘responsible left’, and thus avoid the democratic ‘semiloyalty’ that has at times 
characterised it – such as the period following the 2006 elections, when despite being the 
second biggest party in Congress and governing Mexico City, the PRD found itself weakening 
the very same democratic institutions it had fought for and being a quasi anti-systemic party 
(Silva-Herzog Márquez, 2010: 305). James McCann’s analysis (2009) of the attitudes of 
Mexican voters to foreign leaders, for instance, indicates that the views of the electorate towards 
specific foreign leaders (e.g. Bush and Chávez) can help us classify individual voters along the 
left-right ideological spectrum. Although this obviously does not mean that foreign leaders have 
an actual impact in shaping ideological orientations in Mexico, it does indicate that the Mexican 
electorate is well aware of foreign developments. Although it is hard to know what impact, if 
any, José María Aznar’s ‘interference’ in the 2006 electoral process (when he publicly praised 
the PAN and compared López Obrador with Hugo Chávez) may have had on the outcome (ibid: 
269), there is no doubt that, at least, the public were aware of Aznar’s standing and what he 
represented. Similar signs of support from established democratic parties in the United States 
and Canada towards opposition parties in Mexico would have certainly not gone unnoticed – 
particularly at a stage when the very same process of internationalisation had contributed to the 
weakening of the PRI.  
 
As a final consideration of the influence integration into Europe had on the institutional front, it 
is worth mentioning the significant changes in Spanish foreign policy. Clearly as Spanish 
ostracism was coming to an end, its foreign policy was bound to change in order to adapt to the 
new realities of democratic life. However, there is evidence that suggests that Europe may again 
have played a role in this process. The right’s traditional foreign policy view changed radically 
as the PP joined the EPP; it went from ‘inwards’ nationalism towards a more mainstream 
European view of ‘outward-looking’ nationalism (Varela Ortega, 2000). Clear evidence of this 
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new vision of the PP’s foreign policy outlook came when the Aznar government decided to 
support the United States led invasion of Iraq. Ironically, it was a decision that alienated Aznar 
from the European ‘core’, but it would not have happened under traditional Spanish right wing 
foreign policy principles. The ‘Europeanisation’ of Spanish foreign policy can also be seen as a 
simultaneous process of logical ‘convergence’ of interests with its European neighbours, and a 
process of ‘transfer of problems’ from the national to the EU level occurs (Torreblanca, 2001). 
Whilst North America, on the other hand, faces similar foreign and security challenges (drug 
trafficking, migration flows, a porous borders, etcetera) no real convergence or cooperation at 
the higher level has taken place other than the Mérida Initiative. Although an important step, of 
the $400 million that the United States invested in the Initiative in 2008, about one third was 
destined towards strengthening judicial institutions or the rule of law (Benítez Manaut, 2009: 
231-233), whilst the vast majority went towards military/law enforcement spending. Albeit no 
weaponry is included in the Initiative, the funds are being used mainly for surveillance 
equipment and intelligence operations in the fight against drug cartels; since the military has 
taken over this responsibility, we could consider the majority of the funds available from the 
Mérida Initiative as military aid. If we then consider that the United States granted almost 2.4 
billion to Israel and nearly $1.9 billion to Egypt in military financing in the same year (Sharp, 
2010: 4-6), then we can get a clear idea of how high of a security priority the southern border is 




The first part of the chapter dealt with the very obvious differences between the process of 
European integration and that of North America. I also, however, presented some key 
similarities that, albeit far from obvious, help us understand why Spain joining the EEC and 
Mexico signing NAFTA were similar processes that might have influenced their respective 
transitions to democracy in a similar way. The argument that NAFTA and the EU are simply 
too different to be compared denotes, to an extent, a very one-dimensional understanding of 
both projects. Certainly North America is not Europe, and as such cannot follow the same 
integration paradigm. Yet there are many similarities that not only justify a comparison, but that 
also indicate that there are lessons to be learned from the European experience. There is little 
doubt that in Europe, ‘national political systems have become porous as bureaucracies, interests 
groups and even political parties have established transnational linkages and direct their 
activities toward EU institutions’ (Vega-Cánovas, 1999: 226). Whilst, in stark contrast, the 
integration process in North America has been characterized by ‘lower levels of negative, or 
market integration, with a minimum of shared institutions’ (ibid: 228). I insist, the fact that there 
may certainly be some lessons that can be learned from the process of European integration 
does not mean that it is a process that is likely to be replicated elsewhere. The objective of this 
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thesis, however, is not to offer a direct comparison between the two processes of integration and 
neither is it to propose that North America will (or even should) follow the European path. The 
objective of the description of the two processes of integration was to show the similarities 
between the ways Spain and Mexico internationalised. In particular how, despite the differences 
in the original objectives of both processes of integration, the EEC that Spain applied to join in 
1977 was not entirely dissimilar to what NAFTA has been since its conception.  
 
The second part of the chapter focused on one of those highly relevant differences between the 
two processes, which is key to explaining why European integration was a far more relevant 
factor in Spain’s democratisation that NAFTA ever was in Mexico’s. The dual-bilateral nature 
of NAFTA very much implied that it was, in essence, a treaty between the United States and 
Mexico. By failing to develop the third leg of the triangle, Mexico and Canada did not 
substantially increase interdependence or even cooperation. Despite Canada and Mexico sharing 
some strategic considerations in North America, as well as sharing the same goal of avoiding 
outright American dominance in the region – both having been direct sufferers from American 
expansionism and defining their own brand of ‘exceptionalism’ against the backdrop of 
American influence (Inglehart et al., 1996: 13; Taylor, 2001: 26), the linkage between the two 
was not truly raised by the agreement. Despite the signing of NAFTA serving as a ‘catalyst for 
steady growth in ties between Canada and Mexico’, there is no doubt those in Canada that hold 
the view that ‘the nation should distance itself from Mexico and trilateralism in order to focus 
more fully on its relationship with the United States’ have prevailed (Green and Graham, 2012: 
1-3). This view was summarised back in 2008 by Diane Francis, a prominent centre-right 
commentator in Canada:   
 
‘The problem is Mexico … Three-way trade has been beneficial for all concerned. But Canada's 
relationship with the U.S. should be decoupled from Mexico's so that the two rich neighbours 
can take the next important step, which is to form a customs union. This would be mutually 
beneficial, but is not happening because Mexico is not ready for this due to poor governance and 
deep socio-economic impediments’ (Financial Post 4/3/2008).  
 
Since there was, thus, no real increase in the linkage between the two, there was really no 
increase in the leverage potential Canada could apply to Mexico to democratise, nor was there 
really any desire to develop it. This is in complete contrast to how the process of European 
integration works. The asymmetry that characterises NAFTA may explain why further 
integration between the United States and Mexico was unlikely, but it does not explain why 
these two countries became far more integrated than Mexico and Canada. Geography may 
explain this in part but it is only half the story. Spain managed to develop an internationalisation 
project that did not depend on the strategies of a single government. The multilateral dynamics 
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of the EEC allowed Spain to look for allies in different places at different times. Even when 
Mitterrand’s government decided to unilaterally stop negotiations, Spain could always count on 
support from Germany and other European countries. The multiple centres of power around 
Europe, as we will see in the next chapters, intervened in the process of democratisation at 
different stages. Mexico’s democratic forces, on the other hand, depended solely on the United 
States for international support. When it became clear that the United States had no interest in 
supporting the emergence of a democratic regime in Mexico, the opposition forces were very 
much left without any viable source of foreign support. 
 
Finally, this chapter presented, following a methodological note on institutional transformations 
overall, an analysis of two institutional adaptations influenced by Mexico and Spain’s 
internationalisations, and which had an indirect influence on the shape of the democratic 
regimes of both countries. While decentralisation is not a necessary condition for 
democratisation, when this does take place it is important to minimise the possible conflicts that 
may emerge from it (such as the emergence of new political alliances that disrupt the fine 
balance of new democracies, a possible loss of control over spending and an increase in public 
debt (Montero, 2001a: 163)). As said before, when poorly carried out, decentralisation can 
create further problems for the new democratic regimes at a time when they can ill-afford to be 
perceived as incapable of governing efficiently. The EEC/EU partly and indirectly helped the 
Autonomous Communities and Madrid find common ground for cooperation. NAFTA and the 
wider context of internationalisation, on the other hand, did play a part in accelerating the 
process of decentralisation of power in Mexico but did not contribute towards facilitating the 
changed interaction between the different levels of government. At the same time, whilst 
increasing liberalisation was opening new opportunities to the opposition parties in Mexico, 
pro-democracy forces in the United States and Canada – albeit Canada has, as said before, long 
ignored developments in Mexico – failed to support them. On the other hand, the EU worked as 
a platform from which the AP/PP could redefine itself as a responsible centre-right party and it 
contributed towards the overall moderation of the political party system, whilst individual 
European parties and their leaders took an active role in supporting their respective counterparts 
in Spain. 
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CHAPTER IV. Internationalisation, Modernisation and Democracy in Spain and Mexico 
 
Modernisation theory, its variations and its place in the democratisation literature have already 
been briefly discussed in the second chapter, but there is a need to analyse it in further detail. 
After all, modernisation theory – the supposed correlation between development and democracy 
– has undoubtedly tended to dominate the debate on democratisation. Before going into the 
specific relationship between development, structural contingencies and democratisation 
processes, let us first briefly review the main tenets of modernisation theory and how it relates 
to our projects of internationalisation. As said in the second chapter, classic modernisation 
theory (Durkheim, 1933 [1997]; Lerner, 1958; Schumpeter, 1942 [2011]: 296-297; Weber, 1905 
[2003]) is not necessarily concerned with explaining democratisation. Rather the earlier 
versions of modernisation are more of ‘a conception in which society, economy and polity are 
systemically interrelated, integrated by an overriding value consensus, and subject to increasing 
specification and differentiation of social structures’ (Huber et al., 1993: 71). In fewer words, 
modernisation is the understanding of social, economic and political evolution (what Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005: 1) refer to as ‘human development’ in their revised version of modernisation 
theory) as a linear process. In this linear process, as Moore explains, the principles of capitalist 
development and democracy are, at least in some cases, intrinsically intertwined as they are 
both ‘directly antithetical’ to the principles they originally supressed during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, i.e. the idea of ‘divinely supported authority in politics, and production 
for use rather than for individual profit in economics’ (1966 [1993]: 19-20). The main tenet of 
modernisation is thus that the guiding principle of capitalism – i.e. that  ‘unrestricted use of 
private property for personal enrichment necessarily produces through the mechanism of the 
market steadily increasing wealth and welfare for society as a whole’ (ibid) – develops 
alongside the necessary political structures for it to thrive. Economic, political and social 
developments are part of a single linear process characterised by economic liberalism and 
political democracy. Many democratisation scholars then, based on Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
breakthrough work (1959), and taking advantage of new methodologies and technology, have 
developed specific linear explanations for democracy in which ‘the level of economic 
development correlate[s] positively with democracy’ (Huber, et al., 1993: 71). 
 
Although this very basic principle has been analysed and questioned many times before by 
studies following the two main traditions of democratisation studies – large-n statistical analysis 
and small-n comparative studies – there is still no consensus on what the relationship between 
level of development and democracy actually is. There is not even a consensus amongst those 
who agree that there is some sort of correlation. On the one hand, there is a ‘weak version’ of 
the argument (a weak version of modernisation if you wish) that ‘claims that increased levels of 
economic development are associated with democracy’ (Landman, 1999: 607), whilst on the 
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other, there is a ‘strong version’ of modernisation that suggests that ‘economic development 
causes democracy’ (ibid). And there are also those who see economic development as a 
consequence of political institutions rather than the other way around (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012). This strict institutionalist view, often sees democracy as the cause of a number of 
positive developments other than a better economic performance; some of the expected 
consequences of democracy include better consolidated state institutions, better established 
legal structures, domestic and international peace – Kant famously saw democratic governments 
as a condition for his ‘Perpetual Peace’ – and better redistribution and/or welfare institutions 
(Carbone, 2009: 124). All these positive consequences constitute what we would understand as 
development, thus reversing the causal flow: democracy causes development rather than the 
other way around. And as expected of course, there is a view, proposed by Todd Landman 
(1999) and others, that sees the whole premise of a positive correlation between socioeconomic 
development and democracy as being spurious. 
 
Establishing beyond doubt the correlation between economic development and democracy is 
outside the scope of this thesis – not to mention possibly unattainable. Yet, considering that this 
thesis understands democratisation as a multicausal process, the vast amount of literature that 
deals with the correlation between development and democracy simply cannot be ignored. After 
all, a range of multicausal (Diamond et al, 1995; Huntington, 1991; Linz and Lipset, 1996) and 
monocausal models (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959) acknowledge that economic 
development plays a part in democratisation processes. As Huber et al. claim ‘any account of 
the social and economic conditions of democracy must come to terms with the central findings 
of the cross-national statistical research: a sturdy (though not perfect) association between 
economic development and democracy’ (1993: 72). In any case, even if one does not share the 
deterministic view that socioeconomic factors are the one variable that can explain 
democratisation, we have to acknowledge that economic developments almost certainly play an 
important part. Geoffrey Pridham (1991: 6), for example, argues that, especially when analysing 
the role international aspects play in democratisation, international socioeconomic conditions 
and structures can shape the frame in which decisions have to be taken. This is particularly so in 
cases ‘where this frame – as in Western Europe – is moving along the path of transnational 
integration’ (ibdi). In the instance of our two case studies, internationalisation changed the 
access to resources and, as such, narrowed the available options that could be taken. 
 
At the same time, there is something to be said about the overall role economic structures play 
in political developments. Analysing socioeconomic development is not only about measuring 
the performance of the economy but also about how the economy itself is organised. With this 
in mind, before analysing the correlation between internationalisation, socioeconomic growth 
and democracy in Spain and Mexico, it is necessary to present a detailed analysis of how 
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changing economic structures and institutions can affect political change in more ways than 
simply transforming, as Inglehart suggests, the values and attitudes of society. 
 
4.1. Institution, structure and historical contingency 
	  
It seems obvious enough to say that history and context matter. Different theories of 
development, though, place different levels of importance on historic and structural 
contingencies, but most hypotheses that seek to explain regime transitions tend to at least 
acknowledge the basic relevance of ‘structural contingencies’. It probably goes without saying 
that multilevel explanations of democratisation usually have a place in their models for 
structural and historical considerations. What role they give to history though varies from model 
to model. As seen in the second chapter, Linz and Stepan, for example, emphasise the need to 
account for, at the very least, the characteristics of the regime that immediately precede 
democracy. In their view, civilian led regimes ‘will characteristically have greater institutional, 
symbolic, and absorptive capacities than either military or sultanistic leaders to initiate, direct 
and manage a democratic transition’ (1996: 68). As ever though, this may not be sufficient or 
indeed straightforward. Categorising authoritarian regimes as civilian-led, sultanistic or military 
can be fairly simple in some cases (e.g. the National Reorganisation Process in Argentina 
between 1976 and 1983 was clearly a military regime, whilst Alberto Fujimori’s regime in Peru 
was clearly a civilian one, albeit backed by the military), but this is not always the case. Linz 
and Stepan themselves recognised this issue and acknowledged that an ‘exception to the above 
assertion might seem to be the case of civilian-led, non-democratic regimes based on a 
monopoly party’ (ibid). Mexico under the PRI regime seems to fit this latest category, but 
Franco’s Spain is harder to classify. Although initially a military dictatorship, it moved away 
from a strictly military command by introducing, from the 1950s, civilian technocrats into key 
positions. Indeed the (mainly Opus Dei) technocrats that occupied many of the key roles in the 
regime from the mid 1950s (such as Laureano López Rodó who served as Commissioner for 
Development and then as Foreign Affairs Minister, or Mariano Navarro Rubio who was the 
Finance Minister between 1957 and 1965, and who then became the Governor of the Bank of 
Spain) helped the regime become a ‘modernising dictatorship’ (Casanova, 1983: 31). It is also 
worth considering that although the Franco regime was fairly institutionalised, it never relied on 
a coherent political movement articulated as a party (much as the PRI regime or the former 
communist states did). If nothing else, the likely differences in the access to opportunities 
allowed by different regimes depending on their level of institutionalisation should be enough to 
convince us that the structural conditions that precede the moment of transition always matter.  
 
Also as explained in the second chapter, Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s deliberations on 
democratic transitions also allow for a number of variables to interact. They too attribute a 
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degree of importance to historical and structural considerations, albeit from a slightly different 
perspective. In their view, ‘democratic success in developing countries can be traced not only to 
the growth of democratic values but also to their roots in a country’s historical and cultural 
traditions’ (1995: 20). This notion is backed, as discussed in the second chapter, by José María 
Magone’s explanation of how, based on the Spanish experience, political institutions help 
produce a ‘congruent culture’ that will in turn help sustain these institutions (1996). In that same 
section, we analysed Arend Lijphart’s (1980) logic of how institutions, by force of political 
culture’s being shaped by ‘cognitive orientations’, always contribute towards the shaping of a 
culture conducive to democracy. Hence, institutional developments will leave a mark on a 
political culture, which in turn will contribute towards the shaping of future institutional 
arrangements. This view certainly gives a considerably more important role to history than Linz 
and Stepan’s explanation (or indeed many of the modernisation and culturalists explanations). 
In a sense they share the views of many of the big historical accounts of macrosocial change 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Moore 1966 [1993]; Schumpeter 1942 [2011]; Scokpol, 1979) 
of history being a linear series of causalities. This interpretation goes further than modernisation 
theory – as it cannot be considered a middle-range theory – but is closely related to the idea of 
structural contingencies. In short, whilst previous experiences with democracy (whether positive 
or negative) will have a direct influence on a nation’s attitudes towards it and thus shape the 
range of options available to the elites, socioeconomic development opens new opportunities for 
different groups, thus changing the overall structure within which transitions to democracy take 
place.  
 
4.2. Can modernisation theory explain democracy everywhere? 
 
Modernisation scholars roughly believe that democratisation is a by-product of development. At 
the same time, the basic claim is that development (in any form) stems from a specific type of 
economic growth. Hence, in order to understand how economic developments affect political 
change, we have to account for how a country achieves economic growth. Inglehart argues that 
economic success can help maintain any sort of political regime but ‘unless economic 
development is accompanied by certain changes in social structure and political culture, liberal 
democracy is unlikely to result’ (1988: 1220). Only a certain type of economic growth (i.e. one 
that leads to the ‘occupational diversification, social complexity, and knowledge-intensity that 
characterise the creative economies of postindustrial societies’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:45) 
can cause the right changes. Thus, in order to establish if a country’s economic growth is the 
‘right’ type of growth, one invariably has to look at the broad economic context of that country.  
 
An example – particularly in a Latin American setting – commonly used to illustrate how 
important the economic context of a country actually is, is that of the divergent political (and 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  106	  
developmental) paths Colombia and Venezuela took after independence in the nineteenth 
century. The ‘staple-led development’ hypothesis claims that the variable that explains the 
divergent outcomes in the political developments of these two nations is the different 
approaches they took to economic growth. In a nutshell, Venezuela and Colombia share a 
similar geography and a common history of colonialism, whilst both countries avoided major 
revolutions and/or civil wars by maintaining a relative stability of elite competition since 
independence, which also explains why both established some sort of democratic regimes early 
on – in relation to the rest of Latin America of course. However, Venezuela modernised 
considerably earlier based on an industrialisation project that was a response to the country’s oil 
production. According to Terry Lynn Karl, ‘petroleum is the single most important factor 
explaining the creation of structural conditions for the breakdown of military authoritarianism 
and the subsequent persistence of democracy’ in Venezuela (1986: 175). This rapid 
industrialisation, so the explanation goes, led to the emergence of an increasingly complex 
industrial economy that was incompatible with the ostracism of the authoritarian regime. On the 
other hand, resource-poor Colombia had to rely on coffee production and a largely rural 
population to attain economic growth. Colombia’s process of development also allowed for the 
formation of the ‘Colombian National Front’ in 1958, which was nothing else than a pact 
between the Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Liberal Party to alternate 
government every four years. Leaving aside the clear problem that alternation of power cannot 
mean democracy when the actual electoral process has been reduced to a mere formality, this 
pact excluded a big part of the society: the left-wing peasantry. It was this political exclusion 
combined with open military repression that, according to Bejarano, ‘finally drove the 
Colombian Communists to form a guerrilla movement’ (2011: 165). Colombia’s inability to 
incorporate left-wing groups into the democratic system was, therefore, a direct consequence of 
its rural-based economy. Venezuela’s stronger labour movement that emerged after oil-based 
industrialisation, however, was incorporated into the democratic framework. This apparently 
explains why Venezuela’s democracy was more ‘successful’ from the mid 1960s to the mid 
1980s (figure 4.1).  
 
In this example, a specific export commodity dictates a nation’s path of economic and political 
development. Despite its rather one-dimensional nature, this example highlights the necessity to 
analyse and understand historical developments in order to explain political transitions. Having 
said this though, Colombia and Venezuela’s divergent industrialisation processes do not 
accurately explain their very similar democratic development since 1945. It may partly explain 
why a left-wing guerrilla movement emerged in Colombia and/or why Venezuela’s democracy 
fared slightly better for a period of time. But it does not accurately explain why two countries 
with very different economic structures bucked the authoritarian trend in Latin America for the 
better part of the 20th Century. This theory also fails to explain why a similarly coffee-exporting 
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country like Costa Rica has been far more successful at establishing democracy than either 
Colombia or Venezuela1 (figure 4.1). Neither, for that matter, does this hypothesis explain why 
Guatemala, El Salvador or Nicaragua – all coffee producing nations – have all been far less 
successful in maintaining democracy than Colombia (figure 4.2) (Bejarano, 2011: 34), or why 
Mexico’s experience with democracy, despite being an important oil producer, has been so 
different to that of Venezuela2.  
 
Figure 4.1. Polity IV Project: Political Regimes Transitions and Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-
2010. A scale from -10 to 10 is applied; 10 ‘being full democracy’, 6 to 9 being ‘democracy’, 1 to 5 ‘open 
autocracy’, -5 to 0 ‘closed anocracy’, and -10 to -6 ‘autocracy’. 
 
Probably more relevant to this thesis but still from a modernisation perspective, is Robert 
Kaufman’s (1986) analysis of how an accurate indicator of political change is the way a country 
deals with the internationalisation of its economy. Beginning from a ‘political-economic 
perspective’ his analysis of Latin American authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One explanation is that whilst the rest of the Central American coffee producing countries had 
centralised land-owning elites that opposed democratisation, Costa Rican elites were dispersed all over 
the country and included a commercial and financial elite in the urban centres, and a ‘relatively 
autonomous agrarian middle class, a significant urban middle class and a class of small farmers’ (Huber 
et al, 1993: 82). This led to a demilitarisation of the country and to a more or less homogeneous 
development of a strong civil society (ibdi).  
2 The growth of Mexico’s oil sector has been as impressive as Venezuela’s since the beginning of last 
century; in 1920 Mexico’s production of 157,069 barrels in 1920 (INEGI, 2009) was far superior to that 
of the still underdeveloped Venezuelan oil sector. Despite the impressive growth of Venezuela’s energy 
sector from the mid 1920s onwards, Mexico’s oil production increased drastically since the late 1970s; 
whilst Venezuela’s production averaged 2,246 barrels per day in 1980, Mexico’s production was an 
equally impressive 2,219 barrels per day. Since 1982 Mexico’s average oil production has been greater 
than Venezuela’s; whilst Mexico’s oil production peaked in 2004 when production averaged 3,847.933 
barrels per day, Venezuela’s average production dropped to 2,581.429 barrels per day in 2003 and has not 
averaged more than 3,000 barrels per day since (US Energy Information Administration). Certainly crude 
oil production is not an accurate estimate of the sectors’ size as a whole (Venezuela’s sector is 
constrained by its OPEC commitments) but it still shows both countries have been big oil producers for at 
least the last forty years. 
1945	  1950	  1955	  1960	  1965	  1970	  1975	  1980	  1985	  1990	  1995	  2000	  VENEZUELA	   -­‐3	   -­‐3	   -­‐3	   6	   6	   8	   9	   9	   9	   9	   8	   7	  COLOMBIA	   5	   -­‐5	   -­‐5	   7	   7	   7	   7	   8	   8	   8	   9	   7	  COSTA	  RICA	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	   10	  
-­‐10	  -­‐8	  -­‐6	  
-­‐4	  -­‐2	  0	  
2	  4	  6	  
8	  10	  
Polity IV: 1945-2000 
Venezuela,	  Colombia	  and	  Costa	  Rica	  Democra6c	  Development	  
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  108	  
‘presupposes a partial but systematic link between the formations of bureaucratic-authoritarian 
governments and a syndrome associated with the post-World War II developmental setting’: 
that of an import-substitution model of development (1986: 85). In Kaufman’s view, the historic 
elements that explain political change are not what a country produces but rather how it deals 
with the inherent pressures of adopting new economic strategies. His analysis concludes that, 
given the structural constraints, the only viable way towards democratisation in Latin America 
is through a centre-right coalition that protects the interest of the internationalised capital, as 
long as it achieves some basic redistribution of economic and political power. This is, according 
to Kaufman, far from ‘genuine economic democracy’ but, given the structural and historical 
constraints, was the best Latin America could aspire to (ibid: 107).  
 
Figure 4.2. See 4.1. 
 
This explanation may fit the bill for many Latin American countries (Chile and Peru come to 
mind) but fails to explain, for example, Argentina’s turbulent political and economic ride since 
democratisation in the 1980s. This turbulent ride is probably what led Steven Levitsky (2005: 
66) to claim that for much of the twentieth century Argentina ‘was one of the world’s leading 
democratic underachievers’. Levitsky’s critical view of Argentinian democracy is not based 
purely on performance issues – there were many other regimes in Latin America that were just 
as repressive (or even more so) than the Argentinian military dictatorship of the 1970s and 
1980s – but rather on the characteristics surrounding Argentina’s democratic setbacks. 
Argentina has the dubious honour of being the highest income country ever to have suffered 
democratic breakdown. In 1976 Argentina had a GDP per capita of $1, 701 (current USD), 
whilst Portugal’s GDP per capita in 1974, when the Carnation Revolution overthrew Salazar 
and Caetano’s Estado Novo, was a marginally higher $1, 904 (World Bank DataBank, 2013a).  
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Similarly, Argentina’s democratic survival since 1983 is just as puzzling as its collapse in the 
1970s. Albeit with the benefit of hindsight, the democratic evolution of Argentina seems to 
contradict Kaufman’s argument that the survival of democracy in Latin America depended on 
how a centre-right coalition dealt with the increased contradictions that emerged from historical 
structural constraints. In strict modernisation terms, democracy in Argentina could not have 
survived the many economic crises and different governments that threatened both the 
international capital as much as the welfare of the general population. The historical 
contingencies that supposedly would limit Argentina’s democratic development to a centre-right 
coalition were simply not there. Carlos Menem’s Peronist government introduced neoliberal 
reforms (with many of its usual devastating consequences) following a period of severe 
economic troubles (the hyperinflation crisis of 1989 saw inflation reach 200 per cent in July and 
a total of 5,000 per cent for the year). Although the economic situation did improve briefly, the 
1999 crisis devastated the economy and brought an end to Fernando de la Rua’s presidency. The 
crisis was such that by the end of 2003 more than half the population were living under extreme 
poverty, the economy shrank almost 10 per cent in 2002, inflation was above 40 per cent for the 
same year and Argentina defaulted on credit payments… Yet Argentina’s democracy survived! 
(figures 4.3 and 4.4) These developments do seem to challenge Kaufman’s argument – and 
other modernisation theorists’ approach – of a structural contingency based on economic 
development. To understand democratic setbacks and survival in Argentina – much as is needed 
for Mexico and Spain – we need to analyse other sources of democratic strength such as 
political culture, civil society and party strength (Levitsky, 2005: 69-72).  
 
Figure 4.3. See 4.1. 
 
We may be tempted to say, then, that modernisation theories do not offer convincing 
generalisations (or a covering law to use Charles Tilly’s term (2001: 22)) that can account for 
divergent paths in democratic development. What they do, however, is elucidate how, at least to 
a degree, socioeconomic considerations account for some degree of the structural contingencies 
during democratic transitions. In Terry Lynn Karl’s explanation it was the history of 
industrialisation of Venezuela – albeit severely constrained by its structural circumstances, i.e. 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 













Politu IV 1970-2010: Argentina’s Democratic Development 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  110	  
the availability of oil – that explains its democratic evolution. Similarly, Robert Kaufman’s 
analysis has to account for, at the very least, the brief history of capital internationalisation and 
regime evolution. The case of Colombia and Venezuela, thus, may not support the linear 
assumption of modernisation, yet there is no denying that Venezuela’s oil-based 
industrialisation led to very different political challenges than those faced by the more rural and 
agrarian Colombia. Similarly the case of Argentina may seem to challenge the basic assumption 
of modernisation theory, but we need to consider that Argentina’s turbulent experience with 
democracy does not mean that the socioeconomic structure did not lead to the very same sort of 
social pressure that led to democratic advancements or regressions. The Argentinian example 
evidences that socioeconomic development may not be enough to explain and predict 
democratisation, but this does not mean that socioeconomic structures are not relevant. 
 
Figure 4.4. World Bank Databank, 2012 
 
Modernisation or socioeconomic oriented explanations are not the only ones that consider the 
role structure plays in shaping political outcomes. In fact, culturist explanations also rely on 
structural contingencies. A valid criticism of culturalist explanations of political development is 
that most of its postulates ‘lead to the expectation of political continuity’ (Eckstein, 1998: 789). 
Most scholars from the political culture school see cultural syndromes as durable and hence, 
‘even if slightly modified by short-term forces, their fundamental effects persist over the long 
haul’ (Jackman and Miller, 1996: 635). This is because culturalist scholars tend to consider that 
change does not respond exclusively to ‘situations’ but also to the cultural pre-dispositions that 
dictate an individual’s behaviour. Since the orientations that shape culture only change over 
prolonged periods of time, explaining sudden political change becomes problematic. Hence, the 
analysis of political evolution hinges on more than a historical analysis of how a given country 
reaches key junctures (e.g. democratic transitions) in their history; this has to be complemented 
by, and in a way is dependent on, the analysis of the general ‘cognitive, affective and evaluative 
predispositions’ that condition behaviour (Eckstein, 1998: 792). It is not as important, then, how 
we get to a point where transitions become increasingly likely, but how it is that culture will 
dictate how individuals will behave in those circumstances. In the case of Argentina, for 
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example, ‘the traumatic experience of the Dirty War led to a “profound metamorphosis of 
Argentine political culture”’ (Levitsky, 2005: 69). The mass-level trauma very much 
conditioned the behaviour of most Argentinians, which, combined with other structural 
elements, led to an unprecedented support for democracy even in the face of huge adversity 
(e.g. economic crises). A similar process took place during the Spanish transition to democracy. 
The memory of the civil war, which had to be avoided at all costs, was an important factor that 
led to the moderation of certain actors (especially the left) during the transition to democracy 
(Aguilar, 1997 and 2000: 33). Similarly, the social consensus in favour of European 
membership functioned, as we will see in the sixth chapter, as an additional guarantee that the 
elites would not deviate from the democratic path. 
 
Samuel Huntington also reminds us that, even if cultural traits can be ‘fundamental obstacles to 
progress’ (2000: xxviii) in some instances, culture in itself ‘is not an independent variable. It is 
influenced by numerous factors, for example, geography and climate, politics, and the vagaries 
of history’ (ibid: xxvii). Therefore, history, along with geography and politics, and I would 
argue socioeconomic development, all contribute towards the shaping of an overall structure – 
or returning to Marxists terms, the ‘überhaus’ – that shapes culture as much as it is culture 
shaping the structure. Although this reinforcing dynamic between culture and institutions will 
be discussed in detail in the sixth chapter, for now let us just say that in this reinforcing cycle, 
the study of the socioeconomic structure becomes as important as the study of politics and/or 
geography. Although not necessarily culturalist, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s theory 
of political evolution shares this reinforcing view. The ‘modernisation side’ of their argument – 
i.e. that socioeconomic development leads to a political change – already implies that a 
country’s economic structure is relevant. However, Inglehart and Welzel claim that, although 
socioeconomic development is the variable that causes change, there are other factors that also 
shape the outcome of this change. They claim that ‘although socioeconomic development tends 
to transform societies in a predictable direction, the process is not deterministic’ (2005: 46). The 
pre-existing culture (i.e. before industrialisation) of a country will combine with socioeconomic 
process to form new political cultures. In this sense, their theory goes further than many 
‘middle-range’ theories as it calls for the need to analyse the very foundations of a nation’s 
identity.  
 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also acknowledge that certain structural contingencies play a 
part in shaping political cultures. They see key specific events as catalysts that can transform 
both political structures and, thus, political cultures; one such event, for instance, was the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910, which completely transformed the previous structure and 
succeeded in stimulating ‘modern and democratic aspirations and expectations’ (1989: 38). 
They also view the processes of nation-building as key to understanding why some political 
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cultures are more homogeneous than others, which is a key characteristic of stable regimes 
(1989: 25-30). In essence then, the analysis of socioeconomic development and conditions is 
not only relevant for the study of democratisation if we are following a strict modernisation 
perspective. In the view of this author, even if not following a strict modernisation approach, the 
analysis of socioeconomic developments can still help explain transformations in the overall 
structure (as we will see later on, changes in economic policies shape the resources available to 
different political actors by, for instance in Mexico, changing the size of the state), which can 
help us better understand how democratisation happens. 
 
4.3. The elephant in the room: internationalisation, economic growth and democracy 
 
Having acknowledged and discussed in detail the many intricacies and contributions 
modernisation theory can make to the study of democratisation – but without ignoring its many 
different interpretations or the many unanswered questions that still surround its main premises 
– we can now analyse the impact NAFTA and the EEC had on Mexico and Spain’s economic 
development. A key aspect that should be borne in mind here is that, although the key aspect of 
modernisation theory, this analysis will try and look at more than the direct correlation between 
socioeconomic development and democratisation. Although this will certainly be dissected, an 
equally important objective of this analysis is to present a breakdown of how 
internationalisation influenced the broad socioeconomic structure (i.e. changes in the resources 
available and their distribution within the state) that shaped the transitions to democracy in 
Spain and Mexico. 	  
4.3.1 Early liberalisation and development in Spain: the ‘Desarrollo Years’, the 
Stabilisation Plan and the Preferential Trade Agreement 
 
The period of accelerated economic growth that followed Franco’s Stabilisation Plan of 1959 
and that came to a sudden end in 1975 is commonly referred to as the Desarrollo (development) 
years. According to data from the World Bank, in 1961 the Spanish economy grew more than 
almost every other country in the world and was the fastest growing economy in Europe (figure 
4.5). What is more, this was neither an isolated event nor a phenomenon caused solely by 
variations in the international market. The desarrollo years in Spain were made possible by a 
combination of mainly external factors. The Cold War, for starters, had helped the Franco 
regime end its international ostracism and, having originally missed out on Marshall aid due to 
strong opposition from the French (Messenger, 2006: 50-51) and from Atlee’s Labour 
government in Britain (Portero, 1999: 222-223), Spain received extensive economic aid from 
the United States following the Pact of Madrid of 1953 which allowed the United States to use 
military bases in Spain (Balfour, 2000: 278). The signing of this agreement had an important 
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impact on Spain’s economic development as over $500 million in economic aid – plus an extra 
$600 million in military aid – poured into its economy. At the same time, once Spain’s status as 
a pariah state was lifted, private credit institutions in the United States were comfortable enough 
to start lending in Spain – from 1953 to 1963 over $1 billion worth of credit flowed into Spain 
(Liedtke, 1999: 237-238). Besides the impact this aid may have had on the economy, what is 
more significant is that the sudden benefits of accessing credit and foreign capital did help 
convince the regime’s elite that apertura (opening up) was necessary. The 1959 plan signified a 
complete transformation of the economy under the leadership of the technocrats. During the 
1960s and 1970s Spain experienced the sort of economic growth that Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005: 82) define as the right kind of economic development – i.e. one that consists not only of 
GDP per capita growth but also of industrialisation and fair redistribution. At the same time, we 
need to recognise that, unlike economic performance (GDP growth in a given year), which is 
merely an immediate indicator, socioeconomic development is a cumulative variable, and needs 
to be measured accordingly. After all, ‘annual increases in a society’s GDP always constitute a 
small percentage of that society’s GDP’, thus these type of variables only show ‘substantial 
changes only over the long run’ (ibid: 213). Therefore, although the data from 1961 is a good 
short-term indicator of a specific event, i.e. the impact of the Stabilisation Plan on the economy, 
it really does not say much about Spain’s societal transformations that, according to 
modernisation scholars, help us predict democratisation.  
 
Figure 4.5. GDP growth rates in 1961. Data from The World Bank DataBank  
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A wider analysis of economic indicators however, shows that, although Spain never reached the 
same level of economic expansion it enjoyed in 1961, the country’s GDP per capita grew at a 
steady and remarkable pace during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. GDP per capita 
more than doubled between 1960 ($3,711 constant 2000 US$) and 1975 ($8,465 constant 2000 
US$), and, probably more significantly, this improvement in the economic situation was 
accompanied by other relevant developments. This is probably down to the fact that Spain’s 
economic growth was not fuelled just by the simple liberalisation of the economy, and its 
immediate effects on the increase of tourism, the export of raw materials and/or commodities or 
the remittances sent back to Spain (Sampere, 2003: 91-92) (which according to one estimate 
totalled as much as $5 billion between 1960 and 1973 (Balfour, 2000: 279). Certainly the 
common explanation that sees the ‘Spanish Miracle’ as a consequence of an increase in tourism 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the subsequent development of the real estate and 
construction sectors is not entirely off the mark. The increase in tourism was mostly European 
and was fuelled by an overall increase in the standard of living in Western and Northern 
European countries; the number of tourists rose from 4 million in 1959 to 14 million in 1964, 
and the economic significance of the industry rose accordingly as earnings from tourism went 
from $129 million to $919 million in the same period (Balfour, 2000: 279). The tourism 
industry did not only help create new service-oriented jobs, but it also provided much-needed 
currency to ‘finance machinery and technology imports which were needed to foster the Spanish 
economy’ (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá, 2002: 877); it has also been argued that tourism 
facilitated the interaction of Spaniards with the outside world and thus contributed towards the 
sort of societal transformation that makes democracy likelier to occur (Tusell, 2005: 197).  
 
Whether there is truth in this explanation, there is little doubt that Spain’s economic growth 
during this period had more to do with just a boom in the tourism industry. Certainly tourism, 
foreign investment and emigration to Europe were three important catalysts for the economic 
growth (ibid) but they do not present the whole picture. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 was 
more than a mere attempt to liberalise the Spanish economy or to promote Spain as a tourist 
destination3. The ‘Spanish Miracle’ was to a great extent caused by the development of a new 
industrial model based on a mass production strategy supported by a large working class, low-
wages and the corporatist structures facilitated by Francoism (Sampere, 2003: 92). It could be 
said that Spain was one of the first experiments of what later became the ‘conventional, 
neoliberal approach’ to democratisation that was to be applied in post-communist Europe 
(Pickles and Smith, 1998: 1). Although a detailed explanation of the economic developments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although the influential minister during the 1960s (and eventual founder of Alianza Popular) Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne, then in charge of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, did orchestrate a very 
successful campaign under the slogan ‘Spain is different!’ – which is a line widely attributed to Napoleon 
Bonaparte – in what proved to be a master stroke by the regime in its attempts to transform Spain’s image 
abroad from a backward nation into one of traditions, flamenco, bullfighting and sunshine.  
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during the 1960s and 1970s would require a deep analysis and thus falls outside the scope of 
this thesis, it is important for the objectives of this project to examine how the economic 
reforms of the time led to some gradual structural transformations that could have made 
democracy an ever likelier outcome, as well as the role Europe played in this development.   
 
As we can see in figure 4.6, it is clear that the economic growth of the time led to an 
urbanisation of Spanish society. According to some estimates, during the 1960s some 5 million 
people moved from their places of origin to some of the main industrial centres in Spain or 
abroad, and the share of the economically active population engaged in the industrial sector 
grew roughly from 27.4 per cent in 1950 to 48.4 per cent in 1975 (Sampere, 2003: 92). 
Although a rough estimate, since the data from 1950 was gathered from the population census 
rather than from sources dealing specifically with these questions, these rough numbers do paint 
a clear picture of a country involved in a process of rapid industrialisation. Other World Bank 
indicators (World Bank DataBank, 2013b) from the time help us complete the picture of a 
rapidly changing economic structure. By 1974, Spain’s industrial production as percentage of 
GDP (40.1 per cent) was already similar to other Western industrialised nations such as France 
(33.1 per cent), West Germany (44.3 per cent), the United Kingdom (40.1 per cent) or even the 
United States (34 per cent) – it was also considerably higher than the highest percentage Mexico 
has ever achieved (38 per cent in 1987) – albeit all these nations had already started a process of 
post-industrial development. This rapid industrialisation also led to an impressive increase in 
Spanish exports as a percentage of GDP. In 1964 Spain’s exports of goods and services 
represented 7.6 per cent of its GDP but by 1974 that number increased to 8.74 per cent – and 
would continue to grow as the process of European integration intensified. The sixth chapter 
will deal in detail with the many societal transformations inherent in this sort of socioeconomic 
development but, for now, let us briefly analyse the role Europe played in this process. 
 
According to Sebastian Balfour, between 1961 and 1973 Spain managed to transform from a 
‘predominantly agrarian society on the fringes of Europe’ to an ‘industrialised urban and 
consumer society largely integrated into Europe’ (Balfour, 2000: 279). This transformation was 
triggered, as we have discussed, by a combination of factors that included the Stabilisation Plan 
of 1959, economic aid received by the United States, an unprecedented increase in tourism and 
remittances, and an overall process of industrialisation. Yet Europe also played a key part in this 
process. Indeed, once economic relations with Europe were partially reinstated in the early 
1960s, thanks in part to the alliance with the United States, Spain was ‘sucked into the Western 
economic boom’ (Balfour and Preston, 1999: 2). First of all, as the Stabilisation Plan eased the 
constraints on foreign investment in Spain, an unprecedented increase in FDI was experienced. 
Of the approximately six billion dollars of FDI between 1959 and 1974, European capital 
represented over 42 per cent of the total (Tusell, 2005: 198). These figures by themselves, albeit 
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impressive, do not necessarily mean a lot. What is important to understand is what this 
investment meant for the Franco regime; it very much convinced the dictator that participation 
in the economic integration of Europe, under the right conditions, could only benefit the regime. 
 
Figure 4.6. Growth of urban population in Spain. Data from The World Bank DataBank and Sampere 
(2003) 
 
The Franco regime, we must not forget, was distinctly anti-European during its early stages and 
Franco himself – identifying with traditional Spanish conservatism – saw Europe as the problem 
rather than the solution (Crespo MacLennan, 2004: 24). Franco himself, then, had made no 
secret of his mistrust of the emerging process of European integration during the 1950s and was 
apparently reluctant to show an interest in participating out of fear of being rejected (Powell, 
2007: 46). The picture drastically changed once it became clear Great Britain – who along with 
the United States had always preferred pragmatism to principle when dealing with Franco – was 
to join the EEC rather than continue its parallel free trade process under the EFTA. This meant 
that, Franco having already given up on his dream of self-sufficiency, Spain had little option but 
to look for some sort of agreement with the EEC. The technocrats that by then dominated the 
regime managed to convince Franco that applying for association with a view to eventually 
becoming a full member was the best option (ibid). However, the Spanish application for 
membership to the EEC in 1962 never really seemed to gain traction. First of all, the EEC was 
already concerned with the troubled process of British accession, and the difficulties of 
implementing the CAP, to even begin considering what Spanish integration would mean for the 
process. More importantly though, the 1961 Birkelbach Report by the European Parliamentary 
Assembly had already enumerated certain political conditions prospective members should 
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Common Market. However, since this report was not necessarily binding (as it was not included 
in any of the Treaties), there was always a hope that other pragmatic considerations would 
weigh more than the desire to see a democratic Spain. After all, Greece and Turkey were 
accepted into NATO despite the preamble of its Treaty clearly referring to ‘the principles of 
democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law’ (ibid) as conditions for its members. Both 
Greece and Turkey went through many periods after their accession in 1952 when they could 
not have been considered to be defending any of the principles enshrined in NATO’s preamble, 
yet they remained members. The regime’s hopes, however, that the EEC would follow in 
NATO’s footsteps were quickly crushed when the Report was duly used as a justification to 
reject Spanish membership in 1964; the process of European integration was to remain strictly 
restricted to democratic countries.  
 
Thus, despite already having achieved some degree of international rehabilitation – as a member 
of the UN and the IMF – the EEC decided to only offer Spain a Preferential Trade Agreement 
(PTA) in 1967 rather than full membership; the doors of Europe remained firmly shut to the 
dictatorship (Viñas, 1999: 246). The regime publicised the signing of the Agreement in 1970 
with a rather positive spin and public declarations by the regime’s Development Plan Minister, 
Laureano López Rodó, seemed to suggest the regime’s leadership expected Spain to become a 
full member of the EEC following the PTA (Europa Press, 2/7/1969). That the agreement was 
not only ‘inferior’ to those Brussels signed with Morocco and Tunisia (Powell, 2007: 48) was, 
however, generally overlooked. However, the fact that the regime clearly overstated and/or 
overestimated the significance of the PTA in an attempt to maintain its claim to legitimacy 
through economic performance, does not mean the PTA was, in the slightest, irrelevant. 
Although by the time the PTA was signed the liberalisation of the Spanish economy was 
already well on its way, we need to consider that the PTA resulted in a considerable increase in 
Spanish exports towards the EEC (27.5 per cent in the twelve months following the agreement 
according to official figures) and thus accelerated the liberalisation of the economy. At the same 
time, it has been argued that the fact that the PTA was believed to be – mistakenly – or was 
depicted to be – in an attempt to save some dignity – a precursor to full membership in the EEC, 
encouraged the government and business sectors alike to take some unilateral measures in 
preparation for accession. Some of these measures included the adoption of the VAT, further 
industrial restructuring and increasing economic flexibility (Royo, 2003: 8).  
 
At the same time, Charles Powell (2007: 48-51) has explained how the PTA triggered (or at 
least coincided with) an increase in Spanish exports to EEC members by offering a considerable 
lowering of its tariffs – which, however, was not entirely reciprocated by Spain since it 
remained a comparatively protectionist economy. Powell also suggests that there was not only 
an increase in exports to Europe, but that the types of goods that were being exported changed. 
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By Powell’s reckoning (bid: 49), in 1960 60 per cent of exports to Germany and 55 per cent of 
those destined to France were still agricultural products. This situation changed gradually 
during the 1970s as economic ties continued to develop. Certainly agricultural products 
continued to dominate Spanish exports to the EEC, but the industrial and service industries 
started to gain some ground. It is obviously very difficult to prove how much of an impact the 
PTA had in these developments and how much of it was down to the domestic adjustments 
started by the regime. What is clear to see, however, is that the desarrollo years had a deep 
impact in the Spanish economy, society and, to a lesser extent, the state itself. There seems to be 
a wide consensus in the academic literature that the period between 1959 and 1974 saw a 
reformulation of the Spanish economy, which led to a deep transformation of Spanish society 
(Balfour, 2000: 277; Tusell, 2005: 205; Viñas, 1999: 246), the emergence of new Europeanised 
bourgeoisies (Holman, 1995), and that saw economic ties with Europe deepen past a point of no 
return (Powell, 2007: 50). The role the PTA (and Europe in general) played in these early 
developments is, to an extent, easy to see but hard to prove. The impact the actual process of 
integration with Europe had on the Spanish economy is, if nothing else, clearer to see and 
explain. 
 
4.3.2 Europeanisation and economic performance 
 
If anything, the effects of European integration in the economic development of Spain only 
became more apparent after the death of the dictator and the beginning of the transition to 
democracy. Once the main barrier to democracy and, by inference, to accession into the 
European integration process was removed by nature’s good work, a more uniform process of 
Europeanisation started to take place. In more than one way, the process of European 
integration could be seen as ‘extreme internationalisation’. Although it may seem that 
Europeanisation is no different from any other transition towards an interdependent system, we 
should consider that Europeanisation distinguishes itself from any other process of 
internationalisation precisely because it formalises the links of interdependence in institutional 
arrangements (Closa, 2001: 16-17). The process of formal institutionalisation of 
interdependence links that exist as mere practices elsewhere is what makes Europeanisation 
unique. The transformations inherent in Europeanisation for prospective members can hardly be 
compared with processes outside Europe. Yet, although there seems to be a common view that 
Europeanisation is a unique and deep-rooted process there still no overarching theory that 
explains exactly what it is or how it happens (Morata, 2007: 19). At the most basic level, 
Europeanisation refers to the interaction of two dimensions: the ‘bottom-up’ and the ‘top down’. 
The former basically refers to ‘a process of institution-building at European-level driven by 
transfer of competencies from the member states to the European Union’ (Börzel, 2002: 15). 
The second dimension refers to ‘the potential effects which the evolving European system of 
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governance has on the institutions of the member states’ (ibid: 16). A more detailed view sees 
Europeanisation as a five-level process that also considers – besides the two already mentioned 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dimensions – the changes in the size of the Union the incorporation 
of new states entails, the inclusion of multilevel governance, and the ‘export’ of the new 
European ways of organising politically and of governance beyond the boundaries of the EU (a 
sort of extra-European dimension) (Morata, 2007: 19).  
 
As will be discussed in the sixth chapter, it has also been claimed that there has even been a 
social dimension to Europeanisation that refers to a process of a change in public opinion and 
social values (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001), as well as – as mentioned in the previous 
chapter – a process of ‘Europeification’ of foreign policy that was more than a mere 
‘normalisation of international relations’ after democracy (Torreblanca, 2001: 511), as it 
implied a process of institutional adaptation in Spain after it joined the EEC – which included 
the European Political Cooperation mechanism as an intergovernmental tool of foreign policy 
‘harmonisation’ (Barbé, 2007: 373). The current section, however, focuses on a highly relevant 
aspect of this process; the influence Europe has in the transformation of the economic system of 
a member state. Indeed, Carlos Closa argues that probably the most significant transformation 
in Spain as a result of Europeanisation has been the adoption of a very specific economic 
model. In his view, by sacrificing social components in favour of free market imperatives, the 
Spanish state (especially under Felipe González’s government) underwent the most significant 
process of Europeanisation of its policies and institutions (Closa, 2001: 517-518). This 
economic transformation is often considered beyond Europeanisation simply because it is not, 
in essence, a process unique to Europe. However, it is hard to disagree with the notion that the 
reality of Spain’s ‘deepening integration into a Europeanised market-dominated framework’ 
very much set the logic for the transformation of the Spanish economic model – in particular the 
intense process of privatisation that took place in the early stages of the transition (Chari and 
Haywood, 2008: 194). This also helps us explain, for example, why the process of economic 
transformation did not change significantly despite the changes in rhetoric between the UCD, 
PSOE and PP governments (ibid). Although this process may not be entirely dissimilar to the 
transformations other countries go through as part of specific projects of economic 
(neo)liberalisation, the process of European integration – similarly to what NAFTA did with 
Mexico – very much formalises economic interdependence which makes reversing the process 
almost impossible or at least incredibly costly.  
 
Either as a phenomenon linked with Europeanisation or as part of a wider trend, it seems that 
integration with Europe played a very important part in the reformulation of the Spanish 
economic system. If nothing else, European funds at the very least helped alleviate some of the 
pain that the economic reforms needed to join the EEC would cause. There is also the argument 
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that membership into the Common Market ‘offered critical external guarantees to the business 
and property classes’ in Spain as membership into the EEC more or less ensured ‘prompt and 
adequate compensation for all private property acquired by the state’ (Whitehead, 1991: 52). 
This is a key factor not only to ensure economic development but also democratisation. 
Authoritarian regimes in Spain and Mexico, for example, could not guarantee property rights or 
a stable tax regime to their respective wealth holders through institutional democratic means; in 
these cases, the respective governments needed to coax ‘wealth holders into deploying their 
capital by granting them special privileges design[ed] to raise their rates of return high enough’ 
to compenstate for the extra risks that implied doing business under an authoritarian regime 
(Haber et al., 2008: 9). In fewer words, European integration, by offering enough guarantees to 
the business class and granting further access to its markets, very much guaranteed the rich 
would not oppose democracy (Whitehead, 1991: 52). Mexico joining NAFTA, on the other 
hand, may have granted access to markets but did not necessarily offered any new guarantees to 
the Mexican capitalist business class.  
 
Although integration into Europe may generate similar benefits and challenges for new 
members, the effects of integration can still differ from case to case (Anderson, 1999: 10). 
Therefore, we should not confuse the challenges and advantages Europeanisation represents 
with the specific impact European integration had in Spanish democratisation. It would be a 
mistake to believe that, for example, joining the common market meant a radical overhaul of 
economic policy for Spain as it did for the post-communist countries joining the EU in the last 
decade; Spain had already been functioning under a market economy for almost three decades 
by the time it joined the Common Market. Yet, although a desire to integrate with Europe 
cannot be considered as the only reason why the regime liberalised its economy – albeit it was 
one of the reasons – the process of European integration still played an important role in the 
transformation of Spain’s economy, and in its economic performance in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
If we were to apply a strictly narrow modernisation rationale (as said before, this refers to the 
strict linear progression from socioeconomic development to democracy) to the story of Spanish 
democratisation, we would have little choice but to accept European integration played an 
important role in this process. Since modernisation theory explains democracy on purely 
socioeconomic terms, the positive impact the increase in economic ties with Europe during the 
1960s had on the Spanish economy should be enough to convince the sceptics. Just as the 
European fuelled economic development of the 1960s helped transform Spanish society and 
make democracy a likelier outcome, so did the initial unquestionably positive economic benefits 
EC membership had for Spain help stabilise the new democracy. According to one estimate, in 
1989 EU aid, for instance, (funds established under the Delors I Plan) represented a staggering 
1.5 per cent of Spanish GDP, and between 1994 and 1999 European funds represented 15 per 
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cent of the total public investment in Spain (Royo, 2004: 540); another estimate claims that EU 
backed projects mobilised an average of about 3.4 per cent of Spanish GDP in the same period 
(Pastor, 2003: 10). Spain’s European fuelled economic growth allowed Spain’s per capita GDP 
to increase from 70 per cent of the EU’s GDP per capita average in 1986 to 88 per cent in 2003 
(the year before the enlargement to Eastern Europe lowered the EU’s average). What is more, 
European social and regional policies (The European Social Charter, Title V of the Single 
European Act and Regional European Policy) made sure economic growth did not promote 
further economic inequality, which, following modernisation theory, is a condition to develop a 
larger middle class and increase the pressure on the regime to democratise. There even seemed 
to be an understanding in Spanish society that, as the magazine Cambio 16 wrote in 1978, ‘a 
new economic, political and social liberalisation’ had to take place as an ‘inevitable 
consequence of the economic boom’ experienced in Spain (Díaz Dorronsoro, 2012: 61).  
 
There could be an argument that by the time Spain joined the EU in 1986 the ‘miracle’ had 
already taken place as Spain had ‘succeeded in irreversibly consolidating democratic 
institutions’ (Przeworski, 1991: 8). I disagree. Even if we ignored the impact the transformation 
of the economic structure inherent in European integration (as said before at the very least EC 
membership ‘secured’ these changes), there is still enough evidence to suggest membership into 
Europe had a real positive impact on the Spanish economy. Firstly, and as I have said before, 
speaking of ‘consolidation’ may not be as wise as it was once. In fact the previously acquiesced 
definition of Spain as a ‘consolidated democracy’ has been tested in recent times as it becomes 
increasingly manifest that Spanish institutions (including the Constitution of 1978) are still full 
of authoritarian references and ambiguities, and have failed to address the key problems with 
Spanish democracy. I would also argue that Spanish democracy did not achieve ‘consolidated’ 
status (even in the academic lingo of the time) until the peaceful alternation of power to a 
centre-right party in 1996 when the PP reinvented itself as a true alternative to the PSOE, and 
once the political party system, as explained in the previous chapter, became overwhelmingly 
democratic and depolarised. In any case, regardless of the quality of Spanish democracy in the 
early years of its process of European integration, the fact remains that, from a strict perspective 
of modernisation theory, integration into Europe and the socioeconomic development that this 
has generated, has, at the very least, exponentially reduced the chances of a democratic 
regression in Spain, thus contributing to its survival. The evidence also suggests that 
considerable European aid started flowing towards Spain long before democracy was 
considered consolidated by anybody’s standards. The European Investment Bank, in accordance 
to pre-accession agreements, started its operations in Spain from 1981. In the period between 
1981 and Spanish accession to the EEC in 1986, the Bank had channelled in excess of 550 
million euros in loans towards all sorts of development projects. This figure almost doubled (in 
excess of 960 million euros) the following year (European Investment Bank, 2009). As said 
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before, it was this development aid – coupled of course with the many other comparative 
advantages membership into the EEC entailed (access to markets, increase in FDI, access to a 
wide economy of scale and the protection offered by membership to a commercial bloc) – that 
partly caused the Spanish economy to grow at the accelerated rates it did. 	  
 
If one shared the view that fairly distributed socioeconomic development is the only factor 
behind successful democratisation (Boix and Stokes, 2003: 543) that would be the end of the 
debate. The EU has clearly had a positive influence on Spanish socioeconomic development – 
let alone the redefinition of its economic model; hence it played an important role in Spain’s 
transition to and consolidation of democracy.   
 
4.3.3 NAFTA and Mexico’s socioeconomic development: the failure of expectation 
 
Even more so than in Spain, there seemed to be a broad expectation that NAFTA-fuelled 
economic growth would help solve issues of political representation in Mexico. As it transpired, 
it probably did but not as expected. Before jumping on the NAFTA-bashing bandwagon, 
however, it is important to acknowledge NAFTA’s relative successes. It is fairly clear that 
NAFTA was successful in achieving its explicit goal: to increase trade between the three 
countries involved. Even outside official circles the common view is that NAFTA ‘succeeded in 
fostering the growth of trade and investment, promoting economies of scale’ but failed in 
meeting the ‘hyperbolic expectations of many of its strongest advocates prior to its enactment’, 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 105). NAFTA’s remarkably narrow and 
remarkably explicit goal of simply ‘strengthen the special bonds of friendship and cooperation 
amongst the nations’ by creating an ‘expanded and secure market for the goods and services 
produced in their territories’, has already been mentioned. Whatever the reasons for setting such 
an uninspiring objective is, for now, irrelevant. What is important to note is that in this narrow 
sense NAFTA seems to have attained some level of success. According to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative ‘from 1993 to 2007, trade among the NAFTA nations more 
than tripled, from $297,000 million to $930,000 million’ (USTR, 2008) – clearly NAFTA has 
achieved its main goal of increasing trade between the three partners.  
 
However, as Robert Pastor points out, NAFTA’s ‘principal failure was its omissions’, which has 
left the three countries without the capacity to ‘anticipate, coordinate or plan for new shocks or 
take advantage of opportunities’ (2003:1); NAFTA lacks the institutional tools to deal with 
political internationalisation. NAFTA’s ‘skeletal organisations’ are explained by concerns 
shared by the three governments regarding sovereignty, as well as regarding the high costs of 
running permanent supranational or intergovernmental institutions (Domínguez and Fernández 
de Castro, 2009: 71). For the time being, let us focus on what NAFTA was actually trying to 
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achieve: an increase in trade that would lead to sustained economic growth. Hence, if we were 
to follow the narrow modernisation approach to democratisation analysed at the beginning of 
this chapter, measuring NAFTA’s influence in Mexico’s democratisation would be the same as 
measuring NAFTA’s impact in Mexico’s economic development. As said before, neither the 
link between socioeconomic development and democratisation is beyond doubt – particularly at 
the regional level  (Landman, 1999) – nor is it easy to quantify just how much of an impact 
NAFTA had in Mexico’s economic growth. On one side of the spectrum, most NAFTA 
supporters constantly refer to the impressive trade statistics that have been achieved under 
NAFTA’s structure in order to prove its positive impact on Mexico’s economic performance. 
Official data presents a link between NAFTA and economic growth, increase in FDI, a decrease 
of unemployment rates and the creation of better-paid jobs in Mexico (Secretaría de Economía, 
2006). A report by economists from the World Bank, goes as far as to claim that ‘the Treaty 
helped Mexico get closer to the levels of development of its NAFTA partners’, and that – even 
more surprisingly – between 1994 and 2002 ‘NAFTA made Mexico richer than it would have 
been without NAFTA by about 4 per cent of its [GDP] per capita’ (Lederman et al., 2005: 2). 
Their rather optimistic appraisal of NAFTA’s achievements is based on the common 
explanation regarding an increase in non-oil related exports and an increase in FDI. 
 
At the opposite side of the spectrum there is a view that sees NAFTA as nothing short of a 
failure. Although the causes of the 1995 economic crisis, which caused the Tequila effect 
around the world, are contested, what is true is that the collapse of the Mexican Peso in 1995 
caused a severe economic crisis and a sharp shrinking of the economy (figure 4.8). NAFTA’s 
supporters tend to see the crisis as a completely exogenous phenomenon from the Treaty. 
Robert Pastor suggests that the 1995 crisis was simply the result of too much capital ‘washing 
out after a year of instability’ (2011: 55), rather than the result of structural shifts inherent in 
implementing NAFTA and a new economic model. He also seems to ignore the fact that much 
of the instability he refers to was caused by a Zapatista uprising in Chiapas that was directly 
linked to the implementation of the Treaty (not for nothing the uprising was launched on the 
same day NAFTA came into effect), and the murder of key political figures including the PRI’s 
presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and the leader of the PRI bloc in the Upper House 
José Francisco Ruiz Massieu (Raúl Salinas – Carlos’ brother – was convicted of, amongst other 
charges including corruption, the murder of the latter but then exonerated for the murder charge 
in 2005 and of the corruption charges in July 2013). Pastor’s view is echoed by the afore-
mentioned World Bank report as it claims that ‘it would be a stretch of the imagination to 
attribute [the negative effects]’ of the crisis (i.e. a dramatic fall in real incomes and wages) to 
NAFTA (Lederman et al., 2005: xvi). Somehow unsurprisingly, former President Carlos Salinas 
– the main instigator of NAFTA – puts the blame for the crisis at the doorstep of his successor, 
Ernesto Zedillo, as it was Zedillo whom, according to Salinas, irresponsibly doubled the 
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emission of state bonds. Zedillo then decided, once the devaluation was imminent, to alert (or 
‘consult’) his plans to a select number of the Mexican business elite who immediately decided 
to withdraw their capital from the country creating a panic (Milenio, 12/4/2012). This version of 
events contradicts what has become the commonly accepted explanation that it was Salinas 
who, in a desperate attempt to avoid an economic crisis before the August 1994 presidential 
elections, delayed the devaluation of the Peso by draining the country’s reserves (ibid; Cameron 
and Wise, 2004). The country’s crisis was further intensified by an incredibly corrupt banking 
sector under Salinas that, understanding they were ‘too big to fail’, had no qualms about 
granting themselves huge loans that they then defaulted on (Haber et al., 2008: 115-116). As the 
debate over the real causes for the crisis rumbles on (Milenio, 26/4/2011 and 27/4/2011), 
regardless, it is likely that, as with many other aspects of NAFTA, the gap between the two 
versions will prove too wide for something resembling consensus to emerge in the near future. 
Whether or not the 1995 crisis was an indirect consequence of NAFTA or if it was a completely 
exogenous process, what matters here is that it was not anticipated and that it wiped out any 
hope of NAFTA delivering on its exaggerated promises. 
 
Even if we were to agree with the version of events that sees the 1995 economic crisis as 
completely unrelated to NAFTA, there seems to be no clear way to know what sort of impact 
NAFTA had on Mexico’s economic recovery and performance after 1995. Even the impressive 
trade and FDI statistics that NAFTA supporters often rely on have been questioned. During the 
earlier stages of Mexico’s liberalisation, as it was unilaterally preparing for NAFTA, the 
investment it received from the United States was mostly ‘portfolio capital that quickly fled the 
country during the panic of 1994-1995’ (Blecker, 2003: 9). Although the level of FDI did 
increase between 1995 and 2001 (when it represented a staggering 4.8 per cent of GDP) (World 
Bank DataBank, 2013c) this has since steadily declined. Some of Mexico’s supposed increase 
in trade is also ‘illusionary’ since ‘the parts and components shipped into Mexico for assembly 
in maquiladoras and then re-exported in an assembled form [were] double counted on both 
exports and imports’ (Blecker, 2003: 10). Similarly, the figures boasted in official circles 
regarding NAFTA’s job creation record in Mexico has been broadly criticised. Albeit true that 
NAFTA has led to the creation of jobs in export-related activities, it is evidently clear that this 
job creation has not been enough to keep up with Mexico’s high rate of population growth 
(Moreno-Brid et al., 2005).  
 
In any case, Mexico’s average economic growth rate of 2.7 per cent between 1994 and 2010, 
which pales in comparison to the US 3.3 per cent average, is less than impressive. If we were to 
look at the inflation-adjusted rate (real GDP growth) the results would be even less inspiring; 
according to one estimate the average rate of real GDP growth averaged 1.3 per cent a year 
between 1994 and 2005, which is ‘a slow rate by any comparative standard’ (Haber et al., 2008: 
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2). What is more, Mexico’s economic policy based on trade-fuelled growth may have proved 
effective at first, but it has failed to ignite a development of knowledge incentive sectors and 
overall innovation. As we saw in the previous chapter, once an institutional path is chosen it 
becomes harder and harder to change it; as seen at the beginning of this chapter, once a policy 
or institution has been established, especially when dealing with economic policy, it will 
‘generate powerful incentives that reinforce’ its own stability and further development (Pierson, 
2000: 255). Since Mexico’s economic policy has moved the country away from developing 
‘first-mover advantages’ (i.e. innovation), it is hard to see how this trend will be reversed in the 
future. Indeed, Paul Pierson has argued that since first-mover advantages are so significant for 
the continuing economic development of a country, then ‘free trade may not be an optimal 
policy for a country whose trade partners are willing to subsidise emerging sectors’ (ibid).  
 
Something similar can be said about the reliance on FDI; although foreign capital can initially 
help a country develop key industries, ‘the truth of the matter is, however, that foreign 
investment is not a substitute for domestic investment’ (Haber et al., 2008: 93). NAFTA has, in 
a way, limited the options for Mexico’s economic development and has, most likely, forever 
linked Mexico’s economic performance to that of the United States. Although this is not 
entirely dissimilar to the situation in Spain, manufacturing and trade have not been the only 
drivers behind Spanish economic growth. Spain’s share of GDP invested in Research and 
Development (R&D) ten years after joining the EEC was more than double (0.81 per cent in 
1996) that of Mexico ten years after signing NAFTA (0.4 per cent in 2004). What is more, 
whilst Spain’s expenditure in R&D as a percentage of GDP continuously increased until 2010 – 
when the effects of the financial crisis were starting to seriously impact the Spanish economy – 
and got closer to levels spent by France and Britain, Mexico’s expenditure has very much 
remained constant and well below the other Latin American ‘giant’, Brazil (figure 4.7). The 
average output per worker is another noteworthy way of assessing real socioeconomic 
transformations. In this respect, a comparison between Spain and Mexico throws some 
interesting results; whilst in the 1950s Spain’s output per worker never surpassed the average in 
Mexico, a few years after the Stabilisation Plan was set in motion ‘Spain opened a sizable lead 
on Mexico’, and this lead continued to grow over the next two decades – by the 1970s Spain’s 
average labour productivity advantage over Mexico was 47 per cent (Haber et al., 2008: 56). In 
short, economic growth does not mean the same thing to every country at every time, and not all 
liberalisation projects have the same effects. Spain’s internationalisation led to different 
structural transformations than Mexico’s. 
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Figure 4.7. Percentage of GDP invested in R&D. Data from The World Bank DataBank. 
 
The simple truth is that NAFTA’s supposed ‘achievements’ are not even close to the 
expectations that preceded the signing of the treaty; or, even more problematic, this ‘success’ 
cannot be compared to the economic transformations achieved by Spain during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Although in mere nominal terms the Spanish and Mexican economies presented a 
similar growth rate in the decade following accession into the Common Market and NAFTA, 
respectively – Spain averaged a 3.01 per cent rate whilst the Mexican economy grew at 2.76 per 
cent average (figure 4.8) – we have to consider that by then Spain had already started to 
experience important demographic changes that brought Spanish society closer to European 
medians. By 1986 Spain’s net rate of population increase was just over 0.3 per cent (compared 
to 0.23 per cent in the UK and 0.57 per cent in France) whilst Mexico’s population grew 1.73 
per cent in 1994 – almost eight times faster than Spain’s population increase in 1986. Similarly, 
36.3 per cent of Mexico’s population was 15 years old or younger in 1994, compared to 22.7 
per cent in Spain in 1986. Thus demographics not only had an impact on the evolution of the 
two country’s GDP per capita growth (figure 4.9), but also on the raising of standards of living. 
The accelerated rate of population growth in Mexico together with the comparative youth of the 
nation means that Mexico’s economy should ‘expand at an average annual rate of at least 5-6 
per cent in real terms just to create sufficient jobs’ (Moreno-Brid et al., 2005: 1113). This 
simple look at demographics does not even deal with the issue of wealth distribution; in 2005, 
ten years after the implementation of NAFTA, more than 40 per cent of the national income was 
shared among less than ten per cent of the country’s population. In a similar way, in the same 
year the poorest 20 per cent of the country shared less than four per cent of the income (World 
Bank DataBank, 2013d). Whilst in 2005 Mexico’s ratio of total income received by the 20 per 
cent of the population with the highest income, to that received by the 20 per cent of the 
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population with the lowest income (this is defined as the ‘income quintile share ration’ by the 
European Commission) was 6.59, this figure was 4.3 in Spain. Although Spain still had one of 
the highest ratios of inequality in Europe, its inequality indicators are still considerably better 
than Mexico’s. Indeed, concerns regarding the negative effects economic liberalisation could 
have had on the democratic prospects of Mexico were grounded on the fear that economic 
liberalisation could further strain ‘the already-strained social compact between rulers and ruled’, 
thus encouraging ‘authoritarian rather than liberal politics’ (Knight, 1992: 136). The new 
economic model may have, in fact, ‘undermined social structures and organisational networks 
that had sustained pro-democracy mobilisations in earlier periods’ (Middlebrook, 2004: 7), thus 
limiting rather than expanding the share of the society with a possibility of influencing political 
outcomes. Regardless of how unfair the comparison may be it is clear that, as far as economic 
gains go, NAFTA could have done far better.  
 
  
Figure 4.8. Nominal GDP growth in Spain (from 1986 to 1995) and Mexico (from 1994 to 2003). Data 
from The World Bank DataBank. 
 
The case of Mexico, at best, elucidates how economic growth can have an impact on the end of 
authoritarianism but it is not enough to predict full democratisation or indeed the quality of the 
democracy; Mexico’s income was relatively high since the mid 1970s (when GDP per capita 
reached $4,500) but the highly institutionalised nature of the regime combined with an 
international context that favoured stability over reform, helped the regime survive until the 
year 2000 (when GDP per capita was close to $8,500) (Magaloni, 2005). Hence, beside it being 
hard to establish the degree of influence NAFTA had in Mexico’s economic development, it is 
even harder to see how, from a narrow modernisation theory perspective, the feeble economic 
growth in Mexico during the years following the implementation of NAFTA could have had 
any impact on the transformation of Mexico’s political system. It makes far more sense to 
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analyse how other transformations to Mexico’s economic system that were carried out as part of 
its project of internationalisation may have influenced political change.  
 
Figure 4.9. GDP per capita growth in Spain (from 1986 to 1995) and Mexico (from 1994 to 2003). Data 
from The World Bank DataBank. 
 
One such argument is that NAFTA allowed the PRI technocrats to contemplate political 
accountability without fearing economic collapse. The idea being that, under a centralised 
economy, the PRI had to be in control of the economy and politics; once the PRI rendered the 
control of the economy to the forces of the market, it could allow for political reform without 
the fear of an economic meltdown. However, despite Salinas’ claims to the contrary – in a 
somewhat bizarre argument, Salinas defines his presidency as a ‘Social Liberalism’ that was 
later discredited by the negative propaganda of the ‘neoliberals’ and the ‘neopopulists’ after the 
Peso Crisis of 1995 (Salinas de Gortari, 2010: 158-160) – ‘there is little evidence that 
[NAFTA’s initiator] intended to fully democratise Mexico’ (Cameron and Wise, 2004: 304). 
Regardless of his intentions though, signing NAFTA did mean that the PRI rendered control of 
the economy for good. 
 
As explained in great detail in the previous chapter, NAFTA did imply a whole set of economic 
reforms that led to a reduction of the size of the state; and as the state got smaller, the ability of 
the PRI to use official resources to deal with social issues diminished (Levy and Bruhn, 2006; 
Middlebrook, 2004). Certainly the shrinking of the state started before NAFTA came into effect 
and was, to a great extent, the consequence of the devastating budget crisis that accompanied de 
la Madrid’s presidency. However, a clear consequence of NAFTA – similar to the effect 
Europeanisation had on Spain’s economic system – is that the move towards neoliberalism 
became permanent; it was no longer a matter of need but a political and ideological choice that 
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would be impossible or at least incredibly costly to reverse. NAFTA, then, made it ‘more 
difficult to revert to trade protectionism’ and also established ‘mechanisms that firmly 
safeguarded the property rights of foreign investors’ (Haber et al., 2008: 16). Thus, besides 
hurting the PRI’s capacity to deal with every problem in a vertical, highly hierarchical manner, 
NAFTA introduced a whole new socioeconomic rhetoric in which populism – or arbitrary 
expropriation – had no place. Even when the regime introduced its Programa Nacional de 
Solidaridad (PRONASOL), it was unable to reap the usual rewards of direct patronage, as the 
PRI local caciques were bypassed (Levy and Bruhn, 1995: 182). NAFTA hurt the clientilistic 
network of the PRI as it made the regime’s intervention with market forces implausible. It 
would be naïve to believe, however, that the Salinas administration did not anticipate this 
development. 
 
The view that Salinas’ intention was to democratise Mexico but that he was – having learnt the 
lessons from the Soviet Union – delaying political reform only in order to consolidate its 
economic reforms (Dresser, 1996: 320), does not survive the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, it 
seems likelier that the Salinas administration saw the reduction of the state as a side effect, and 
intended to use NAFTA to buy some time and slow down political reforms. The plan was 
simple: as NAFTA brought prosperity, the PRI would regain the confidence of the electorate; 
once the electorate was convinced that the PRI was the only party capable of running the 
economy, the old regime could use fear of economic collapse as an argument against political 
reform. What is more, the PRI regime correctly calculated that signing NAFTA would gain 
them ‘credibility’ in the United States. As Mexico slowly became the darling of the markets, the 
regime could ‘indulge’ in some of its typical anti-democratic practices without fear of 
international retaliation; NAFTA would, according to its critics, ‘provide a ready source of 
foreign exchange to sustain the ruling party’s expensive web of patronage’ (Cameron and Wise, 
2004: 305). According to different estimates, anything between 150 (Eisenstadt, 2004: 121-122) 
to 300 (Magaloni, 2005: 131) activists from the leftist and anti-NAFTA PRD were lost to 
‘political violence’ during the Salinas administration. The impressive recovery of the PRI in the 
federal elections of 1991 (obtaining 58.66 per cent of the votes for Senators and 58.47 per cent 
of the votes for simple majority Representatives) and the presidential elections of 1994 (gaining 
48.7 per cent of the vote against the PAN´s 25.9 per cent) suggests that things were going 
according to plan. The sudden and ‘unexpected’ Peso devaluation of December 1994 changed 
everything. When the 1995 crisis hit, the hopes of the PRI to remain in control vanished almost 
as quickly as the value of the Mexican Peso. Suddenly, besides applying pressure on the PRI’s 
anti-democratic networks, NAFTA’s failure to deliver the grossly exaggerated results the PRI 
had promised led to a sudden loss of confidence in the regime.  
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‘As consumer debt exploded in 1995 and purchasing power collapsed under a 30 per cent real 
adjustment of the peso, the Salinas team’s opportunism in delaying adjustment and spurring 
growth through politically motivated election-year spending would haunt the ruling party for the 
remainder of the decade’ (Cameron and Wise, 2004: 316).  
 
Indeed, as vast sectors of society lost confidence in the PRI’s ability to handle the economy, 
political liberalisation became a real possibility. The 1996 electoral reform was the first to be 
introduced at a time when the PRI could not have calculated it was in a position to win the 
elections (Magaloni, 2005: 135). As it turned out, as well as losing the race for Mexico City’s 
first elected mayor, the PRI lost control of Congress for the first time in the 1997 elections. 
What is more, national surveys indicate that the economy was a primary concern for the 
Mexican electorate coming into the 2000 elections; whilst in 1993 51.8 per cent had a 
favourable view of Salinas’ management of the economy, by 2000 only 16 per cent of the 
interviewees thought Ernesto Zedillo, Salinas’ successor, had improved economic conditions 
(Durand Ponte, 2004: 275). Although there is little evidence to suggest NAFTA directly 
contributed to the crisis, there is little doubt that the expectations created by the PRI were 
contradicted by the devastating effect of the 1995 crisis. At the same time, evidence suggests 
that the Mexicans’ rejection of the PRI’s management of the economy was not related to a 
rejection of NAFTA or the market reforms; even though less than 20 per cent of the population 
thought the economic situation of the country was positive in the year 2000, over 52.3 per cent 
of Mexicans still regarded free trade and a market economy as the best system for Mexico 
(Latinobarometro, 2000). Whilst NAFTA and market reforms remained mostly on positive 
terms, the failure of the PRI to deliver on its own exaggerated promises partly prompted the 




This chapter has analysed the key question of the relationship between economic development 
and democratisation. Since, whether we like it or not, modernisation theory has dominated the 
study of democratisation in the last few decades, it was essential to tackle this question. 
However, as is usually the case with small-n research (Landman, 1999), the correlation 
proposed by modernisation theory is far from clear in the two case studies. Even more 
importantly, it is unclear how much of an impact internationalisation may have had in the 
economic development of both nations. Whilst it seems likely the process of European 
integration may have had a more positive – or at least less negative – impact on the Spanish 
economy (if nothing else through the great amount of development aid that went into Spain) 
than the case of NAFTA, the results remain inconclusive. Having said that though, some basic 
indicators seem to support the idea that, if we adhere to a broader understanding of 
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modernisation theory, the process of European integration was more supportive of the right type 
of overarching structural transformations in Spain (i.e. the one that leads to democracy), than 
NAFTA was in Mexico. At the same time, NAFTA’s main influence in the democratisation of 
the country – from a perspective of economic development that is – probably had more to do 
with its failure to deliver the high expectations, both home and abroad, of ‘a second Mexican 
miracle’ that would match the achievements of the ‘so-called miracle of the 1950s and 1960s’ 
(Golob, 1997: 96). A comparison with other middle-income liberalising economies of the time 
shows that the supposed comparative advantages of NAFTA never materialised; ‘the average 
annual rate of GDP per capita growth of the fourteen other middle-income liberalisers was 2.1 
per cent over the 1994-2005 period, compared with 1.3 per cent in Mexico’ (Haber et al., 2008: 
81). That the PRI went from being perceived as the party ‘that could best manage the economy’ 
to being seen as ‘a major source of the country’s economic difficulties’ (Magaloni, 2005: 144) 
may have been, at least in part, an indirect consequence of NAFTA, but it cannot really be 
counted as one of NAFTA’s ‘successes’.  
 
This thesis does not follow modernisation paradigms of democratisation though. Indeed, I 
pretend to challenge the ‘conventional, neo-liberal view of transition’ that sees it as a ‘relatively 
unproblematic implementation of a set of policies including economic liberalisation and 
marketisation alongside democratisation, enabling the creation of a market economy and a 
liberal polity’ (Pickles and Smith, 1998: 2). The next chapters will continue with this analysis of 
democratisation that sees it as far more than the establishment of ‘elections and markets’. 
Certainly socioeconomic development can play a key role in transitions, and hence the analysis 
of how internationalisation impacted the economic system was necessary. The next chapters, 
however, will focus on how internationalisation interacted with democratisation by influencing 
elite behaviour, societal values and specific institutions in both countries.  
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CHAPTER V. Analysing Linkage and Leverage: The Elites, the International Dimension 
and the Europe’s Democratic Conditionality 
 
This chapter will focus on the first side of what is usually understood as two contradictory 
views of how democratisation evolves. As was discussed in the second chapter, classic 
approaches to democratisation have tended to see it, broadly speaking, as a process either from 
above (elite-driven theories) or from below (culturalist explanations and modernisation). This 
chapter will thus deal with the former. The main premises of the elite-driven/instititionalist 
approach have already been discussed in detail in the previous chapters, so the specificities of 
the approach will not be discussed here again. This chapter will instead look at the specific 
ways in which the processes of internationalisation in Spain and Mexico influenced the 
calculations of the elites, and the way in which this happened. At the same time, although some 
of the most common models of transition (as analysed in the second chapter) recognise the 
international context as part of their conditioning variables, most of them assume its influence 
rather than adequately incorporate it into their theoretical framework (Pridham, 1991: 5). This 
may explain why, for example, Huntington’s famous model of transition (1991) – much as 
Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) model – only considers the international context as a potential 
barrier to democratisation rather than an explanatory variable in itself. More than a whim, 
however, this tendency to ignore international consideration is based on an old disciplinary 
division between comparative politics and international relations (Pridham, 1991: 2). Both 
disciplines have tended to zealously guard their areas of influence. This chapter will, thus, cut 
between this theoretical division and incorporate both disciplines into the analysis. 
 
There is no doubt that ‘while the salience of the international context of democratic transitions 
may […] be easily recognised, analysing its real impact or influence on this process is no easy 
task either theoretically or empirically’ (ibid). In fact, a thorough analysis of the international 
aspects of democratisation – especially if we are dealing with what has been referred to as its 
‘consolidation’ stage – requires the analysis of multiple variables and actors. Such an analysis 
goes beyond a broad consideration of the international dimension of democratisation as 
‘contagion’ – i.e. democracy seen as a ‘virus’ and proximity as the main explanatory variable 
(Whitehead, 1996: 5-8) – or as ‘control’ dynamics – i.e. the role that the ‘strategies of regulation 
and control adopted by the dominant states in the system’ play in imposing, promoting or 
encouraging democracy. A comprehensive account ‘would need to incorporate the actions and 
intentions of relevant domestic groupings, and interactions between internal and international 
processes’ (ibid: 15). In such an approach it becomes ‘necessary to work with intricate and 
elusive patterns of strategic interactions which differ subtly from one case to the next’ (ibid: 
32). If on top of this we consider that for the better part of the last thirty years causality has 
dominated the study of democratisation – and comparative politics more broadly – and that, as 
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such, models that did not recognise a clear causal flow were considered inadequate, then it is no 
surprise that ‘students of democratisation have tended to concentrate on the internal dynamics 
of institution-building and mutual accommodation [i.e. pacts], regarding the international 
component of the generation of consent as generally secondary in importance’ (ibid). 
 
Although, as discussed in the second chapter, this dynamic has recently changed, the difficulties 
of analysing the international context in transitions to democracy remain the same. As said a 
few times before, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s (2005 and 2010) approach to linkage and 
leverage in transitions to democracy has presented a novel way of dealing with the international 
aspect of democratisation. Although this approach does not eliminate all of the theoretical and 
empirical problems Geoffrey Pridham referred to back in 1991, it does help us elaborate more 
systematic comparison between cases. This chapter, then, will use Levitsy and Way’s model1, 
complemented with Pridham’s own work in linkage politics, to analyse how European and 
North American integration interacted with the processes of democratisation in Spain and 
Mexico respectively. This approach can also be broadly divided between the influence on the 
elites (leverage) and the influence on the general population and social organisations (to be 
analysed in the next chapter). As such, this chapter will deal with the role of international 
leverage (or the lack of it) and the elites in the transitions of Spain and Mexico. It is indeed one 
of the main (if not the main) objectives of this thesis to explain how the fact that the United 
States perplexing refusal to apply any sort of leverage on the PRI regime to democratise – 
despite the high-levels of linkage that characterised the period around the signing and 
implementation of NAFTA – had a clear impact on Mexico’s transition to democracy. 
Notwithstanding the signing of NAFTA and a wider process of integration with the United 
States, which invariably increased its linkage to the US and, consequently, the leverage 
potential of the United States over the Mexican elites, the process of internationalisation in 
Mexico failed to deliver on its democratising potential. At the completely opposite end of the 
spectrum was Spain, as its transition to democracy evolved in an international context in which 
leverage was consistently applied as its linkage to Western Europe developed; accession into the 
Common Market was an incentive to democratise and a source of resources for the democratic 
forces in Spain to utilise. Or to paraphrase Dimitrova and Pridham (2004: 99), the EU was not 
afraid of using strong conditionality as the stick and the prospect of membership (and the due 
access to assistance this entails) as the carrot. 
 
5.1. A Note on elites and their role in democracy 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Albeit designed with competitive authoritarian regimes in mind (such as Mexico), it can still explain to 
an extent the dynamics between the domestic and the international during the transition in Spain. 
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Before continuing with the empirical analysis of my case studies, I believe it is important, 
though, to discuss the different roles that different theories attribute to elites during transitions 
to democracy. Although I already briefly discussed elite-driven theories of democracy, I believe 
it is necessary to discuss elites in their own right simply because even culturalist or institutional 
theories (i.e. those that do not place a causal correlation between elite pacts and successful 
democratisation) often refer to elites (or the role of leadership) as independent actors in 
democratisation processes. The role that elites play in transitions to democracy is such a central 
issue that even typologies of democratisation processes have been constructed based solely on 
the issue2. At the same time, unlike institutions or society in general (i.e. the citizenry), elites are 
not always easy to define, identify or categorise. In his classic work on elites in the United 
States, C. Wright Mills (1956, [2000]: 11), for instance, refers to the elite as a ‘more or less 
compact social and psychological entity’ who have become ‘self-conscious members of a social 
class’ and who ‘behave toward each other differently from the way they do toward members of 
other classes’. Mills claims that the members of this elite are not only self-conscious but that 
they also ‘accept each other, understand one another, marry one another, tend to work and to 
think if not together at least alike’. For Mills and other theorists of elitism, the elites are more 
than just the ‘people who are able, through their position in a powerful organisation, to affect 
national political outcomes individually, regularly and seriously’ (Burton and Higley, 1987: 
296). The elite is self-conscious and also self-serving; although they may be unaware of the 
power they actually have or be uncertain about their actual role (Mills, 1956 [2000]: 4-5), ‘elite 
variability’ (i.e. its transformations) is independent of other social, economic or cultural forces 
(Burton and Higley, 1987: 296; Mosca, 1939). In short, classical elitists interpretations propose 
the notion that elites are groups that are in many ways independent from the rest of society; thus 
elite behaviour often acts as an independent variable.  
 
Certainly there have been many challenges to this elitist understanding of democracy, mainly in 
the shape of pluralist interpretations (Dahl, 1961 and 1971), structuralist understandings of 
power (Lukes, 2005) and what can be described as postmodern interpretations of power 
(Foucault, 2000). Regardless, the idea that elites exist and that they operate in a different realm 
than the rest of us has survived the different challenges to the classical interpretations of power.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It has been claimed that democratisations can be classified between ‘responsive’ and ‘non-responsive’. 
According to this typology democratisation processes are always conducted by elites but they can either 
respond to mass pressures (i.e. responsive democracy) or they can initiate this process without there being 
any pressure from below (non-responsive). Non-responsive democratisations can happen when elites 
make a decision to democratise because they see it as beneficial to the country (enlightened 
democratisation), or because they decide to do so to take advantage of foreign aid/assistance 
(opportunistic democratisation), or they have no choice since democracy is imposed from abroad 
(imposed democratisation) (Welzel, 2009: 87-88). 
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This does not mean though that elites are, by any means, easily identifiable. Since elites do not 
have to actually use their power but merely have the possibility to use it, it is very hard to 
ascertain who is and who is not part of the elite. To say that national elites are built by the 
individuals who are ‘capable, if they wish it, of making substantial political trouble for high 
officials’ whilst avoiding being ‘promptly repressed’ (Field and Higley,1973; in Burton and 
Higley 1987: 5) would imply that repression is always predictable. Repression however, is 
never certain and it depends as much on structural limitations as it does on individual decisions. 
In the case of Mexico, for instance, the PRI regime used repression only sporadically, and its 
use depended as much on the personality and ability of the President in turn to resolve conflicts 
(the President being something of a supreme leader) as on the wider context of structural 
limitations (e.g. the resources available, the size of the ‘threat’ or movement, the social sector 
represented and, as well, the international context). The violent repression of student protests on 
the watch of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (and his successor Luis Echeverría who was Interior 
Minister at the time) in 1968, for example, was caused by the combination of the President’s 
authoritarian style and a need to maintain order before the 1968 Olympic games in Mexico City. 
The infamous Batallón Olimpia – integrated by military troops from all over the country – had 
been created with the specific mission of maintaining order in the eve of the Olympic games. 
Members of this battalion allegedly infiltrated the student groups and were at the forefront of 
the violence on the 2nd October 1968. Some accounts claim that this battalion was charged with 
blocking the entrance points to a nearby building (the Chihuahua building) that could have been 
used as a refuged for the protestors once the repression began (Castillo et al., 1980: 28-34).  
 
Considering that up until that point repression was aimed at the guerrilla groups operating in the 
south of the country during the 1960s and 1970s, and that the organisers of the student 
movement did not know of the existence of the Batallón Olimpia, it would be fair to assume 
that they could have not calculated that they were indeed going to be the victims of the firmest 
of repressions. Urban mobilisations until then were usually controlled by a combination of co-
opting the leadership and/or, in some cases, coercion but rarely ever with outright violent 
repression (the medics movement in 1964 and 1965 are other isolated examples). By all 
accounts it seems like the urban middle classes in Mexico City, and specifically the leadership 
of the student movement, felt that they could make ‘substantial political trouble for high 
officials’ without being ‘promptly repressed’; it has been claimed that even the army itself had 
to be ‘tricked’ into believing it was being attacked by the demonstrators in order for them to 
open fire against the masses (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 73-84). Considering how effective the 
Tlatelolco massacre and other repressive strategies (culminating in the arrest of over 500 people 
related to the movement) (Poniatowska, 1971) were in preventing the growth of the student 
movement, one could assume that the participants in this movement were not expecting the 
level of violent repression. In that sense, the educated middle classes and, more importantly, the 
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leaders of the largest university in Latin America (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México – 
UNAM) may have considered themselves – and indeed be considered by others – as part of the 
‘elite’ only to find out the hard way that they were far from it. Most likely the leaders of the 
student movement would have created significant trouble for the regime escaping repression if 
this had happened at a different time (not so close to the Olympic Games when the eyes of the 
world would be on Mexico), under a different President (the Díaz Ordaz administration 
represented the highest point of the PRI’s authoritarian evolution) and framed in a different 
international context (in 1968 it was very easy to justify violence in front of the eyes of the 
international community with an anti-communist rhetoric). It was not until they took action and 
were promptly repressed that they realised just how far they actually were from being part of the 
‘elite’. For this reason, then, when referring to the ‘elites’ in this chapter I will be referring to 
the elites in the narrower possible sense; high-ranking officials within the regimes and leaders 
of opposition parties. I will therefore not necessarily focus on trade union leaders, social 
movement leaders or the broader ‘business class’ simply because their classification as part of 
the negotiating elites is far from undisputed. 
 
What is more, the process of defining the elites is increasingly problematic when dealing with 
regimes on transition to democracy since, as said before, transitions are characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty. Furthermore, the issue of definition and identification is just as 
challenging as establishing what part they play in transitions to democracy. As explained in the 
previous section, elite theorists and supporters of ‘pacted transitions’ claim that democratisation 
is a process that is invariably initiated and conducted by the elite(s). After all, if ‘a regime 
change is precisely a change of the rules of the game’ then, logically, ‘the game for changing 
the rules cannot entirely be shaped by the incentives structured by the rules being changed’ 
(Colomer, 1995: 6). In other words, if all actors were entirely constrained by structural 
limitations change would not occur; there has to be some actors who are less constrained by 
structural factors, i.e. the elites. It is the decisions and actions of these actors what will dictate 
the outcome of the transition.  
 
The Spanish transition is certainly one that has been explained repeatedly through this prism of 
elitism. Josep Colomer (1991 and 1995) has – borrowing some of Przeworski’s (1986: 50-56) 
theoretical framework and using O’Donnell’s distinction between ‘hard-liners’ and ‘soft liners’ 
among the ruling elite (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 15-16) – analysed the outcome of this 
transition using exclusively game-theory models and rationale. His argument is that democracy 
was not only conducted by the elites but it emerged as a direct result of their bargaining; the 
elites shaped the democratisation process not by reaching a consensus but by achieving their 
basic goals. This idea is backed by his claim that ‘in certain situations where various political 
actors interact, the winning alternative does not have the sincere and unanimous approval of 
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those who openly accept it’, but rather that it is a ‘mixed and varied result of the preferences of 
the different actors’ (Colomer, 1995: 50). Hence the different political actors did not back the 
democratisation of Spain because they felt the pressure from below or even because they were 
themselves convinced by the virtues of democracy. The country safely transited to democracy 
simply because it was the only alternative most members of the elite could live with. Similarly, 
Nicos Poulantzas (1976) and Otto Holman (1995) offer explanations for the Spanish transition 
based on elite conflicts rather than a change in societal preferences or pressures from abroad. In 
their view, different preferences for different sources of capital (European or American) led to a 
division or conflict between the elites, which the authoritarian regime was unable to solve 
(Polunatzas, 1976: 29-30).  
 
As ever, though, there are those who disagree completely with elite-driven explanations of 
transitions to democracy. Despite most democratisation scholars acknowledging that agency 
plays an important role in transitions to democracy, there are those who see elite behaviour as 
the result of structural or social constraints. As such, focusing on elites is, for lack of a better 
expression, a waste of time. Even the Spanish case, so often used to describe the paradigmatic 
nature of ‘pacted’ transitions, has been analysed from perspectives that question the common 
assumption that ‘pacted/negotiated transitions’ are more successful than revolutionary 
transitions. Laura Desfor Edles, for example, reminds us that it is not enough to say that ‘elites 
reach agreements but we have to explain why they reach these agreements’ (1995: 355-356). 
She goes on to praise elite-theory scholars (or ‘pactmen’ as she rather mischievously refers to 
them) for their attempts to ‘correct “deterministic” structural paradigms by highlighting 
individual agency’ but then criticises them for failing to put forward a non-deterministic 
explanation for transitions to democracy. If elites decide to negotiate based on their rational 
inclination towards utility maximisation, and not because structure limits their possibilities, then 
how can we explain failed transitions? Is it that elites in some countries are just not rational 
(ibid: 359-360)? Clearly we have to consider subjective explanations that cannot be explained 
by game models. The case of the PCE and its leader Santiago Carrillo, exemplify how elite 
actors do not always act ‘rationally’; the failure of the PCE in the 1978 elections (receiving less 
than 10 per cent of the popular vote that translated into 19 seats in the lower chamber and one 
seat in the Senate) implies either a clear miscalculation by Carrillo or his reluctance to pursue 
his immediate objectives (electoral victory) at the expense of the feeble Spanish democracy. 
Either an error or a political decision not based on individual gains (i.e. the decision to support 
democracy implied losing the PCE’s core supporters), Carrillo’s decision to move the PCE 
closer to Eurocommunism could not have been predicted exclusively through the use of game 
models.  
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Furthermore, there is also something to be said about the supposed independence of the elite 
from the rest of society. There is an argument to be made that the national elites and their 
respective societies have to share certain characteristics of political culture. It is impossible to 
ignore that the general cognitive, affective and evaluative patterns of predisposition that shape 
political culture vary from society to society as well as from social segment to social segment 
(Eckstein, 1998: 792). In other words, even though elites may be able to act independently (in 
their capacity as self-conscious and self-serving groups) from the rest of society, they are still 
conditioned by the same orientations that shape society. Considering that ‘actors do not respond 
directly to “situations” but respond to them through mediating “orientations”’ (ibid: 790), the 
supposed ‘independence’ of the elite has to be seriously questioned. Can elites really take 
decisions that go against societal pressures? The distinction between the two groups is 
‘inherently blurred’ since ‘both elites and non-elites are part and parcel of the same historical 
“reality” or drama’ (Edles, 1995: 370). Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel’s work suggests that 
‘within a given country, the rich and the poor strata tend to have values that are more similar to 
each other that to citizens of other countries’ (2005: 70), and that the values and attitudes of all 
segments of society tend to move in the same direction as socioeconomic development takes 
place (ibid: 58). Therefore, the idea that elites’ preferences and actions are completely 
independent from the rest of society seems to lose its validity. The core values and attitudes of 
the elites remain closely linked to those of the wider society.  
 
As a multicausal study of democratisation, this thesis does not support the idea that elite pacts 
(and the resulting institutional arrangement) are at the fore of a causal correlation. At the same 
time, however, I do not agree with strict culturalist or modernisation explanations that almost 
completely ignore the role of agency in transition to democracy. Certainly there is very little 
doubt that adept leadership can, at the very least, smooth the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy, but this is not to say that elite pacts can, by virtue of their own importance, sustain 
democracy. Colombia’s and Venezuela’s democracies during the second half of the last century, 
as seen in the previous chapter, followed the same ‘pacted model’ of transition in the 1950s, yet 
their respective democracies evolved very differently and now face challenges that emerged 
from these specific progressions (Bejarano, 2011: 18). In this new era of democratisation 
studies, context always matters. Thus, the widespread opinion during the 1980s that ‘pacts 
endow democracies with healthy doses of stability’ does not longer hold the sway it once did 
(ibid: 84-85). Higley and Burton’s (1989) theory that the stability of a regime is a direct 
consequence of the ‘unity’ of its elites may help explain why some regimes are stable and some 
are not. It does not explain, however, why some regimes are authoritarian, democratic, or 
something in between. The fact is that whilst the existence of pacts may explain stability, it 
cannot in its own right explain regime type; during the bargaining stages, it is near impossible to 
gauge if a pact is democratic or undemocratic since this very much depends on the intentions of 
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the elites involved. In fact, the nature of the pacts – democratic or undemocratic – can only be 
known for certain after these have taken place, and even then it is it is not clear-cut. In order to 
establish if the pacts themselves are democratic one has to probe into the process of negotiation, 
interrogate the individuals involved in the negotiations, finding out ‘their motives and their 
capacity of representation’ as well as ‘analysing the institutional outcome of their negotiations’ 
(Bejarano, 2011: 85). It is almost impossible, then, for scholars to predict the true intentions or 
true capacities of representation of different elite groups during the bargaining stages. 
Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the pacts themselves and the context in which they are 
negotiated (who is taking part in the negotiations and who is being left out, what is included in 
the bargaining and subsequent pacts, who has the upper hand, and how committed are the 
different elites to the project) can help explain – and even predict – the democratic evolution of 
a country. 
 
I have already explained the particularities of Historical Institutionalism and Structured 
Contingency, and how, according to these approaches, institutional evolution places certain 
structural limitations to elite bargaining. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010: 82), for 
instance, unequivocally suggest that although ‘leadership obviously affects regime outcomes, 
particularly in the short run […] leadership is less important than international and domestic 
structural variables’ in shaping regime trajectories. Unless we choose to believe that successful 
transitions are down to particularly skilled and ideologically committed individuals – thus 
accepting that a change of leadership would be enough to secure a democratic transition 
anywhere – we would have to admit that ‘leaders’ choices often are heavily structured by the 
domestic and international context in which they operate’ (ibid). The analysis in this thesis 
follows the general reservations to elite theory presented above. Democratisation cannot be 
understood as an exclusively top-down process in which elites (as defined before) act 
independently of societal pressures, or outside the confines of the orientations that condition the 
rest of the members of a specific society, or indeed unaffected by international pressures and 
tendencies. If that were the case, a comparison of the transitions to democracy in Spain and 
Mexico would have to focus primarily on the actors who shaped the process of democratisation. 
What is more, such a study would have to conclude that Mexico’s less successful transition – if 
compared to the Spanish case at least – was down to Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente 
Fox and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas simply being less apt and/or less committed to democracy than 
Adolfo Suárez, Felipe González or Santiago Carrillo. Or as Alan Knight put it: ‘whether horse 
or jockey is more important is an old racing conundrum, to which most experts would reply that 
although jockeys can certainly lose races (i.e. elites can squander post-revolutionary 
opportunities), it is horses, not jockeys, that win races’ (1992: 119). 
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Although this may very well be the case (nobody could claim with a straight face that Vicente 
Fox was shrewder or in any way a better politician than Suárez, González or Carrillo), such a 
study would hardly be worthy of a PhD thesis. Having said that though, the role that elites play 
in democratisation processes cannot be ignored and, in fact, has to be considered as part of any 
multi-level model (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995; Linz and Lipset, 1996; Merkel, 1998). This 
chapter, thus, acknowledges the important role elites play in transitions to democracy but is also 
mindful of the limitations of elite-driven theories. Also, by analysing the influence of the 
international context – intensified under the conditions of internationalisation – I will be 
acknowledging the key role structural contingencies play in elite-level calculations. I thus claim 
that, although international considerations – I am focusing on leverage in this chapter – may 
not, by themselves, explain all of the elites decisions, I do claim that the international context 
plays an important part in shaping the transitions once they are set in motion. In the cases of 
Spain and Mexico, international leverage impacted the speed with which the respective 
transitions unfolded, which in turn helps explain the different outcomes of the democratisation 
processes in both countries. 
 
5.2. When leverage complements linkage: the Spanish elites and democratic conditionality 
 
Recent events in Spain deem it necessary to revisit the Spanish transition to democracy and to 
analyse it, with the benefit of hindsight, from a different perspective. As I have repeatedly tried 
to portray during this thesis, there is little doubt that, although not without its problems, the 
Spanish process of democratisation has been a success – or at the very least more successful 
than Mexico’s. Back in the 1970s and 1980s the multi-level transition Spain was embarking on 
captured the imagination of Europe and the world; Spain went from being an international 
pariah and a European anomaly to being the European centre of attention. The core European 
countries were eager for the Spanish democratisation to succeed; unlike Portugal and Greece, 
Spain was a middle-sized country (circa 35 million people against the approximately 9 million 
in Greece and Portugal in 1975) whose integration into Europe could present bigger challenges 
but also bigger rewards. Moreover, the Spanish transition gave an external ‘purpose’ to the 
Community at a time when it was lagging impetus. During the final days of the Franco regime, 
frustrated with the lack of convincing reforms by the then President Arias Navarro, the EEC 
coordinated a fierce wave of hostility against the dictatorship. France and Germany were, at the 
time, particularly vociferous in their condemnation of the regime and their support for the 
opposition (Crespo MacLennan, 2004: 149-151); the German social democrats, the 
eurocommunist groups and the Socialist International were especially active in supporting the 
opposition to the Franco regime (ibid: 178), and as the leftist leaders in exile were ‘exposed’ to 
these moderate left-wing philosophies the Spanish left ‘underwent a process of “renovation”’ 
(Encarnación, 2008: 51). Even in Britain, despite ‘limited recognition’, condemnation to the 
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regime – amplified by the question of Gibraltar – was widespread (Portero, 1999: 224-226). 
Only the United States remained oddly detached from the situation and seemed not to offer 
either support for the regime or for the reformist forces. It was in this atmosphere of European 
pro-democratic euphoria that the Spanish transition to democracy was achieved. This sense of 
‘euphoria’ helps us explain why the earlier studies of the Spanish transition were, with the 
benefit of hindsight, clearly too optimistic about the prospects for Spain’s democracy; scholars 
and commentators alike tended to ignore some the negative aspects of the transition (such as the 
clearly uncertain and sometimes contradictory provisions present in the 1978 Constitution), 
whilst talk of a ‘Spanish model’ – based on elite settlements and consensual politics – became 
common practice amongst many political scientists (Edles, 1998: 6). The fact that the Spanish 
democratisation process has not been as trouble-free (or indeed as ‘consolidated’) as previously 
thought, however, should not undermine the achievements of what was, by almost any 
standards, a successful process.  
 
With this in mind, we can analyse the role Europe played in the democratisation of Spain. The 
Spanish period of transition – let us say from the assassination by ETA of Franco’s chosen 
successor, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in December 1973 until the ratification of the 
Constitution in December 1978 – coincided with a period of rapprochement between President 
Giscard d’Estaing of France and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany, which ‘followed up 
by the decision in 1976 to hold direct elections to the European Parliament [with the first 
elections held in 1979], further reduced the distinction between domestic and foreign policies in 
European countries’ (Story and Pollack, 1991: 141). Although the troublesome 1960s – 
characterised by De Gaulle’s attempts (such as the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of 1965) to steer the 
Community away from the use of qualified majority voting in the Council and overall 
supranationalism (Vanke, 2006: 141-142) – had slowed down the federalist impetus of 
European integration, it was the eventual accession of Great Britain in 1973 that decisively set 
the Community on an intergovernmental path. Intergovernmentalism, let us be clear, did not 
imply a move away from a multilateral approach, but rather a move away from 
supranationalism. In any case, this trend was not going to be significantly changed until, under 
the leadership of Jacques Delors, the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht were implemented in 
1987 and 1993 respectively. Intergovernmentalism at European level, however, did not mean a 
halt in the development of linkages between the different European nations. As was discussed 
during the previous chapter, the 1960s and 1970s represented a period of increasing linkage 
between Spain and the rest of Europe. What is more, the trend towards intergovernmentalism 
during the early 1970s meant that ‘the bilateral dimension of intra-Community relations gained 
ground’ (Story and Pollack, 2006: 133). This, in turn, allowed Spain – and in particular its elites 
– to develop many bilateral links with a number of European nations that were to have a bearing 
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on its transition to democracy. These increasing bilateral linkages, as described in the previous 
chapter, were characterised by an increase in trade, investment, tourism and migration.  
 
The path towards intergovernmentalism, then, allowed the regime to develop many bilateral 
linkages in different fronts and with a number of European nations bypassing the EEC. The 
obvious advantage of this approach was that it could be achieved without having to deal with 
the pesky issue of the regime’s nondemocratic nature. At the same time, despite what the 
official line may have been, it was clear that the rejection of Spanish membership in 1963 and 
the subsequent signing of the PTA was considerably less than what the regime was hoping to 
achieve. As such, a policy of slow bilateral rehabilitation – spearheaded by increasingly close 
ties with the United States – allowed the regime to pursue a policy of internationalisation 
outside of the EEC. It was indeed American support that ensured Franco’s regime was not 
completely isolated; by the early 1960s Spain was already a member of the UN, the IMF, the 
World Bank and the OECD (ibid: 128). Yet it was Spain’s accession into Europe that was the 
ultimate goal. It was not until this goal was achieved that (much as Mexico’s accession into 
NAFTA meant the end of its ‘exceptionalism’) a revision of the traditional interpretation of the 
history of Spain could take place; integration into Europe would change the image of Spain as a 
deviation from a ‘European model’ (Balfour and Preston, 1999: 1).  
 
Achieving the regime’s ultimate foreign policy objective, i.e. its inclusion into Western 
international organisations, was by no means an easy process nor was it beyond doubt. In fact, 
had it not been for a timely intervention (from Franco’s perspective of course) by Churchill’s 
second government, Franco’s regime would have found itself far more isolated than it did. 
Churchill was quick to develop a new policy that backtracked on Atlee’s ideologically grounded 
policy towards the Spanish regime, i.e. that Franco had to be punished for supporting the Axis – 
a view that was widely supported in France and the United States, and that was to define the 
stance of the exiled left-wing opposition to the regime. Churchill’s assessment that Franco’s 
regime was not necessarily ‘crueller’ than Stalin’s or more ‘arbitrary’ that Salazar’s led to a 
more lenient stance towards the regime. The fear was that – and Franco seemed to be well 
aware of this fear – an unstable Spain would only benefit the Soviet Union. Thus, although still 
opposing Franco, strong economic sanctions were avoided and the regime was able to ride the 
(rather tame) storm that was caused by diplomatic sanctions (Portero, 1999: 210-215). The 
combination of a pragmatic approach by Great Britain and the eventual acceptance in the United 
States that Spain had too much strategic value to be ignored or, worse, alienated (Liedtke, 1999: 
233), led to the eventual rehabilitation of the regime.  
 
Despite the increasingly comfortable position of the Franco regime in the international arena, 
Western Europe (France and Germany in particular) remained a safe haven for the regime’s 
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main opposition. The unilateral decision by the post-war French provisional government to 
close its border with Spain for two years, suggests that it was indeed the French who, influenced 
by their own struggles to re-establish their democracy during the war, took the commitment of 
seeing a transformation in Spain more seriously than any of the other Western allies 
(Whitehead, 1986: 13). Although this initial commitment may have been overwhelmed by Cold 
War mentality, France remained the most important centre from where the opposition in exile 
worked. Although very much irrelevant as an opposition force from the 1950s onwards, the 
Republican Government in exile settled in Paris in 1945, after a short stay in Mexico City, and 
continued with its operations there until its dissolution in 1977. Santiago Carrillo, the leader of 
the PCE, was also exiled in Paris from the end of the Civil War until his arrest in Spain in 1976; 
and it was primarily from France (and Portugal) that the PCE decided to coordinate its internal 
opposition to Francoism, which was very much characterised, in the earlier stages, by a guerrilla 
approach that looked to destabilise the regime (Tusell, 2005: 79). France was also the base from 
where the exiled PSOE, under the leadership of Rodolfo Llopis and the key assistance of former 
leader Indalecio Prieto – himself exiled in Mexico – started to develop its opposition strategies. 
It was at these early stages of the struggle that the Socialists chose an opposition strategy based 
almost entirely on external pressure to achieve the eventual transition to democracy (ibid: 75). 
What is more, once the process of European integration was set in motion, ‘Europe’ as a 
concept became an essential part of the political culture of the exiled opposition (Crespo 
MacLennan, 2004: 54). The fact that Europe remained determined to exclude Spain from the 
process of integration based on the very existence of the Franco regime was more than mere 
political ammunition for the opposition; Europeanism became an essential part of the political 
ideology of the opposition forces based in Europe (ibid).  
 
The Franco regime, thus, faced an even more challenging version of the dilemma so often faced 
by authoritarian regimes elsewhere: how to limit political liberalisation and the influence of 
opposition forces abroad, without necessarily limiting economic liberalisation or jeopardising 
the access to international markets and/or investment. After all, the regime’s main goal was 
survival. Thus, as has often been the case in third wave transitions, the Franco regime’s change 
of policy direction towards economic liberalisation was ‘invariably made under some form of 
compulsion’ and was also a ‘defensive’ strategy that looked to maintain ‘(vulnerable) regime 
legitimacy’ (Pridham, 1991: 14). The regime, therefore, needed liberalisation to boost its 
legitimacy as a modernising force in Spain, but it also desperately wanted to limit the influence 
international actors (be they foreign governments, opposition forces abroad or international 
organisations) could have in domestic affairs. Again as in many other cases, this conscious 
attempt by the regime to promote yet also limit international linkages makes it very hard, if not 
impossible, to establish any sort of causality between the actions of international actors and 
domestic developments. If on top of this common – but by no means easy to deconstruct – 
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objective of authoritarian regimes of limiting the effects of liberalisation and 
internationalisation on the domestic political system, we consider that more often than not 
‘official declarations in favour of democracy in the abstract’ by democratic countries correlate 
‘poorly with observable behaviour affecting specific interests and international relationships’ 
(Whitehead, 1986: 7), then we are left with a real problem when trying to analyse the influence 
of the international on domestic transitions.  
 
The case of Spain, however, is different. At elite level, at least, it is easier to identify the 
influence of the international context by looking at how the actions of domestic actors were 
constrained by international influences and conditions. At this point I should note that I am 
consciously referring to influence rather than power simply because, as Pridham reminds us 
(1991: 9), domestic actors during the earlier stages of liberalisation – more so than during the 
transition stage itself – ‘possess a substantial degree of autonomy’. In any case, when the 
balance of power between domestic actors is finely poised – as it was in Spain during the very 
early stages of the transition (Colomer, 1995: 9) – influence rather than power is all it takes; in 
times of high uncertainty such as transitions to democracy (O’Donell and Schmitter, 1986:3-5), 
secondary considerations such as the international context can lead to significant differences in 
the outcome of the process. In the case of Spain, then, the early liberalisation stage not only 
helped develop specific linkages at various levels, but it was also a learning curve for Spanish 
elites. After this initial period it was clear that, although more often than not declarations in 
favour of democracy do not correlate to the actions taken by foreign democratic governments, 
the EEC’s assertion that Spain had to democratise in order to be considered for membership, 
was one of those rare occasions when official statements actually had ‘considerable practical 
force’ (Whitehead, 1986: 7). The Francoist elites had to learn the hard way – by having the 
regime’s attempts to open negotiations with the EEC dismissed outright – that Europe’s support 
for democracy was, unlike NATO or the UN, more than mere rhetoric. When the letter sent in 
February 1962 by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, to Walter Hallstein, 
the President of the EEC Commission, asking for the opening of accession negotiations was 
merely acknowledged rather than properly replied to (Royo and Manuel, 2003: 6-7), the 
regime’s elites got the clearest indication possible that the EEC would not accept a non-
democratic country in its ranks.  
 
Although some hope remained that Franco’s Spain would eventually reach some sort of 
association status, occurrences such as the one just described must have helped transform some 
‘hard liners’ into ‘soft liners’. Certainly the EEC rejection did not change the views of the 
‘bunker’, i.e. those who rejected viscerally ‘the “cancers” and “disorders” of democracy’ 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 16). But the strong rejection of the EEC must have convinced 
some of the more pragmatist supporters of Francoism that the very ‘regime they helped to 
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implant’ would ‘have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of 
electoral legitimation’ (ibid), thus becoming ‘soft liners’ reformers rather than staunch 
Franquistas. Similarly, although the regime’s attempts to get involved in the process of 
European integration never gained traction, the mere fact that the regime showed an interest in 
accessing the EEC meant a change in policy. From then on the regime’s elites and its ministers 
started to publicly recognise the key role Europe would play in Spain’s development and were 
increasingly positive about Spain’s role in the new Europe (Crespo MacLennan, 2004: 47). This 
change in policy helped moderate, at least in public, some of the more radical views of some 
sectors of the regime’s elites. Those who remained suspicious of the process of European 
integration were either removed or were not allowed to express their views openly.  
 
What is more, there is little doubt that the regime’s change in stance towards the EEC provided 
the exiled opposition with a much-needed common discourse. The opposition based outside 
Spain had long been suffering from a lack of resources, a lack of support caused by Cold War 
calculations, and an increasingly divisive rift between different opposition groups and between 
the domestic and the international oppositions (Aguilar, 2000: 303). The process of increasing 
approximation with Europe (i.e. the furthering of linkages) offered the opposition and the 
regime a common political objective, albeit for completely different reasons. Whilst the regime 
pretended to gain legitimacy by benefiting from Europe’s economic boom, the opposition saw 
increasing cooperation with Europe as an opportunity to highlight the incompatibility between 
the regime and the EEC, and also as an opportunity to strengthen its voice inside Spain. 
Santiago Carrillo’s very public acceptance of Eurocommunism, for instance, signified the 
definitive end to the PCE’s relationship with Moscow, and made the PCE’s pro-European 
stance ‘official’.  
 
Although, there is a debate surrounding the reasons Carrillo had for embracing 
Eruocommunism, there is no doubt that this change in policy was a key factor in the transition. 
This shift in stance – according to Carrillo himself the communists were the first ones to ‘bury 
the axe of war’ – paved the way for the spirit of national reconciliation that was to characterise 
the transition (Edles, 1998: 44). The Suárez government desperately needed to limit the social 
mobilisations that could threaten the reforms by giving the ‘bunker’ an excuse to use repression, 
and thus needed the PCE, with its historical ties with the trade unions (in particular the 
Comisiones Obreras – CCOO), to ‘induce moderation’ amongst the ranks (Encarnación, 2001: 
76-77). On the other hand, Carrillo needed to be legalised in order to be able to participate in 
any future electoral process. Thus Carrillo and the Communists had no choice but to moderate 
their stance as part of a bargaining process with Adolfo Suárez’s government, i.e. abandoning 
ruptura was the only way to gain legal status (Colomer, 1995: 68-77). The PCE’s electoral 
failure in the 1977 elections – receiving less than 10 per cent of the votes – would imply that, if 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  146	  
it was merely an electoral and self-serving strategy, Carillo made a big mistake when reading 
the public sentiment; it was the embracement of Eurocommunism, after all, that had pushed 
many of the PCE’s core supporters to abandon the party. An alternative interpretation, however, 
is that Carrillo’s views had been actually moderated after spending forty years exiled in Paris 
and that he decided to move his party towards that line rather than the other way around (Edles, 
1995: 370-372). Carrillo knew he would lose electoral support but was personally committed to 
the democratisation of the country and Spain’s eventual integration into Europe. 
 
Probably the best example of Europe’s influential role in bringing together the different 
opposition forces, and thus moderating the views of conflicting factions, undoubtedly relates to 
the meeting that took place in Munich in June of 1962. On the eve of the Europeanist Congress, 
a large group of Spanish ‘delegates’ representing the majority of Spanish opposition forces 
(except for the Communists), both domestic and in exile, got together with the objective of 
discussing the prospects for democracy and accession into Europe. In Munich there were 
socialists, liberals and Christian democrats, as well as republicans and monarchists, Basque and 
Catalan nationalists, and individuals who had fought against each other during the Civil War. 
Yet they all shared two very basic goals: the democratisation of Spain and its integration with 
Europe (Alvárez de Miranda, 2003: 101). Although there were, of course, resentments between 
the different factions participating, these two common goals were what, according to one of the 
participants, united the individuals present and made consensus possible (El Pais 9/6/2012). The 
meeting in Munich was condemned by the regime, and portrayed by the loyal media outlets as a 
‘betrayal of Spain’ (ABC 10/6/1962a), a ‘farce’ that was not representative of Spaniards’ views 
and even called the meeting a ‘New Munich Agreement’ (ABC 10/6/1962b) (making allusion to 
the Munich Agreement of 1938 between Nazi Germany and the European powers). The 
regime’s police forces were quick in arresting and/or detaining some of the delegates that had 
travelled from Spain. Some, like the Christian democrat Fernando Alvárez de Miranda and the 
monarchist Joaquín Satrústegi, were forced to spend a year of banishment in the Canary Islands, 
whilst others, such as Carmelo Cembrero, chose exile in other European countries (El Pais 
9/6/2012) – finding work in the ECSC and then the EEC. Many more of the participants lost 
their jobs, whilst the police harassed nearly all of them. This exaggerated reaction, besides 
being a misguided show of strength by the regime, had the very negative effect of straining 
Spain’s relationships with the EEC in general, and France and Germany in particular. Whatever 
chances Franco’s regime may have had of ever being allowed accession into the EEC were 
extinguished right then (Alvárez de Miranda, 2003: 101-108).  
 
More than the obviously important logistic support given by the different European nations (e.g. 
facilitating travel to the Congress) or the fierce criticism that was aimed at the regime 
afterwards, the role the ‘idea of Europe’ played as a unifying force during, before and after the 
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Congress is, in my view, just as relevant. In essence, we could say that the process of Spain 
integrating with Western Europe (in the first instance with the development of informal linkages 
and then by the process of institutionalising these linkages) ‘shaped’ rather than ‘made’ the 
democratisation process. It would be a great leap to say that there is a direct causal link from 
integration to democratisation – at least at elite level – but we could say that Europe was a 
platform, a reinforcing example and an important source of consensus. After all, regardless of 
how we choose to explain the transition to democracy in Spain, there is no doubt that consensus 
took precedence over confrontation. I am not denying of course that ‘the process of European 
integration interacted with a wide variety of domestic political and economic factors’ (Fishman, 
2003: 32), but I do, however, believe that, at elite level at least, the process of European 
integration considerably increased the prospect of pro-democracy pacts being reached, as well 
as providing a clear incentive for these pacts to be reached quickly.  
 
There are other instances and analyses that support this view. Although there are those that 
believe that other than providing moral support to the democratic opposition, ‘there was very 
little Europe could do’ (Carr and Fusi, 1981: 214), there is enough evidence to suggest that 
Western European countries and the EEC, at the very least, played an active part in supporting 
democratic actors and, thus, influencing the elites’ calculations. Even if we were to accept, 
however, that Europe could only provide moral support, we need to acknowledge that even this 
minimal influence may have had a significant impact on the calculations of key individuals. 
Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi acknowledge that, if nothing else for instance, King Juan 
Carlos, being the chosen successor of Franco after the assassination of Carrero Blanco, needed 
the legitimacy that could only be provided by the backing of other European nations. Western 
Europe, unlike the United States, was certainly not going to provide its full backing to Juan 
Carlos until he proved his democratic credentials. After all, the reformist agenda eventually 
pursued by the King was more or less a surprise; we must not forget that Franco himself 
handpicked the King as his successor (Gilmour, 1985). Indeed, Juan Carlos’ first speech as 
King could hardly be described as an endorsement of political reform (Aguilar, 2000: 306-307), 
and his first attempt at forming a government, under the leadership of Carlos Arias Navarro, the 
last Prime Minister of the Franco era, did little to convince the domestic opposition or the 
international community that the King was a true democrat. The ‘comedy of errors’ that was 
Arias Navarro’s government seemed like a half-hearted attempt to ‘enact a few reforms, call the 
result a democracy, and hope for the best’ (Gilmour, 1985: 141). It was also during these early 
stages of the transition that European pressure reached its highest level. Before then, there had 
always been disagreements around Europe over how to react to the imminent transformations in 
Spain; whilst the conservative forces advocated for moderation – following the policy devised 
by Churchill’s government – the socialist left considered that ending the Franco regime was a 
‘European mission’ that was long overdue. Ultimately, the disappointing reforms of Arias 
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Navarro, the King’s apparent ambivalence towards reform and the worrying situation in 
Portugal tilted the balance in favour of those who advocated a stronger stance against Franco 
(Crespo MacLennan, 2008: 148-149).  
 
How much of an influence did the barrage of European condemnation have on the King’s 
‘sudden’ decision to replace Arias Navarro with Adolfo Suárez, and embark on a far more 
comprehensive process of political reform, is impossible to know. Spain’s romanticised version 
of its transition has long promoted the idea that Juan Carlos was never anything else than a 
staunch democrat. However, Juan Carlos had been directly appointed by Franco ‘as the best 
guarantee for the continuation of the institutions and spirit of Francoism’ (Carr and Fusi, 1981: 
207). Franco believed that with the King on the throne the future of the regime was bien atado 
(tied down) (Bermeo and Gracía-Durán, 1994: 91), and Juan Carlos did not make his stance 
clear until his state visit to the United States in February 1976 when he described the Arias 
Navarro Government as an ‘unmitigated disaster’ (Aguilar, 2000: 308). If this was his strategy 
all along or a reaction to changing circumstances, we will probably never know for sure. I 
would argue, however, that we should assume that the King must have been influenced by 
pragmatism as much as by conviction. Juan Carlos was certainly aware of what was happening 
to his brother in law in Greece – where Constantine’s failure to offer his unconditional support 
to Greece’s attempts to establish a republican democracy at least partly led to the defeat of the 
monarchical alternative in the referendum of 1974 – and of the increasingly antagonistic stance 
of individual members of Europe towards authoritarian regimes in its periphery. The more or 
less generalised outrage in Europe that followed the execution of three communist and two ETA 
members in September 1975 was a clear indication that Europe was ready to take the gloves off. 
Although the executions went ahead, the regime was seriously damaged by the episode, and was 
even forced to defend itself after reports in the BBC suggested there was widespread rebellion 
in the Francoist ranks (Informaciones, 27/09/1975). 
 
By this stage it was not only painstakingly clear that the EEC would not allow non-democratic 
countries to join its ranks, but also that the Community was going to be ‘stricter’ with Spanish 
democracy than with that of Greece or Portugal. As said before, concerns from several EEC 
member states – France in particular – regarding the very real challenges Spanish accession 
would bring to the newly established CAP were partly behind this intensified scrutiny, and it 
was a sobering fact already recognised by some at the time of the transition (Poulantzas, 1976: 
29). But it is also true that Spanish isolation from Europe had been longer and deeper than that 
of Greece or Portugal. The Greek dictatorship lasted less than a decade and Salazar’s Estado 
Novo was never entirely isolated because of its close relationship with Great Britain. Portugal’s 
status as a historical ally of the British had even enabled Portugal to participate in the alternative 
British-led process of integration framed under the EFTA (Powell, 2007: 52). Spain’s isolation 
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from Western European organisations had been total: despite the United States viewing the end 
of Franco’s isolation positively, the regime found itself barred from participating in the 
Marshall Plan and NATO due mainly to French and British opposition (Portero, 1999: 223). As 
said before, the EEC also used the political conditions set in the 1961 Birkelbach Report as the 
main reason not to start accession negotiations with Franco; similarly the Council of Europe’s 
Parliamentary Assembly had already explicitly declared that only members of a freely elected 
Spanish Parliament under a constitutional regime would be eligible to participate as 
Representatives of the Assembly, thus effectively banning Spanish participation under Franco3 
(Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 15, 28/8/1950). All these meant that 
the Franco regime was excluded from any of the (primarily) European organisations. 
 
This complete isolation was not only an embarrassment for the regime but also provided a 
strong symbolic statement for elites across the political spectrum. Once there was a consensus 
amongst the different elites that a transition to democracy was desirable, it became clear that 
only the clear recognition of the EEC – inherent in accepting Spain’s participation in Europe – 
would be enough to legitimise the new Spanish democracy. By refusing to baulk on its 
democratic conditionality, the different European organisations (the Community and the 
Council of Europe) became the only judges with enough legitimacy to sanction the emerging 
democracy (Powell, 2007: 52-54). On the other hand, the eventual integration into Europe’s 
main political and economic organisations – and the inherent process of Europeanisation this 
meant for Spain – was, particularly from the 1970s onwards, regarded as synonymous of 
modernisation (ibid: 53). Spain’s ‘chronic’ underdevelopment – relative to Western Europe of 
course – remained the same ‘problem’ in 1975 as in 1898. By the time of Franco’s death, 
however, it was widely accepted that Europe was indeed the solution. In the mid 1970s the 
influential magazine Cambio 16 summarised this widespread view; the magazine believed that 
accession into Europe was more than a short-term solution for orange farmers and bicycle 
cranks producers, and called it an alternative way of modernisation (Díaz Dorronsoro, 2012: 
64). Since modernisation was the ultimate goal and accession into Europe was regarded as 
synonymous with modernisation, there was not a single elite group that could afford to be seen 
as an obstacle to integration. This explains why all political parties and other leaders 
unanimously supported accession into Europe.  
 
The influence of this strong consensus and the impact it had on the democratisation of the 
country should not be underestimated.  Accession into the Community was for the elites at the 
helm of the transition an important incentive to democratise. The fact that the ‘EEC was solidly 
democratic, and had “set up a stable pattern of rewards and disincentives” for would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A point made even clearer when Greece was asked to withdraw from the Council in 1969 following the 
military coup. 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  150	  
members’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 113) meant that the elites were very sensitive to European 
opinion. It was widely believed that Spain’s international ostracism and inability to join 
European institutions was down to the Franco regime; the majority of the population regarded 
the EEC as a ‘symbol of democracy and development’ and the elites, wanting to benefit from 
the Community’s reputation, understood joining the Common Market was a ‘decisive step for 
the consolidation of democracy’ (ibid). The fact is that Brussels had made it very clear that 
political reform was a sin qua non for integration; the elites knew it and, more importantly, so 
did the electorate. Whether or not this conditionality was a ploy is irrelevant. The fact is that 
Spanish elites believed that democracy was a condition for European integration, they also 
believed that integration was the only way to achieve the ultimate goal of ‘modernising’ Spain, 
and they acknowledged that only the EEC could give the emerging democratic regime the 
legitimacy it so badly needed. Given that the Spanish economy risked being left behind if Spain 
did not join the Common Market, and given that the vast majority of the population saw 
integration with Europe in a positive light (I will refer to this in the next chapter), elites from all 
sides of the political spectrum saw integration into Europe as essential. Europe’s insistance on 
democracy, coupled with the elites’ calculations of the costs of not joining, meant that the 
Spanish elites’ sensitivity towards European opinion increased exponentially, thus the costs of 
repression or democratic regressions became higher with internationalisation. In other cases 
where political considerations have been completely ignored, regional integration does not 
necessarily improve democracy. The case of North American integration is often used to prove 
this point. The United States’ silence on political conditionality and reluctance to pressure the 
Mexican elites, meant that the political elites in Mexico were comfortable engaging in less than 
democratic practices, as they did not see the economic agreement linked to their attitudes 
towards democracy (Gentleman and Zubek, 1992).  
 
5.3. Mexico and North American integration: the curious case of linkage without leverage 
 
As I briefly explained in the first chapter, the events surrounding the highly contested 1988 
presidential election are probably better remembered as the ‘beginning of the end’ of Mexico’s 
single-party rule. However, the early days of Carlos Salinas’ presidency also signalled a radical 
change in the way Mexico related to the international; from then on Mexico’s economic policy 
was transformed and autarky stopped being a viable option. Although the López Portillo (1976-
1982) and de la Madrid (1982-1988) administrations had already started to open up to the 
world, they had done so for the ‘wrong’ reasons. López Portillo was emboldened by an oil 
bonanza that took him, in an attempt to rehabilitate the regime’s image, to break with Mexico’s 
‘non-intervention’ tradition in international affairs and get involved in the Central American 
conflicts (Mazza, 2001: 14). Conversely, although de la Madrid probably succeeded in 
strengthening Mexico’s links with the rest of Latin America (Castañeda, 1988: 13-14), he 
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eventually ended up following the usual neoliberal reforms pushed by the IMF and the United 
States Treasury once the inevitable end to the oil bonanza sparked a severe deficit crisis. By his 
own admission, de la Madrid let Carlos Salinas – by appointing Gustavo Petriccioli (later to be 
appointed Mexican ambassador to Washington and one of Salinas’ closest allies) as the head of 
the Mexican Treasury – take control of the country’s economic policy as early as June 1986 
(Castañeda, 1999: 198). Whether this path was chosen by de la Madrid or imposed by the 
circumstances continues to be debated. Manuel Bartlett, the Interior Ministrer under Miguel De 
la Madrid and one of his closest allies, claims that they had no other choice but to accept the 
recommendation of the IMF and the American Treasury in the mid 1980s, thus handing the 
initiative to the technocrats (Aristegui, 2009: 22-23). On the other hand, I have already 
mentioned how Salinas has claimed that his presidency was a ‘social liberal’ experiment later 
discredited by the ‘neoliberals’. Whether it was chosen or imposed, this change in policy did 
lead to the eventual ratification of NAFTA in the United States Congress in November 1993. 
This policy change also heightened the vulnerability of the regime to international forces; the 
pressure that Mexico has been under since the early 1990s to ‘integrate itself economically, 
politically, and culturally to the values of a range of international forces is unprecedented’ 
(Levy and Bruhn, 2006: 66). Finally, this radical change in policy was accompanied by an 
exaggerated expectation and, as said before, signified the end of a self-imposed 
‘exceptionalism’ that had shaped Mexico’s foreign policy since the 1930s under the principles 
of nationalism, xenophobia, mistrust of the United States (and other superpowers), limitations 
on foreign investment, and a strong interventionist state (Dresser, 1996: 318). 
 
The previous chapter looked at the supposed correlation between socioeconomic development 
and democratisation in Mexico, and the role NAFTA played in this process. From that analysis, 
I concluded that NAFTA’s influence on Mexico’s democratic development was, at best, 
debatable. Unlike the somehow hazy and contentious relationship between NAFTA, the 
economy and democracy, the impact NAFTA had on the behaviour of Mexican elites is not only 
far more interesting in my opinion, but also clearer to see.  Levitsky and Way’s model, as 
detailed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, already explains how leverage can, by 
increasing the cost of repression, electoral fraud or other government abuses, be an efficient 
democratisation tool when combined with high linkage to Western democracies. Linkage not 
only raises the costs of undemocratic behaviour for the governing elites but also for everybody 
else (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 33). What is more, although Franco’s Spain does not fit their 
definition of a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime and as such falls outside what would be an 
ideal case for the application of their model, Levitsky and Way (2010: 153) consider the post-
1982 PRI regime to be a clear example of ‘competitive authoritarianism’.  
 
According to this model, then, Mexico’s democratisation prospects were to exponentially 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  152	  
increase as the linkage to the United States that had been developing since the mid 1980s, and 
that gained even more momentum with the negotiating and implementation of NAFTA, 
advanced. Levitsky and Way argue that – and I agree with this argument – Mexico represents, 
however, an unusual example of linkage without leverage. They claim that direct leverage was 
almost unnecessary due to the deep linkage between Mexico and, mainly, the United States. 
Given that since the 1980s the PRI regime changed its strategy by betting on free trade-fuelled 
economic development as a source of legitimacy, successive PRI governments (mainly De la 
Madrid’s, Salinas’ and Zedillo’s), in their pursuit of the international credibility that would 
safeguard this strategy, virtually unilaterally decided to underutilise ‘their coercive capacity and 
[to invest] in strong electoral institutions’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 161). The view is that the 
PRI regime ‘did not have to democratise’ (or at least it had other options) but chose to do so 
simply because the United States ‘would not allow Mexico into NAFTA without a credible 
promise to democratise’ (Philip, 2002: 133). Therefore, although leverage was not directly 
applied, the international conditions were enough for the regime to behave with moderation. In 
the case of Mexico, then, ‘indirect pressure for reform’ generated by linkage and other ‘linkage-
based’ forms of constraint (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 154-155) were enough to guide the regime 
towards democratic reforms. ‘Even without conditionality, then, linkage “limit[ed] the range of 
choices that might be made by Mexican policy makers”’ (ibid: 155-156).  
 
It is my view, however, that Levitsky and Way only describe how, in the case of Mexico, an 
increase in linkage (i.e. internationalisation) led to an increase in the sensitivity to leverage. 
There is no doubt that ‘in the context of international negotiations over free trade, democracy 
advocates and opposition political parties used the government’s sensitivity to international 
criticism’ to try and force political change (Selee and Peschard, 2010: 13). Yet the tentative 
steps that were taken in a democratic direction, that stem from the international context, were 
more part of a preventive strategy than the result of any actual leverage. Although I do not agree 
with the view that the international community – i.e. the United States – actually strengthened 
the regime’s position and thus prolonged the transition (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 32), I argue 
that despite having the capacity to considerably accelerate the process the United States failed to 
do so by refusing to actually use any of its leverage potential. Certainly the dynamic of ‘baby 
steps’ reform that characterised Mexico’s protracted transition – very similar to what Charles E. 
Lindblom (1959) famously referred to as ‘the science of “muddling through”’ in policymaking 
– easily predates the development of international linkages (Dresser, 2005: 363). The PRI 
regime had always used electoral processes as a legitimising tool domestically, as well as a tool 
to protect its image internationally. The fact is that the clear increase in the sensitivity to 
international leverage, caused by increasing linkages, only marginally (if at all) accelerated the 
already established dynamic of protracted reform. Unlike the Spanish transition, Mexico’s 
democratisation process did not produce a foundational pact (the 1978 Constitution and the 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  153	  
Moncloa pacts of 1977 in Spain), or a comprehensive reform of the political institutions 
(Merino, 2003: 15). Indeed, the fact that the transition has been slowly played out almost 
exclusively at the elite level – political parties constantly negotiating amongst themselves over 
resources rather than overarching reform – remains the main problem of Mexico’s transition 
(ibid: 8). Therefore, linkage on its own – with the inherent increase in the sensitivity to leverage 
– was not enough to transform or truly accelerate the dynamic of Mexico’s long transition to 
democracy, and hence it was not conducive to a more successful democratisation. 
 
What is more, to say that the increased linkage to the United States led to the PRI 
administrations – Salinas’ in particular but also Zedillo’s – to practice any sort of self-restraint 
when violent repression was chosen over co-option feels like a stretch. The targeting of PRD 
activists during the Salinas administration (already mentioned in the previous chapter), as well 
as the string of political assassinations that plagued the last months of his government, are 
actually evidence of how comfortable and confident the regime was with its international 
situation. The Acteal Massacre of December 1997 – when a paramilitary group murdered 45 
men, women and children in Chiapas – somehow fails to support the vision of a PRI 
government keen on underutilising its coercive capacity. In fact, it seems likelier that the 
Zedillo administration’s ability to cope with international human rights pressures was indeed 
‘more impressive than its capacity to [actually] improve human rights conditions in Mexico’ 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 110). Similarly, the fact that Washington ‘was 
determined to ignore what had become, [already] by late 1990, Salinas’ track record of election 
fraud and political violence’ (Gentleman and Zubek, 1992: 84), does not mean these were not 
taking place. 
 
However, I do agree with Levitsky and Way’s basic premise that when a country embarks on a 
project of internationalisation it recognises that linkage, as well as its susceptibility to leverage, 
will invariably increase. Mexico was no exception. What was if not exceptional certainly at 
least very unusual, was that Mexico’s transition took place in an atmosphere characterised by an 
increasing linkage to the United States yet also – by refusing to impose any political 
conditionality during NAFTA’s negotiations and by refusing to criticise the PRI regime – by a 
complete lack of leverage. Cold War mentality could, to an extent, explain why the United 
States policy towards Mexico prioritised stability over democracy; but it cannot explain why 
most American policy-makers regarded criticism against the PRI regime as counterproductive 
well after it came to an end. It is no secret that the United States’ main foreign policy objective 
towards the region has historically been, particularly in the case of Mexico, to maintain stability 
rather than promote democracy or development (Gentleman and Zubek, 1992: 84; Mazza, 
2001). The first precedence of this approach towards Mexico was set during the Porfirio Díaz 
dictatorship that managed to normalise relationships with the United States by simply achieving 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  154	  
stability. After the hiatus that was the Mexican Revolution – which, somehow unsurprisingly, 
set the conditions for the American intervention in Veracruz in 1914 – the PRI regime borrowed 
a page from Díaz’s book and normalised the bilateral relation4 by achieving political stability. 
The ‘normalisation’ of relations, however, became everything but a ‘normal’ bilateral 
relationship during the Cold War. As the Cold War intensified so did the zealous non-
interventionist stance of the United States towards Mexico. Successive PRI governments (from 
the Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) to the López Portillo (1976-1982) administrations) had, to 
varying degrees, shielded themselves from foreign criticism by proclaiming their neutrality 
under the third-world banner, and by conducting a foreign policy based on non-intervention and 
non-interference (the so-called ‘Estrada Doctrine’) that helped Mexico’s image as a ‘progressive 
international force’  (Dresser, 1996: 318). Although this represented a good trade-off for both 
countries, the United States ‘took this bargain to the extreme. Instead of simply respecting the 
sovereignty of Mexico, the U.S. government almost completely ignored Mexico’ (Domínguez 
and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 10). Even more so, throughout the whole Cold War, when 
containment dominated foreign policy calculations, democracy in Mexico was not merely 
secondary to other geopolitical considerations but it was even questionable in itself; there was 
no guarantee that democracy would not, as it had done in Chile, lead to a left-wing government  
(Mazza, 2001: 7). This is a very distinctive difference between the foreign policy approach the 
United States took towards Mexico and Spain during the Cold War; whilst the United States 
simply did not care what regime Spain had as long as it was a ‘cooperative’ one, the 
continuation of the PRI regime was, in the case of Mexico, arguably preferred to a transition to 
democracy. 
 
This foreign policy stance towards Mexico during the Cold War was certainly not exceptional, 
but rather an element of the preferred strategy towards Latin America. What is interesting in the 
case of Mexico, nonetheless, is that this policy remained almost unchanged after the end of the 
Cold War. According to Jacqueline Mazza (2001), there is an ‘operational code’ amongst policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Following an interview with an American journalist in March 1908 – in which Díaz claimed that his 
political ideals had not been ‘corrupted’ by his then 32 years in power and that he still firmly believed 
that democracy was the only just type of government (Díaz-Creelman Interview, in Aguayo Quezada, 
2010b: 23) – the then Secretary of State Elihu Root bizarrely claimed that ‘from all men alive today, the 
worthiest is General Porfirio Díaz […] if I were Mexican I would feel a devout fidelity for the rest of my 
life that would not repay what he has done for what would be my country […] I see Porfirio Díaz, 
president of Mexico as a great man that should be considered a model of heroism by the entire Human 
race’ (ibid: 24). The meeting between President William H. Taft and Porfirio Díaz at El Paso Texas and 
then Ciudad Juárez in October 1909 – the first ever visit to Mexico by a sitting American President 
(Aguayo Quezada, 2005: 76) – was further indication of the regime’s success in establishing more than 
mere cordial relations between the two nations. Indeed, it was American investors who ‘ultimately 
financed much of Mexico’s railroad construction’ in the last decades of the nineteenth century 
(Summerhill, 1997: 98). This ‘normalisation’ in the relationship, however, was anything but ‘normal’. In 
fact, this ‘normalisation’ came at the price of Mexico being, for all intents and purposes, left out of most 
foreign policy consideration by the United States. The unprecedented level of stability led to a ‘policy of 
no policy’ that remained more or less a constant until the 1980s (Mazza, 2001). 
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makers in the United States that predisposes them to take no-action when dealing with Mexico; 
the ‘policy of no policy’ has become the policy. The idea that intervening in Mexican affairs 
could only complicate what is already a very complicated relationship has remained unchanged 
despite the fact that Mexico has already undergone radical changes (ibid: 4-7). For whatever 
reasons though, this continuation of the policy towards Mexico may explain why, when 
NAFTA was being negotiated, there were no serious calls for any sort of political conditions; a 
point made very clear by Washington both ‘officially and in a variety of semi-official forums’ 
(Gentleman and Zubek, 1992: 79). There are, as ever, contrasting views of why this was the 
case. The view from NAFTA supporters in Mexico is that any sort of political conditionality 
would have implied that NAFTA had a political dimension; any hint of NAFTA being anything 
else than a strictly free-trade agreement would have immediately led to a loss of the required 
support in the United States Congress (De la Calle Pardo, 2003: 1-2). Although the Democrats 
held a slender majority in both Houses of Congress, the share of the seats was finely distributed; 
any move towards including any sort of democratic conditionality would have sat well with the 
Democrats but this would have almost invariably led to the PRI regime asking for further 
concessions, which would have in turn led to ‘a haemorrhage of Republican backers’ (ibid). The 
fact that the treaty is what it is, from the perspective of the Mexican negotiators, is due to the 
fact that it is all it could ever be.  
 
There is also the argument that since an alternative left-wing movement against NAFTA and 
free trade did not emerge until the 2006 electoral process with the campaign of Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador (Pastor, 2011: 13)  – the PRD candidate to the presidency – there was no real 
political force inside Mexico pushing for political conditionality either. NAFTA supporters 
when challenged about the clearly undemocratic nature of the treaty – i.e. it is a binding 
international treaty signed by a government that cannot be considered, by anyone’s standards, as 
democratic – have also used this argument to justify NAFTA. The reasoning being that there 
was a consensus in Mexico that NAFTA and free trade were positive for the country’s 
development. Jorge Domínguez and James McCann (1996: 69) agree that since the 1980s – and 
data from the Latinobarometro seems to confirm this – the majority of Mexicans have tended to 
favour FDI and free trade, but this has not been the case with other individual issues regarding 
economic liberalisation such as the privatisation of state industries. Even more importantly, 
Domínguez and McCann claim that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ challenge in the 1988 election was 
so successful precisely because it represented an alternative to the economic policy chosen 
during de la Madrid’s administration; in fact, Mexican society was polarised around the issue 
(ibid: 52). The idea that there was no organised domestic opposition to NAFTA pushing for 
democratic conditionality is not supported by the facts. In November 1990, just as the news 
broke that the Salinas’ government was indeed pursuing a free trade agreement with the United 
States and Canada, Cárdenas gave a speech in Vancouver in which he categorically called for a 
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multilateral agreement that would include a social chapter and that would strengthen Mexico’s 
struggle for democracy (Cárdenas, 2010: 325). Adolfo Aguilar Zinser and Jorge Castañeda – 
who later became Vicente Fox’s Ambassador to the UN and Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
respectively – went directly to the State Department and to a number of Democratic 
Congressmen with the idea of conditioning NAFTA on the regime accepting international 
observers in the 1994 elections but were quickly turned down (Mazza, 2001: 95). The fact that 
the PRI eventually allowed observers anyway, shows just how reluctant the United States were 
on setting any sort of conditions. In any case, it is clear that Cárdenas, Aguilar Zinser and 
Castañeda were all of the idea that democratic conditionality was desirable; hence to claim that 
this was not included because there was no real domestic political pressure to make it happen is 
misleading. 
 
The fact that there was a domestic opposition at elite level against NAFTA, as well as those 
who wanted it to be conditioned to democratic reforms is significant in its own right. The 
success of the PRI regime greatly relied on its ability to maintain a high degree of stability 
within the elite through cyclical regeneration. Although the agreements that gave birth to the 
PNR – the first forebear of the PRI – only achieved a partial unification of the elites – the 
Church and business sectors were excluded (Knight, 1992: 122) – the PRI regime eventually 
achieved a degree of elite unification and cooperation that is hard to achieve under non-
democratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes are, more often than not, characterised by the 
exclusion of a complete sector of society. In the case of Spain, for example, the Franco regime 
excluded the defeated factions in the Civil War and maintained its stability by limiting the 
emergence of other elite groups. In the case of Spain, as has been already discussed, the 
liberalisation of the economy and the access to European capital led to the emergence of a new 
elite or petit bourgeoisie (Holman, 1993; Poulantzas, 1976: 30) that challenged the established 
Francoist elite funded mainly by American and/or protected domestic capital. It was this elite 
disunity that, following Higley and Burton’s (1989) model, led to instability inside the regime 
and what eventually may have opened the door to far-reaching democratic reforms – after all, 
democracy remains the only way of institutionalising conflict. A similar process took place in 
Mexico but with a very different outcome. The elite fracture that occurred in Mexico during the 
1980s took place within the regime itself; the Corriente Democrática within the PRI that was 
started by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas – a civil engineer graduated from UNAM and the son of 
former left-wing president Lázaro Cárdenas – and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo – a former leader of the 
party and a law graduate from UNAM – represented the ‘traditional’ wing of the party vis a vis 
the ‘techno-yuppies’. Unfortunately, the ‘democratic wing’ of the regime that broke away from 
the party before the 1988 elections was not supported by any international actors, which partly 
explains why it failed to ‘mobilise the previously un-mobilised’ (Domínguez and McCann, 
1996: 11).  
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What is more, the fact that the United States openly supported Salinas’ wing inside the PRI, 
together with the consensus inside Mexico that free trade and FDI were positive for the 
country’s development, resulted in a very different reorientation of power than in Spain. Whilst, 
as mentioned before, Europe’s insistence that democracy was necessary if Spain was to join the 
EEC led to the moderation of some of the francoist elites as they went from being ‘hardliners’ 
to being ‘soft-liners’. In the case of Mexico the complete opposite happened; economic 
integration with North America was not associated with democratisation but actually with the 
survival of the PRI regime. If anything, we could argue that the United States position had the 
effect of further radicalising the anti-democratic factions of the PRI. 
 
The lack of support by the United States to the Frente Democrático Nacional and then to the 
PRD is not, however, that hard to understand; it was primarily a left-wing movement that, by 
opposing extensive liberalisation, was against basic US interests. This does not explain, though, 
why the United States government remained supportive of the PRI regime rather than 
supporting the PAN – a far more sensible and conservative opposition force. Based on the 
United States wider foreign policy it seems likely that both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations considered that free market reforms would invariably lead, as they did in Post-
communist Europe, to Mexico’s democratisation, and thus calculated that antagonising the PRI 
was an unnecessary hassle since democracy would happen anyway. The expectation was that 
trade would not only lead to Mexico’s development – and thus to democratisation – but also that 
the sheer ‘volume of economic transactions between the three countries and their intricate 
structural ties linking the three economies’ would provide economic incentives for a further 
rationalisation of free trade (Inglehart et al., 1996: 33). This self-reinforcing pattern would in 
turn lead to further interaction between individuals in the three countries, increasing trust 
between the three societies and an eventual merger in basic values (ibid: 18). All these would 
invariably have to lead to the democratisation of Mexico.  
 
This explanation also seems to be more in tune with the preference amongst American 
policymakers of interfering as little as possible when dealing with Mexico. What is more, the 
fact that Carlos Salinas was regarded as a champion of the free market more or less guaranteed 
Washington’s support. His economics education in Harvard as well as the Ivy League degrees 
of his closes associates5, it seemed, was evidence enough of his commitment to democratic 
reform. It also meant that the NAFTA negotiations could be moved forward with relative ease; 
the fact that the highest Mexican officials spoke fluent English, had degrees from American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This new Latin ‘Techno-Yuppies’, as referred to by the US media (Newsweek 11/11/1990) included – 
besides President Carlos Salinas – Trade Minister Jaime Serra Puche, Budget Minister Ernesto Zedillo – 
both Yale graduates – and Finance Minister Pedro Aspe – from MIT. 	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universities and shared many of the values as their counterparts in the United States translated 
into the bilateral negotiations becoming like ‘conversations amongst members of the same 
team’ (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 31). This also meant, of course, that the 
personal friendships and affinities, as well as a common vision, gave the PRI elite some 
important leeway. The fact, for example, that Salinas’ PhD dissertation – ‘Public Investment, 
Political Participation, and System Support’ – was very much a draft version of PRONASOL, 
which supposedly was introduced to alleviate extreme poverty but in reality worked more as a 
new version of the old PRI’s patronage networks (Urzúa, 1997: 94), did not seem to deter the 
enthusiasm of American policy-makers. Immediately after the highly contentious elections of 
1988 and even before Salinas was officially announced as the winner, for instance, the 
American Embassy in Mexico had already publicly congratulated him on his victory; no major 
newspaper in the United States even reported on the highly contentious nature of the elections 
(Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 116). The Reagan administration even congratulated Carlos Salinas 
on his victory before the votes had been counted (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 
107). Not entirely inconsequential, is the fact that the second leader to congratulate Salinas – 
also before he was declared the official winner – was Felipe González, which led to Porfirio 
Muñoz Ledo (the co-founder of Corriente Democrática alongside Cárdenas) claiming that the 
PSOE was now, ironically, supporting what he referred to as a ‘type of Mexican Francoism’ 
(Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 119).  
 
It is somehow puzzling that despite the wave of democratisation in Latin America and the 
support that the United States was showing to emerging democracies in the region, consecutive 
American administrations decided to remain quiet in the case of Mexico. The Reagan 
administration, for example, rarely criticised the PRI regime or met with the PAN leadership, 
yet it was incredibly vocal and gave ‘explicit electoral financial support’ to the opposition in 
Chile during the plebiscite campaign (Mazza, 2001: 57). There is certainly nothing new about 
the United States not supporting an emerging democracy. What is surprising is that in the case 
of Mexico, US administrations not only did nothing to encourage democracy but actually went 
as far as supporting the PRI regime. The 1991-1992 Action Plan from USAID went as far as 
claiming that democracy promotion activities in Mexico would be counter-productive (ibid: 66). 
The NED offered very little funding for democratic development in Mexico during the Reagan 
and Bush years or during the NAFTA negotiations; neither of its Republican (the International 
Republican Institute) or Democrat (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) 
wings offered any support to opposition parties until the early 1990s, and even then it was rather 
limited (ibid: 52). This is particularly puzzling since the Salinas’ administration had given every 
indication that they were desperate to improve Mexico’s image in the United States regarding 
the PRI’s record in Human Rights and democracy (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2009: 
108-110).  
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The absolute refusal to even raise the issue of political conditionality was a continuation of a 
‘policy of no-policy’, and constituted a definitive missed opportunity to strengthen Mexico’s 
democracy. Even the slightest signs of discontent in the United States were enough to make the 
regime give some concessions, as the creation of the Comisión Nacional de los Derechos 
Humanos (National Human Rights Commission – CNDH) proves (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 
126; Gentleman and Zubek, 1992: 80-81). The Mexican elites must have calculated that, 
although the United States government had no intention of asking for any sort of political 
conditionality, both Bush and Clinton were still vulnerable to criticism by Congress or other 
interests groups that could use the PRI’s democracy and human rights records as a pressure 
point to advance their own protectionist interests. Despite assurances by the Bush and Clinton 
administrations, both in public and in private, that they had no intention of pursuing an 
explicitly pro-democratic agenda with NAFTA, the regime’s elite was so sensitive to events in 
the United States that any sort of criticism from unofficial circles prompted a response.  
 
5.4.Conclusion: leverage as a determinant factor 
 
This comparison between the Spanish and the Mexican experiences with internationalisation at 
elite level helps illustrate how sensitive elites are to international pressure when transitions to 
democracy overlap with projects of internationalisation. In the case of Spain, it has even been 
argued that ‘Europe as a political example was probably far more important for Spain […] than 
the European Union as a set of material incentives’ (Fishman, 2003: 40). NAFTA, in stark 
contrast, was imposed by a nondemocratic regime on Mexican society and, regardless of 
whether the majority of Mexicans agreed with it or not, it cannot be regarded as an example of 
democratic policy-making. Accession into the Common Market was for the Spanish elites at the 
helm of the transition an important incentive to democratise. The fact is that the Spanish elites, 
much as their Mexican counterparts, were very sensitive to European opinion and pressure. The 
difference is that Europe decided to actively engage in Spanish democratisation; by 
conditioning accession into the EEC to democratic reforms, the EEC was effectively using its 
leverage potential. This conditionality in itself was certainly not enough to cause the 
democratisation of Spain but it certainly played a part in shaping the process. European 
integration was probably the only thing every single sector of society, political party or key 
actor could agree on. The widespread belief that EEC membership was key to the development 
of Spain injected the process of democratisation with a certain degree of urgency; without 
democracy there would be no entry into the Common market, and without the Common Market 
there would be no modernisation of Spain.  
 
This sort of consensus at elite level was never reached in the case of Mexico. On top of this, one 
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has to consider the active role individual European democracies took in supporting Spanish 
democracy. It is well documented that the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) developed strong 
links with the German SPD and the Swedish Socialists, whom, in turn, offered financial and 
logistic support to the PSOE’s electoral effort (Plattner, 2009: 6; Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 135). What 
is more, the PSOE’s leader, Felipe González, took advantage of Willy Brandt and Olof Palme’s 
personal endorsements – and substantial financial and logistical support (Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 
125) to convince the Spanish electorate that the PSOE was ready to head a democratic 
government (Blanco y Negro, 26/4/1975; Europa Press, 23/12/1975). One can only speculate 
on the outcome of the Mexican transition had policy-makers in the United States shown a 
similar level of commitment to Mexico’s democracy. The almost paranoid refusal by the United 
States government to consider any sort of democratic provisions as part of economic integration 
seems to have encouraged anti-democratic practices by the regime. Or, at the very least, despite 
the increasing linkage making the PRI regime incredibly vulnerable to foreign leverage, the fact 
that successive American administrations were unwilling to use it allowed the dynamic of 
‘muddle-through’ democratisation to continue. It is widely accepted that Mexico’s ‘long 
transition’, which started at the subnational level in the 1980s and is still to be completed in 
some parts of the country (as seen in the third chapter) (Hiskey and Bowler, 2005: 58-59), as 
well as the lack of any foundational pacts and the far-reaching institutional reforms that can 
only emerge from such agreements, greatly explains its limited success. During the negotiation 
stages of NAFTA the Mexican elites were probably more susceptible than they have ever been 
to political pressure from the United States; once the treaty was agreed, however, the leverage 
potential decreased greatly. Just as it happens in Europe, ‘the temptation of the carrot is strong 
[only] as long as the offer of membership has not yet been made, since then the stick of 
conditionality could become an empty threat’ (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 109). Unless there 
is a further push for regional integration in North America, it seems unlikely that a similar 
opportunity to apply pro-democratic leverage will present itself again. 
 
Certainly it is not possible to affirm that internationalisation causes democratisation, but it is 
possible to infer that – given that NAFTA played an important role in Mexico’s democratisation 
without even trying – had there been a stronger will to apply any sort of leverage amongst 
American policy-makers, NAFTA’s positive effects on Mexico’s democratic transition would 
have been greater. A quick comparison with the Spanish case confirms this. Therefore, 
internationalisation projects should be considered when analysing transitions to democracy; in 
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CHAPTER VI. Internationalisation and Democratisation ‘from Below’ 
 
The previous two chapters have already analysed how integration with North America and 
Western Europe influenced the processes of democratisation in Mexico and Spain, respectively, 
in a number of ways. The third chapter presented a brief comparison of the evolution of both 
processes of regionalisation, as well as a brief analysis of how internationalisation projects – 
even when weakly institutionalised – can open opportunities for institutional transformations. 
The fourth chapter presented – following the premises of a broad understanding of 
modernisation theory – a detailed analysis of the supposed correlation between 
internationalisation, socioeconomic development and democratisation. The fifth chapter, on the 
other hand, analysed how the different approaches to internationalisation shaped the actions of 
specific actors thus influencing the transitions to democracy at elite level in both cases. The 
main argument in the previous chapter was that, despite the fact that both countries were 
developing stronger linkages to democratic centres, the variation in the use of leverage (i.e. 
democratic conditionality) was an important factor in their transitions to democracy. This 
chapter, then, deals above all with what could be considered the ‘other side of the coin’. Whilst 
the previous chapter dealt with the structural factors and elite calculations (democratisation 
‘from above’) that shaped the transitions to democracy in Spain and Mexico, this chapter will 
focus on the social dimension of democratisation. Firstly, this chapter will briefly revisit the 
theory relating to the social dimension of democratisation processes. The brief theoretical 
background will be immediately followed by an overall comparison between the ways NAFTA 
and the EEC/EU dealt with the social and cultural consequences of integration, and then by a 
detailed description of the part the social dimension (mass values, identity, civil society and 
social capital, and political culture in general) played in the Mexican and Spanish transitions. 
Finally, the last part of this chapter will argue how the clear sociocultural dimension of the 
process of European integration played a key part in Spain’s democratisation ‘from below’, 
whilst the limited ambition of NAFTA failed to support a similar social consensus in favour of 
democracy. 
 
6.1. A Culturalist approach: democratisation from ‘below’ 
 
It is important to, in the first instance, revisit in further detail the argument analysed in detail in 
the second chapter regarding the importance of social values and/or cultural attitudes (political 
culture in particular) in the consolidation of democracy. This is of particular interest for this 
thesis because both Spain and Mexico’s transitions have often been regarded as ‘non-
responsive/enlightened’ processes that were initialised and negotiated from above (Welzel, 
2009: 87-88). However, an important premise of this thesis is that democratisation is an 
inherently multicausal process and, as such, there was also a ‘responsive’ dimension (ibid) to 
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both processes of democratisation that has to be explored. This social dimension of 
democratisation processes refers to the transformations in the characteristics of the political 
cultures and social/mass values, as well as other social transformations that help the 
consolidation of democracy. When speaking of democratisation, one of the most studied social 
developments credited with contributing towards the consolidation (more than the transition in 
itself) of democracy, has been the emergence of social capital. Social capital, simply defined as 
an ‘instantiated set of formal values or norms shared among the members of a group that 
permits them to cooperate with one another’ (Fukuyama, 2000: 98), is closely related to the 
emergence of a healthy civil society. Civil society, understood here as the cluster of voluntary 
associations that ‘extend beyond the purely local and informal but that do not typically carry as 
much political content as activities guided toward policy’ (McDonough et al., 1998a: 16), may 
not include political parties or other policy specific interest groups but it still plays a key part in 
the process of democratisation. Social capital and a healthy civil society, theoretically at least, 
allow ‘different groups within a complex society to band together to defend their interests, 
which might otherwise be disregarded by the powerful state’ (Fukuyama, 2000: 99-100). The 
existence of horizontal organisations independent of the state is a key characteristic of 
democratic regimes, but above all a strong civil society helps eradicate authoritarian tendencies 
within society (Encarnación, 2001: 54) as well as reinforcing society’s commitment to 
democracy (Hamman, 2003: 62). It is no surprise then that the assertion that ‘a flourishing civil 
society is an essential ingredient for successful democratisation’ (Encarnación, 2001: 55) almost 
became common wisdom during the 1990s and the beginning of last decade.  
 
At this point it should be made clear that, as discussed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, 
although there seems to be a growing concern regarding the use of a simple distinction between 
the transition and consolidation stages of democratisation (this dichotomy gives the impression 
that democracy is a linear process) (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 24; Bejarano, 2011: 6; Pridham, 
1995: 167), societal changes seem to be more relevant during the consolidation stage of the 
process. While there are still many questions regarding what consolidation actually means (are 
temporal considerations enough as suggested by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995: 9) and Peeler 
(1992: 102 and 109), or is consolidation related to wider social transformations as O’Donnell 
and Schmitter suggest (1986: 43)?), in the interest of pragmatism I will use the distinction 
between transition and consolidation in its simplest chronological sense. Hence, we could say 
that the consolidation stage in the cases of Mexico and Spain began when alternation in power 
was achieved. In the case of Spain, then, this is after Felipe González takes control of 
government in1982, and in the case of Mexico we could say the consolidation stage begins 
somewhere between the PRI losing control of Congress in 1997 and the PAN winning the 
Presidency in 2000.  
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This focus on the consolidation stage is more than mere caprice. Although social movements 
can play an important part during the early stages of transition – especially in cases like Mexico 
where ‘authoritarian elections’ provide important ‘structural opportunities for collective 
challenges’ to emerge (Schedler, 2009: 306) – the cycle of mobilisation suggests that after a 
rapid increase of social participation during the transition, the citizenship tends to demobilise 
rather quickly unless a specific challenge to democracy emerges (as the 1981 attempted coup in 
Spain) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 26-27). During the Spanish transition, for instance, 
social mobilisations began suddenly in the early 1970s – with groups like the Comisiones de 
Barrio in the working class enclaves of Madrid and Barcelona – but were in clear decline by 
1977 (Encarnación, 2008: 73). We could, therefore, say that an increase in civil society 
engagement initially supports democratisation by facilitating the organisation of an opposition 
to a non-democratic regime. Once democracy is established, though, civil society contributes 
greatly towards the maintenance of democracy by expanding the citizenry’s access to 
information (thus increasing governmental accountability), helping members of society to learn 
compromise and tolerance, stimulate individual participation in politics, facilitate trust, increase 
solidarity and even work as a training ground for would be political leaders (Berman, 2009: 38; 
Paxton, 2002: 254). For this reason, although without ignoring the many social transformations 
in Spain during the 1960s in particular (which were a clear effect of the overall process of 
modernisation in the country) or the many relevant social movements that took place during 
Mexico’s protracted transition (the 1968 student movement or the 1988 post-electoral 
movement), this chapter will primarily focus on the consolidation stage of the democratisation 
process in both countries.  
 
Besides the specific role civil society and social capital play in consolidating democracy, it 
would be fair to assume that some sort of social consensus supporting democracy and a 
participative citizenry (even if their engagement is minimal) are necessary conditions for the 
appropriate functioning of democratic political institutions (Duarand Ponte, 2004: 19). This is 
not to say that support for democracy from below or a robust civil society are enough to secure 
democratisation, or even that these are more important than the institutional design in itself. In 
fact, regardless of how robust a civil society is, if an adequately democratic institutional 
framework does not accompany it, it will probably not make much of a difference (Encarnación, 
2001: 54). Yet, most scholars from the three broad theoretical ‘schools’ of democratisation (i.e. 
modernisation, culturalist and elitist/institutionalist) would acknowledge that, for democracy to 
become ‘the only game in town’, there has to be a broad consensus that the only possible way to 
attain power is through the ‘competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. Inglehart and Welzel’s 
(2005) theory of democratisation, for instance, paints a very clear picture of the relationship 
between mass values and democratisation. Some institutional scholars also claim that although 
it is interaction with institutions that shapes the attitudes, orientations and feelings of individuals 
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towards the political system (what we can understand as political culture) (Lijphart, 1980; 
Crespo, 2007), mass values will invariably have to be aligned with democratic institutions if 
democracy is to be consolidated. And there are, of course, culturalist scholars – from 
Tocqueville to Putnam – that view culture as an independent variable that can, by itself, explain 
democracy. Whether or not changes in political culture are completely independent from 
institutional arrangements, socioeconomic development or variances of the wider culture is, for 
the time being, irrelevant. What is worth noting here is that, at least at some level, most 
democratisation theories acknowledge that mass values and societal preferences play some part 
in democratisation.  
 
Finally, there is a need to explore what implications, if any, the international context can have in 
the sort of social transformations that are conducive to democratic consolidation. The previous 
chapter already established how the internationalisation processes in Spain and Mexico 
increased the linkages to democratic centres in Europe and North America respectively, and, by 
increasing the salience of the international context in domestic politics, also increased the 
susceptibility to leverage. There is, however, the need to also focus on the linkage dimension 
and the influence the international setting had in social and cultural transformations. After all, 
internationalisation usually involves more than the ‘repressive’ dimension of the state apparatus 
(i.e. its institutions of control), and includes the ‘ideological’ and ‘mass-integrative dimensions’ 
that operate ‘through extra-bureaucratic and extra-legal means’ (Görg and Hirsch, 1998: 591). 
Thus, when internationalisation leads to an increase in linkage between countries, it affects all 
aspects of the political life; when an ‘internationalisation of domestic politics’ – as defined by 
Douglas Chalmers (1993) – takes place, there is a significant presence of ‘internationally based 
actors’ within a number of formal, as well as informal institutions (i.e. those that include ‘any 
set of settled routines, norms and procedures which are recognised by the participants in 
allocating authority, establishing ways of resolving conflicts, and setting the broad procedural 
terms for arriving at decisions’) (ibid). As said before, though, the use of the concept ‘informal 
institutions’ understood as the diffuse norms, self-images and preferences that can help actors 
predict behaviour (Jackman and Miller, 1996: 635), can lead to confusion and makes it 
unnecessarily harder to distinguish between political institutions and political culture. In any 
case, what Chalmers calls informal institutions is simply what we understand as political culture 
and mass values. In short, regardless of what we want to call it, the fact is that 
internationalisation influences social constructs and political culture, just as much as it does 
elites’ calculations and institutional arrangements. 
 
6.2. Do supranational identities matter in transitions to democracy? Contrasting the EU 
and NAFTA: embracing vs. ignoring the cultural dimension of internationalisation   
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Before presenting the analysis of how the two processes of internationalisation have contributed 
towards the transformation of social interactions, mass values and political culture, it is 
necessary to develop an overall comparison between the two projects. It is the premise of this 
chapter that the process of European integration directly and indirectly contributed towards the 
process of ‘bottom up’ democratisation (or the ‘responsive’ dimension of the transition) in 
Spain, whilst the process of North American regionalisation failed to have the same positive 
effects in Mexico. The fact that there was a lack of a coherent effort in North America to 
develop the sort of sociocultural policies (or at least a coordination/cooperation in the policies) 
that emphasise similarities and that can lead to the emergence of a common ‘identity’ – which 
in turn leads to an increased interaction between the three countries’ societies and a reinforcing 
of the integration process – meant that Mexico’s internationalisation process did not contribute 
towards the development of a democratic political culture or towards building a consensus at 
social level in favour of democracy. In the case of Spain, Europe played an important role both 
as an incentive to support democracy at social level and as a source of democratic values and 
practices. This, however, could not have happened had Europe not recognised the importance of 
the sociocultural dimension of its integration process and had it not taken steps to strengthen its 
common identity. 
 
As emphasised repeatedly in the previous chapters, the process of European integration, albeit 
carried out by primarily economic means, has been, in great measure, a politically motivated 
process. Accordingly, Spain had clear political as well as economic (as analysed in the fourth 
chapter) motivations to seek membership with the Community (Tsoukalis, 1978: 438). Given 
this clearly political dimension, it is not surprising to also find a social element in the 
construction of Europe. The use of language that inferred a clear bond between the process of 
European integration and distinctive social and political principles can be traced all the way 
back to the Treaties of Rome. Although nowhere in the Treaty are words like ‘democracy’ 
‘identity’ or ‘culture’ used, the Treaty does invite other peoples of Europe that share the ideals 
of ‘peace and liberty’ to join in the integrationist efforts of the Six (Treaty of Rome 1957: 
prologue). As a wider, at least geographically, instrument of European integration, the Council 
of Europe’s European Social Charter of 1961 (which Spain did not ratify until 1980), went a 
long way in defining the sort of social interactions (mainly in a setting of labour relations) that 
are characteristic in European democratic societies. All of the EU’s major treaties from the SEA 
onwards have also made direct allusion to the principle of democracy (SEA, Prologue), 
common European principles (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997: Article 1, section 8a.), a common 
heritage (Treaty of Lisbon Article 1, section 1), or the principle of solidarity between the 
member states (Treaty of Nice, 2001; Article 1, section 16).  
 
As explained previously, societal support for democracy is, at the very least, helpful for its 
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consolidation. Although the fact that the Spanish transition was well on its way before Spain 
achieved EEC membership suggests that ‘Spaniards did not require [membership] in order to 
solidify their commitment to democracy’ (Fishman, 2003: 38), this does not mean that Spain’s 
internationalisation process – and the linkages at social level already being developed with 
Europe during the pre-accession stages – did not contribute towards the solidification of this 
commitment to democracy. It also does not mean that Europe was not seen as more than a mere 
common market. Indeed European integration has been for Spaniards the ultimate guarantee that 
the country would maintain a democratic order and a place in the international arena (Alvárez 
de Miranda, 2003: 109). It is therefore not surprising that the Spanish citizenry has generally 
seen Spain’s membership in Europe and the wider process of European integration in a positive 
light since the 1950s (Díez Medrano, 2007: 205). In fact, as far as the late 1990s, a higher 
percentage of Spaniards regarded the process of European integration as positive than the 
percentage of the population that thought Spain was benefiting from EU membership. In other 
words, a percentage of the Spanish population has been in favour of European integration 
despite their belief that Spain was not directly benefiting (in material terms) from EU 
membership (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001: 34).  
 
The long-held belief amongst Spaniards that their ‘history, culture and religious values belong 
squarely with the European tradition’ (Encarnación, 2008: 32), which intensified during the 
1960s and 1970s as Spanish society felt the effects of modernisation and the desire to ‘be like 
other Europeans’ grew (Díez-Nicolás, 2003: 119), helps explain this apparent contradiction. 
Despite the dictatorship’s attempts to distance Spain from a European modernity, which they 
saw as socially and culturally corrupted by socialism and liberalism (Crespo MacLennan, 2004: 
50-53), the feeling that Europe was the solution to Spain’s problems was reinforced during the 
latter stages of the regime. An increasing receptiveness towards European ideas and cultural 
products following the Stabilisation Plan intensified this belief amongst most Spaniards; the 
lack of legitimacy of the regime had become almost part of the consciousness of Spanish 
society (permeating even into some conservative elites that had previously backed the regime 
(Powell, 1990: 253)), and it was regarded as essentially immoral (Cotarelo, 1992: 7). In short, 
the ‘onslaught of northern European culture’ in Spain – due to migration patterns, tourism and 
cultural exports – around the time of its transition to democracy (Wiarda, 1989: 176) 
contributed towards the notion in Spain that Europe implied – as said in the first chapter – 
‘cultural, political, social and psychological interconnections as well as economic ones’ (ibid: 
175). 
 
With this in mind, then, we need to analyse what this European onslaught meant for Spain’s 
democratisation process. Why are social and cultural links to Europe relevant? It seems clear 
that there is a sociocultural dimension to democratisation and indeed to the process of European 
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integration. Of course the fact that there is a sociocultural dimension to European integration 
that consciously attempts to reinforce a certain European identity, does not mean that there has 
been a decrease in national allegiance as integration has advanced (or even as a by-product of 
globalisation (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 12)); but it is still possible to identify the emergence 
of a secondary allegiance to ‘Europe’ (Milward, 1997: 15). This growth in allegiance towards 
Europe may not directly equate to the development of a cultural identity in the traditional sense 
(i.e. the nation), yet there is a sense that the ‘idea of Europe’ has ‘percolated through the 
complex populations of the European continent’ and that it has been ‘“refracted” through the 
prism of daily interactions’ (Herzfeld, 2002: 145). The sense that Europe is a political and 
cultural ideal just as much as it is a geographical space (Lovell, 2003: 122) is certainly not new. 
Whilst there seems to be a common set of values emerging from what could be perceived as a 
single European origin (recognised by the European Commission (2006:36)) – in itself 
questionable of course – described as the ‘Athens-Rome-Jerusalem’ progression (ibid: 121; 
Shore, 1993: 792) (or to paraphrase Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Europe is the Bible and the Greeks’ 
(Morgan, 2011: 186)), it is actually very hard to attest the existence of a European culture.  
 
Yet, one could easily say that the formation of the European Communities was ‘accompanied 
by an ideology of “Europeaness”’ (Pocock, 2002: 301). The fact that a European ‘super-state’ is 
still very far from being a reality, however, also seems to indicate that there is no such thing as a 
homogeneous European identity or culture. In fact, there is an argument to be made about how 
the pressures inherent in the process of economic integration have led to further social divisions 
within the EU. Divergences in economic performance between countries (the PIGS and the rest, 
or those in the Euro-zone and those outside, for example) as well as within regions in the same 
country (West and East Germany for instance) have led to – particularly since the increase of 
regional funds in the mid 1980s has encouraged regions to act as lobbyists and sometimes 
‘compete against each other over resources and for influence’ (Bourne, 2007: 291) – a 
reinterpretation of the European project as a process of differentiation rather than one of 
homogenisation (Hudson, 2000: 413-414).  	  
Although I agree with the notion that European identity will probably not be strong enough in 
the near future to challenge individual nationalisms, it is also clear that Europe – particularly in 
the 1970s and 1980s – has been a significant sociocultural entity that has had a singular effect 
on its members and its periphery (Herzfeld, 2002: 145-148). After all is said and done, there is 
no denying that Spain’s transition was a success not only because of its ability to consolidate 
democratic institutions and a successful market economy in record time, but also because it 
succeeded in ‘inducing cultural changes that made it part of the European community of 
nations’ (Encarnación, 2001:61). Ironically, the fact that Spain’s current problems with its 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  168	  
democratic regime are a mirror image of the rest of Europe’s, seems to support the notion that 
Spain was very successful in consolidating the European model of democracy.  
 
What is more, a cultural dimension has long been a part of the project of European integration. 
There is little doubt that the institutional construction of Europe has, very much since its 
beginnings, been ‘accompanied by an increasing feeling of uncertainty over just what it [is] that 
represent[s] Europe particularity in the cultural field and what it mean[s] to be European’ 
(Passerini, 2002: 193). That uncertainty hindered, to an extent, the EEC’s ability to implement 
specific strategies aimed at developing a coherent cultural policy, but it also shows that this 
dimension has always been considered. It was not until the rather disappointing turnout in the 
first ever European elections of 1979 (although the Commission was rather disappointed at the 
time, we should note that the 61.99 per cent turn out in that election remains the highest to date) 
that the Commission finally decided that a coherent set of cultural policies had to be devised 
(Shore, 1993: 779). The fruits of these efforts are found in article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which calls on all member states to bring a ‘common cultural heritage to the fore’ and 
establishes mechanisms for cooperation in the cultural arena. However, even as early as the 
1980s, when the ‘People’s Europe Project’ was launched, the Commission was already 
attempting to construct a European culture. As part of this ‘orchestrated attempt to create and 
nurture “new symbols of European identity”’, the Commission hired a professional PR firm to 
‘analyse “motivational dynamics related to Europeanisation”’ (ibid: 788). It was as part of this 
project that the European Flag was designed, the European Anthem (based on Beethoven’s Ode 
to Joy) was written, European driver’s licenses and passports were introduced, the concept of 
European citizenship was developed, and the new European gift shops started to appear around 
Brussels. Programmes such as the European Heritage Days and the Cultural Capitals of Europe 
were likewise implemented by the Council of Europe as part of this coordinated attempt to raise 
the ‘awareness of the public about the multiple values’ of the European ‘common heritage and 
the continuous need for its protection’ (European Heritage Day website). 
 
The sudden emergence of a policy aimed at strengthening the sense of ‘Europeaness’ is 
evidence of the existence of a cultural dimension to the process of European integration. This 
cultural dimension had an influence in the way Spain was transformed, in particular, during the 
time when its democracy was being consolidated. There is no doubt that, as I have said before, 
the modernisation of the country played a key part in many of the transformations at social, 
cultural and mass value levels. Yet we must also consider that although modernisation 
contributes towards cultural changes in the same general direction, ‘the diversity in basic 
cultural values’ partly explains ‘the huge differences that exist in how institutions perform in 
societies around the world’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 4). Modernisation explains the 
generalities of cultural and social change but it is not the only independent variable.  
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During the transition years there was a growing sense that the Spanish national identity had to 
be redesigned in order to fit with Europe’s common interest, and also with Europe’s common 
identity and institutional frameworks (Farrell, 2005: 215). As we will see in the next sections, 
this desire to ‘catch up’ with Europe at the social and cultural levels played a key part in 
shaping Spain’s democracy. The distinctly postmodern dimension to European culture and 
identity implied that for Spaniards to become European they had to embrace some of the most 
salient characteristics of the European ‘culture’. There is no doubt that a European ‘culture’ 
cannot be easily compared to national cultures since Europe, as a political and economic unit, 
lacks the resources and strategies that were (and to an extent still are) available to nation-states 
in their bids to create common identities and cultures. Nation-states are probably modernity’s 
main political contribution, whilst the European project feels distinctly postmodern (or post 
nation-state). And in this postmodern understanding of identities, these are ‘constantly being 
renegotiated’ as the challenges to traditional identities (globalisation, American cultural 
dominance, immigration, etcetera) are continuously increasing (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 11) 
Furthermore, ‘individualism has long been a stereotype of European identity’ (Herzfield, 2002: 
139). This inherently European individualism, which is a part of Europe’s common identity that 
Spaniards were trying to replicate, is closely linked with a European tradition that emphasises 
self-expression over survival values (to put it in Inglehart’s terms), and which hinders the ability 
to create a culture by utilising the repressive capabilities available to the state. After all there are 
no European myths capable of shaping a feeling of belonging that can be compared to the 
national myths (Milward, 1997), and there seems to be no clear way to create such myths. Or as 
Anthony Smith eloquently put it: ‘who will feel European in the depths of their being, and who 
will willingly sacrifice themselves for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe?’ 
(Smith, 1995: 139). Despite the fact that a European culture, in the traditional sense, is far from 
being consolidated and widely accepted, there is no doubt that Europe as a project has had a 
strong sociocultural component. NAFTA, on the other hand, is a completely different story.  
 
Robert Pastor, as one of the staunchest defenders of NAFTA, has called for leaders in Canada, 
Mexico and the United States to begin developing strategies and policies that take under 
consideration the ‘North American idea’. Pastor argues that this ‘idea’ is simply the realisation 
that all three countries would be better off designing together ‘a continental future’ and 
developing ‘a genuine partnership that goes beyond a rhetoric to a clear definition of a 
community in North America’ (Pastor, 2011: xiv). Although I agree with his overall argument 
that further cooperation and even some degree of supranational (or at least 
multinational/intergovernmental) institutionalisation is desperately required, one would be 
forgiven for finding the emergence of something like a North American idea hard to imagine. 
Unlike the European experience, the three North American countries do not share many of the 
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components that could construct a shared supranational identity, let alone culture. One only has 
to read Samuel Huntington’s (2004) last major work to realise how difficult the task of 
developing a North American community would be. In Huntington’s view, there is a crisis of 
national identity in the United States that is caused, along with subnational and transnational 
identities, by the emergence of non-American national identities (specifically Mexican and 
Latin American) that – unlike the immigrants from the past who ‘wept with joy when, after 
overcoming hardship and risk, [they] saw the Statue of Liberty’ and became ‘the most intensely 
patriotic citizens’ (ibid: 5) – do not feel loyal or identify themselves with the United States.  
 
There are, of course, those who have a more positive or at least pragmatic view towards 
Mexican immigration. After all, it was during the 1980s and 1990s in particular, that the 
insatiable need for low-skilled labour in the United States facilitated mass migration; the 
expanding economy meant that any number of immigrants (legal and illegal) could easily find 
work in the buoyant service industry (hotels, restaurants, bars and entertainment centres), as 
well as the rural jobs traditionally reserved for Mexican labour. By some estimates, up to 50 per 
cent of the new jobs that were created during the 1990s were taken by new comers to the United 
States, the majority of which were Mexicans (Davidow, 2003: 178-179). The problems many in 
the United States have with Mexican immigration, as Huntington’s work suggests, has to do 
with more than sheer numbers. The question of identity is at the forefront of the debate. 
 
A quick comparison with the European experience is rather enlightening. In the case of the 
project of European integration, the emergence of a secondary (to the national identity) 
European identity has had a very specific influence in the policies and attitudes towards 
immigration (Pastor, 2011: 66). Although not without its problems, the free flow of labour 
within Europe had a positive effect on the consolidation of Spanish democracy. Spain’s 
experience as a sender of migrants to Northern Europe – from the 1950s onwards guest 
workers’ programmes in France, Germany and Switzerland facilitated emigration to these 
countries (Encarnación, 2004: 175) – positively contributed to its transition to democracy. 
Besides the issue of remittances, emigration to Northern Europe, allowed a great number of 
Spaniards – according to different estimates anything between a quarter of a million (Balfour, 
2000: 279) and over a million (Encarnación, 2004: 175) emigrated to Northern Europe between 
roughly 1960 and 1974 – to interact with other democratic societies and, to an extent, learn from 
this experience. The end of the economic boom in Northern Europe coupled with the Spanish 
economy’s impressive performance through the 1980s and the increasing liberalisation of the 
political regime encouraged many of those living abroad to relocate to Spain (more than one 
million between 1973 and 1980) (ibid), and thus bring with them many of the attitudes and 
practices learned abroad. Spain’s status as a former emigrant nation has also contributed 
towards Spaniards’ attitudes towards new immigration from Northern Africa and Latin 
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America; in fact human rights organisations and NGOs defending immigrants represent one of 
the few sectors of civil society that has developed (ibid: 176).  
 
On the other hand, despite the United States’ rhetoric as an immigrant nation, and as a 
welcoming land of opportunity and equality, the laws that gave preference to white European 
immigrants were only abolished in 1965. Up until then Latin Americans, Asians and Africans 
could not fairly compete for the limited number of visas available (Davidow, 2003: 180). There 
is certainly a lot of truth to the assessment that a customs union or a common market – which 
would invariably lead towards freeing labour flows – is hindered by the asymmetry between the 
three nations (Miller and Stefanova, 2004: 509-510). Yet, on second examination, it seems that 
there may be more to it. Romania’s GDP per capita (all in constant 2005 US dollars) in 2000 
(when accession negotiations with the EU were opened), for instance, was $3,339 compared to 
Britain’s $33,689 – over ten times Romania’s GDP per capita. By 2004, when Romania was 
accepted into the EU, the gap had narrowed but Britain’s GDP per capita was still over eight 
and a half times larger than Romania’s. The United States’ GDP per capita in 2000 (when North 
American integration was supposedly at its height) was less than five and half times that of 
Mexico. As the Romanian example elucidates, asymmetry in levels of development is definitely 
a challenge (the UK took steps to minimise immigration for instance) but it is not an 
insurmountable one. In the case of Romania, the EU had political, historical and strategic 
interests to work towards minimising the effects of asymmetry (Pridham, 2001). Claiming that 
NAFTA’s only challenge to integration is the asymmetry between Mexico and the United States 
would be a gross simplification. It is not easy to know if NAFTA has or will, by increasing the 
levels of transactions between the citizens in the three countries, actually lead to ‘greater 
similarities in values’ between them (Inglehart et al., 1996: 18), which could lead to a change in 
views towards immigration and even possibly to the development of a common culture… but it 
seems unlikely. According to Inglehart’s ‘cultural maps’ (World Values Survey website), the 
values of Mexican society have moved only slightly closer to those of the citizens in the United 
States and Canada, but it is impossible to know if this is due to the peculiarities of NAFTA or to 
those generally associated with modernisation. 
 
Similarly, a quick analysis of the opinion Mexicans hold of the United States in general does 
not seem to back the argument that anything resembling a cultural coming together is taking 
place. In the 2010 Latinobarometro only 6.3 per cent of Mexican respondents held a very 
positive opinion of the United States – the lowest number in the region – whilst 9.8 per cent had 
a very negative image – the highest in the region. If anything, the relationship at social level 
seems to be getting worse: in 1995 12.5 per cent of Mexicans had a very positive view of the 
United States and only 4.7 per cent had a very negative image – below the average number of 
respondents for the whole region. This data (figure 6.1) also seems to suggest that the time 
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when Mexicans’ positive opinion of the United States was at its highest level was between 2000 
and 2002, a time when, according to Robert Pastor, North America was ‘almost as integrated as 
Europe was after fifty years’ (2011: 19). However, soon after the 9/11 attacks, as the 
governments in the three countries failed to develop common security strategies, the 
‘integrationist’ trend in North America was stopped in its tracks. The distinct lack of a coherent 
institutional framework under NAFTA did not facilitate a coordination of policies between the 
three governments to tackle the security problem at regional level, which would have surely 
been the better option. Instead, the unilateral measures taken by the United States regarding 
security led to the old problems and grudges relating to the border regions to re-emerge and 
even intensify (ibid: 5). This partly explains why in 2003 and 2004 the image of the United 
States in Mexico was so negative. It could be argued that this reverse in regional cooperation led 
to a change in attitudes that brought people in Mexico and the United States further apart than 
they had been before; thus partially lending credence to the view that greater interaction leads to 
greater understanding between societies, which in turn leads to further integration. 
 
Figure 6.1. Percentage of Mexican sample that had a ‘very good opinion’ of the United States. 
Latinobarometro, 2012. 
 
Besides considering the real impact the specific context at a particular time may have in the 
bilateral relations at social level (for example the passing of Arizona’s controversial 
immigration Law SB 1070 in 2010, the War in Iraq in 2003, or the tougher border controls that 
were implemented following 9/11), we also have to accept that the sociocultural differences 
between Mexico and the rest of North America are considerable. Certainly I do not agree with 
Huntington’s exaggerated vision of Mexico’s identity being a threat to American society, yet we 
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global liberalism that emerged triumphant in the 1990s has come to dominate the political 
discourse – in the whole of Latin America democracy and the market (albeit not every aspect, 
privatisation of state industries, as mentioned before, remains controversial) are understood as 
‘values of universal applicability’ just as they would almost anywhere else (Whitehead, 2010: 
57) – it is unclear if this will lead to a societal transformation that would get Mexico closer to 
the sort of cultural kinships with North America that could lead to a common identity. This 
perfected and ‘all-encompassing’ version of liberalism, which is fairly homogenous around the 
world, implies a consensus around some basic issues including the wisdom of liberalising trade 
and investment across borders. This consensus does not exist for the liberalisation of labour 
though (ibid: 58). Although in Europe labour was also liberalised, the experience there suggests 
that integration produced a reinforcing cycle: increasing interaction between societies, leads to 
greater similarities in values, which in turn leads to further rationalisation for free trade and 
integration.  
 
In the case of Europe, there is little doubt that identity, as well as material considerations, has 
been a factor that needs to be considered when analysing the rationalisation behind Europe’s 
integration process; the decision to open labour flows within Europe could not have been 
reached following economic considerations alone. In fact, some steps towards European 
integration – albeit not all of them as some of the most sensationalist sections of the British anti-
European media would like us believe (Booker and North, 2005: 225) – have been taken despite 
economic considerations. When Jacques Delors pushed for the EMU to be implemented, he 
was, apparently, warned by economists from the Commission about the perils of such a bold 
move without first securing some sort of fiscal union (The Telegraph 16/11/2010). Following 
the motto so often pinned on him of a ‘beneficial crisis’ (The Telegraph 2/6/2012), Delors 
pushed forward with the project in the hope that any crisis emerging from the contradiction of 
having a common currency without a common fiscal policy would only lead to further European 
integration. Although this feels like an exaggerated version of events – Delors himself has 
defended the EMU project by claiming its failure has to do with its execution rather than its 
architecture (The Telegraph 2/12/2011) – it is clear that there was a wider rationalisation in the 
process of monetary union than mere economic gains. The argument that in North America the 
main stumbling block to further economic integration – the next logical step towards ‘positive 
integration’ would be, as put forward by Vicente Fox in his ‘NAFTA plus’ proposal, a customs 
area – is the asymmetry between the three countries, needs to reconsidered. This asymmetry 
does lead to a ‘complex interdependence’ (Inglehart et al., 1996: 19) that is far more difficult to 
overcome than it was in Europe, yet still a move towards further integration feels improbable 
not only because of the obvious issues emerging from these structural conditions but also 
because of sociocultural issues and the question of identity.  
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There is no doubt that the cases of Spain and Mexico are, again, very different. The process that 
took place as Spain integrated with the European Community in the 1980s was more about 
Spain regaining its place in Europe rather than Spain ‘becoming’ European. A similar 
development in North America would have to consider, besides the obvious structural 
constraints, that the sociocultural differences and the apparent lack of anything resembling a 
North American identity would make further integration harder than it was in Europe. Indeed, it 
has been claimed that despite the clear  ‘cultural and social penetration’ of American values and 
culture ‘in everyday Mexican life’ (Levy and Bruhn, 2006: 31), as well as the ‘chicanisation’ of 
American cities, the increasing interaction between the two nations and the homogenising 
influences, Mexico and the United States remain ‘ethically, culturally, socially, economically 
and politically’ (ibid: 33) completely different.  
 
Having said this though, much as structural conditions can be transformed (a narrowing of the 
development gap between the United States and Mexico is not too hard to imagine) so can mass 
values and identities. As said in the previous section, the European Commission developed a 
detailed policy program aimed at strengthening the cultural links between European countries in 
an attempt to emphasise their shared ‘Europeaness’. Certainly this attempt to foster a common 
regional identity was facilitated by a historical and sociocultural kinship, yet there is no denying 
that much of this secondary identity has been constructed.  
 
What is more, it seems that differences in mass values do not preclude a group of nations from 
developing a common identity. After all, the differences in social and mass values between, say, 
Spain and Sweden are probably greater that those between the United States and Mexico (figure 
6.2). Yet, the Eurobarometer wave conducted in the same year as Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
published their cultural map – which shows a considerable difference in both the 
traditional/secular and survival/self-expression values between the two countries – shows that 
Sweden and Spain had a noticeably high level of attachment to Europe (74 and 72 per cent 
respectively). Obviously their clear ‘cultural’ differences did not preclude Spaniards and 
Swedes from sharing a sense of ‘being’ European. In the same Eurobarometer wave, people in 
Spain and Germany showed similar levels of belonging to a European identity; 76 per cent and 
60 per cent of respondents in Spain and Germany, respectively, felt either completely European 
or a combination of a national and a European identity. This is also despite both countries 
showing marked differences at mass value level1. Again, ‘cultural’ differences did not seem to 
get in the way of Spaniards and Germans sharing a common European identity. In a similar 
vein, in the 2003 Latinobarometro only 25.7 per cent of Mexicans admitted to feeling ‘really 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It would be fair to assume that in the case of Spain the strength of this identification with Europe is 
explained by the fact that ‘for much of the twentieth century and in particular under the Franco 
dictatorship [Europe] signified modernity and democracy for Spaniards who aspired to both’ (Balfour and 
Quiroga, 2007: 163). 
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close’ to Latin America as a region, yet almost 60 per cent of respondents (well above Chile and 
Argentina) said they felt very proud of their ‘Hispanic culture’. Clearly, then, a cultural affinity 
or the sharing of mass values is not a pre-condition to developing a common identity, just as 
sharing some cultural characteristics does not guarantee the development of a common identity. 
Common identities can be constructed from below by increasing interactions between societies, 
as well as from above by introducing policies that emphasise similarities.  
 
Figure 6.2. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, 2000: 29; modified by the author 
 
Notwithstanding the clear cultural implications inherent in furthering the links of economic 
interdependence between the three countries, NAFTA completely ignored the social dimension 
and the consequences that an increase in free trade would have at social level. This is highly 
unusual considering Canadian fears, in particular, regarding the effects economic integration 
with the United States would have at a sociocultural level. Although in Mexico some similar 
concerns regarding the incursion of American cultural values (and products) were raised during 
the negotiation stages, the economic rewards and/or risks were so overwhelming that they 
almost completely dominated the debate (Taylor, 2001: 51). In the case of Canada, however, the 
concern that an asymmetric integration with the United States would lead to a dilution of 
Canada’s political sovereignty and even its cultural identity was far more pronounced; Canada 
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is a relatively young country divided by strong regionalisms and where national identity is often 
subordinated to regional considerations (ibid: 47-49). Further interaction with the United States 
would lead, according to some, to an American social and cultural dominance in the region. 
Unlike the Mexican-American border, the American-Canadian border does not have its own 
border culture; whilst the presence of both Mexican and American cultural constructs in the 
border region (which in turn leads to a border identity) helps ease the concerns over American 
cultural dominance in Mexico, this does not happen in Canada. In that sense, Canadians are 
probably most concerned when it comes down to cultural integration. Yet, instead of trying to 
solve the issue by including some sort of cultural provisions or legislation within NAFTA, the 
three countries, following the prevailing dynamic of minimalist integration, chose to ignore it.  
 
6.3. The social dimension of the Spanish and Mexican transitions to democracy 
 
Spain has long been hailed as an example of how to achieve a democratic transition through 
consensus at elite level, which apparently often results in a peaceful transfer of power. Yet we 
must now recognise that pacts at elite level cannot guarantee that democracy will prevail 
(Bejarano, 2011: 18-19; Edles, 1995: 355-356; Huntington, 1991: 141) – much depends on what 
kind of pacts are being reached (as discussed in the previous chapter) and how these are being 
reached2. Analysing social changes, therefore, is more than a mere caprice; it actually allows us 
to understand why elites opted for moderation over confrontation, and why we cannot see the 
Spanish transition – nor the Mexican for that matter – as merely an enlightened ‘velvet’ 
transition that took place independently from societal pressures (Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 37). 
Certainly the personality of political leaders played an important part, but allowing this to be the 
only explanation presupposes a degree of subjectivity that is not explained by elite theory 
(Edles, 1995: 359). In a similar vein, saying simply that authoritarian/democratic regimes are 
explained solely by authoritarian/democratic cultures holds a similarly limited explanatory 
value (Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 28). Understanding social changes (in values, public opinion and 
social capital), as well as how these shape and are shaped by structural considerations and elite 
calculations, is necessary to understand the Spanish and Mexican transitions. If – as strict 
structuralist and elitist theories of democratisation presume – the underlying motivating factor is 
‘the desire on the actor’s part to maximise utility’ (Edles, 1998: 13), then how could we explain, 
for instance, that whilst the Socialists and Catalans decided, under pressure from below, to 
move towards consensus, the Basque nationalists decided the opposite (Edles, 1995: 369-370)? 
Certainly the Basque leaders stood to ‘win’ as much as the Catalan or Socialist leaders. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 According to Ana María Bejarano (2011: 87), the role pacts will eventually play in political outcomes 
(i.e. the type of regime) largely depend on three features: ‘(1) the degrees of inclusion and exclusion with 
regard to its signatories; (2) the nature and scope of the restrictions they impose on the future 
development of the political regime; and (3) the duration of degree of institutional entrenchment of these 
same restrictions’. 
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calculations of the leadership are not taken in a vacuum; they need to account for the support 
they can garner. In the Basque case, for instance, the general atmosphere of ‘consensus’ that 
reigned in Spain after Franco’s death was somehow overpowered by a focus on the past and a 
hardened approach to negotiations influenced by the years of repression under Franco (Edles, 
1998: 129-138). Even if the Basque leaders would have preferred consensus based solely upon 
their ‘rational’ calculations of self-interest – in itself questionable – there is no telling whether 
they could have achieved this without popular support. 
 
Spain’s consensus-based transition has also been blamed for weakening some of the new 
democratic institutions. Whilst some of the institutions that directly emerged from the elite pacts 
during the transition evolved to become strongly democratic, other institutions and practices 
(often linked with political culture) suffered from this process and retained an authoritarian 
legacy. Although this is a bigger problem in the case of Mexico (Merino, 2003: 15), the Spanish 
elite-driven and consensual transition may have allowed for the peaceful solution of many 
conflicts and clashes of interests, but it also left the door open for poor or uneven 
institutionalisation when consensus could not be reached (Field and Hamann, 2008). In the 
Spanish case, the electoral system, the political party system and the parliamentary government 
were areas transformed by pacts and an even institutionalisation. On the other hand, the 
territorial politics (decentralisation) and the politics of industrial relations were not entirely 
solved by consensus and as such have evolved within a weak institutional framework (ibid). 
Spanish political decentralisation has been, as seen in the third chapter, an extra-institutional 
process (according to the 1978 Constitution Spain is not a federal state) achieved through the 
sort of negotiating, competing, bargaining and political strategizing that can only exist in a loose 
institutional framework (Colomer, 1998: 40). But at least the regionalisation process in Spain 
has taken place within the wider process of democratisation. The ‘frozen democracy’ 
hypothesis, on the contrary, offers the worrisome view that one key risk inherent in pacted 
transitions is that whatever negative side effects these kind of transitions may lead to, they will 
be hard to correct. For instance, in the Spanish case the pacted nature of the transition has, to an 
extent, led to a stifling of political competition as it is the same elites that originally pacted the 
transition who remain in power; this in turn can lead to a disenchantment with democracy at 
social level which can hamper transformations in political culture  (Encarnación, 2008: 43-44). 
Although some claim that very little about the democratic development in Spain supports the 
‘freezing’ hypothesis (ibid: 44), others claim that the ‘viability of Spanish democracy’ has been 
achieved ‘at some cost to its quality’ (McDonough et al., 1998a: 1).  
 
In any case, the question of whether or not Spain should be considered a frozen democracy 
needs to be seriously considered. The previous chapter already explained how pacted transitions 
should not be considered as a panacea for successful democratisation. In fact, it has been argued 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  178	  
that pacted transitions can undermine democratic ideals and practices, have negative 
consequences for economic development, strengthen or maintain clientilistic networks, foster 
corruption, limit political competition and limit the positive influence of civil society 
(Encanración, 2005:183). In the Spanish case, the pacted nature of the transition allowed many 
of the regime’s key institutions to survive the transition almost intact. Even more importantly, 
during the ‘negotiating stages’ of the democratic process (say from 1977 to 1979) some key 
institutions including the police, the armed forces, the judiciary and local governments had not 
been reformed in the slightest. This gave the conservative forces – the military and security 
apparatus in particular – an important veto power, which in many ways shaped the transition  
(Field, 2011: 2). It could be said, then, that non-democrats negotiated the Spanish transition to 
democracy. This is particularly relevant for this study since, as argued by Frances Hagopian 
(1990: 148-149), ‘patterns of politics established in periods of transition have a very real and 
strong potential to become semipermanent features of the political landscape’, and transitions 
represent unique opportunities (‘critical junctures’) that once missed are seldom regained. On 
top of this, the history of democratic failures in Spain that led to the horrors of the Civil War 
shaped the democratisation process; the transition managed to, in many ways, bring together the 
‘two Spains’, which gives the 1978 Constitution an even greater symbolic value (Magone, 
2009: 430). All these means it is very hard for the Spanish political system to change or evolve. 
Regardless of the inadequacies that may characterise the transition process (e.g. the 
demobilisation of Spanish civil society, the ‘conservative’ nature of the process, the ‘pacto del 
olvido’ and the incomplete institutionalisation of the Spanish autonomic model), the political 
system that emerged from it is here to stay.   
 
Even if the ‘freezing hypothesis’ of Spanish democracy is sternly contested (Encanrnación, 
2005 and 2008), events in the last few years seem to have put in evidence many of the 
shortcomings of the Spanish democratic system, and we have to acknowledge that these can be 
directly traced to the transition process. However, although the freezing hypothesis may bring 
into question the quality of Spanish democracy and the success of its transition, Mexico’s 
democracy has been as negatively impacted (or even more so) by the ‘micro-pacts’ that 
characterise its transition. It has been said in previous chapters that Mexico’s democratisation 
has resembled a fight of attrition at micro-institutional level (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 25; 
Merino, 2003; Ortega Ortiz, 2001: 269-270). If anything, the greater capacity by the PRI regime 
to incorporate wider sectors of society meant that the transition was even more determined by 
elite bargaining and the resulting institutional reforms than it was in Spain. Unlike the Franco 
Regime, the PRI had the tools available to ‘integrate’ an even broader range of social 
movements and represent their interests; the PRI successfully integrated the left wing and 
conservative sections of society by, for instance, considering mass-labour’s demands in the 
decision-making process (Middlebrook, 1995), but also reaching pacts with the rent-seeking 
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coalitions that, as discussed before, allowed them to make huge profit by supporting the regime 
(Haber et al., 2008: 9-11). The fact that in Mexico the politically organised opposition to the 
regime has been ‘loyal’ greatly contributed towards the almost complete demobilisation of 
society; more so than in Spain, political parties and elites in Mexico had to work within the 
existing institutions in an attempt to transform them (Ortega Ortiz, 2001: 269-270). In Mexico 
there has been minimal creation of new democratic institutions or even drastic transformation of 
the existing ones; the change in the ‘rules of the game’ was about making the existing 
institutions work rather than changing them (Merino, 2003: 15). Whilst Spain passed a new 
constitution, inaugurated a new Parliament and transformed its political party system (with the 
emergence of a new centre-right party), Mexico’s current constitution was ratified in 1917, the 
main institutions remain fairly unchanged and the two parties that have held power in the last 
hundred years are the same ones that have dominated the political landscape in Mexico since 
1939. In Mexico, the freezing hypothesis seems to hold more validity. The strengthening of 
political parties during the last 50 years of reforms has, as discussed at length in the third 
chapter, led to political parties being just as concerned with maintaining the status quo as the 
PRI regime (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 32). Instead of supporting mass mobilisation and civic 
engagement, all political parties seek to limit it, as it could jeopardise the power they have 
gained through decades of political struggle. 
 
Due to the pacted/negotiated nature of both transitions, the sociocultural dimension of both 
processes has, in my opinion, been under-analysed. However, the many problems that can be 
directly traced to the nature of the Spanish and Mexican transitions make it necessary to 
reconsider the role society played in the process. In the Spanish case, for instance, there is a 
view that highlights how the lack of a broad structural-institutional break with Francoism, in 
particular during the immediate years after the transition, stopped the sort of social 
transformation that leads to democratic consolidation. Some went as far as claiming that 
Spanish political culture remained inexorably authoritarian (Rodríguez Ibañez, 1987: 34) or at 
least not entirely democratic (Wiarda, 1989: 9). As has been mentioned before, however, by the 
time of Franco’s death Spanish society had already been fundamentally transformed by the 
effects of the process of socioeconomic modernisation (urbanisation, industrialisation, etcetera) 
as well as by mass migration patterns, tourism and the overall increase in contact with the 
developed democratic nations in Western societies (Balfour, 2000: 284). Between 1971 and 
1978, for instance, the percentage of Spaniards enrolled in tertiary education almost trebled 
(from 8.7 per cent to 23.5 per cent) – not to mention that the ratio of female to male enrolled in 
higher education almost doubled (World Bank Databank, 2013e). Religiosity also fell sharply in 
the same period, and divorce was legalised in 1981 with over 80 per cent of the population 
supporting the move. Hence, even if ignoring the whole cognitive element of political culture 
and disregarding the effect institutions have in shaping culture (Crespo, 20; Lijphart, 1980; 
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Magone, 1996: 175), I still do not agree with the view that the values of Spanish society were 
inexorably authoritarian after its transition. To say this would be to ignore the widely accepted 
consequences economic development had in generating a range of ‘values and attitudes’ that 
‘conflicted with those of the regime’ (Balfour, 2000: 283), as well as ignoring the clear 
correlation between institutional changes and changes in the political culture.  
 
Yet, it is also true that the ‘advent of democracy in Spain did not prove especially auspicious for 
the rise of a vibrant civil society’ (Encarnación, 2008: 70). If anything, Spain’s transition, as 
said repeatedly, stands out for its consensual nature, abandonment of maximalism and low 
levels of mass mobilisation – at least from 1978 onwards. Indeed until fairly recently Spanish 
democracy suffered from alarmingly low levels of political engagement and participation. This 
lack of engagement in politics is seen as a by-product of Spain’s weak civil society in 
democracy; by the time democracy was being consolidated civil society in general was, with the 
exception of during the 1981 failed coup attempt (Ortega Ortiz, 2001: 291), fairly demobilised. 
A lack of participation and engagement in politics is clearly a problem for any democratic 
country, but it is particularly troublesome in those countries with emerging democracies 
(Hiskey and Bowler, 2005: 58). In any case, the feeble state of Spain’s civil society and low 
levels of social capital is partly a consequence of the rejection of maximalism that characterised 
the transition (McDonough et al., 1998a: 3) – which implied the demobilisation of society at the 
very point when the strengthening of civil society seemed most likely (Encarnación, 2008: 69) – 
as well as a consequence of the legacies of Francoism and the ‘corporatisation’ of society that 
resulted from the regime’s attempts to create artificial forms of civic engagement (ibid: 70).  
 
This does not to mean, as said before, that the Spanish transition occurred in a vacuum free 
from any sort of social mobilisations or societal pressures. Indeed there were some important 
social mobilisations in urban centres during the years preceding the transition. During the 
1960s, for instance, the official workers (Organización Sindical – OS) and students (Sindicato 
Español Universitario – SEU) organisations of the regime were infiltrated by clandestine 
opposition groups and managed to stage protest movements during the 1960s, yet these were 
vehemently repressed by the regime (Aguilar, 2000: 305). However, neither the OS nor the SEU 
were ever able to completely shake off their Francoist tag and as such were unable to lead real 
opposition social movements. Nevertheless, the changes introduced by the regime in the 
economic sphere – combined with some weak cosmetic reforms introduced during the mid 
1960s that attempted to bring the state apparatus in tune with the new social reality of Spain – 
opened some important opportunities for some social movements to emerge (mainly trade 
disputes and strikes) in some of the main industrial centres in Spain (Balfour, 1989: 142-143). 
In many ways the economic growth experienced during the 1960s had been achieved without 
having to undergo any real structural reforms within the regime, particularly in social issues. 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  181	  
Thus, even though the country was rapidly developing and there was a marked increase in the 
standard of living of the population, labour conditions remained poor; unemployment benefits 
covered only 30 per cent of the salary as late as 1972, safety conditions in the workplace were 
precarious at best and the contributions paid to the official trade union (OS) were far greater 
than any benefits received from it (Sartorious and Sabio, 2007: 51-53). At the same time, the 
labour movement in Spain (shaped in no small measure by the PCE leadership) underwent a 
‘cultural’ transformation. The focus changed from an out-dated ‘revolutionary’ rhetoric to a 
focus on specific social issues and goals (ibid: 53-54). Hence, despite the fact that strikes were 
still to be legalised by 1976, the number of working days lost because of industrial action in 
Spain was almost three times higher than the average for EC countries, were industrial action 
was legal (Martín García, 2010: 51).  
 
The strikes and labour mobilisations also opened opportunities for other social forces to join in 
the cycle of contestation in the very early years of the democratisation process (from 1974 until 
1977); students, the clergy and nationalist also started to mobilise against the dictatorship. This 
broader mobilisation was initially repressed by the police forces, which only helped to 
deteriorate the image of the dictatorship outside Spain even further (ibid: 52-53). This in turn 
opened more windows of opportunity for the opposition forces to mobilise. In a first instance, 
the labour and student movements that dominated the social landscape during the Arias Navarro 
and the first Suárez governments were characterised by a radical and rupturista stance, which 
both drove and set the boundaries for the democratic process (Soto, 2005: 447-448). In many 
ways, then, the social movements during the early stages of the transition that were 
characterised by a ‘brief but intense cycle of protest influenced short-term political events and 
even shaped some of the longer-term characteristics of political culture in contemporary Spain’ 
(Sánchez León, 2011: 95). This interpretation of the Spanish transition ‘from below’ certainly 
seems to challenge the ‘official’ version of events, i.e. that the transition was as a controlled and 
planned process carried out by the political elites from both sides (Francoist and the opposition). 
The high levels of mobilisation between 1974 and 1977 seem to suggest that, at least at the very 
beginning, there was no clear plan or programme that was being followed but that key decisions 
were taken on the go, shaped in great measure by social mobilisations (Quirosa-Cheyrouze y 
Muñoz, 2007: 17-19). Having said this though, there is no denying that following the Moncloa 
pacts of October 1977 and the de facto abandonment of the rupturista option by the PCE, the 
social effervescence that typified the early years of the transition and the last years of the 
dictatorship was replaced by social disengagement. The clear support for the CCOO in the 
February 1978 elections for trade union representatives – the first democratic elections of this 
sort in over 40 years – was a clear indication that workers were contempt with subordinating 
short-term goals in favour of the democratic consolidation (Sarotrious and Sabio, 2007: 141).  
The subsequent decline in trade union membership and participation guaranteed that the 
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‘consolidation’ of democracy took place in an environment almost entirely unrestricted by 
social protest.  
 
In any case, Mexico, much as it happened in Spain, went through important social 
transformations in the 1950s and 1960s driven by an aggressive process of modernisation and 
economic expansion (Ortega Ortiz, 2001: 302; 2008: 157). In both cases, it is worth mentioning, 
modernisation did lead to the emergence of social pressures that were to challenge the regime; 
the difference is that whilst Francoism quickly collapsed, the PRI regime went on to survive for 
another three decades. Although this may imply that Spanish civil society was better organised 
or that, indeed, Spaniards were more supportive of democracy than Mexicans, the reality is that 
one would struggle to find evidence that suggests the Spanish citizenry was particularly well 
organised or mobilised, particularly after 1978. Indeed, for whatever reason, it seems that civil 
society in both Spain and Mexico has been relatively weak. As in the Spanish case, there are 
those who claim that Mexico’s political culture was relatively unchanged by its transition to 
democracy (Durand Ponte, 2004: 20). Although the same arguments that contradict this notion 
in the Spanish case also apply for Mexico (i.e. ignoring the effects modernisation and 
institutional changes have on political culture), there is no denying that Mexico’s civil society 
or social engagement with democratic politics is also far from exemplary. Mexico, for instance, 
only has around 8,500 legally registered NGOs whilst Chile has over 50,000 (Acosta, 2010: 
278-279). As said before, a vibrant civil society is often considered a requisite for democratic 
consolidation as it is believed to be, by developing horizontal networks independent of the state, 
one of the main creators of ‘a generalised trust among the citizenry’ (i.e. social capital) that 
helps eradicate authoritarian tendencies and, thus, consolidate democracy (Encarnación, 2001: 
54). 
 
Spain’s democratic consolidation, however, succeeded despite its ‘notorious dearth of voluntary 
associations’ (Hamann, 2003: 47). Although the positive association between civil society (and 
social capital) and democratisation has been questioned (Berman, 2009; Encarnación, 2001), it 
is the opinion of this author that civil society and social capital, without being the ‘political 
panacea’ some believe them to be (Encarnación, 2001: 56), more often than not help rather than 
hamper democratisation. This is not to say that democracy cannot be achieved without the 
positive influence of civil society – in fact it can be that, under certain conditions, too much 
social pressure can derail the democratisation process by increasing the likelihood of extremism 
and anti-democratic movements emerging (Berman, 2009; Hamann, 2003). But in the absence 
of the positive effects related to a strong civil society, there has to exist a different source of 
social capital (usually the democratic institutions themselves), a different source of a pro-
democracy consensus at social level and a democratic ‘guarantee’ that deters authoritarian 
tendencies in the absence of an organised society capable of defending democracy. With this in 
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mind, I argue that the process of European integration was a relevant ‘particularity’ of the 
Spanish case that contributed towards partially solving some of the problems inherent in its 
‘pacted’ transition. Whilst democratic disillusionment and lack of social mobilisation in 
Mexico, for instance, contributed towards a diminished consensus about the benefits of 
democracy, the incentive of European integration helped to maintain a pro-democracy 
consensus in Spain.  
 
6.4. European actors, civil society and social democracy in Spain 
 
There are many instances that support the notion that there were many ‘positive exemplar 
effects of European capitalist democracies, deriving of a common collective “European 
Identity”’ (Waisman, 2005:6), during Spain’s democratisation. The previous chapters have 
already analysed some aspects of Europe’s role as an ‘example’ and ‘influence’, as well as it 
being a set of incentives (Fishman, 2003: 40). Now the focus is on Europe’s positive effect at 
social level during Spain’s consolidation of democracy. As said before, it is during the 
consolidation stage that societal pressures and attitudes are more important. However, the 
behaviour of specific social actors during the transition stage can sometimes be equally relevant. 
The way the trade unions acted during the transition to democracy in Spain is a good example 
of such instance. The importance of labour organisation during Spain’s transition was magnified 
by the fact that, although they were not necessarily as organised and efficient as their European 
counterparts, they were far more influential than other civil organisations and, most importantly, 
they were better organised than the Spanish employers’ associations (Bermeo and García-
Durán, 1994: 101). During the 1970s and early 1980s – especially after González came to power 
– relations between the PSOE and the main trade unions (the UGT and the CNT) soured due to 
high unemployment and tough economic conditions (McDonough et al., 1998a: 20). Although a 
nationwide strike was eventually called in December 1988, there is no doubt that, despite their 
potential to destabilise the transition, the trade unions showed a high degree of moderation 
during the early years of the democratisation process – especially between 1979 and 1982 when 
the UCD’s majority in government was weak, and social mobilisation could have created 
serious problems for the government (Hamann, 2003: 56). A major factor that explains this 
moderation is the positive reputation Europe had amongst the trade unions. The European 
Community in general, and some individual European governments in particular, had gained the 
respect of many trade union leaders (both socialists and communists) during the years of 
struggle against Franco; thus trade union leaders were receptive to the advice given by other 
European trade unions, that were encouraging them to hold back on their original instincts to 
reject the harsh economic measures and call for social mobilisations (ibid). More importantly 
though, the consensus on European integration was so wide that, much as the PSOE was forced 
to adjust its economic policy due to the constraints of European integration, the trade unions had 
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very little choice; the popular support was such that they could not be perceived as being the 
main factor derailing the process (ibid: 56-61). Thus, the process of European integration 
shaped the way labour-state relations were integrated into the new democratic system. 	  	  
We could also argue that by following this internationalisation path, Spain’s labour-state 
relations became more akin to those in other European industrial nations (where the influence 
and levels of participation in trade unions has been consistently declining). Once the PSOE was 
in government and democracy was considered to be relatively safe, the trade unions (mainly the 
UGT) felt comfortable enough in their position to break away from the party due to Felipe 
Gonzalez’s economic policy. This break strengthened the independence of the unions from the 
PSOE, and thus transformed them into real actors of civil society, but it also led to a decrease in 
their influence. From around the same time as unions became independent, the ‘Spanish 
workers fled the Unions almost as fast as they joined them’ (Encarnación, 2001: 67).  
 
On top of the explicit efforts by European actors to moderate the trade union’s strategies, it 
seems that whatever pressure wielded by Europe was complemented by its mere presence as an 
incentive and example. Despite a clear absence of a strong civil society in Spain, ‘the prospect 
of a better future as part of Europe may have absorbed much of the function with which civil 
society is credited – such as reinforcing the commitment to democracy’ (Hamman, 2003: 62). 
‘The political culture of the transition was’ according to Jonathan Story and Benny Pollack 
(1991: 134) ‘peculiarly imbedded with a sense of linkage between domestic regime and external 
alignment’. They argue that Europe became synonymous with democracy; Europe, according to 
them, ‘provided the unifying objective around which the internal consensus of the 1978 
Constitution could be formed’. European integration, then, worked as an alternative to one of 
the functions commonly related to social capital, i.e. reinforcing a commitment to democracy. 
However, even if Spain’s transition took place in the absence of a flourishing civil society 
(Hamman, 2003: 55) and even if Europe performed a key task often related to a strong civil 
society, this does not mean that social capital was not created, but rather that it was created in 
other ways.  
 
As said before, institutionalist explanations of democratisation have long claimed that 
democratic political institutions often take over the creation of social capital where a weak civil 
society is unable to do so, thus producing ‘the very same pro-democratic values and orientations 
believed to aid a flourishing civil society in a consolidating democracy’ (Encarnación, 2001: 
77). This often occurs because ‘formal laws play an important role in shaping informal norms 
[… and] informal norms make the creation of certain kinds of political institution more or less 
likely’ (Fukuyama, 2000: 111). The European Community, we could argue, provided (to an 
extent) certain formal ‘laws’ – in the shape of clear limitations as to what could and could not 
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be done without jeopardising Spain’s membership in the EEC – which played a role in 
developing norms in Spain, which in turn made the emergence of democratic institutions more 
likely. In the absence of a strong civil society capable of creating the social capital credited with 
the consolidation of democracy, the consensus surrounding European integration worked as a 
democratic guarantee at social level. We should also not underestimate how important it was 
that a consensus was actually being reached at social level. After all, before the consolidation of 
democracy, Spanish political culture was characterised by an abundance of overlapping 
antagonisms (left vs. right, secular vs. religious, national vs. regional, etc.) (McDonough et al., 
1998a: 26). These antagonisms had led to the historic polarisation of Spanish society, and 
democracy can hardly be consolidated within highly polarised societies (unless special 
provisions for ethnic minorities are made) (ibid: 25). The fact that there was a social consensus 
regarding European integration indicates the mere incentive of European integration played a 
part in the depolarisation of Spain’s political culture. In any case, once the institutional 
transformations inherent in the process of European integration were completed, the institutions 
themselves contributed towards the creation of the sort of social capital needed for democratic 
consolidation (Crespo, 2007). 
 
Finally, from the late 1970s, as part of the Community’s push into the sociocultural arena, there 
has been a clear move towards homogenisation of social and cultural policies around the 
member states. The Maastricht Treaty’s Social Chapter is clear evidence of this move. Its 
articles on welfare and labour indicated Brussels’s desire to get involved legally and 
institutionally in European social engineering, and represent a clear indication of the EU’s 
social dimension. However, the Maastricht treaty only formalised and reinforced the norms that 
already shaped the European social ‘model’. This social model has long been characterised by a 
wide welfare state that, although it varies from country to country along the lines of Gosta 
Esping-Anderson’s typology (1990)  (from Britain’s Anglo Saxon model to Scandinavia’s 
socialist model), it normally covers social protection, income maintenance, health care, social 
services and unemployment protection. Even before Spain joined the EEC in 1982, there had 
been a clear trend towards the Europeanisation of its social model. However, after Franco’s 
regime was dismantled the spending on social services as percentage of GDP consistently 
increased; social spending went from under 10 per cent of GDP in 1975 (Encarnación, 2008: 
123) to over 21 per cent in 2005 (OECD Stats, 2013b). Although Spain’s high unemployment 
rate partially explains increases in social spending, in 2005 Spain’s unemployment (9.2 per cent 
of total workforce) was considerably lower than in 1985 (21 per cent), yet social spending as 
percentage of GDP was over 4 per cent higher (World Bank databank, 2013f). In short, despite 
the constraints on public spending imposed by a tough economic situation and the need to 
comply with European directives in order to join the EMU, what had been a very traditional 
welfare system – as in the rest of Sothern Europe and the developing world based primarily on 
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family ties (Bermeo, 2000: 274) and not on government intervention – was fundamentally 
transformed. As in other areas of economic reform (such as the privatisation programme 
followed after the transition), the need to develop a comprehensive welfare state followed the 
logic of European integration and the structural limitations this implied, rather than a direct 
conditioning to do so by the EEC; the dynamics of integration set the agenda for political 
change whilst the different governments decided how to achieve it (Chari and Heywood, 2008: 
201). The quick expansion of Spain’s welfare state is partially explained by one direct and one 
indirect factor related to European integration. In the first instance, the expansion of social 
spending is directly explained by the post-transition objective of ‘catching up’ with Europe in 
economic (Encarnación, 2008: 123; Yaniz Igal and De Lecea, 2007: 349) as well as social 
(Guillén and Alvarez, 2004: 26) terms, whilst there was also a desire – particularly amongst the 
PSOE leadership – to protect those who would suffer the most from the rest of the structural 
reforms necessary to modernise the state and to join the EEC (Bermeo and Gracía-Durán, 1994: 
113-115).  
 
The more radical changes in the Spanish social model took place ‘from the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s’ and were especially evident in the enhancement of social citizenship in the fields of 
‘health care, non-contributory benefits, social services for dependent people, and labour 
insertion policies’ (Guillén and Alvarez, 2004: 24). The radical transformation of the social 
structures of the state in this period is largely explained by the PSOE’s ability to implement 
policies due to its close links with organised labour – the UCD government was never able to 
garner such support (Bermeo and Gracía-Durán, 1994: 101) – rather than by a radical change of 
ideology from the UCD to the PSOE. Whatever the reasons in the ‘delay’ in implementing 
social reform, this adjustment has brought the Spanish social model closer to the European 
standard in terms of the amount of money spent in social policy and the way this money is 
spent. Europe has had a direct impact on this process by setting European directives (found in 
the SEA and the Social Charter) and by providing European funds that are directed at 
supporting specific social programmes that may not necessarily be national priorities, such as 
the infrastructure related to the welfare state (job centres, vocational training schools and related 
expenditure). Spain’s internationalisation, then, not only influenced how Spain achieved its 
transition to democracy but also the type of democracy it was moving towards. 	  
Europe’s ‘soft touch’, then, has been an influential social factor during Spain’s reformulation of 
its welfare state. For the Spanish population ‘becoming European has meant, among other 
aspects, “attaining European levels of social protection’’’ (Guillén and Alvarez, 2004: 26); 
hence, since the very beginning, one of the main goals of Spain’s project of internationalisation 
was to achieve a social transformation. It was also clear from the outset that in order to achieve 
this goal, Spain had to take on the European discourse, and the policies that came with it, 
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regarding gender equality, justice, the fight against poverty and social security. Although it 
would seem some of these aspects are inherent elements of democratisation, we should not 
immediately assume this; there is a huge difference between what democracy is, what the 
prerequisites for its emergence are, what it generates and what it contributes towards (Carbone, 
2009: 124-126). There is no guarantee that democracy will lead to inclusive politics or 
redistribution; democratic politics may indeed produce a distinction between winners and losers, 
and it is not necessarily the majority who will always end up being the winners (ibid: 129). 
Spain’s transition to a social democracy was the consequence of more than its transition process 
alone; Europe as an example and as a project played a role in shaping the social dimension of 
Spanish democracy. What is more, even if the ideological dimension had not been not there, 
access to European funds available to apply certain social policies is enough of an incentive to 
apply them. This is yet another example of European policy, ethos and practices having a direct 
effect on the constitution of Spanish society and state. Europe has, by virtue of influencing the 
Spanish welfare state, influenced the composition of Spanish political culture. Spaniards are 
now becoming less focused on their survival/material values (since they have been taken care of 
by the welfare state) and are now just as focused on self-expression values (equality, personal 
freedom, tolerance and the such) as the rest of Western Europe. 
 
In short, European integration explicitly includes an economic/political dimension as well as a 
sociocultural one. It is its dual commitment to market and social development that makes the 
European project unique. This model, ‘described as a “social market economy”, [which] 
combines a market system with internal solidarity and mutual support’ (Pastor, 2002: 37-38), 
has influenced the Spanish transition to democracy in far more fundamental ways that NAFTA 
did in Mexico. It also greatly ‘shaped’ the Spanish democracy in what can only be described as 
the European social mould of democracy. It is now necessary to compare this wide-ranging 
experience of internationalisation – that includes a strong sociocultural dimension and a 
multilevel influence on democratisation – with the absolute omission of any sort of policies, 
strategies or even dialogue addressing these issues in the North American process. 
 
6.5. Internationalisation, society and democracy in Mexico 
 
What internationalisation meant for Mexico’s transition to democracy is far from 
straightforward. As was said in the very first chapter, there is still ‘a widely shared sense’ that in 
countries like Mexico there is ‘an important, if not easily explicated, relationship between pre-
existing cultural norms and the legacies of authoritarian rule’ and the prospects for democracy 
(Middlebrook, 2004: 28), yet it is not clear if Mexico’s internationalisation has, in any way, 
transformed these cultural norms. Some claim that Mexico’s process of internationalisation has 
had a degree of influence in shaping Mexico’s push for democracy from above as well as from 
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below. Daniel Levy and Kathlin Bruhn’s assessment that ‘political change in Mexico has 
become inextricably intertwined with internationalisation’ (2006: 4) considers these two 
dimensions. In their view NAFTA played some part in Mexico’s cultural democratic 
development, much as it did in limiting some of the choices available to the elites. Despite the 
many marked differences with their North American neighbours, Mexicans, they argue, are 
becoming more and more democratic as a result of internationalisation, and their political 
culture resembles more and more that of the citizens in the United States and Canada (ibid: 
128). How it is that this homogenisation of political culture is taking place, however, is not 
explained in much detail. Their broad explanation that NAFTA, by reducing the capacity of the 
states to deal with problems in a vertical manner, contributed towards the emergence of civil 
society groups that occupy these spaces is not entirely convincing. 
 
Kevin Middlebrook, unlike Levy and Bruhn, is more cautious in his analysis of NAFTA’s 
effects on Mexico’s society and democracy. Besides showing concerns about the democratic 
nature of Mexican political culture, he claims that the United States has not done much to 
support democratic development in Mexico, or indeed that NAFTA has not done much to ease 
the pressure of social inequality. He shares Levy and Bruhn’s view that economic liberalisation 
did play a role in Mexico’s economic development whilst undermining the links between the 
PRI and the peasantry (its usual electoral stronghold), but he also finds that the new economic 
model ‘undermined social structures and organisational networks that had sustained pro-
democracy mobilisations in earlier periods’ (Middlebrook, 2004: 7). He uses the example of 
Spain to put forward the view that although in many cases economic integration with well-
institutionalised democracies can contribute to democratisation, this was not entirely the case 
with Mexico. This has to do with an entrenched Mexican nationalism that tends to reject any 
sort of American influence, but also with the fact that ‘most U.S. government agencies and 
nongovernmental actors did not adopt a pro-democracy agenda in their relations with Mexico 
until the mid 1990’s’ (Middlebrook, 2004: 22) by which time NAFTA had already been signed 
and approved by a non-democratic government. Although he does acknowledge that closer 
economic ties and an ever-growing cross-national civil society (mainly emigrants’ networks and 
environmental NGOs) ‘may over time contribute significantly to greater political pluralism and 
societal democratisation in Mexico’ (ibid: 47), his overall analysis of NAFTA’s impact is rather 
negative.  
 
In many ways, I agree with Middlebrook’s argument that just because NAFTA – by securing a 
move towards a neoliberal model – contributed toward the shrinking of the central 
(authoritarian) state, it does not mean it helped the development of a strong civic society or a 
consensus for democracy. The fact is that not all social groups are inherently good for 
democracy or creators of social capital. In the case of Mexico, for instance, the authoritarian 
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past has left long-lasting legacies at social level that influence the behaviour of civil society. We 
must remember that although the PRI was a semi-corporatist state that controlled a wide 
clientilist network, it still had to work with the limited resources available to a developing 
economy. At the same time, the arrangement between the PRI and the rent-seeking coalitions in 
Mexico was done in a non-institutionalised manner – since doing it in any other way would 
have implied the PRI surrendering control to external forces – which furthered crippled the 
ability of the regime to directly ‘bribe’ the masses. The PRI’s cosy arrangement with the rent-
seeking coalitions, which was, to an extent a characteristic inherited from the Porfiriato3, further 
limited the resources available to the regime. By offering incentives to the wealth-holders (in 
the form of access to information, protection from competition and a favourable tax regime) the 
PRI sacrificed income for the sake of avoiding competition. The PRI, unlike the oil-rich regimes 
in the Arabian Peninsula for instance, simply could not afford to buy off everyone (through free 
education, little to no taxation, comprehensive welfare, healthcare or straightforward bribes). 
This meant that the citizenry quickly adapted to this reality; like in many other authoritarian 
regimes, political culture under the PRI in Mexico was exclusively a function of the political 
regime (Durand Ponte, 2004: 27). The average citizen in Mexico was always well aware ‘of the 
kinds of political action’ that were ‘likely to be rewarded by the authorities’ and thus tried to 
‘influence the government decision-making process’ at the stage of policy implementation 
rather than during the input stage of the process (Craig and Cornelius, 1980: 332). The dawn of 
an electoral democracy in Mexico has not yet transformed this social dynamic. As the 
mobilisation following the contested 2006 electoral results arguably show, in Mexico the 
making of a point that people seem to believe is democratic, justifies employing antidemocratic 
strategies (Castañeda and Morales, 2008: 254); more often than not politically organised groups 
are less apt at changing things than they are at simply blocking the making of decisions (Silva-
Herzog Márquez, 2010: 199). In essence, the fact that NAFTA contributed towards the 
retrenchment of the state away from spaces that should be occupied by civil society and other 
social groups did not guarantee that these spaces were occupied by the sort of civil society 
groups that lead to creation of social capital. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Some new interpretations claim that the Porfiriato’s success was based on more than simply delivering 
order; much of the economic success during this time was based, so the argument goes, on a specific 
policy of favouring national industrial entrepreneurs over foreigners (Lewis, 2004: 353) and by 
developing a stable market economy for public debt where investment banks could operate (Marichal, 
1997: 127). Yet, it seems likely that the objective of such policies was ‘to create opportunities for mutual 
self-enrichment’ by the Porfirian elites (Lewis, 2004: 353). What is more, although the regime helped to 
establish a banking sector by introducing institutional reforms, the authoritarian nature of the regime also 
ended up hindering its development and that of other industries. There were severe restrictions on the 
banks’ founding and operations ‘in order to protect the interests of an in-group of financial elites’. This 
hindrance on the banking sector combined with the highly politicised nature of the regime ‘meant that 
individuals were reluctant to invest in enterprises in which they lacked direct knowledge or control’ 
(Haber, 1997: 171). A similar situation emerged during the dominance of the PRI and they, much as the 
Porfirian technocrats did long before, decided to incentivise investment by limiting competition and 
taxation, thus developing a system of opportunities for elite self-enrichment. Although this worked fine 
for the elites, it left the regime with a limited capacity to raise revenue from taxation.  
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This is not to say that the 1990s were not a period characterised by a level of civil society 
engagement never experienced before in the country (Acosta, 2010: 268). As said earlier in this 
chapter, to say that Mexico achieved a transition to an electoral democracy without 
transforming, at least partly, the political culture of the country seems unlikely. In the case of 
Mexico, much as happened in Spain, the transition to a democratic system was the consequence 
of pressure being put on the regime’s structure from different angles. Although at the highest 
level the ‘loyal’ opposition (i.e. the PAN) remained the main political force challenging the 
regime from within, suddenly other forms of opposition emerged: there was a clandestine and/or 
violent opposition (e.g. the Zapatista movement in Chiapas), a social opposition, and an 
opposition from within the regime (e.g. Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo’s Corriente Democrática) 
(ibid: 149).  
 
The emergence of a wide-ranging – even if not necessarily powerful – opposition movement 
suggests that there was more to the pressure to democratise than elite-level calculations. During 
the 1990s, as the neoliberal reforms transformed the state structures, there was an opportunity 
for new social groups to emerge. The context of NAFTA, which increased the sensitivity of the 
regime to international criticism, greatly explains why the many NGOs that emerged following 
the 1977 political reform (which made it easier for opposition parties and organisations to gain 
official status) were considerably strengthened during the 1990s (Selee and Peschard, 2010: 13). 
Ever since the mid 1980s, as De la Madrid’s administration stopped trying to mediate in the 
Central American conflicts, the attention of the Human Rights organisations that emerged in the 
1970s (such as Adademia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos) shifted towards domestic affairs 
(Durand Ponte, 1994: 300-301). This led to some respected international Human Rights 
organisations (mainly Amnesty International) to also start focusing more on the Mexican case 
(ibid). A few years later, as NAFTA was being debated in the early 1990s, many social and 
ecological concerns emerged, which triggered an even bigger wave of attention; many sectors of 
society in the United States who had been disengaged with the Mexican situation started to take 
notice of developments south of the border. What is more, the Salinas administration also tried 
to use the Mexican ‘diaspora’ in the United States as a tool to improve its image there, which 
was still somehow tarnished by the perceived electoral fraud of 1988, and garnish support in 
favour of NAFTA. A part of this strategy was to try and get Mexican civil organisations in the 
United States involved in (mainly localised) projects in Mexico (Ayón, 2010: 233-236). All of a 
sudden people in the United States, Canada and beyond started to show concerns about the 
effects NAFTA (as an expression of globalisation) would have on the poor and the 
environment, but also about the PRI’s record in Human Rights abuses. Some NGOs in Mexico 
saw the opportunity to forge alliances with likeminded organisations in the United States, which 
allowed them to gain an international audience and financial resources (Acosta, 2010: 273). The 
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Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas also helped Mexican NGOs to remain in the limelight. However, 
after the transition to democracy was achieved in 2000, the boom of NGO activity – which, as 
said before, was compared to other Latin American countries still rather weak (ibid: 278-279) – 
came to an end as Mexico stopped being in the consciousness of the international community 
(ibid: 275-277). Whatever it was that civil society achieved during the 1990s it failed to 
replicate after the transition, which is actually when it is most important for civil society to 
develop social capital.  
 
In short, both the Mexican and Spanish transitions to democracy happened despite the lack of 
the sort of civil society organisations that are commonly associated with creating the social 
capital necessary for democratic consolidation. The difference is that in the case of Spain the 
process of European integration offered, in the first instance, such a powerful incentive at social 
and elite level that it very much guaranteed the success of the transition, whilst the many 
institutional adaptations implied in the Europeanisation of Spain also functioned, after the 
transition, as an alternative source of social capital (Closa, 2001; Encaranción, 2001; Hamman, 
2004; Linz and Stepan, 1996: 113). In the case of Mexico, although there were important social 
mobilisations and an increasing number of civil organisations (see for example Durand Ponte 
(1994: 306) for a detailed list of Human Rights organisations in Mexico) which, as in the 
Spanish case, put pressure on the regime to democratise (Ortega Ortiz, 2008: 37), the fact 
remains that civil society was still fairly underdeveloped. Even the widespread 1988 
mobilisation led by Cárdenas cannot be considered as a consequence of a change in political 
culture or in the society’s capacity to organise itself. In many ways the movement was a 
reflection of the traditional political culture of ‘following the leader’ (in this case the son of the 
mythical nationalist president the ‘Tata’ Lázaro Cárdenas) (Durand Ponte, 2004: 79). The fact 
that the Corriente Democrática failed to capitalise on this momentum is partly explained (as 
well as the pacts reached by the PRI and the PAN, and the political violence aimed at its 
activists) by a lack of social engagement.  
 
There may be no guarantees that had the United States taken a more proactive stance towards 
developing civil society in Mexico the outcome would have been different. In fact, recent 
studies have questioned the wisdom of outside funding of civil society organisations, as this can 
lead to polarisation and violence rather than democratisation (Berman, 2009: 55). Having said 
this, until fairly recently supporting civil society (as well as supporting decentralisation and 
strengthening the judiciary) was the preferred strategy for democracy promotion amongst 
democratic centres (Carothers, 2002: 14-16). The United States in particular – having tried in 
the past military intervention, covert action, diplomatic and economic sanctions in their attempts 
to ‘advance democracy’ – settled since the 1980s for ‘a new tool’ of ‘democracy assistance’ in 
the shape of ‘financial support and training for prodemocratic groups abroad’ (Pangle, 2009: 5). 
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Considering that the fall of the Berlin Wall was followed by a drastic increase in democracy 
promotion activities (ibid: 6-7), we would have to conclude that the fact that the United States 
did not get more involved in supporting civil society in Mexico had more to do with its overall 
lack of involvement in the country rather than with a particular strategy.   
 
In truth though, as Mariclaire Acosta (2010: 274) – a prominent civil activist and Head of 
Freedom House Mexico – acknowledges, by the 1990s the regime was so ‘discredited and 
fragile that it did not take much to make it yield’; civil society was stronger than before but by 
no means was it ‘setting the beat for the transition’. In Mexico, then, there was no external 
factor similar to the EEC that could provide an alternative source of democratic consensus or 
social capital. If anything, we must not forget, NAFTA was an exercise of non-democratic 
policy-making – no one could claim with a straight face that Salinas’ government was a 
democratic one. We also have to consider two more factors. First of all, as mentioned before, 
the nationalist sentiment among Mexicans, which has historically been based ‘upon popular 
resistance to an even greater US presence in domestic affairs’, further constrained any sort of 
‘potential political effects flowing from geographic continuity with the [United States] and 
North America’ (Middlebrook, 2004: 22) during the transition years. On top of that, we have to 
consider that by the time most nongovernmental actors in the United States started to adopt a 
pro-democracy agenda in Mexico (i.e. the mid 1990s) NAFTA had already been signed and 
approved (ibid). In a similar vein, Mexico’s democratic consolidation should have taken place 
in the earlier part of last decade (2000s) when the momentum of the transition, coupled with a 
strong civil society, would have made it possible to enact the deep institutional reforms that 
were needed (Aristegui, 2010). In short, by the time civil society was being mobilised on both 
sides of the border the moment of heightened sensitivity to leverage, when social pressure in the 
United States could have made a real difference, had already passed, and the time when a strong 
civil society was needed to help consolidate democracy was yet to arrive. Civil society was 
unable to sustain its level of effervescence and the momentum was lost (ibid). 	  
6.6. Conclusion 
 
The lack of an external dimension to the creation of social capital is not entirely to blame, of 
course, for the lacklustre performance of Mexican democracy, but it was certainly another 
missed opportunity to strengthen it. The lack of a strong civil society or even a wider-ranging 
democratic consensus has led to Mexican democracy being ‘hijacked’ by the electoral-political 
realm. As with the Spanish case, the mass values, attitudes and ideology of Mexican society 
have been greatly shaped by the experience of over 70 years of authoritarianism (Durand Ponte, 
2004: 33), and changing this political culture will take longer than it took to transform the 
institutional design (ibid: 31; Crespo, 2007: 11). In the Spanish case, the European institutional 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  193	  
framework and the legitimacy that European membership gave to the democratic regime – 
especially during González’s first term – meant that democracy could thrive in Spain despite a 
democratic culture not being entirely consolidated. Similarly, during the early stages of the 
transition, the broad consensus surrounding European membership and the widespread belief 
that democratisation was a condition for accession, effectively functioned as a guarantee that the 
social consensus in favour of democracy would not be broken. This consensus in favour of 
democracy is usually protected by social capital and a strong civil society. In the Mexican case, 
the first government after the alternation in power – which is key in shaping the new political 
culture of society (Crespo, 2007: 37) – had to rely on its own democratic performance to 
‘convince’ Mexican society that democracy could deliver on its promises. The lack of 
comprehensive institutional reforms in Mexico, then, has led to the creation of a ‘vicious’ rather 
than ‘virtuous’ cycle between democratic political institutions and democratic political culture 
(Durand Ponte, 2004: 273). NAFTA, unlike the EU, offered little in terms of supporting 
democracy at social level, supporting the emergence of civil society, contributing towards the 
transformation of an institutional design that helps shape a democratic political culture, or 
indeed simply being a wide-ranging incentive to support democracy.  	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VII. Conclusions and Epilogue 
 
The thesis’ main goal has been to present a detailed analysis of the way in which Mexico and 
Spain’s experiences with internationalisation shaped – to varying degrees and in particular ways 
– their transitions to democracy. In a similar vein, the main motivation to carry out this 
comparison has been to contribute towards the field of democratisation studies as much as to the 
fields to Spanish and Mexican studies. With this in mind, I believe it is important to, first and 
foremost, develop some overall conclusions of the broad analysis presented in this work, as well 
as to frame within the current international context some of the lessons that can be learned from 
the Mexican and Spanish experiences. To an extent, lessons from the Spanish transition to 
democracy have already been learned; during the eastern enlargement, for instance, the 
European Commission took a much firmer approach to the now explicit (in the Copenhagen 
Criteria) democratic conditionality and introduced specific instruments to strengthen it 
(Pridham, 2007: 237). Yet, there are also some important lessons that can also be learned from 
the Mexican experience. Probably the most important of them is that a high linkage to a 
democratic centre has to be complemented by at least some degree of leverage. As we saw in 
the fifth chapter, the Spanish case elucidates how the EEC/EU has not been afraid of using 
strong conditionality (even though it was not entirely explicit then) as the stick, and the prospect 
of membership as the carrot (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 99). The United States in the case 
of Mexico, on the other hand, refused to use the stick or to condition the carrot on any sort of 
democratic commitment. Even in the few instances when some sectors of society in the United 
States showed some concerns about the political situation in Mexico (such as during the 
political crisis of the mid 1990s), the United States government categorically refused to 
condition the signing of NAFTA on political developments. In short, as has been said repeatedly 
throughout this thesis, NAFTA represents, above all, a missed opportunity. 
 
7.1. Main conclusions 
 
Many instances that back the argument that NAFTA has been a missed opportunity have been 
presented throughout this thesis. Similarly, although not without its tribulations and ambiguities, 
there is enough evidence to suggest that the role the process of European integration played in 
the consolidation of democracy in Spain was far more positive than the one NAFTA played in 
Mexico. To reach this overall conclusion, this thesis followed a typical small-n research design. 
As was discussed in the first chapter, due to the nature of the research, the population size (N) 
from where to gather our sample (n) was always limited; there are, after all, only a limited 
number of cases outside Europe of countries that have embarked on a democratisation process 
whilst (almost) simultaneously attempting some degree of regional integration with highly 
democratic countries. There are certainly some IOs that have applied some degree of democratic 
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conditionality (NATO, the Council of Europe, OAE, MERCOSUR and even some international 
financial institutions), but there is little doubt that the ‘integrative institutions in the European 
context exceed by far the influence any international organisation has on institutional change in 
sovereign states in other parts of the world’ (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 94). Certainly 
NAFTA’s weak institutional arrangement is far from the European model, but it could also be 
said that what NAFTA meant for Mexico was very similar to what the process of European 
integration meant for Spain: a key element in their respective attempts to redefine their political 
systems. Again, there may be other cases where democratising countries join IOs in an attempt 
to legitimise their democratic credentials (Pevehouse, 2002), but there are no other cases outside 
of Europe of democratising countries attempting economic or political integration with 
consolidate and well-functioning democratic centres. 
 
The first chapter also conveyed the importance of focused comparisons when dealing with 
mechanism-based explanations of democratisation. Although large-n statistical studies are of 
paramount importance when testing specific causal correlations, the analysis of case studies 
remains, in my view, the best way to analyse the complex interactions between 
internationalisation processes and transitions to democracy. Let us not forget that, as was 
discussed at length in the earlier stages of this work, the exercise of defining, categorising and 
qualifying democracy remains, after more than fifty years of study, highly problematic. Whilst 
the procedural/Schumpeterian definitions of democracy have been criticised – and often with 
very good reason – I argued in the second chapter that these type of straightforward definitions 
do allow researchers to efficiently develop the kind of simple ‘either/or’ classifications that then 
allow us to embark on the sort of ‘more or less’ comparisons (Kalleberg, 1966: 81) such as this 
project. With this in mind, then, after offering a wide-ranging (without being exhaustive) 
literature review, a definition of democracy based on Shumpeter’s minimalist definition but 
complemented by Bobbio’s legal dimension, Sartori’s liberal elements, and Inglehart and 
Wlezel’s genuine democracy concept (the mass-values/social dimension) was developed. There 
is no denying that this attempt at developing a definition of democracy that fitted my research 
had to overlook – due to temporal and methodological constraints – some other interesting 
aspects of the debate such as what democracy is and what it is not (see for example Schmitter 
and Karl (1991)) or the questions that still exists regarding the wisdom of attaching qualifiers to 
democracy in order to define a wide range of regimes (Merkel, 1998). However, the objective 
was to develop a definition based on Schumpetirian/procedural interpretations rather than a new 
minimalist definition. The definition put forward in the second chapter is ‘minimalist’ in the 
sense that it focuses on the procedural (formal institutions) elements of democracy rather than 
on its ideological or theoretical interpretation. Certainly there are some problems with such an 
understating of democracy – as acknowledge throughout the thesis – yet there is no denying that 
such an understanding facilitates comparison. At the same time, even if we were to consider a 
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broader range of characteristics to define the quality of a democracy (e.g. good governance, 
security, redistribution and welfare, peace, etcetera), there is little doubt that, despite its many 
problems, Spanish democracy is of a higher quality than Mexico’s democracy.  
 
Similarly, although hybrid regimes were analysed, and a clear explanation of why Spain’s 
democratisation should be considered as a greater success than Mexico’s was put forward, it is 
clear that it would have been almost impossible to cover the wide range of literature that deals 
with the concept of democracy and the singularities of democratisation. Similarly, the definition 
of internationalisation presented in the second chapter had to ignore – although not in its totality 
– some key aspects of the debate surrounding the impact globalisation can have in the exercise 
of democracy (Held, 1995 and 1997; Saward, 2008). Yet, it was necessary to present a focused 
definition of internationalisation as a conscious process that is characterised by the increase in 
the salience of the international (be it the context in general or specific actors) in domestic 
politics.  
 
More importantly, however, the second chapter really set the beat for the rest of the comparison. 
The brief description and categorisation of democratisation theories based on the issue of 
causality shaped the rest of the thesis’ structure. This division of democratisation theories into 
three/four general approaches or schools – political culture, modernisation and elite 
theory/institutionalism – was to be mirrored throughout the thesis. In very broad terms, the 
fourth chapter analysed the correlation between internationalisation and democratisation from a 
perspective of modernisation theory, the fifth did the same from a perspective of elite theory, 
whilst the previous chapter looked at ‘the other side of the coin’ by analysing the influence of 
international actors and context in prompting democratic pressures from below.  
 
The third chapter, although already engaging fully with the analysis of the case studies, 
presented some initial general considerations. First of all, this chapter, building on the 
theoretical justification for carrying out a comparison between Mexico’s and Spain’s transitions 
to democracy, presented a far more detailed comparison of the peculiarities of NAFTA and the 
EEC/EU. Besides presenting an overall chronological/historical description that further 
elucidated why this particular comparison was justified, the first part of this chapter touched on 
a very important singularity of NAFTA; its dual-bilateral nature. Despite being a trilateral 
agreement, this chapter explained how, in reality, NAFTA works more as a ‘dual-bilateral’ 
agreement between Mexico and the United States, and between the United States and Canada; 
the ‘third leg of the triangle’ is considerably weaker. In essence, although trade between Mexico 
and Canada did increase after NAFTA, the relationship between the two has remained weak. If 
anything, it seems that NAFTA rather than spurring cooperation between the two countries in 
order to ‘correct’ the inherently asymmetrical nature of North American integration – much as 
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the smaller countries in the EU sometimes do – has led to even more reliance on the United 
States as both Mexico and Canada are unwilling to risk angering the colossus by giving the 
impression they are plotting against it. Besides the more obvious implications of this 
asymmetrical relationship (an overreliance on the United States economy has led to an almost 
chronic inability of the Mexican economy to diversify), the lack of any significant increase in 
the linkage between Mexico and Canada basically means that only United States based actors 
(at least official actors) are able to provide the sort of pro-democracy international 
support/assistance that Spain received from a number of sources (the EEC, the Commission, 
individual European Governments, the Council of Europe, etcetera), and only the United States 
had any significant leverage potential during Mexico’s transition. Given that, as said in the 
previous chapter, the United States is neither the biggest advocate of democracy promotion, or 
has it been particularly concerned with supporting democracy in Mexico (at least not 
financially), Mexico’s democratic struggle has not benefited, despite the opportunities economic 
integration with North America produced, from the positive effects democracy promotion 
strategies can arguably produce. 
 
Despite the very narrow (some may say short-sighted) remit of NAFTA, the lack of a clear 
commitment by United States based actors and United States administrations to support 
democracy in Mexico, and despite the almost complete indifference Canada has shown towards 
Mexican affairs since the signing of NAFTA, Mexico’s internationalisation still shaped, to an 
extent, its democratisation process. If nothing else, Mexico’s radical change in its stance 
towards the outside world – evident in its attempts to formalise its links of economic 
interdependence with the United States – opened the door for a wide range of political, social 
and even institutional transformations. The experience with decentralisation that followed 
Mexico’s process of internationalisation is a very good example of how the context of NAFTA 
– albeit not the treaty itself of course – contributed towards the emergence of the sort of ‘critical 
junctures’ that, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), only appear sporadically and are 
key in achieving institutional transformations. Albeit somehow marginally, NAFTA contributed 
to the Mexican decentralisation process by, sometimes in a more direct way than others, 
opening opportunities to certain municipalities and state governments to gain access to 
resources outside the federal (i.e. the PRI’s) control. The two narrow ‘development’ institutions 
that emerged from NAFTA – the NADB and BECC – allowed a small number of localities to 
access some resources outside the PRI’s direct control. Although these and other resources – 
such as remittances set by the Diaspora to their communities of origin to support very localised 
development projects – were rather limited, they were still significant as it was the first time 
municipal governments had control of some resources and could, in some instances, challenge 
the wishes of the central government.  
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European membership played a similarly indirect part in the decentralisation of power in Spain, 
as it opened opportunities for regional governments to access European funds. However, its role 
during the consolidation of the Spanish State of the Autonomies was probably far more 
significant. It has been argued that in the new Spanish democracy European politics have 
worked as a source of cooperation on what is a system usually characterised by bargaining and 
confrontation. In a nutshell, the transfer of competencies to the European level has transformed 
the distribution of resources between the central government in Madrid and the Autonomous 
Communities leading to a mutual dependence between the two (Börzel, 2000). The regions 
depend on Madrid to access European-level decision making, whilst Madrid depends on the 
regions to implement European policies. This mutual dependence is accentuated by the fact that 
the European Commission – after a ruling from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – has the 
capacity to implement hefty fines if a member state fails to ‘fulfil’ an obligation; the lack of 
‘fulfilment’, however, can emerge from a failure to legislate accordingly (a remit of the central 
government) or as a result of facts, i.e. a failure to enforce the law (often a remit of the regional 
governments). Thus, if the central government is to avoid action from the Commission and the 
ECJ it needs to work together with the Autonomous Communities in order to implement the 
European directives. This peculiar European dynamic may help explain why Tanja Börzel (ibid: 
18) goes as far as to claim that it was ‘Europeanisation rather than the consolidation of the State 
of the Autonomies [that] has driven the shift [away from competitive regionalism and] towards 
cooperative federalism’. In short, whilst it could be said that the EU contributed towards the 
normalisation of Spain’s institutionally uneven decentralisation process, NAFTA contributed 
only towards the uneven decentralisation and not towards the normalisation of relations.  
 
Decentralisation/federalism is but one characteristic that political regimes and, although it can 
of course partly define the quality of a democracy, it is not in itself a requisite of democratic 
regimes. I have no doubt that both Spanish and Mexican democracies would benefit from a 
strong institutional federalist model, but this characteristic is not what makes them democratic. 
In short, the influence of the dynamics of regional integration and the decentralisation process 
only indirectly plays a part in shaping democratic regimes. On the other hand, socioeconomic 
development, as argued by modernisation scholars for over fifty years, supposedly can cause the 
right conditions for democracy to emerge and to survive. As we saw in the fourth chapter, there 
is not just one version of modernisation, but rather a plethora of theories that are linked together 
by the premise that, to varying degrees, there is a direct positive correlation (not necessarily 
causal however) between socioeconomic development and democracy. Although modernisation 
theory may sometimes fail to explain – or predict – democratisation (we briefly explored these 
issues in a Latin American setting), there is an argument to be made that, as said in the fourth 
chapter, any analysis of democratisation has to at least ‘come to terms with the central findings 
of the cross-national statistical research’ and acknowledge that there is some degree of 
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‘association between economic development and democracy’ (Huber et al., 1993: 72). With this 
premise in mind, this thesis presented an analysis of the ways in which NAFTA and the EEC 
(the prospect of membership included) may have influenced socioeconomic development in 
both countries. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, it would be fair to say that, if we 
take the stricter view of modernisation theory, Spanish accession into Europe was far more 
positive for its economic development than Mexico’s attempts to integrate economically with 
North America. 
 
Although some of NAFTA’s strongest backers allude to some of the impressive figures 
regarding the increase of trade between the three parties and the huge increase in FDI that 
flowed into Mexico, there is little doubt that the sheer amount of aid Spain received before and 
after accession to the EEC overshadows whatever positive impact NAFTA may have had on the 
Mexican economy. Having said this though, both countries underwent some relevant structural 
transations as a consequence (or in preparation of) their processes of internationalisation. 
NAFTA meant the end of Mexico’s isolationism and it basically secured Mexico’s economic 
strategy for the foreseeable future. What is more, the signing of NAFTA was supposed to be the 
masterstroke of the Salinas administration. The signing of the treaty (and the whole neoliberal 
project) meant that the PRI rendered control of the economy, and that, as the size of the state 
was being considerably reduced, the PRI would be unable to use its old clientilist networks to 
secure its political future. Yet, all these costs to the PRI regime were supposed to be offset by 
the huge economic boost NAFTA would cause; Mexico would join the club of developed 
nations and the PRI would gain huge amounts of political capital for making this happen. The 
regime truly bet its political future on economic integration (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 155). The 
plan, so it seems, was to use a combination of fear and political capital to convince the 
electorate that only the PRI could deliver the goods. Everything changed, however, when the 
economic crisis of 1995 all but destroyed the trust of the electorate on the capacity of the PRI to 
manage the economy. In many ways, NAFTA’s greatest success as a democratic agent was its 
failure on delivering its rather extravagant promises. This certainly contributed towards the 
electoral collapse of the PRI – a short-lived one as it turned out – thus opening opportunities to 
opposition forces, but it certainly did not do much to contribute to the establishment of a 
democratic regime. As said before, the Mexican case elucidates, at best, how economic 
considerations can help us explain the breakdown of an authoritarian regimes, but not 
necessarily (at least in the Mexican case) of how democracy emerges. 
 
An equally important factor this thesis analysed was the very distinct linkage and leverage 
dynamics in North America during the early stages of Mexico’s transition. As was said in the 
fifth chapter, the sensitivity to foreign leverage amongst the Mexican elites during the 
negotiating stages of NAFTA was like nothing that has happened before or since. There are of 
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course no guarantees (political science rarely is about absolutes) that had the United States 
taken a stronger stance and decided to apply some of its leverage potential (i.e. condition 
NAFTA to political developments in Mexico), the Mexican democratisation process would have 
been a categorical success. As the very Spanish process of democratisation elucidates, ‘pacted’ 
transitions (or democratisation from ‘above’) are far from being the silver bullet solution to the 
problem of democratic consolidation. Yet, the part Europe played as a democratic ‘incentive’ at 
elite level can hardly be described as anything other than beneficial. If nothing else, the strict 
use of leverage by the EEC (categorically conditioning accession to widespread democratic 
reforms), combined with the widespread belief amongst virtually all sectors of Spanish society 
that Europe was ‘the solution to the problem of Spain’, filled the elites at the helm of the 
transition with a certain degree of urgency. All political factions agreed that joining Europe was 
necessary to secure Spain’s future development; thus the EEC’s strict democratic conditionality 
provided an extra incentive for the political elites to democratise and to do so as quickly as 
possible. This consensus was lacking in the Mexican case and this certainly helps to explain 
why the transition to democracy in Mexico has been the sort of ‘war of attrition’ that 
characterises protracted transitions (Esiendstadt, 2000: 4), and which explains its relative lack of 
success. 
 
What is more, despite Levitsy and Way’s (2010: 153-161) insistence that the ‘powerful indirect 
pressures for reform’ that linkage to the United States generated were enough to force the PRI 
regime to initiate democracy from above ‘at a time when opposition forces were still relatively 
weak’, there is enough evidence to suggest this process was not entirely as straightforward. 
Although I completely agree with the argument that to understand Mexico’s transition we have 
to understand ‘the interplay between domestic and international factors’ (ibid: 161), we should 
not ignore the many shortcomings of NAFTA, particularly if compared to the Spanish case. 
There is no doubt that, as has been said repeatedly throughout this thesis, ‘Mexico’s position 
regarding the role of international actors’ shifted as a result of NAFTA-fuelled pressure from 
the United States (Dresser, 1996: 324). Almost overnight, Mexico’s sensitivity to leverage from 
the United States was drastically increased, whilst in the eyes of the United States Mexico 
stopped being ‘an exotic anomaly’ and became ‘a part of the North American community’ 
(ibid). The stage was set for the United States (and Canada) to play a greater part in supporting 
Mexico’s democracy. Why Canada refrained from getting involved in promoting democracy in 
Mexico is more or less clear, but the reasons behind the United States almost paranoid refusal to 
even suggest some sort of political conditionality on NAFTA remain something of a mystery. 
Cold War mentality explains to a certain degree why the United States tolerated (and sometimes 
openly supported) authoritarian regimes in the Western Hemisphere, but there seems to be no 
explanation as to why the United States changed its stance towards the rest of the region except 
Mexico. It seems that in the case of Mexico, as Jacqueline Mazza (2001) persuasively argues, 
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the United States has historically placed far more importance on stability than on democracy. 
The principle of a ‘policy of no policy’ has very much (mis)guided American foreign policy 
towards Mexico since the times of the Porfiriato, and has arguably led to a belief amongst 
policy-makers in the United States that the best way to deal with Mexico is to not deal with it at 
all.  
 
There is little doubt that Mexican nationalism was to an extent build on the foundations of 
mistrust of the northern hegemon, and that social views towards the United States have never 
been particularly positive. Regardless, NAFTA presented a unique opportunity to the United 
States to support democratic development in Mexico. Despite the real opposition to NAFTA 
that the PRD represented, there is evidence to suggest that the majority of the population 
regarded free trade and FDI in a positive light since the mid 1980s (Domínguez and McCann, 
1996: 69). Considering what appears to have been a more or less widespread view in favour of 
NAFTA (for obvious reasons there was no official consultation on the matter) and that the PRI 
was counting on its success to survive, it would be fair to assume that had the United States 
decided to apply some of its leverage potential it would have been very hard for the Mexican 
political elites to ignore it.  
 
NAFTA represented, yet again, a missed opportunity. Although arguably a ‘success’ in the very 
narrow goals it officially set for itself, there is no doubt that the prevailing impression is that the 
treaty simply failed to deliver on its potential. NAFTA’s contributions to Mexico’s 
democratisation are unimpressive. The sixth chapter further elucidated this point by presenting 
an analysis of how despite the context of NAFTA drastically increasing the opportunities to 
develop linkages at civil society level, this never truly materialised. Despite the overwhelming 
flow of citizens from one side of the border to the other (not only from Mexico to the United 
States but also the other way around), and claims that Mexicans, Americans and Canadians are 
becoming increasingly similar in their values and attitudes (Inglehart et al., 1996; Levy and 
Bruhn, 2006: 128), there seems to be no clear democratic culture emerging in Mexico. This of 
course has very little to do with NAFTA and has more to do with an authoritarian past that has 
shaped societal attitudes in a specific way. Yet internationalisation processes can also help 
transform societal attitudes – or at least minimise their impact on the democratic regime.  
 
Spain is a typical example of democracy being consolidated despite the lack of a broad civil 
society or other organisations capable of producing social capital. Although the idea that a 
vibrant civil society and the social capital it creates are indispensable for democratic 
consolidation has been seriously challenged recently (Berman, 2009; Crespo, 2007; 
Encarnación, 2001; Hamann, 2003), there is no doubt that a social consensus in favour of 
democracy has to exist in order for it to be consolidated. It was argued in the sixth chapter that 
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in the case of the Spanish transition – characterised by a distinct lack of broad social 
mobilisations, civil society engagement or a strong democratic history – membership to the 
EEC performed the role a of ‘guarantor’ of democratic consolidation at social level that is 
usually attributed to a strong civil society.  
 
In short, despite the comparatively low levels of social participation and civil society 
engagement in Spain, the legitimacy that its new democratic regime drew from membership into 
the EEC worked as a guarantee that the elites would not deviate from the democratic path – yet 
another function that is commonly attributed to a strong civil society. What is more, much as it 
did with the elites, the strong democratic conditionality the EEC set on membership meant that 
the social ‘consensus’ in favour of democracy would not be broken. At the same time, evidence 
suggests that the pro-European consensus at social level in Spain had to do with more than just 
mere calculations on material gains. Certainly access to the European market and considerable 
aid played an important part consolidating a pro-European consensus at social level, but there is 
evidence to suggest there was a sociocultural (or a matter of identity) dimension to this 
phenomenon. At social level, joining Europe was partly about Spain bridging the development 
gap with as much as it was about ‘reclaiming’ its place in Europe. The fact that as early as the 
mid 1990s there were more Spaniards supporting European integration than Spaniards believing 
Spain was benefiting economically from European membership indicates that support for 
Europe in Spain cannot be due solely to material calculations.  
 
At the opposite end, NAFTA, far from working as a guarantee of the regime’s commitment to 
democracy, was, at the end of the day, an agreement negotiated and signed by a nondemocratic 
government. Although the context of NAFTA did open the door for some new civil society 
organisations to emerge, NAFTA failed to provide the sort of democratic reference the EEC 
provided for Spain. The fact, however, that there seems to be no clear sociocultural dimension 
to NAFTA does not mean that this could not (or cannot in the future) have been developed. 
Again, the European experience elucidates how, despite some immense differences in values 
and attitudes (to some extent ‘cultural’ differences), some of the different members states have 
developed something like a common (overarching) European identity that evokes a certain 
degree of loyalty. This ‘sociocultural’ aspect of the European integration process played some 
part in creating a pro-democratic consensus at social level in Spain.  
 
Throughout this thesis, then, we have seen how the prospect of gaining access to European 
institutions was probably as influential in the democratisation of Spain as the actual process of 
institutional adaptation after accession. There is little doubt that the actual process of integration 
with Europe at least partially transformed the internal dynamics of the Spanish state, thus 
shaping Spanish democracy (Fishman, 2003). In a wider sense, however, European integration 
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also influenced the transition to democracy in Spain by providing a broad incentive to 
democratise (a yet to be compromised ‘democratic clause’ ensures all prospective members 
fully understand a democratic regime is a sin qua non for integration), as well as by 
transforming institutions, dynamics and the distribution of resources within the state. Thus, 
 
‘The EU enlargement process enhances both linkage and leverage in the aspiring candidate 
countries, as membership entails a high level of integration and policy coordination, with 
regulations encompassing virtually every aspect of democratic governance. EU political 
conditionality [also] differs from that of other multilateral organisation in many ways’ (Levitsky 
and Way, 2005: 27).  
 
In fewer words, despite the intricate dynamics of the process of European integration and of 
Spain’s democratisation process, the Spanish case is rather straightforward. European 
integration was, above all, an incentive to democratise both for the elites and the general 
population. This incentive narrowed the available options to the elites during the democratic 
transitions, as well as ‘guaranteeing’ social support for democracy despite Spain’s low levels of 
social participation and civil society engagement. What is more, economic integration with 
Europe played a part in Spain’s socioeconomic development and thus, following modernisation 
theory’s main tenet, contributed towards the sort of structural transformations that make 
democracy an ever-likelier outcome. At the opposite end, although NAFTA may have 
contributed to Mexico’s economic growth (still debatable), the shrinking of the central state and 
the relative weakening of the PRI regime – albeit almost accidentally – this thesis has 
emphasised how despite having transformed Mexico’s structural context, internationalisation 
through NAFTA failed to shape this transformation in a way conducive to democracy. 
 
Of course the way internationalisation interacted with the Spanish and Mexican 
democratisations was not always, as we have seen throughout this thesis, entirely 
straightforward. In the case of Spain, we also have to acknowledge that there is a lot to be said 
about the EU’s own need to improve its own democratic functioning, and that not every aspect 
of Europeanisation is going to lead to an increase in the quality of the member states’ 
democracies. In this sense, there is much to be said about the widely debated issue of the EU’s 
‘democratic deficit’; are the EU’s democratic credentials ‘well within the norms of advanced 
industrial democracies’ (Moravcsik, 2004: 338)? Or is the EU actually taking power away from 
the electorate? The issues relating to the EU’s democratic deficit cannot be simply ignored. The 
multiple concerns regarding the supposed influence the EU has had in strengthening the 
executive power over national parliamentary overview, or the apparent weakness of the 
European Parliament relative to the non-elected Council, or the argument that the EU is simply 
‘too far’ (psychologically and institutionally) from the average voter and that the ‘two thirds’ 
Pablo Calderón Martínez	    King’s College London 	  
	  204	  
majority voting leads to legislation being passed on countries that would otherwise not accept it 
(Follesdal and Hix, 2006: 534-537) cannot be ignored. In the specific case of Spain, has the EU 
institutional framework led, for instance, to an unwanted neoliberalisation of the Spanish state? 
The Indignados movement that gained so much prominence in 2010 was quick to jump on the 
Euro-bashing (German in particular) bandwagon, and condemned attempts to reach pacts within 
the Eurozone that would strengthen its fiscal coordination. The readiness with which some 
sectors of Spanish society found a European dimension in their calls for ‘real democracy’ is 
evidence enough that not everything in this relationship is rosy.  
 
At the same time, to say that NAFTA and the EU partially shaped Mexico’s and Spain’s 
transitions to democracy, is not the same as saying that domestic factors did not feature at the 
forefront of their transitions. Domestic factors, to a great extent, explain the divergent outcomes 
in the democratisation of both countries. A lot of the responsibility (or blame), for instance, has 
to be placed on the political elites and political parties in Mexico and Spain. There is no doubt 
that in Spain the memory of the civil war (Aguilar, 1997), the capacity of the political parties to 
build new democratic identities and mobilise society when needed (Ortega Ortiz, 2008), the key 
role King Juan Carlos played during the transition (Gilmour, 1985), the clear effects 
socioeconomic development had in transforming Spanish society (Balfour, 2000: 277; Tusell, 
2005: 205; Viñas, 1999: 246), the structural constraints on elite choices (Colomer, 1991 and 
1995), along with many other domestic considerations, explain to a great extent the democratic 
transformation of the Spanish state. In a similar vein, in Mexico the highly institutionalised 
nature of the PRI regime (Ortega Ortiz, 2001 and 2008), the long and protracted transition that 
was fought almost exclusively in the electoral arena (Dresser, 2005; Merino, 2003), the 
exaggerated role political parties now have and the lack of incentives for them to transform the 
rules of the game (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a: 132), as well as the many shortcomings of 
Mexico’s political leadership (Aguayo Quezada, 2010a; Aristegui, 2009 and 2010), all partly 
explain why Mexico’s transition was less successful than Spain’s.  
 
Yet, despite the many real challenges the EU is now facing in the democratic front, and the clear 
prominence of domestic considerations when explaining transitions to democracy, this thesis 
has showed, if further proof was indeed needed, that the international context in transitions to 
democracy maters, and it matters even more when transitions to democracy are taking place at a 
time when internationalisation projects increase their linkage and their sensitivity to leverage. 
What this thesis has also demonstrated is that linkage in itself may not be enough, and that the 
actions and attitudes of foreign democratic centres can play a key role in shaping, if not always 
making, democracies.   
 
7.1. Epilogue: Lessons from Mexico and Spain 
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Democracy promotion/assistance, although by no means a new occurrence1, has become a 
widely discussed and researched subject in academia in the last fifteen to twenty years. The 
military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan – and the subsequent attempts to establish (some 
may say impose) democratic regimes – have only strengthened this interest. Since then, we 
could say that the debate surrounding the morality, practicality and levels of success that can be 
achieved by promoting democracy became a matter not only of academic interest but also of 
widespread contemporary significance (Plattner, 2009: 1). Regardless of the reason, there is 
little doubt that the United States, the EU and other democratic centres are now considering 
democracy promotion as a key foreign policy objective, and that the academic interest in the 
international dimension of democratisation has increased accordingly (Brown and Kaufman, 
2011: 241). At the same time, this recent interest in the international dimension of 
democratisation has led to a number of new approaches that account for the international as an 
explanatory variable. Having said this though, this thesis was not necessarily an attempt to 
analyse the democracy promotion/assistance policies or strategies of the EEC/EU and the 
United States, but rather, as said in the second chapter, to analyse the effects of 
internationalisation projects (understood as the political effects of joining the international 
economy (Garrett and Lang, 1995)) on the transitions to democracy in Spain and Mexico. 
Although a recent paradigm of ‘democracy promotion by integration’ in the EU (Dimitrova and 
Pridham, 2004) seems to be emerging, this was not entirely developed when Spain applied for 
membership of the EEC in 1977. In a way, Europe’s influence in the Spanish transition came as 
a consequence of its attempts to join the EEC rather than as a specific long-term strategy. 
Indeed we have to consider that, as the Mexican case elucidates, democracy promotion (or 
democracy support/assistance) is not an inherent characteristic of internationalisation. Policies 
and/or activities carried out by democratic regimes that promote democracy around the world 
are not necessarily a by-product of increased internationalisation or ‘globalisation’. We could, 
however, argue that, in a way, powerful democratic states cannot avoid their propensity to 
become ‘paternalistic empires’ as they ‘generously’ try to export democracy (Pangle, 2009: 17-
19). The claim that democracy has emerged triumphant from the battle of ideas around the 
world (Bermeo, 2009: 243-245) only adds to the argument that ‘the soul of liberal 
republicanism has from its inception, in varying degrees, been animated by a dedication to the 
liberation of all humanity through the spread or export of liberal republicanism’ (Pangle, 2009: 
31). It is debatable whether or not democracies have to engage in direct activities that seek to 
export democracy or if democracies should settle with setting a good example. What seems 
clear to me, though, is that democracy promotion, assistance or diffusion is not necessarily 
linked with internationalisation projects or projects of regional integration.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In fact, it has been argued that democracy has a tendency to ‘export itself’ which can be traced back to 
the very first ‘democratic’ regimes of ancient Athens (Pangle, 2009: 17-19). 
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In fact, it has been argued that efforts (mainly from the United States) to assist democracy and 
shape economic policy ‘often work at cross purposes […] support for neo-liberal economic 
reforms has left legacies that undercut the political reforms that democracy assistance promotes’ 
(Bermeo, 2009: 259). The two cases analysed here more than elucidate this point. Mexico’s 
internationalisation was carried out within a framework of North American economic 
integration where democracy promotion/assistance was all but non-existent, whilst Spain’s 
integration with Western Europe was an internationalisation project that had democratisation at 
its core. These are two extreme cases that epitomise just how unconnected democracy 
promotion can be from internationalisation projects; the influence internationalisation may have 
on processes of democratisation is not necessarily linked to efforts to promote democracy – 
albeit these can, as in the case of Spain, be a part of the process. With this in mind, I believe 
there is an opportunity to, in the future, develop structured comparisons that analyse the impact 
models of ‘democratisation by integration’ (even outside Europe) have vis a vis strategies of 
democracy promotion in the traditional sense. Without obviously developing a detailed analysis 
or a comprehensive literature review at this stage, I believe that a comparison between the 
different approaches taken by the EU to democracy promotion in the Balkans, or the United 
States took in Central America vis a vis Mexico, offer interesting cases to analyse these 
dynamics further. According to Thomas Carothers, for example, the ‘US and European pro-
democracy groups mounted a well-coordinated and well funded (to the tune of $60 to $100 
million) aid campaign to help Serbian civic and political groups mount an electoral challenge to 
Milosevic’ (2006: 60-61)2, yet democracy promotion/assistance in Serbia arguably did not look 
at the time like a policy framed within a wider process of internationalisation. Serbia has just 
achieved candidate status for EU accession (March 2012) and does not look likely to achieve 
full membership until at least 2015 (BBC 4/7/2012). These are of course mere conjectures at this 
stage, but – without ignoring the many particularities of the Serbian case of course (The 
Economist 3/2/2012) – I believe it could be a good case study to research in the future. What is 
more, there is a potential to learn from the Mexican and Spanish experiences in this regard.  
 
Let us consider that – despite the real surge in policies implemented by the United States, the 
EU and other democratic actors aimed at exporting, supporting, promoting or assisting3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Other sources claim the Unites States has spent over $300 million supporting Serbia’s democratisation 
efforts (Finkel et al., 2008: 69).	  
3 Nancy Bermeo makes a distinction between ‘1) the export of democracy, meaning wholesale system 
transfer [almost impossible to achieve]; 2) democracy promotion, meaning the ideational project of 
framing democracy as the best form of government; and 3) democracy assistance, meaning support for 
the various interrelated institutions and behaviours, which emerging democracies are thought to require’ 
(2009: 243). This is a distinction, though, that is not often made; for all intents and purposes democracy 
promotion and democracy assistance are used as synonyms while export of democracy is rarely 
mentioned in the literature. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that there are different ways to 
promote democracy. 
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democracy – the level of success of democracy promotion strategies remains questionable. On 
the one hand, aid aimed at developing democracy in a specific country can be counterproductive 
if the host governments are not committed to reform (Carothers, 1997: 97). In some cases 
attempts to promote democracy in a country can be used by some autocratic strongmen to 
justify repressive practices under the rhetoric of protecting sovereignty; Russia under Putin 
being, according to Thomas Carothers (2006: 62), a good example. On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the effect of democracy assistance (as defined by Bermeo) strategies can have 
a clear impact on democratisation. According to the study carried out by Steven Finkel, Anibal 
Pérez-Liñán and Mitchell Seligson (with results published in 2006, 2007 and 2008), the 
investment of $1million is expected to increase the typical rate of democratisation by 0.026 per 
cent in the Freedom House index (2007: 424) in any given year. The same study claims that $10 
million invested in democracy promotion would normally raise the index in the Polity IV scale 
by just under half a point (0.05)(ibid). In short, the study claims that for every $10 million 
USAID invests specifically in democracy assistance, a country is predicted to improve their 
Freedom House democracy index by 0.25 points. Although this study does control the impact of 
other assistance related variables, I believe there are other interactions during 
internationalisation projects – as this thesis has demonstrated – that cannot be explained as 
simply being the by-product of democracy promotion strategies, and that cannot be explained 
by only looking at the dollars and cents spent on promoting democracy. As we have seen in the 
cases of Mexico and Spain, internationalisation can be an incentive to democratise at all levels. 
What is more, the changes in the interaction between a democratising country and the 
international community can have many repercussions for the democratisation process that 
cannot be accurately explained by ‘one-way’ models of democracy promotion.  
 
Although democracy promotion/assistance is ‘far from being a magic elixir’ (Carothers, 2006: 
63), when correctly carried out it may make a real difference. Yet, there may be other instances 
when democracy promotion may work a lot better within a framework of internationalisation 
projects. It certainly has to be acknowledged that the EU’s model of ‘democratisation by 
integration’ is unique in several ways. The EU’s model of democracy promotion (within Europe 
of course) is different because it affects a much broader set of areas of governance and 
institutions than any other strategy of democracy promotion or membership to any other IO, it 
holds a clear commitment to conditioning membership on democratic transformations and has a 
number of tools to ensure these conditions are met (yearly Progress Reports for candidate 
countries), and it explicitly promotes – since the mid 1990s – a very specific type of democracy 
(the way the EU’s definition of democracy goes beyond a minimalist understanding and 
includes social, economic, political and cultural rights) (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004: 94-97). 
Despite the many obvious particularities of the EU, however, there are lessons that can be 
learned from its unique model of democracy promotion. Although its true that the EU has 
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greater pull than any other IO in terms of the benefits membership entails, which allows the EU 
to set strict criteria for accession, the importance the Mexican regime gave to NAFTA probably 
put the project of North American integration on a similar footing. NAFTA probably meant 
more for Mexico than membership to any other IO has meant for any other democratising 
country outside of Europe. Understanding the limitations of NAFTA (mainly the lack of a 
strong institutional framework) as well as its similarities to the EU, however, can help us 
understand how some elements of the ‘democratisation by integration model’ can be applied 
elsewhere. Indeed, an important lesson. 
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